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

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

WISH AND WILL.

WISH AND WILL:

An Introduction to the

PSYCHOLOGY

OF

DESIRE AND VOLITION.

BY

GEORGE LYON TURNER, M.A.

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PREFACE.

THE following pages were printed, in the first instance, for use in the college class-room, and not with a view to publication. By many, however, whose judgment I valued, in whose hands I placed the proof-sheets, I was advised to seek for them a wider circle of readers by this further step. Had I from the first had the needs and the taste of the general reader in view, the form in which the matter is presented would, probably, have been somewhat different. But, to remould the whole would require leisure which I cannot now command ; and if only to some commencing the study of psychology, it prove a stimulus to healthy and earnest thought on the topics treated, and to any of those more advanced in mental science, it raise the old questions in a new form, and so prove the occasion of the old problems being thought out again from other points of view,—the publication of the volume will be amply justified to my own mind. The points to which I would specially ask attention, as

peculiar in their treatment, if not absolutely new, are the following:—The position I assign to Desire, as involving an essential contrast and distinction between "Wish and Will;" an essay at the psychological investigation of the functions, the range, and the methods of operation, of Volition (as the proper introduction to the great Controversy as to Liberty and Necessity), a thing never (to my knowledge) fairly attempted before; a careful investigation of the nature and province of Law, with a view to determining its relation to Volition; a somewhat detailed examination of the mutual relations of Volition and Character (including a special effort to grapple with the subtlest form of the argument of the Necessarians on that question); and a brief reference to the ontological significance of its phenomena.

CONTENTS.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY x

Desire.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE

ITS TRUE POSITION IN A CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA 1

CHAPTER II.

THE RELATION OF DESIRES TO THE OTHER THREE CLASSES 9

CHAPTER III.

CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES 19

CHAPTER IV.

MISCELLANEOUS 31

Volition.

CHAPTER I.

ITS ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS: 1. EVOCATIVE; 2. DIRECTIVE 38

CHAPTER II.

ITS ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS (*continued*): 3. SUSTENTATIVE; 4. INTENSIFYING 49

PAGE

CHAPTER III.

ITS RELATION TO THE OTHER FACULTIES: 1. COGNITION 57

CHAPTER IV.

ITS RELATION TO THE OTHER FACULTIES (*continued*): 1. COGNITION (*continued*); 2. FEELING . . . 74

CHAPTER V.

ITS RELATION TO THE OTHER FACULTIES (*continued*): 3. DESIRE 97

CHAPTER VI.

ITS RELATION TO LAW: 1. LAW 114

CHAPTER VII.

ITS RELATION TO LAW (*continued*): 2. INDIVIDUALITY . 136

CHAPTER VIII.

ITS RELATION TO LAW (*continued*): 3. RELATION OF INDIVIDUALITY TO LAW; 4. RELATION OF VOLITION TO INDIVIDUALITY 158

CHAPTER IX.

ITS RELATION TO LAW (*continued*): 5. CONSEQUENT RELATION OF VOLITION TO LAW 181

CHAPTER X.

ITS RELATION TO MOTIVE 202

CHAPTER XI.

ITS RELATION TO CHARACTER 214

CHAPTER XII.

THE GREAT CONTROVERSIAL PHRASES: 1. THE WILL; 2. FREEDOM AND NECESSITY OF THE WILL . . 232

PAGE

CHAPTER XIII.

THE GREAT CONTROVERSIAL PHRASES *(continued)*: 2. FREEDOM AND NECESSITY OF THE WILL *(continued)*; 3. SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE WILL 246

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS PHENOMENA . 266

APPENDICES.

I.

VOLITION AND MIRACLE 287

II.

WILL, DIVINE AND HUMAN 311

NOTES.

NOTE A 337
NOTE B 339
NOTE C 341
NOTE D 343
NOTE E 347
NOTE F 350

ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

SUBJECTS 353

AUTHORS 355

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY.

Desire.

CHAP. I.—ITS TRUE POSITION.

		PAGE
§ 1.	Position hitherto assigned to it	1
§ 2.	Reasons for this	3
§ 3.	Not satisfactory	4
§ 4.	Radical distinctness involved in the position of previous philosophers	4
§ 5.	Points of distinction indicated in detail	6

CHAP. II.—ITS RELATION TO THE OTHER CLASSES OF PHENOMENA.

§ 6.	Never immediately follows Cognition	9
§ 7.	Natural antecedent of Volition	10
§ 8.	Is the natural order invariably followed?	10
§ 9.	(*a*) Is Feeling invariably followed by Desire?	11
§ 10.	(*b*) Does Volition ever immediately follow Feeling?	12
§ 11.	Bain's answer—Objections	13
§ 12.	Negative answer established	15
§ 13.	Sources of Desire: ideal and real	17
§ 14.	Result of preponderance of one or other on Character	17

CHAP. III.—CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES.

§ 15.	(1) Subjective: Desires and Aversions	19
§ 16.	Relation of each to the other	21
§ 17.	(2) Objective: general plan	22
§ 18.	I. Corporeal or Physical	23
§ 19.	II. Intellectual-Corporeal, or Æsthetic	28
§ 20.	III. Purely Intellectual	29
§ 21.	IV. Moral or Ethical	30
§ 22.	V. Religious	31

CHAP. IV.—MISCELLANEOUS.

PAGE

§ 23. I. Mutual Relation of Desires—
1. May different Desires co-exist? 31
§ 24. 2. What is their ultimate fate? 32
§ 25. Bain's treatment of the problem—analysed . 33
§ 26. II. The Kinship of Feeling and Desire 34
§ 27. III. The Kinship of Desire and Volition—'Wish and Will'. 34
§ 28. Cases in which 'Wish' may be taken for 'Will' . 35
§ 29. Practical confirmation and deduction 37

Volition.

CHAP. I.—ITS ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS.

§ 30. A. General—Control of power 38
§ 31. B. Special—Fourfold classification 39
§ 32. 1. *Evocative.* (*a*) Many actions have purely physical origin 40
§ 33. (*b*) Even *Mental* Phenomena often thus produced. 41
§ 34. (*c*) But most the direct result of voluntary evocation 42
§ 35. Need for it explained in general terms 43
§ 36. Essence of mental existence, only potentiality for activity 44
§ 37. 2. *Directive.* Needed for *Decision* 45
§ 38. And for Diversion of activity 47
§ 39. Importance of this faculty: its bearings hinted . 48

CHAP. II.—ITS ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS (*continued*).

§ 40. 3. *Sustentative.* (*a*) Energies flag 49
§ 41. (*b*) A Law: 'force tends to dissipate itself in activity' 49
§ 42. (*c*) Mental Inertia 50
§ 43. Problem put—What is its *modus operandi?* . . . 51
§ 44. (*a*) Is it by a number of successive acts of Volition? 52
§ 45. (*b*) Is it by a continuous stream of Volitional energy? 53
§ 46. Sustentation, at first voluntary, may become automatic 55
§ 47. 4. *Intensifying.* Conditions of its exercise 55

PAGE

§ 48. Character of the process 56
§ 49. Explanation impossible 56

CHAP. III.—ITS RELATION TO THE OTHER FACULTIES.

§ 50. This relation varies 57
§ 51. Yet in one point, the same with all 58
§ 52. General principle: of *active* powers Volitional control *immediate*; of *passive*, only *mediate* . . . 58
§ 53. Application to the three classes of Mental Phenomena . 59
§ 54. Its Relation to Muscular Movement: why touched only incidentally 60
§ 55. Bain's position—*per contra* 60
§ 56. Objections 61
§ 57. What muscles voluntary, and what involuntary . . 62
§ 58. Which most important, psychologically . . . 62
§ 59. Its Relation to the Mental Faculties—
I. COGNITION.—Some processes voluntary, some involuntary 63
§ 60. To be looked at more in detail 64
§ 61. 1. *Acquisitive.* A. Perception—Twofold conditions . 64
§ 62. (1) Situation or pose of the organ 65
§ 63. Succinct description of the organs . . . 66
§ 64. Relative completeness of voluntary control in each 66
§ 65. When most complete, however, not absolute . 67
§ 66. (2) State of Interpreting mind: Attention . . 68
§ 67. Only a certain *quantum* at command . . 68
§ 68. Consequence of this, with reference to 'concentration' 69
§ 69. B. *Reflection* or *Introspection*—essentially Volitional . 72

CHAP. IV.—ITS RELATION TO THE OTHER FACULTIES (*continued*).

§ 70. Memory.—2. *Conservative*—essentially involuntary . 74
§ 71. The only question is as to duration of impressions . 76
§ 72. Even here Volition acts indirectly 77
§ 73. 3. *Reproductive.* Partly within, and partly beyond, control 77
§ 74. (*a*) Suggestion; involuntary; Laws of Association . 77
§ 75. (*b*). Connected trains of thought, semi-volitional . 79

PAGE

§ 76. (*c*) Reminiscence proper—distinctly voluntary . . 79
§ 77. Importance of this faculty 80
§ 78. Its various degrees 80
§ 79. Its mode of operation : only in part, though distinctly voluntary 80
§ 80. 4. *Imagination.* Subordinate—only casually voluntary 81
§ 81. More fully analysed 82
§ 82. 5. *Elaborative.* Its essential nature 82
§ 83. Essentially voluntary ; though partly involuntary . 83
§ 84. 6. *Regulative.* Explanation of its nature . . . 85
§ 85. Quite beyond the control of Volition . . . 86
§ 86. II. FEELING. Problem stated in outline . . . 87
§ 87. 1. No *direct* control, either to produce or to remove—
§ (1) Sensations 88
§ 88. Seeming contradiction in biological phenomena . 89
§ 89. Removed on explanation : ordinary, and Dr. Carpenter's 90
§ 90. (2) Emotions 91
§ 91. 2. Yet *indirect* control real, and far-reaching . . 93
§ 92. Proved in case of (*a*) Sensations 94
§ 93. With (*b*) Emotions, three methods possible . . 95
§ 94. Bain's view too narrow, and unsatisfactory . . 96

CHAP. V.—ITS RELATION TO THE OTHER FACULTIES (*continued*).

§ 95. III. DESIRE. Clue to the perplexing nature of the problem 97
§ 96. Control, probably, real, though limited and indirect . 99
§ 97. Akin to that of 'Taste' and 'tastes' 99
§ 98. (*a*) Is there any accounting for tastes? are they innate? 101
§ 99. Have they not a purely physical origin? . . 104
§ 100. This would involve absence of responsibility . 105
§ 101. (*b*) Is a man accountable for his tastes? issues involved 106
§ 102. Appeal to the authority of Christ.—Defended . 107
§ 103. His 'dictum' on the 'lustful look' 108
§ 104. Its significance : guarded from exaggeration . 108
§ 105. Volitional Control of Desire—how effected? . . 110

PAGE

§ 106. (*a*) Not direct 110
§ 107. (*b*) By the tardy process of adoption of course of action 111
§ 108. Explained by principle of human nature . . 112
§ 109. Application of principle to case in point . . . 113

CHAP. VI.—ITS RELATION TO LAW.

§ 110. Introduction and plan 115
§ 111. I. *Law.* Always expressible in a proposition . . 117
§ 112. Consequences of this A. Negative 118
§ 113. B. Positive 119
§ 114. Conception of Law varies, as view is Theistic or non-Theistic 121
§ 115. I. *Theistic.* General description 122
§ 116. Its realm twofold : intelligent and unintelligent . 122
§ 117. Resulting difference in 1. Form 123
§ 118. 2. Response 124
§ 119. 3. Purport and Power . . 125
§ 120. Form of Moral Law, varies with stage of moral development 127
§ 121. II. *Naturalistic.* Summary description . . . 129
§ 122. Mill's exposition summarised 131
§ 123. Its essence : merely chronological order of occurrence 132
§ 124. Difference between this and the Theistic conception of Law 133
§ 125. Difference in results makes Science of Human Action impossible 134
§ 126. Except under very limited conditions 135

CHAP. VII.—ITS RELATION TO LAW (*continued*).

§ 127. 2. *Individuality.* From general to the special . . 136
§ 128. Yet Science of Individuality and Doctrine of Personality possible 137
§ 129. In Man, there is Individuality 138
§ 130. Of two kinds : Objective and Subjective . . . 138
§ 131. (1) Objective : in lower creation as well . . . 139
§ 132. Varies in complexity with position in scale . 140
§ 133. In mineral kingdom—simplest 140
§ 134. In organic nature—'life' 142

PAGE

§ 135. In vegetable kingdom—more complex . . 143
§ 136. In animal kingdom—very intricate . . . 144
§ 137. In man—most complex of all 145
§ 138. (2) Subjective: marked change of stand-point. . 147
§ 139. Involves 'inner loneliness,' and conscious separateness 148
§ 140. Revealed in (1) The Phenomena of Feeling . . 150
§ 141. (2) The Sense of Responsibility . . 153
§ 142. Responsibility involves authorship. . . . 154
§ 143. Authorship involves free alternativity . . . 155
§ 144. Alternativity involves original, central causation . 156
§ 145. All this realised most vividly in the sense of 'sin' 157

CHAP. VIII.—ITS RELATION TO LAW (*continued*).

§ 146. 3. *Relation of Individuality to Law.* Problem stated 158
§ 147. (1) Objective: the product of its operation . . 159
§ 148. Practically the position of Solly . . . 161
§ 149. (2) Subjective: incompatible with the sole Reign of Law 162
§ 150. Its absolute dominion would make Noumenal Subjective Individuality impossible . 162
§ 151. In much modern philosophy, the 'objective' alone taken account of . . . 163
§ 152. The cases of Mill, H. Spencer, and Bain . 165
§ 153. In all these, Individuality unfairly dealt with 166
§ 154. 4. *Relation of Volition to Individuality.*
(1) With Objective, very close 168
§ 155. (2) With Subjective, closer still: in a twofold way 169
§ 156. Voluntariness, the condition of causation or authorship 170
§ 157. In anything done against or apart from Will, no responsibility. (*a*) Outside the limits of the nature 172
§ 158. (*b*) All organic and automatic processes . . 172
§ 159. (*c*) All activities, strictly speaking, involuntary: *α*. Mental processes produced physically . 173
§ 160. *β*. Those produced by forces external to the body 177
§ 161. By some, Volition actually identified with Personality 179

PAGE

CHAP. IX.—ITS RELATION TO LAW (*continued*).

§ 162. 5. *Consequent Relation of Volition to Law.*
I. The case put most broadly. In *essence*, its contradictory 181
§ 163. Twofold classification of Mental Phenomena, resulting 182
§ 164. Pernicious tendency to resolve the one into the other 182
§ 165. The distinction applicable to the four great classes 183
§ 166. How far *Intelligence* compatible with a Machine 184
§ 167. With *Volition*, this incompatibility absolute . 186
§ 168. Only two cases of calculability of Volitional development 187
§ 169. To what degree the other three classes are calculable 188
§ 170. Whedon's distinction of Causes, into alternative and inalternative 189
§ 171. Truth in it: and objections to it 190
§ 172. Investigation of nature of cause has been partial 191
§ 173. II. In *conditions of exercise* of Volition Law enters. Stated broadly 192
§ 174. (1) Physical vigour the absolute condition of Volitional control 193
§ 175. (*a*) Most complete, when physical system firm and healthy 194
§ 176. (*b*) Weakened, as weariness verges on exhaustion 194
§ 177. (*c*) Lost in sleep or faintness 195
§ 178. (2) Volitional control weakened by protraction and intensity 196
§ 179. Varies with nerve-power 197
§ 180. (3) With involuntary actions, no sense of exhaustion 198
§ 181. This position substantially confirmed by Dr. Carpenter 199
§ 182. Further: by Volitional impotence of habitual drunkards 199
§ 183. (4) Secondarily automatic actions less tiring than purely voluntary ones 201
§ 184. III. What is the cause of inherent differences of Volitional energy? 201

PAGE

CHAP. X.—ITS RELATION TO MOTIVES.

§ 185. Problem made more difficult by ambiguity of terms 202
§ 186. Etymology of word 'motive' 203
§ 187. Double meaning of verb 'move' 204
§ 188. So in 'motive:' power of 'moral suasion' or 'true cause' 205
§ 189. The position maintained that 'motives' are a 'true cause' 206
§ 190. Argument by which this position is maintained . . 207
§ 191. Conceded that motives are almost invariably antecedent 207
§ 192. Still not 'causes;' only 'conditions' 209
§ 193. Fowle's position—that 'self' is the master-motive . 212
§ 194. His use of 'self' ambiguous 213
§ 195. Consequent confusion of 'motive' with 'motor' . 213

CHAP. XI.—ITS RELATION TO CHARACTER.

§ 196. I. What is the influence of Character on the decisions of the Will? Close relation of 'motive' to Character 214
§ 197. Position—that 'motives in relation to character' are true causes 215
§ 198. Destroys the 'strongest motive' argument . . 216
§ 199. Still contended that decisions of Will are infallible indications of character 217
§ 200. This contradicted by 'inconsistencies' 219
§ 201. Though abnormal, quite 'in point,' because strictly voluntary 219
§ 202. *Ergo:* Volitions not within the realm of Law . 221
§ 203. II. What is the influence of decisions of Will on Character? 222
§ 204. In formation of character, 'externals' very influential 222
§ 205. But not everything: else the result of Inalternative Law 223
§ 206. So Mill: arguing that a true Necessitarian is not a Fatalist 224
§ 207. The relief offered not real; 'agency' not primary 225
§ 208. 'Desire' is put for 'the man;' all formed *for* us 226

PAGE

§ 209. So the 'relief' vanishes, and Fatalism returns . 227
§ 210. In each man, a power 'central and effectual' of moulding character 228
§ 211. Every true decision of Will has effectual influence 229
§ 212. Through increasing facility gained with each decision 230
§ 213. Importance of recognition of this in Education . 231

CHAP. XII.—THE GREAT CONTROVERSIAL PHRASES.

§ 214. Enumerated 232
§ 215. 1. *The Will.* Natural influence of substantive form 233
§ 216. The danger adverted to by Hamilton, etc. . . 234
§ 217. Rhetorical metaphor at bottom of American classification 235
§ 218. Must be realised distinctly 235
§ 219. The truth—distinctly stated *negatively* . . 236
§ 220. Consequent danger in any 'definition' . . 238
§ 221. Summary statement of truth in *positive* form . 239
§ 222. 2. *The Freedom and Necessity of the Will.* In strictness unmeaning 240
§ 223. Such the position of Hobbes, Locke, Bain . . 240
§ 224. Still must be examined, as covering truth and error. Point at issue: Relation of a Volition to its antecedents and consequents . . 241
§ 225. (*a*) The Freedomist is prepared to 'transcend' phenomena 243
§ 226. Becomes Ontognostic: and passes the Realm of Law 243
§ 227. (*b*) The Necessitarian restricts himself to phenomena 244
§ 228. (1) Some consider only the consequents of a Volition 244

CHAP. XIII.—THE GREAT CONTROVERSIAL PHRASES (*continued*).

§ 229. (2) Others investigate its antecedents . . . 246
§ 230. Recognise the phenomenal alone: as Mill . 246
§ 231. Though this should have excluded it from his investigation 247
§ 232. Yet applies purely physical methods to the problem 248

PAGE

§ 233. Admitted as valid, too, by M'Cosh . . 249
§ 234. Twofold result of this view 249
§ 235. So maintained that 'motives' are causes; and Volition necessitated 250
§ 236. Still: impossible to accept the position . . 251
§ 237. Truth, roughly expressed in ordinary phraseology 252
§ 238. Accurately, in the sentence—"I am free in willing" 253
§ 239. 'Freedom' defined by Bain 254
§ 240. Criticism of definition 254
§ 241. Application of the illustrations . . . 256
§ 242. Application of the abstract statements . 257
§ 243. Hobbes's definition—examined 258
§ 244. Positive position re-affirmed: alternativity essential to Volition 259
§ 245. Kant's argument tantamount to this . . . 260
§ 246. 3. *The Self-Determining Power of the Will.* Strictly, absurd 261
§ 247. Edwards's argument against the Arminians: pure logomachy 261
§ 248. Based on unfair literalism: exposed . . . 262
§ 249. Its clear meaning: that 'self' determines; not any other agency 263
§ 250. Same appears in the word 'choice' 264
§ 251. 'Other courses of action ideally possible'—not enough 264

CHAP. XIV.—ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS PHENOMENA.

§ 252. Reasons for drawing special attention to it . . . 266
§ 253. The crucial question of philosophy—What is man? . 268
§ 254. 1. Materialists answer—wholly material . . . 268
§ 255. 2. Idealists—wholly 'spirit' 269
§ 256. 3. Positivists—nothing but phenomena . . . 269
§ 257. 4. Semi-materialists—ontologically material, but with phenomenal experiences truly spiritual . . 270
§ 258. As put by Clifford 271
§ 259. Bain's approach to Absolute Identity, not consistently wrought out 272
§ 260. No attempt at detailed refutation 274

PAGE

§ 261. Ontological reality of 'self' revealed in self-consciousness, as well 274
§ 262. Plain significance of 'personal pronouns,' as Mivart . . 275
§ 263. Reality of 'Ego' proved in 'control of its faculties,' and 'true causation of its actions' 278
§ 264. This 'power of control' essentially Volitional . . . 278
§ 265. More clearly so with 'Causation'—
1. The idea of 'cause' gained only in voluntary processes 279
§ 266. Otherwise only a ghostly and imperfect one . . . 281
§ 267. 2. In voluntary action, 'Ego' revealed as 'true cause' 282
§ 268. Position of opponents, and its logical issues . . 283
§ 269. Review and summary 285

APPENDIX I.—VOLITION AND MIRACLE.

§ 270. Nature and origin of modern opposition to miracle . 287
§ 271. Does Scripture make the claims, which are attacked? 288
§ 272. Review of the actual phraseology of Scripture . . 289
§ 273. Character of miracles as thus described by Scripture itself 290
§ 274. No reference whatever to 'reign of Law' 291
§ 275. I. Essential characteristics of Volition, naturally appear in Miracle 292
§ 276. II. But what of their relation to Law? Incredibility passed by 293
§ 277. 1. On Positivist principles, impossible, as *real* irregularity 293
§ 278. In human Volition, however, a constantly recurring fact 294
§ 279. On purely human hypothesis, therefore possible . 295
§ 280. The 'marvellous' purely relative, in twofold way . . 297
§ 281. (*a*) To the proud, 'marvels' will diminish, and disappear 297
§ 282. Scripture miracles only product of extraordinary knowledge and skill . . . 298
§ 283. This explanation rejected, as involving 'imposture' 299
§ 284. (*b*) To the lowlier: 'marvels' multiply on every hand. 299

PAGE

§ 285. 2. On Theistic principles. (*a*) 'Undignified:' answered 300
§ 286. And 'dangerous.' "Unseen Universe" . . 302
§ 287. Unworthy and weak: 'the ordinary' still 'the rule' 302
§ 288. Only thus, too, could Personality be revealed . 304
§ 289. (*b*) 'Inconsistent:' 'Suspension of Law:' answered 305
§ 290. Or, at least, 'Interference with and dislocation of Law' 306
§ 291. Granted, that Miracle involves the introduction of 'new' element 306
§ 292. This 'intrusion' not 'interference,' only 'freedom,' as in 'human volition' 307
§ 293. So quite possible with God; even without, much more with, employment of additional energy . 309

APPENDIX II.—WILL, DIVINE AND HUMAN.

§ 294. Difficulty as to Foreknowledge only glanced at . . 311
§ 295. Two ways of meeting it—
(1) Knowledge the effect, not the cause . . . 312
§ 296. (2) Modes of God's foreknowledge not the same as ours.
As to present and past; certainty does not involve inalternativity 312
§ 297. Of *future*, with man, knowledge possible only where all is inalternative, and therefore calculable . . 314
§ 298. With God, foreknowledge is not calculation, but intuition 315
§ 299. The great difficulty is in Fore-willing—
(1) *Providence:* all predetermined, Will not determined 316
§ 300. (2) *Sovereignty:* God's will supreme, yet broken . 317
§ 301. (3) Fore-ordination must be of everything, bad and good 318
§ 302. In face of these logical contradictions, we give up the 'Law of Thought,' and say that both contradictories are true 320
§ 303. Still there are alleviations, or partial explanations . 320
§ 304. I. Free Will the condition of a moral nature; and so, of worthy service: else all would be mechanical 321

PAGE

§ 305. II. The difference is real between permitting and ordaining, though Will is in operation in the one as in the other 325

§ 306. III. The power of 'great' men over their fellows does not interfere with their individual freedom . 328

§ 307. IV. A parallel between games of skill, and the realities of human life 329

§ 308. The suggestion that 'sin' was needed as occasion of Redemption—no relief 332

§ 309. Nor that the 'Fall was a Development' 334

§ 310. Conclusion 335

ERRATA.

Page 98, footnote, for 'pp. 10–13' read pp. 6–9.'
" 108, footnote, for 'p. 31' read 'p. 27.'

DESIRE.

CHAPTER I.—ITS TRUE POSITION IN A CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA.

§ 1. IT is of the utmost moment to assign to the phenomena of *Desire* their true position amongst the other phenomena of the human mind. That this is a matter of some difficulty is evident from the great divergence of opinion upon the subject. It seems, however, never to have had a fair and full consideration. For I think our subsequent examination will show that haste and comparative carelessness, much more than any inherent mystery or ambiguity in the nature of the phenomena themselves, must have been the real cause of such strange difference of view. As a matter of fact, I suppose it will be admitted that *Cognition* at the one end of the series and *Volition* at the other have received far greater attention than the other two. Of these, moreover, *Feeling*, perhaps naturally, has been investigated with greater care and patience than Desire. And so it has come to pass that Desire—though, spite the comparative inattention of philosophers, it has obtruded itself upon their attention as possessing marked peculiarities—has been hurriedly confounded with one or other of its neighbours By some it has been classed with *Feeling;* while by others with *Volition.* The former view seems to find most favour in America, and the latter in Britain.

(1) Of American thought upon the subject, we may take Whedon as an enlightened exponent; and he says: "We assume as correct the ordinary generic classification of the operations of the human mind into Intellections, Sensibilities, and Volition;" while he defines "the *Sensibility*," as "the capacity of the mind of experiencing 'the feelings'—namely, the *emotions* by which the mind is excited, or the *desires* by which it becomes appetent of objects."[1]

(2) Of the British position Sir W. Hamilton and Bain are modern champions.

(*a*) It is interesting to notice, however, that President Edwards, though an American, held this same view. Was it that he lived before the great disruption between his nation and our own, and so at a time when the Americans had not worked their way to a distinctive stand-point of their own? However that might have been, the fact was, as Whedon expresses it, "Edwards and the older Necessitarians held Volition to be the same as Desire, or at least to be included generically under it."[2]

(*b*) Sir W. Hamilton has a threefold division (like Whedon), but it is in his third, not in his second, that Desire is included. He gives it the name of *Conation*, covering by the term what he feels compelled to call "the complex phenomenon of Will and Desire."[3]

(*c*) Bain, again, goes farther than either. In the fourfold division of his great work on Mental Science—Sensations, Intellect, Emotions, and Will—Desires have no separate place. The fact is that he merges them in the last; viewing the state of Desire as rather excep-

[1] Whedon, "The Freedom of the Will," p. 13. 1864.
[2] Ibid. p.15. [3] "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 184.

tional than normal; and, where it does appear, as being in reality only a modified Volition.

No philosopher that I am aware of has put them in a class by themselves; though I conceive that there is ample reason for this course. They have always been treated as perhaps a *little more than Feeling*, or a *little less than Will;* as either a *precocious emotion*, or a *dwarfed Volition.*

§ 2. The reason of it, doubtless, is to be found in the hybrid character, or complex nature, of the phenomena themselves. There are confessedly points, obtrusive in their nature, in which, at a hasty glance, Desires present most striking resemblances to Feeling on the one hand, and Volition on the other.

(1) Desire is most intensely *subjective* in its character; and we know that *subjectivity* is the special and distinctive characteristic of *Feeling.* In all the phenomena of Feeling there is pure *passivity*, entirely inactive "affection." This peculiarity is undoubtedly shared by Desire. It may take a slightly more objective form; it may be brought forth and compared with the desire of another, and so be described with greater accuracy than Feeling; but it is always as essentially personal, or subjective, as a sensation or an emotion. It is almost as much merely experienced—not exercised, or put forth—as either one or the other. Dwelling, then, only on this largely predominating element of subjectivity, we need not be surprised that it has been classed with Feelings under the common head of Sensibility.

(2) On the other hand, it is true, there is as much, if not more, that, at first glance, makes it akin with *Volition.* In both there is a *nisus* or *tendency* from the subject to the object: in the case of Desire, incomplete,

and merely "appetent;" while, in Volition, complete and decisive. In Desire there is the effort which becomes Volition when it takes actual effect. In Sir W. Hamilton's own language,[1] "What is common to both Will and Desire" is "the tendency towards the realisation of their end." "By Will is meant a free and deliberate, by Desire a blind and fatal, tendency to act." Or, in more precise language, every Desire has for its distant unattained aim, precisely what is the direct and actual work of every Volition; in some form or other, the appropriation of the object by the subject, the impression of the subject on the object, the modification of the object by the subject; or, in one phrase, the *subjectification* of the *object*. So that just as the essential mark of Cognition is *objectification*, and that of Feeling is *Subjectivity*, so the common note of both Desire and Will is *subjectification*.

§ 3. But, while all this is granted, justifying on superficial grounds the merging of Desire with either Feeling or Will, a more careful examination of the phenomena themselves will convince us that there is as much reason to erect them into a separate class, as there is in the case of either Cognitions or Volitions.

§ 4. For the reality of their distinctness, from both Feeling and Volition, we may rest content with the evidence of those who have adopted a threefold classification. So clearly have those, who have classed Desire with Feeling, emphasized its difference from Volition; and so distinctly have those who have grouped it with Volition indicated its difference from Feeling.

(*a*) In defending his own plan of classing Desire

[1] "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. lecture ii. p. 185.

with Feeling, Whedon maintains most stoutly the distinction between Desire and Volition. "Desire," he writes, "be it ever so intense, never becomes Volition, but by a distinct *movement* known to consciousness, and no action can follow except Volition arises. Desire is uneasy and stimulant; Will is decisive, and brings all the mind to acquiescence."[1] And he follows up this statement by an enumeration of eight distinct points, in which most clearly he shows that Will may be distinguished from Desire.

But, long before Whedon drew this distinction, our own Locke, with his strong common sense, had pointed out the difference between Desire and Will in language which is pithy if it be somewhat quaint. "The Will is perfectly distinguished from Desire, which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our wills set us upon."

(*b*) No less decidedly does Sir W. Hamilton, while classing Desire with Volition, sever both from Feeling. "The feelings of Pleasure and Pain and the Conations are, thus," he writes, "though so frequently confounded by psychologists, easily distinguished. . . . . Pain and pleasure, as feelings, belong exclusively to the present; whereas Conation has reference only to the future, for Conation is a longing,—a striving, either to maintain the continuance of the present state, or to exchange it for another. Thus, Conation is not the feeling of Pleasure and Pain, but the power of overt activity, which Pain and Pleasure set in motion."[2]

There are then, clearly, points as numerous and as important, (nay, we think more vital,) in which Desires

[1] "The Freedom of the Will," p. 16.

[2] "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii. p. 433. Edition 1861.

differ from both Feelings and Volitions; as those in which they are akin.

§ 5. Let us try to put them before us as distinctly and as fully as we can.

I. Desire, though like Feeling it is subjective, is *not wholly subjective;* though like Volition it is a tendency, it is *not actually effectuating.* It differs from Feeling in that it *involves* an *object*, it differs from both Feeling and Volition in that while the one is a mere *affection*, and the other *actually effectuates*, it is only a *longing for effectuation.*

1. In Feeling all that is directly revealed is some conscious condition of the Ego. It concerns the Ego alone. As far as its immediate testimony is concerned, all that is necessarily involved is the existence of the conscious subject that experiences the feeling. Though for a full explanation of the *raison d'être* of any particular feeling it may be necessary to recognise the existence of a non-ego as the cause of this particular effect, any such conclusion is reached by indirect reasoning; it is not the immediate datum of consciousness in the feeling as such. But in every Desire, an *object—i.e.*, something logically external to the conscious subject—is involved, is a necessary element in its very existence. A Desire must be a desire for something, something beyond 'self,' as yet unpossessed. So that, quite as clearly and precisely as in the case of perception and self-consciousness, a 'logical object' is involved in every form of desire. In face of this difference, so central, and so vital, it must be unphilosophical, even with the sanction of so acute a reasoner as Whedon, to class Desire with Feeling.

2. But there is a second point in which the difference between Desire and Volition comes out *pari passu* with a difference from Feeling as radical and even more sugges-

tive than that just named. Feeling is a mere 'affection.' It is merely the consciousness of being affected in a certain way. Volition actually 'effectuates.' Its special province is to decide, and to do. The region of its specific function is energy and action. Desire on the other hand simply longs for a change. It is born of discontent. It springs out of dissatisfaction. It cannot rest in things as they are. It consists in an aspiration after making them different from what they are. For, contradiction as it may seem, the desire that things should remain *in statu quo*, when analysed, is an illustration of this very principle. "To remain" is different from "to be." All that Feeling concerns is the actual state of things at the present moment; but Desire ever reaches beyond the present moment into the future. Its object is always the non-actual; not always even the actually possible. It is the hankering after fancies, the wish to make them facts. Even in this extreme case, it is unwilling that the 'status' should be only momentary; it longs for its prolongation into permanence. So that in this wish for change it is again shown to be essentially distinct from Feeling. But quite as clearly is it distinguished from Volition; inasmuch as, while Will actually effectuates, Desire merely *longs for effectuation* somehow and somewhere, leaving ways and means untouched, and unthought of. Will carries out what Desire merely solicits. What in Will is actual, completed, decisive, in Desire is inchoate, incomplete, and in suspense.

So much for the objective points in which the difference between Desire and both Feeling and Volition becomes apparent.

II. But what is of more paramount importance remains to be mentioned, viz.: the characteristic attitude

assumed by the spirit in Desire. It constitutes the first, and, to my mind, the one sufficient reason adduced by Whedon for distinguishing it from Volition. He says, "Volition is consciously distinct *in nature* from even the culminating desire." And what he says of it in reference to Volition may be said too of it in reference to Feeling. The pose or attitude of the spirit is essentially distinct. To use metaphors which from their very boldness cannot mislead, we may depict the matter thus.

In Feeling the Ego is comparatively speaking motionless and still: either in a subdued ecstacy of joy, or in the benumbed agony of some terrible pain. If there be movement at all, it is merely an outward expression of the inward feeling; a tumultuous agitation of the limbs in the excitement of pleasure, or a trembling of the knees, or a wringing of the hands in the despondency of fear or grief. In Volition, the attitude is one of decision —all suspense is put to an end. The hands are set to vigorous work, the feet tread swiftly the path of duty. There is the putting forth of power, the exertion of central force, the prompt movement of self-energy. The word of command is given to forces which await the signal. All is bustling activity. But in Desire, the attitude betokens neither pure activity nor mere passivity. It seems to stand halfway between the two. There is no actual movement. But the attitude speaks of readiness and eagerness for both movement and action. The whole frame tends forwards and upwards. The feet are parted; one retreating, while the other is advanced. The arms are outstretched; the hands open; the fingers parted ready either to clasp a gift or to wield a weapon. The face is eager, and the eyes are strained in their earnest gaze. It is clearly a moment of preparation,

preface either to effort or relapse. Thus distinct is the pose of the spirit in the phenomena of Desire as compared with both those of Feeling and Volition.

III. Further; its midway character appears in its *genesis* too, as truly as in its *attitude.* It is daughter to Feeling, and mother to Volition: but the daughter does not lose her individuality. She is merged neither in her parent nor her offspring. The 'parvus Phœnix,' Desire—though it rises out of the ashes of its parent, Feeling—though it be Feeling developed into wish and longing—is still distinct from that which gave it birth. And though, again, Volition is the consummation of Desire, still the blossom is distinct from the fruit, around which it dies away. Desire may be the necessary antecedent of Volition, but the chrysalis is distinct from the butterfly, which leaves behind the grey shell of the pupa the moment it mounts aloft on its gaily-painted wings.

So much for the position of Desire in a classification of the phenomena of the mind. It must be ranged side by side with Cognition, Feeling, and Volition as one of the four great Classes into which Mental Phenomena must be divided.

CHAPTER II.—THE RELATION OF DESIRES TO THE OTHER THREE CLASSES.

§ 6. All thinkers are agreed that *no desire ever follows immediately* on *Cognition.* Cognition is its necessary antecedent. The *objective* element in Desire involves this very thing. We can desire nothing of which we have no knowledge. The object of Desire must there-

fore have been previously an object of Cognition. There must, however, always be the intermediate link of *Feeling*. To take an instance; in reference to the pulsation of the heart—while that is normal, I am not made pointedly aware of it. Though an object of Cognition, it is not accompanied with any special sensation. When, however, it becomes abnormal in its action; either irregular and slow, sometimes stopping for an instant, or exceedingly rapid, it is accompanied by distressing and painful sensations. In both circumstances, there is Cognition. I know, as a matter of fact, that it is beating; but, in the one, there is no special feeling associated with Cognition, while in the latter case the feeling is intense and painful. Just for this reason, in the first instance, I have no *desire* about the matter, *i.e.*, no desire arising out of the simple cognition of the fact; in the latter, the desire is very strong for the cessation of the unnatural condition: in other words, there is a strong desire for relief from the pain. *Desire clearly is the child of Feeling.*

§ 7. As clearly *Desire* is the *natural antecedent* to *Volition*. For, in the cases which naturally occur to the mind, Volition is evidently only the maturing of a Desire known; *Will* is but the carrying out of a *wish*. The natural order then of the four classes of phenomena is that in which they have been enumerated—Cognitions, Feelings, Desires, and Volitions; Desire being the child of Feeling, and the parent of Volition.

§ 8. The question, however, arises;—Is that order *invariably* followed? Are there never any gaps in the succession? Does not sometimes one or other of them drop out, and the transition become immediate between those ordinarily linked together by a third? More pointedly two problems need solution.

(*a*) Does Feeling invariably give birth to a Desire? And (*b*) does Volition ever immediately follow on Feeling without the intervention of a Desire?

§ 9. (*a*) The answer to the first must be negative. There are three cases at least, in which Feeling does not give birth to a Desire.

In the strange, hueless feeling of 'blank astonishment' or 'bewilderment,' the whole nature is abruptly brought to a standstill, and no Desire is born of the emotion.

What again is the meaning of that state of heart expressed by the phrase 'don't-carishness'? What but that from such an emotional condition no Desire arises? The feelings are so lightly stirred, that we say—"we have no wish any way." This is the mood so aptly described by the phrase, *laissez-faire.* Its characteristic is the dearth and death of all Desire.

A case distinct from either. There are many circumstances in which the emotional conditions—though very real, and even intense—are so equally balanced, that no definite desire arises in one direction rather than another.

The question, then, naturally arises—What are the general conditions of such a state of things as we have found in the three cases just enumerated? They are twofold. First, when a state of feeling is *neither* pleasurable nor painful. This is the explanation of *blank astonishment* and *indifference.* And, secondly, when the elements of a pleasurable and painful character are about *equally balanced.* This is only a re-statement of the third.

From this negative position by way of a corollary we get a positive one. Seeing what are the conditions

in which no distinct desire follows on feeling, we gain an idea of the condition on which it will. Clearly the feeling must be *one that creates a want*, and as clearly, only that state of feeling will do so which is either *decidedly pleasurable* or *decidedly painful.* If the *pleasure* be intense up to a certain point, there is the desire for its continuance; while if it be moderate, there is a desire for its indefinite prolongation, or for an intensification of the pleasure already experienced. In the case of a *pain*, the only instance in which it is possible to desire its continuance is that in which the pleasure attendant on the "*vent of the emotion*"[1] is greater than the pain in the emotion itself. In all other cases it is but a truism to say that the desire is strong for its removal.

§ 10. (*b*) There is the further question. Does *Volition* ever follow *immediately* on *Feeling without the intervention of Desire?* It is necessary at the outset to distinguish this question from one that may very easily be confounded with it, viz., does *action* ever immediately follow on *Feeling*,—action, involving muscular movement? It is hastily taken for granted that this involves the other; action including Volition, as the greater includes the less.

But there are many cases of action with which Volition has nothing to do; and we may freely concede that many muscular movements do follow immediately upon sensation. Indeed some actions of this kind have had given to them by Carpenter and others, a special name. They are *automatic* in their character. But automatic actions are of two kinds.

In the first, an external stimulus gives rise at once

[1] See Bain's Classification of the Emotions, in "Emotions and Will," pp. 57 and 58, and especially pp. 63–65. Edition 1859.

to a corresponding movement, but without producing any sensation. These are *purely reflex* movements. The nervous stimulus is conveyed by an afferent nerve to a ganglionic centre, and from this, the nervous impulse issuing in movement is conveyed direct by the efferent nerve to the muscle in which it terminates, without sending any current to the brain. The most striking instances of this are in the movements which may be produced in the limbs of a decapitated frog.

But there is a second class of automatic movement in which although it is quite mechanical a *sensation* intervenes, or accompanies it. It is to this class of cases that I now refer, and to them the name *Consensuous* has been given. Such is the involuntary closing of the eyelids when any foreign substance is carried against or into the eye, or the involuntary coughing of a violent and explosive nature which invariably takes place when anything which ought to be travelling down the œsophagus is on the point of entering the larynx to descend the trachea. Now, in each of these cases, undoubtedly, action does follow immediately on Feeling without the intervention of Desire. But they are not cases in which Volition is concerned at all.

§ 11. With reference to the question now before us, Bain gives a most distinct answer in the affirmative. He maintains that *as a rule* Volition does follow on Feeling immediately. Indeed it would seem that his view of the whole question is determined by the thought that Desire is rather *exceptional* and *abnormal* than natural and normal. He seems to think that the term Desire can only be applied to the states of *longing* that are either realised only after the lapse of a considerable interval of time, or never realised at all. Such a view

seems involved in his definition.[1] "Desire is the state of mind when there is a motive to act—some pleasure or pain, actual or ideal—without the ability. It is thus another of the states of interval, or suspense, between motive and execution." It is involved as clearly too in the statement which follows. "In Desire there is the presence of some motive, a pleasure or a pain, and a state of conflict, in itself painful." In so many words, he says distinctly, (p. 371), "Desire is incorrectly represented as a constant prelude of Volition;" and in the following paragraph, he speaks of it as a "transformation of the Will proper, undergone in circumstances where the act does not immediately follow the motive." But such a view is too narrow to cover all the facts of the case. The state of mind intermediate between motive and execution in many cases may be brief, almost instantaneous, and yet be essentially of the nature, and therefore a specimen, of Desire. I am walking the streets of London on a muddy day. A spot of mud is splashed upon my face. The sensation experienced is decidedly disagreeable; it at once creates the desire to get rid of it. That Desire with the rapidity of thought itself issues in a Volition to pass my hand, or to take my pocket-handkerchief, to wipe the mud from my face. Here Desire arises,—most distinctly recognisable as such,—but so *rapidly* does it rise into consciousness, and disappear again, that it almost *ceases* to be a *state*, and becomes rather an act, or a transient operation. Truly then it must be admitted that, though its distinct nature comes out most clearly in the exaggerated instances of a prolonged state of suspense, it still remains the connecting link between the Feeling and the Volition, even when the length of time that it remains

[1] "Mental and Moral Science," p. 366.

in consciousness is reduced to a moment, unmeasurable by our usual methods.

At this point, however, I must confess great reluctance in allowing the states properly described in the language of Bain to pass by the name of Desire at all. While states of genuine desire may be included in these terms, the descriptions virtually contained in the phrases above quoted more strictly apply to states that ought to be classed under the head of Volition. What Bain calls "a transformation of the Will proper," in cases where the act has to be delayed, is what I take to be a '*resolve*;' and a *resolve* is essentially of the realm of Volition, quite distinct from a mere Desire. In such a case, my mind is '*made up*' *as* completely as when the action follows immediately. The accidental circumstance, that physical hindrances prevent my carrying out my decision, does not alter its essential character; it is simply kept in abeyance, until the physical hindrance be removed. Had not these difficulties been in the way, the execution would have been prompt and instantaneous; and in that case there would have been no doubt whatever of the Volitional character of the determination. But this being so, I take such a delayed determination to be essentially Volitional; indeed such resolves are the clearest proof that can be given of Volitional strength.

§ 12. Having gone so far, the question arises,—Ought we not to go farther, and say that on close examination every case that seems to contradict the rule will be found either to illustrate it, or to belong to a class of instances with which this inquiry is not properly concerned? Take the instance Bain uses to illustrate his position, that when a pleasure prompts us to work for its continuance or increase, and we at once follow the

prompting, there is no place for Desire; and so with Pain. It is this. Going out into the open air, we encounter a painful chill. We turn back and put on extra clothing. His own explanation of the fact is that the pain has induced a remedy by "the primordial stimulus of the Will guided by our acquired habits." But it is a very great question whether in any such instance the Desire to remedy this state of discomfort does not distinctly arise in consciousness, and consciously become the source of that Volitional stimulus which issues in the return home, and putting on of the great coat. In such a complex case I would clearly maintain *per contra* that the *Desire does arise*, and is quite capable of recognition. Here then what seems to contradict, really illustrates, the rule.

But take a simpler case which seems much nearer proving his point. A fly settles on the point of my nose; and the feeling of irritation at once causes me to put my hand to the place to rub off or crush the insect. It may be fairly asked,—Is not that an *action following on Feeling without any intermediate Desire?* It may be,—we answer; but in that case *without any intervening Volition:* and that removes the case from the range of the topic we are examining, and places it among that class of instances, which we were careful to show are illustrations of a point quite distinct from this. The question before us is: Does a Volition ever immediately follow a Feeling without the mediation of a Desire? And this is an instance of a consensual action, reflex, and therefore *involuntary* in its character. Into all such cases the element of Volition does not enter, and our position is left unimpugned, which, even in the face of Bain's counterplea, is fairly established,

viz.:—That *in every case of Feeling being followed by a Volition, it is at the instigation, and through the stimulus of a distinct Desire.*

§ 13. Before leaving this part of the subject (the essential connection of Desire and Feeling), a further fact must be distinctly realised, viz., that the Feeling which is the occasion of the Desire may have as its source what is *ideal*, as well as what is *real* or *actual*. The Feeling may be the emotional reflex of an *imagination*, and yet operate as a cause as truly as a *sensation* or *direct Cognition*. Its cause may be a *vivid representation*, as well as an external object perceived by the senses. Take the case of petty theft. The pickpocket sees the end of a rich silk pocket-handkerchief. This sight acts upon his imaginative faculty with a force he cannot resist. In thought he is the possessor of the handkerchief; the thrill of that fancied pleasure is so vivid that its motive power asserts itself with great energy. The Desire arises to become possessed of it, and with the swiftness of light the Desire is transformed into a Volition, and the hand is outstretched. Now clearly it was here "the pleasure of Imagination" that prompted the Desire, not any feeling immediately associated with the perceptive sensation. The influence of the poetic faculty is greater than that of prosaic sense. Of course the same is true in brighter and nobler directions. When put in another way, then, the root of a Desire may be *one* of *two* things; either an *actual experience* or the *vivid idea* of a *possible* one.

§ 14. It is, moreover, worthy of distinct notice that the preponderance of one class or other of these causes of Desire will give the hue and character to the life.

(*a*) Those who live and are moved chiefly by the

former are creatures of *impulse*, the slaves of circumstances. In them the lower, the physical part of their nature has greatest influence. They are undeveloped and immature. Their wishes are fathered by the feeling of the moment. They change with every change of surrounding circumstance. Such are all young children; and those amongst adults who are most like them are the uncultured and slow-minded. And as extremes meet, we find as clear instances of this fickleness of purpose in impulsive and impetuous natures even where the mind is active and well-trained, whenever the impetuosity of the heart overbears the judgment of the head.

(*b*) On the other hand, those who are most under the spell of the latter are most *independent of surroundings*. They live in the world of the unseen: but to them it is as real as what is sensuous.

When kept within due limits, this is a sign of mental robustness and greatness of soul. Thrift is born of this disposition. Living for the future rather than the present is simply impossible without it. It is the very heart of all ambition, whether noble and Christian, or selfish and worldly.

But when it once passes the limits of the fitting, it degenerates into either fanaticism, romance, quixotry, or positive madness. In one view the three former may be called lighter forms of the last; for madness is the loss of mental balance. Mental balance consists in giving all the different classes of objects with which the mind deals their due and proportionate influence; and hence, whenever one class of objects has a power which is undue, this is an approach to insanity. In the case of *fanaticism* the objects of religious emotion absorb the

energies, to the disparagement and neglect of others which are perfectly legitimate, and which must be fairly regarded, to make the religion healthy and sound. In *romance*, the beautiful and the pathetic; and in *quixotry*, the antique and the chivalrous have an unjustifiable prominence in thought and Feeling. In *actual madness*, on the other hand, a fixed idea or dominant thought, either foolish or even positively false and unreal, has more influence on the inner and outer life of the unfortunate sufferer than the plainest and most indisputable fact of the real external world.

CHAPTER III.—CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES.

§ 15. ALL along, hitherto, a fact has been presupposed which must now be distinctly stated. Desires are both *Positive* and *Negative;* and in many cases, if not in all, the positive Desire involves a corresponding negative, and *vice versâ*. The consequence is that the one psychological fact as to any particular desire may be described in either the positive or negative fashion.

Of course this is a direct consequence of the relation existing between Pleasures and Pains out of which all Desires grow, and which are, too, their objects in every case. Since pleasures and pains are mutually exclusive, and so are *always contraries;* since, moreover, in most cases, the absence of a Pleasure is a real Pain, and the cessation of a Pain is a palpable Pleasure, and so *generally contradictories;* it will naturally follow that the Desires linked with these will be as closely related themselves as are the Feelings.

Now the Desires connected directly and most closely with Pleasure, we call *Positive* or DESIRES PROPER; and those concerned most immediately with Pains we call *Negative*, or AVERSIONS PROPER. Each of these is *two-fold* in its *character* and *occasion*, according as the Feeling is an *actual present* experience or a *possible future* one pictured by imagination. On this principle we get the following general classification, which may be distinctively designated a

(1) SUBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION.

A. DESIRES PROPER. These are subdivided into:

First. Those founded on a vivid *imagination* of a *possible* pleasure, taking the form of a wish for what we have not; and distinctively called '*longings*.'

Second. Those growing out of an *actual* experience of a pleasurable character expressing themselves as '*wishes* to *retain*' what we have. In this case we have *subjective retention*, just as in longing we have *subjective expansion*. (For this kind of wish I know of no distinct name, but it is the characteristic of that "*contented mind*" which, Solomon says, is "a continual feast.") These Desires, although a component part, or constituent element, of *contentment*, are not thought of when that term is generally used. The ordinary connotation of the word is that *quiet satisfaction* which results from *absence* of any *longing* for what we do not possess. For the analysis of this condition to be complete, the presence of such Desires must be recognised, which are yet constantly satisfied. It is, therefore, really a continual state of restful satisfaction or a state of continuous moderate Desire.

B. AVERSIONS PROPER. These are subdivided into:

First. Those concerning only the *future* which we

have reason to *fear* may sometimes, or soon, become an actual experience, and which take the form of *shrinking* from an *object of dread.* These consist of a *subjective retraction,* an *impulse* to *avoid,* or to *ward off* the dreaded pain or anticipated calamity.

Second. There are those which are the fruit of *present* suffering, and so become the Desire to *get rid of* or to shake one's self free from the pain in question. These which cannot be distinctly designated by a separate name, become the source, sometimes, of aimless and restless activity; but more often, of strenuous effort and ingenious device to abolish or remove that which is the cause of suffering.

§ 16. It will be readily seen, moreover, that it is very seldom that the Desire proper does not involve the Aversion proper, and that the Aversion is not accompanied by the Desire. More palpably, perhaps, and universally is the latter true than the former. Indubitably, whenever a *pain* is felt, the state of *Desire* that is awakened may be expressed almost indifferently as a *wish* for the *pleasure* of *relief* from it, or a *Desire* to be *rid* of the *distress* it causes. Unless the present experience is all-absorbing, the thought of what will follow, and what is involved in its removal, will elicit *Desire proper,* as truly as the Pain itself will produce *repulsion* or *aversion.* On the other hand, however, it must be admitted that in the longing for any positive pleasure, the relative pain involved in its non-possession, does not necessarily, nor indeed often enter consciousness. Logically and philosophically it may be distinctly implied; but to conscious thought it is not generally present. There is a want. That want induces restlessness; and as restfulness, or satisfaction, is a positive pleasure, it might be argued, that its absence

is a negative pain. But it is not the want and its painfulness which are ordinarily the prominent objects of thought, *but what is wanted*, as a something intensely pleasurable in its character. So that it would seem that *while a* NEGATIVE *Desire is always accompanied by its correlated* POSITIVE, *a* POSITIVE *is by no means generally attended in consciousness by its corresponding* NEGATIVE. So much then for the most general and subjective classification.

(2) OBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION.

§ 17. A more objective classification will perhaps be more distinct and practically useful. In this we shall be guided by what we have discovered of the essential kinds of Feeling. As with them, Desires might be broadly divided into *physical* and *mental;* according as the objects of the Desire in question are known by the physical or mental faculties. We should then have, on the one hand, all those Desires which grow out of *sensation;* and on the other, the infinite variety which are born of '*sentiments*' or '*emotions.*' But this would be to mass together Desires of very different grades and nature, covering by one name those which differ as vitally as does the sense of beauty from the appreciation of the generous; aversion to ugliness, from hatred of sin. We clearly need a more careful analysis to secure a more satisfactory classification. The best principle I can suggest is *the part of our complex nature* which is specially brought into play in connection with the Desires in question. Those 'parts'—of course, using the phrase, not literally, but metaphorically, for purposes of logical distinction—are, broadly, four, *Body*, *Intellect*, *Soul*, and *Spirit:* though a fifth region is sufficiently important to justify its

separate consideration, viz., that in which the Intellect works upon the materials afforded by the Body. In this way we have resulting, a fivefold division of Desires.

1. The Corporeal, or Physical.
2. The Intellectual-Corporeal, or Æsthetic.
3. The Purely Intellectual.
4. The Moral, or Ethical.
5. The Spiritual, or Religious.

EXAMINATION OF THE SEPARATE CLASSES.

§ 18. Of course all that can be attempted is an indication of the groups which appear under these heads and an investigation into the character and condition of typical instances of each. A complete enumeration would be almost impossible.

Further, throughout the following examination reference will be constant and repeated to the two classes into which every one may be divided; the positive and negative—in other words, to those which are the outcome of pleasure, and those which are the outcome of pain.

I. THE CORPOREAL, OR PHYSICAL.—At first thought we might be prompted to say that the phrase '*appetites*' would really cover them all. But closer consideration shows that this term properly applies only to a very small group of Desires, which come under this head.

A. The *negative* here far exceed the positive in their readiness to fall into distinct classes. They may be grouped according to the *degree* in which the *pain* out of which they grow may be *localised*. On this principle they naturally arrange themselves under *three* heads.

1. Those whose source is *diffused* and *vague*. Such are all those Desires arising out of a state of *general*

physical discomfort, and that assume the form of a strong wish to escape that discomfort. For example: (*a*) after prolonged and forced *inaction*, *restlessness* is produced: which merely means a wish to find relief from the imprisonment; and that often assumes the form of the impulse to unrestrained activity after the spell of irksome passivity. Again (*b*) the pains incidental to the *thermal* conditions of the body produce a Desire for their removal. *Chilliness* prompts the wish for warmth clothing, or a cheery fire, or healthy exercise; and *feverish heat* prompts the intense longing for the cooling draught of water. The last example naturally leads to the second sub-class.

2. Those Desires springing out of *pains diffused*, and *yet confined to a certain definite portion* of the physical organism. Their source is a considerable area of the physical nature; but *not* the corporeal structure *as a whole*. In this class we come upon the two, which, through their daily recurrence, and their prominent influence on the due discharge of the vital functions, have always naturally presented themselves to the attention of Philosophers as typical representatives of the entire class of Desires, and are distinctively known as the *Appetites*. I mean of course *Hunger* and *Thirst*.

They are often classed with the feelings, but erroneously; for the sensations which give rise to them are the Feelings proper, and are accurately described only by such phrases as 'being hungry,' or 'being thirsty' which are logically distinguishable, and are really distinct, from 'hunger' and 'thirst' proper. In England indeed we have the distinct verbs 'to hunger' and 'to thirst,' and these are the true names of the physical longings as such. They do not, however—as in the

corresponding terms in other languages—contain any hint of what is the invariable object of the craving, and what will meet it. In Latin, *e.g.*, the only word possessed is a verb which in its very form indicates this very thing, viz., *esurio:* it is formed from the future participle of *edo*, and so means literally, "I am about to eat."

(*a*) In the case of hunger, the *seat* of *discomfort* is the *stomach.* Dr. Carpenter explains it as follows: "The sense of hunger appears due to the distention of the blood vessels of the stomach which takes place in the preparation of the secretion of the gastric fluid" (§ 205). "This determination of blood towards the stomach seems to occur whenever the body needs a fresh supply of nourishment; and it ceases as soon as a sufficient amount of gastric fluid has been drawn off. Hence it is that hunger is relieved by eating." (The gastric fluid flows as soon as any solid substance is introduced into the stomach. This is the explanation of the curious fact, that whatever be the nature of the material so introduced, the gastric fluid flowing, the extreme sense of hunger is appeased. Natives of the South Sea Islands in time of famine will gain relief from chips, or sawdust, or even gravel.) This last fact is so soon learned, and so familiarly known, that the Desire in connection with the famished state, though in its origin it is *negative*—taking the form of a strong wish to be rid of the disagreeable sensation—very early in life becomes, by the power of association, *positive* in its character, and appears as a definite *Desire* for that which will affect the relief longed for, and so is present to consciousness as *a longing* for *something to eat.*

(*b*) In the instance of *Thirst*, the local seat of the pain is *the mouth*, especially the tongue, and the pharynx,

though the disturbing influence is *more widely* diffused and productive of more restlessness than in the case of Hunger. Its cause is clearly a deficiency of moisture in the system, manifesting itself in a consequent deficit in the amount of the salivary secretion in the mouth, and perhaps of mucous fluid throughout the mucous membrane of the pharynx and the larynx. Its removal is effected by *imbibing liquids;* and thus it comes to pass, as in the case of hunger, the remedy of the pain is learned so early in life, and so instinctively comes to the mind when the pain is experienced, that the merely negative longing for relief insensibly transmutes itself into the positive longing for some *beverage* to quench the thirst experienced.

3. The third sub-class of these physical negative Desires is that comprising all those which grow out of *pains* that are *specific in their source*, perfectly definite and restricted in their situation. That source may be either *internal* or *external.*

In the first case it is some *local disease* of *nerve tissue;* very active and sharply defined tracts of pain. Its generic name is *Neuralgia.* Specific forms of it are Toothache, Faceache, Sciatica, etc.

In the second case it is some *lesion of the skin*, in the form of either a bruise or a cut; the result is the depressing discomfort of pain. Now, in all these cases the question is simply one of desire for *relief*, and *release* from it, and so is essentially *negative* in its character. The knowledge of the remedy is so purely a matter of technical experience, that it is only in the case of habitual sufferers that it ever takes any more *positive* form.

B. The *positive* physical Desires are less easily

enumerated. They take distinct form in constitutions robust, energetic, muscular, or in which some one part of the system assumes unnatural development.

1. In a healthy youth who has a full flow of animal spirits, and an abundance of muscular vigour, there is the Desire for *exercise.*

2. In the enervated, from whatever cause, whether from a luxurious or a studious life, there is the Desire for *physical comfort* in a warm external temperature. Such Desires prove their power, rather in a negative, than in a positive way; they bring about a mental and moral *vis inertiæ;* a disinclination to effort; a shrinking from anything which will interfere with the enjoyment of quiet ease.

3. In natures, in which the sensual element is strongly developed, the sensual Desire is as strongly present, and has as commanding an influence as any. It has had appropriated to itself in modern terminology a name which was originally conterminous in its application with Desire itself. I mean '*lust.*' Etymologically, 'lust' is only 'listing,' or 'wishing.' 'We do as we list' is equal to saying, 'we do as we wish, like, or desire.' (This needs to be borne in mind in reading the Authorised Version of the New Testament. For ἐπιθυμία, for which it nearly always stands, does not merely mean carnal Desire, but the *strong setting of the soul* on anything, which is *generally* unspiritual in its character.) Practically, it has been restricted to the indulgence of that which is the grossest form of sin.

4. In not a few the pleasures of the palate are so intense and delicious that the pagan maxim, "Vivimus ut edamus," fully describes them; rather than the golden rule of temperance, "Edimus ut vivamus."

§ 19. II. INTELLECTUAL-CORPOREAL, OR MENTI-PHYSICAL.—The *body* is here still in prominent use, but only as *the organ of the mind.* It is *not* the *body as a whole,* nor either its muscular, nor vital parts that are now employed. It is not the body, in its organs of movement, respiration, circulation, or digestion that is concerned, but only its *organs of perception* and *special senses.* It is mainly, if not wholly, its powers of *Sight* and *Hearing.*

But more than that. It is not the *physical pleasure* accompanying the exercise of these which prompts the Desires now under consideration. That is very small —in many instances almost inappreciable. It is the *mental pleasure* arising from *mental action,* which employs these physical faculties only as caterers, or as purveyors. The material obtained and presented to the mind by this means, consists of the *sights* and *sounds* and *odours* of the external world. But it is not these, in their *isolated* and *atomic* form, as just bare 'intuitions,' that are the objects of these Desires: it is these, as *subjected* to the *Elaborative Faculty*—the Faculty of Comparison and Relations; and as giving us impressions according to their proportions or disproportions, their agreements or discords, their utilities or inutilities. It is, in fine, the purely *mental* pleasures or pains obtained from contemplation of *material* objects through the senses, through memory or imagination, which give rise to the Desires thus grouped together under the great head of *Æsthetic.*

Among these may be reckoned: First, Negative. The aversion we have to the *ugly,* the *deformed,* the *odd.* Second, Positive. The longing we have for a sight of the *beautiful,* the *symmetrical,* the *sublime,* or the *picturesque.* These natural Desires constitute the promptings

to Æsthetic pursuits; whether in an artist, with the further view of producing either on canvas or in stone: or in the spectator, in the direction of impelling if possible to gain possession of the objects that will meet these Desires.

§ 20. III. THE PURELY INTELLECTUAL. — This group concerns two great regions—those of *Knowledge*, and of *Truth;* and between the two it is important to distinguish.

1. In connection with the former, it is the *Acquisitive* faculty that is brought into play; and it is partly the pleasure which is the reflex of its spontaneous exercise, and partly that of possession—giving the sense of intellectual *wealth*, which finds a new delight in each accession to the mental stores—which prompt the Desires most characteristic here, ever '*to know more;*' as Cicero expressed it, "Aliquid quotidie addiscere." Hence the *craving* after *Knowledge*, and the *aversion* from *Ignorance*, which distinguish every truly manlike man.

2. The latter we find connected with the exercise of the *Comparative* faculty—*Reason proper;* but *not*, as in the case of Æsthetic, dealing with the *Material.* The objects of its contemplation, the material on which it is employed, are of its own nature, purely *mental.* It is the relation of *Notions* to one another and to actual fact (so far as it still deals with the external); the correspondence or disagreement of idea with idea, or of the ideal with the real; these are the occasions of the Desires which are now in question. The mental *satisfaction* resulting from the contemplation of the '*consistent*' or the *actually* '*true*,' and the *intense distress* which is occasioned by '*inconsistency*,' or '*falsehood*,' or

'*error*,' are the immediate causes of our pursuit of *Truth*, and of our shrinking from, and battle with *Error* and *Falsehood*. In the thirst for *Knowledge*, the one thing desired is *quantity*. In a genuine desire for *Truth*, the first and all-influential thought is *quality*.

§ 21. IV. THE MORAL, OR ETHICAL.—Here we come into the region of *Duty* as contrasted with that of *Fact*. Man has here to deal with what *ought to be*, not what *is*. The faculty exercised in this case is different from that which deals simply with Truth. Its objects range themselves in two grades or classes—the *Right* and the *Good*; according to the distinction recognised in that sentence,—"scarcely for a *righteous* man would one die, yet peradventure for a *good* man some would even dare to die." The *Right* and the *Good* both claim our approval; and their performance brings with them their own reward in inward satisfaction, deep and full; while their contradictory, the *wrong* and the *selfish*, where only our disapprobation manifests itself, bring inward disquiet and remorse. We have then under this head:—

1. Desire for Rightness, *i.e*, Righteousness, consisting in the *fulfilment of duties*, the omission of which would be inexcusable; the practical acknowledgment of claims, deafness to which would be absolutely wrong. There is, too, the corresponding aversion to *injustice*; and *à fortiori*, to *crime* and *wickedness*.

2. A step higher in the scale, involving what *cannot* be *claimed* as a matter of *right*, but which is yet '*comely*,' morally '*fitting*,' and *beautiful*, we have that Goodness which includes *kindness*, *generosity*, and *love*. So the combination of τὸ *καλόν* and τὸ *ἀγαθόν* became, with Socrates and Plato, *καλοκἀγαθία*. For all these, in a nature rightly constituted, there is a strong Desire: and

its correlated aversion is for *selfishness*, *niggardliness*, "*hatred*, *malice*, and all *uncharitableness*."

In the last group we place *Religious* Desires.

§ 22. V. RELIGIOUS DESIRES are distinguished from those which precede, as the Desires arising out of the exercise of that part of our nature, or more strictly that faculty of our nature, by which we may come into personal relation with a personal God.

The occasions for *joy*, here, are *personal conformity* to *God's character*, of one's *nature* to His *will* and *purpose;* and *personal communion* with Himself. In this way arise the spiritual Desires after Holiness and Purity, which are just '*God-likeness*.' They are more than righteousness or goodness in their narrower sense,—because these concern only man's relation to his fellow-man,—and involve, in those as yet unsaved, the passionate Desire for pardon, which is the absolutely necessary preliminary to this higher state of Holiness and Purity.

The one source of *spiritual distress* is estrangement from the Holy Father through the guilt of *sin;* and the absence of peace, which must come as the reflex of imperfect conformity to His character and will. The great Negative Desire in this section is aversion to, and hatred of, sin with all its guilt and degradation.

CHAPTER IV.—MISCELLANEOUS.

§ 23. I. THE MUTUAL RELATION OF DESIRES.—Two questions here arise.

1. May desires distinct in their object coexist in the same mind?

If *connected* with the same *general subject* they may, almost invariably must, *come* into *conflict;* for only one Desire, of a distinct and separate aim, can be gratified. But quite as clearly, if their objects are *not* rival competitors, they *may coexist;* and in their turn, or even together, receive their several satisfaction.

§ 24. 2. When once they have arisen what becomes of them? What is their fate?

(*a*) *Some develop into Volitions,* and in the transition melt away and disappear. The rise of a decisive Volition is the setting of its corresponding Desire. In the moment of the birth of the Volition, must ensue the death of the Desire. But of the Desires that enter the mind this is true only of the few.

(*b*) What then of the mass? Do they linger on for ever as unsatisfied cravings, or do they gradually die? To this twofold question we cannot give one answer.

Clearly of some the one is true; in others, the second alternative is realised.

(1) Some *live on* in the mind as a constant spring of ever fresh endeavour; because, though satisfied in part, the craving is kept up for what is still unrealised. As by a sparing meal the appetite is whetted, so by their partial satisfaction, many Desires continue to live and grow in strength throughout the whole of life. Such is the longing for holiness when once it gains a lodgment in the human spirit; such is the thirst for truth when once aroused in the human intellect; such too is the craving for sensual indulgence when the animal nature has been pampered to such an extent, that it has gained the upper hand. And here it is noteworthy that the significant characteristic of illicit Desire, specially in the region of the sensual, is that though the physical organism may

have been so injured by excessive indulgence that nothing like satisfaction remains possible, the craving still increases in intensity. It is the brand of retribution which God has set upon the sinful.

(2) Other Desires *disappear, although unmet.* Of many the roots are but passing pains, or pleasures, and these are in themselves evanescent. They have taken no hold upon the mind, and with the disappearance of that which prompted them, they fade away and disappear. Such are the momentary wishes to possess objects which give us pleasure, but which we speedily convince ourselves are beyond our reach, because beyond our means. Others gradually die away, because the chance of realising them becomes fainter and fainter with the lapse of years: they are starved out in the absence of any food to sustain them; they die of famine.

§ 25. Two other issues are suggested by Bain. He calls them, "modes of escape from the conflict and unrest of Desire." [1] "The first is *forced quiescence*, to which is given the familiar names, 'endurance,' 'resignation,' 'fortitude,' 'patience,' 'contentment.'" "A second outlet for Desire is *idea* or *imaginary action.*"

Clearly the first of these may be described as the Volitional or Intentional starving of the Desire by one of two means; either *strong self-restraint*, or a *diversion* of the thoughts to other objects, so as to allow other Desires to fill the mind:—the difference between the first of these, and the case we have examined above being simply that there the process was *involuntary*, and here it is *intentional.*

As clearly Bain's second outlet is only a modification of the first case, contemplated under this head: *i.e.*, the

[1] "Mental and Moral Science," pp. 367-8.

Desire here dies away in a Volition—the product of which is an ideal action, instead of a real and actual one.

26. II. THE KINSHIP OF FEELING AND DESIRE.—That the relation between these two is very close, is illustrated strikingly by the noteworthy fact, that many of the terms which we constantly use, really cover both a *Feeling* and a *Desire*, and are not properly speaking the names of either separately, but of both combined; because the one is so inseparably connected, and so inextricably intertwined with the other. This is the form in which I should prefer to put the fact referred to by Bain (p. 370) in the words, "Some Feelings carry the fact of Desires in their name." Such are *Avarice*, *Ambition*, *Curiosity*. For the truth evidently is that (1) '*Avarice*' is more the name of an excessive *Desire* for possessing, an exaggerated '*greed* for gain,' than that of the emotional condition which gives it birth or even that which accompanies it. Indeed it almost seems a misnomer to call Avarice a feeling at all. Still more evident is this the case with (2) *Ambition:* while, in the instance of (3) *Curiosity*, the name seems about equally descriptive of the emotion raised by the imaginary prospect of the novel, and of the Desire—strong enough in man, but stronger still in woman—" ever to be hearing or seeing something *new*."

§ 27. III. THE KINSHIP OF DESIRE AND VOLITION.—I do not forget the fact that I have already drawn special attention to the subject of this paragraph and of that immediately preceding, in connection with the attempt to assign to Desire its true position in a Classification of Mental Facultics or Mental Phenomena. But I here wish to lay special emphasis on a phase of this Kinship which, like that just noticed above, as existing

between Desire and Feeling, is embodied in the *phraseology* of ordinary conversation. It will form a natural and easy transition to the new topic we have now carefully and patiently to consider.

I refer to the evident connection between the words '*wish*' and '*will*;' and the thoughtless and often mischievous confusion of the one with the other. They are often spoken of as though they were almost identical; although in reality there is all the difference between them that there is between a *Desire* merely, and a *Volition*. It would be anticipating a point which must be carefully examined hereafter, to justify the statement by showing all that is involved in it; but I must say this, that the moral impotence and intellectual confusion are lamentable and deplorable which are betrayed, when in answer to an appeal to the performance of some manifest duty, the reply is given, "Well, sir, I really *wish* to do it very much:" with a tone which implies that surely that is all that can be asked for, since there cannot be any great moral difference between a '*wish*,' an *earnest* wish, and a '*will*,' a *good* 'will.'

Of course, if there is to be the '*will*,' there must precede it, as that of which it is the consummation, the earnest wish, or strong desire. But the acknowledgment of the 'strong desire,' if it be not followed by 'the energetic determination of the will,' can bring only moral condemnation, not moral praise. The blame is greater, if the impulse of a true desire is felt, and not responded to, than if no such desire had ever been experienced.

§ 28. Indeed there is only one case possible, in which there can be any excuse for allowing a good *desire* to have no further issue. It is the case in which a common proverb practically confounds Desire with Volition, by

using the word *will*, when what is really intended by it is '*wish*.'

The proverb I refer to is :—" The *will* is taken for the deed." It is embodied in the colloquial phrase : " Well, I suppose I must take the will for the deed." What is really meant, is that *willingness* to do the thing is taken as true a proof of kindness as the *doing* of the thing itself. But that "*willingness to do the thing*," is not *Volition*, it is that ' preparedness to take the steps necessary, including the *voluntary decision* to act,' whenever circumstances permit, which is really a state of *Desire ;* the wishfulness, or even longing to do the thing, if only it were possible.

It really, then, comes to this : In certain circumstances, the *wish* is taken for the *will*, which when clothed in action becomes the deed. Now, what are these circumstances ? In other words, what is the one case, in which the *desire* unfulfilled may have the moral worth of the intentioned and completed action ? The indication of this will be found a natural introduction to the substance of the first paragraph of the following section.

The substance of the only answer which can be given will be found in the phraseology already incidentally employed above. The 'longing to do the thing if only it were possible' remains, and must remain, a longing only, as long as *the thing* is *not possible*. But what is this, 'the thing *not possible*,' but that it is '*out of the power*' of the person concerned to *do* it ? These, then, are the circumstances in which no *wish* can become anything more than a 'wish'; when there is *no power* at command to perform the action demanded. Here, too, is the one condition of any wish becoming a will,—the existence of '*power*' to carry out what is wished. In

other words, it is clear that Desire—even if it goes no further—may be morally 'good' and 'praiseworthy,' when the power to perform what is desired is not possessed; and, on the other hand, the very possibility of its becoming embodied in a Volition—the very existence of Volition itself—implies and involves the existence of *power* to perform what is desired.

§ 29. Is not the truth of this confirmed by the experience of every moral reformer and earnest worker for the elevation of mankind? How often—when he urges the degraded to a better life—is he not met with the hopeless response, "I want to be better; but it's no use, I can't!" And when pressed to make the great *resolve*, the answer returns again, "It's no use for me to say 'I *will*,' for I can't."

And, further, is it not clear, that the best method to pursue is to attempt to persuade such that the thing *is* compassable, if he will only try? If only that conviction is inwrought—either by the force of other examples adduced, or of faith in the reliability of the philanthropic friend—then, and not till then, there is some chance of the degraded one summoning together all the volitional energy which is left, and proving the genuineness of the *Desire*, which has been so often and so passionately reiterated, by putting it into the form of a strong Volition: "I *will* do as you urge." So clearly is Will the correlate of Power.

VOLITION.

CHAPTER I.—ITS ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS.

1. EVOCATIVE. 2. DIRECTIVE.

§ 30. WE have already virtually dealt with the question of the position of Volition in a proper classification of Mental Phenomena, in determining the position of Desire. We may therefore pass at once to an investigation of its essential functions. We may speak of these as *General* and *Special.*

A. *General.*—Each human spirit is phenomenally but a bundle of *forces;* and these forces combined make his *strength.* This is evident enough in the peculiar and significant usage of the Latin language. Each individual force is a *vis* (sing.). The collective forces *vires* (pl.) constitute strength. But these forces or powers do not always work along their several lines in a mechanical impersonal fashion, under the impulse of their special laws, and under the guidance only of their special fate. (Though, as Dr. Carpenter shows, many of them which at the outset, acted only at the instigation, and under the control of Volition, come by use and practice to act in a half-automatic, or even in a wholly automatic fashion.) They are all in a very real sense the man's own; indeed are but manifestations in various directions of that sum total of forces or powers, which entirely determines the

calibre of each individual, and constitutes the true measure of his resources and his strength.

But that they are *his*, and not merely Nature's—not merely a portion of the vast organism of the universe,—can be realised or proved only by his power of control over them. Just this is *Volition* or *Will.*

In *Willing*, the Ego asserts its centrality, its dominion over all these more external portions of its nature ; its authority over all its faculties and energies.

In Willing each *Ego* demonstrates (by the stern logic of actual fact) his *power* of *control ;* each *Volition* is but special instance of *control* of *power.*

§ 31. B. *Special.*—Looked at thus, we very readily obtain a four-fold classification of the Will's essential Functions.

1. Power may be utterly dormant, latent, undeveloped, hidden. It then needs calling forth. This may be called the *Evocative* Function of the human will.

2. Or it may be vibrating, pulsating in a full flood of active energy, yet waiting for some definite path to tread, or work to do. It then needs directing. To this function may appropriately be given the name "*Directive.*"

3. But it will easily die down into latency again. In its very nature it tends to dwindle from activity into passivity once more. To be constant it needs sustaining. This I would call its *Sustentative Function.*

4. Or, lastly, in its present amount it may be unequal to the special task to be performed, the special object to be attained. In such case it must be increased, intensified, if the task is to be accomplished, if the object is to be effected at all. And in such case an extra effort must be made ; and this is accomplished by what I would call the *Intensifying Function* of the *Will.*

In Volition, then, the Ego rouses, directs, sustains, or intensifies its energies or powers.

Let us look at these in detail.

§ 32. 1. EVOCATIVE. Its first function is to rouse into action power that is dormant or latent.

(*a*) In our bodily life, it is true, there is a physical restlessness, produced by the very conditions of our organisation, which becomes the source of physical movement, quite apart from any conscious exertion of will;—indeed quite apart from any Volition at all. The body has a life of its own, which performs its processes, and goes its own way, to a certain extent, independently of the mental, moral, and spiritual life of the human Ego which dwells in it, and of which it is the organ of action—the medium of communication—with the external world. Of course when I say 'independently,' I use the word only in a modified sense. In actual fact, it is plain the corporeal life is constantly and at every part of its existence modified, stimulated, directed, degraded, injured, or destroyed, by the influence upon it of the incorporeal life of its indwelling Ego. True also, as man is at present constituted, the bodily is made so dependent upon the mental, that unless it were provided for by its lord and master, it would soon ebb away and cease altogether. But it is also true that, even in man, for a time at least, the bodily life would go on working itself out according to its own laws, even if the higher were to be annihilated altogether or to leave it for another. This is seen in swoons and trances. Our actual *human life* is the Resultant of two logically distinct but actually united things—the life of the body and the life of the spirit (Ego).

The physical life has a centre, and laws, and forces

of its own : and (so long as the life itself is sustained) the changes of state or condition in different parts of the body, produced automatically by the working out of the processes of digestion and circulation, act upon the nervous system in such a way (or more strictly are, and involve, such changes in the nervous system) that movements, which are phenomenally actions, are the immediate and direct result. I need hardly say that I here use the term "*Action*" in the popular sense,—covering the exacter significations of both πρᾶξις and πρᾶγμα.

§ 33. (*b*) Moreover, it must be conceded, that so intimate is the nexus or connection between the material and immaterial, that changes which originate purely in the physical may produce phenomenal results in the spiritual. The possibility of this may perhaps be made clear by an illustration. When once a horse is securely harnessed to a heavily loaded cart, not only is it possible (else what would be the use of the arrangement?) for the horse to drag the cart along the level ground ; but, in certain circumstances, the lifeless cart may force the horse itself to move. Let only the level be exchanged for a steep incline, and at once the cart may practically become the agent. If it be an upward one, the weight may prove too great for the strength of the horse, and drag it backwards to the level : and if a downward one, the same cause may put it out of the horse's power to regulate the pace of the descent, and may compel him at headlong pace to dash down it to the bottom. And in either case, the movement of the living horse will really have been the effect, and the lifeless load the cause.

If such can so plainly be the case when what are linked together are the lifeless and the living, how much more readily can we understand the possibility when it is

two lives that are thus bound to each other? If one for the moment is passive or inert, the other will have sway: and while in outward form it will appear that the former is still the agent, in reality it will be the action of the latter.

In the illustration cited, if a passer-by were to see a horse dashing down a hillside (ignorant of the weight of the load of lead hidden in the cart behind him), the impression on his mind would be one of pity, perhaps indignation, at the impetuous fury, the wild spirit, of the horse; while, in actual fact, the motive power would be the resistless impulse of the force of gravitation on the loaded vehicle with its mobile wheels. So that many a thought (and many a resultant emotion, desire, or volition) may be only the phenomenal result, in the region of the mental, of an impulse communicated to the incorporeal nature, through a disturbance of the equilibrium of nerve-force in the brain; and that, produced simply by certain conditions of the circulatory system, as the direct effect of the vital processes of respiration and digestion.

This I believe to be the only correct explanation of the vast majority of our *dreams.*

Whether day-dreaming or sleep-dreaming, in each case we have simply *brain-thought*—thought with which volition has nothing to do—over which the Ego has no control, and the efficient cause of which is really the *physical changes*—that are caused by other organic changes—in the nervous system, and specially the brain.

§ 34. (*c*) But though, on the one hand, physical movements may be quite involuntary, and, on the other, many spiritual phenomena may be the direct effect of physical conditions, it is manifest that many more are

the direct result of the evocative faculty of the Ego in *Volition.* In other words, it is plain that many a faculty would long remain dormant, except for a distinct exertion of Volition directed towards it, calling it to activity, bringing it into play. Many a grand result, whether in the realm of thought alone, or in that of thought clothed in deed, the realm of active life, would never have been achieved — because the faculty by which it has been wrought would never have come into active exercise— but for a distinct act of Volition, by which the Ego called it out of torpor into energy. All the architectural skill, that from the first must have formed an integral part of the mental power of the gigantic intellect of Sir Christopher Wren, would in all probability have slumbered on until his death-hour had not the pressing need of a city in ashes led him to make the tax upon his talent, which had never been made before, and to utter the fiat to his sleeping powers, which roused them to an activity, the result of which has given him a world-wide fame, in the exquisite proportions and grand symmetry of the cathedral of St. Paul's, and many other of our City churches.

And this is only a notable instance of what occurs in every human being in the quiet course of every-day life.

The imperial power of the Ego over all its faculties is called into daily exercise, in rousing them from a state of torpor into activity.

§ 35. Only a certain amount of force is at the command of each. It can be exerted only in a limited number of directions at once; so limited a number, that many maintain that it is possible in only one at a time. In other words, at most only a few faculties of our nature, possibly only one can be in energy at once. All others,

then, must be in a state of latency, or inactivity. If they are needed for any fresh work on any special mission, *Volition* must arouse them. So much force that hitherto has been exerted in one direction, must be subtracted to be employed in another. The human Ego has a troupe of servants, its guard of honour, ready to do its bidding. But by a mysterious law of their being they cannot all serve at once. While some are active all the others must be sleeping; and the moment the mandate passes from one to another, the one just now busied to his utmost at once sinks down into the refreshing quietude of sleep, to make way for the fresh service of another, who, until that moment, was motionless in slumber.

§ 36. Indeed, from a careful consideration of the whole subject—and it is a large and wide one, including investigation into the phenomena of somnambulism and sleep—I am prepared to maintain a position in many important points the opposite of that assumed by Descartes, (Leibnitz?), Kant, Jouffroi, and Sir. W. Hamilton.

They maintain that it is the *essence* of *mental existence* constantly and continuously to *think;* that a cessation of actual intellectual energy would be in fact a cessation of the existence of the Intellect itself; that it is part of the nature of the Cognitive faculties to be incessantly active: so that (whatever appearances may be) the mind has been always thinking from the very moment when first it leapt forth into being, till the present moment, and will be to all eternity.

Now, in direct opposition to this position, I quite agree with Locke, who maintains stoutly that "The soul thinks not always;" [1] and confesses himself to have one

[1] "Human Understanding," Book II. chap. i. sec. 10.

of "those dull souls that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas," nor to be able to "conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think than for the body always to move: the perception of ideas being . . . to the soul, what motion is to the body, not its essence, but one of its operations." And I would go even farther, and maintain that, so far from its being of the *essence* of the thinking faculty or any other mental faculty of man (at least as at present constituted), to be always in activity, their essence is no more than a *potentiality for activity*, a capability of being brought into play; and their normal condition, until acted upon by this Evocative function of the Ego in Volition, is rather one of latency than patency, rather one of torpor than action: that, if such a thing could be, were the body and its influence for a time annihilated, so that from that quarter no impulse could come to set the spiritual in motion, and were the Ego to suspend all acts of Volition, there would be no spiritual activity whatever; the whole higher nature would be in a state of motionless trance; the Ego existing still, but not manifesting itself in any direction whatever. Is not the fact of the materiality of the organ of human thought, without which no thought is possible, which thus incidentally involves the action of the law of *Inertia*, the secret of this fact which may seem like a blot upon the higher nature of man?

§ 37. 2. DIRECTIVE. The second and perhaps the most important function of Volition is Direction. In the exercise of its power of control over the forces of its nature, the Ego directs, as well as calls forth, the faculties at its command. For it is evident that inactivity may be the result of indecision quite as truly as of impotence.

The absence of any definite result in thought or

action does not, *per se*, prove the absence of the power adequate to produce either the one or the other. Motionlessness is not an infallible proof of lifelessness. Silence is no sure evidence of dumbness. The lack of any definite conviction does not prove the lack of power to form an opinion.

In all these cases, the very absence of any palpable evidence of power, may be the direct effect of its presence in a superabundant degree. Twice the amount of force which is requisite to produce a certain result may actually prevent its occurrence; because the one half may be acting in opposition to the other. There is a plenitude of power in operation; but the conditions of its activity are such that one part neutralizes the other.

Rest is an evidence—not of the absence, but of the equilibrium—of forces. There is a little world of power, pulsating and throbbing and vibrating with the most intense activity; but it is a system divided into antagonistic sections, it is a house divided equally into Ayes and Noes; and the actual result is just the same as if there had been no power in operation at all. As far as any recognisable product is concerned this scene of busy, even strained, energy might have been a waste void filled with powerless nothingness.

That attitude of statue-like stillness, so protracted and so motionless, is not the inactivity of paralysis, the tranquillity of death; it is that of a strong man, ready to do or dare any task however hard, simply undecided what to do, unresolved to what first to put his hand.

Yonder child, at this moment as silent as a corpse, is no born-mute. She is full of loquacity, talkative as a parrot; but just now is reduced to a momentary silence by not knowing what to say.

The Israelites on Carmel were not reft of the power necessary to take up a decided and intelligent position in reference to Baal or Jehovah; as a casual onlooker might have judged, had he come suddenly upon the scene, and witnessed their strange inactivity, their motionless and silent waiting. No! passions the strongest, tastes the most decided, judgments the sternest, minds the keenest, were all waiting there, in a few hours to be exerted to their fullest extent in either loyal service to Jehovah, or in mad fanaticism for Baal. It was not that they could not resolve the doubt, it was simply that, in weak irresolution, they 'halted between two opinions.'

Now it is in such cases as these that *Volition* is needed to come and end the suspense. The Ego does not here need to raise any energy into activity. The active energy is profuse enough. It is called upon to terminate the tantalising equilibrium, by the power of its own decision. Its function here is to direct in some definite course a fulness of power that is wasting itself for lack of guidance.

§ 38. Nor only in such instances as these is its directive function called into play. Undoubtedly, when we recall the almost innumerable phenomena that make up our active life, the cases in which the tide of activity is stayed, brought absolutely to a standstill — until the Ego by a supreme act of *Volition* decides the case, and so ends the temporary suspense—are comparatively speaking the few. But it exercises this same directive function as truly, when, without any conscious pause, it *alters the direction* of its activity from one course to another. It is as truly directing the path of your journey when you bring the bridle to bear upon the horse in steady trot along the road, as it would be to

bring him to a halt at a cross-road, and after keeping him, with champing bit and restive movement, at the place where the two roads meet, at length, by lash of whip and management of rein, to start him off along the one or the other. The directive function manifestly includes *mere guidance*, as well as actual decision.

§ 39. But from the very nature of the case, it will readily be seen that in this two-fold function really lies hid the spring of each man's rectoral power—the one psychological fact, which makes him an intelligent author of his actions, which constitutes the condition of his responsibility—the foundation of his moral character. That he can guide his energies in the direction of their activity; that he can decide in cases of doubt, vacillation, or difficulty, between a number of rival courses, which together urge their claims, are facts of absolutely the most momentous importance in relation to man's real nature. On them hangs the very possibility of the existence of duty, of moral obligation, of virtue or of vice in relation to himself. Round them has raged the fierce warfare between philosophers and theologians of different schools, as to the Liberty or the Necessity of the Will.

It is well therefore to have our attention fixed steadfastly upon what, from their apparent simplicity, and their very obviousness, might otherwise be passed by as unimportant truisms.

But to go further into detail in order to show their precise bearing upon the vast subjects and gigantic controversies just hinted, would be here out of place; because it would be anticipating an investigation which can be proceeded with more satisfactorily when our array of facts is more complete, precise, and clear.

Suffice it then at this point to recognise it clearly as a second function of Volition, to appreciate it as an undeniable fact that the Ego does repeatedly manifest its control of the forces of its nature; on the one hand, by guiding them along some definite channel; on the other, by deciding what shall be the next sphere of their activity.

CHAPTER II.—ITS ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS (*continued*).

3. SUSTENTATIVE. 4. INTENSIFYING.

§ 40. 3. SUSTENTATIVE.

Its third function is that of sustaining power—the *Sustentative Function of the Will.*

(*a*) It is a fact, the truth of which may be tested, or rather verified, by observation the most casual and least intent, that energies do sometimes, nay do often flag. The flame of activity burns brightly enough for a time; but it soon pales in its brilliancy, and (if unreplenished with fresh oil), will infallibly die down into cold darkness again.

§ 41. (*b*) But we may go farther than this. Facts of this nature recur so constantly in every instance in which *force* of any kind is brought into play, that they compel us to the conclusion, that there is a law in accordance with which all these fadings away of force, these dyings down of power take place. It would be expressed in ordinary language in some such phrase as this—"Energy is apt to wear itself out in time"; "Activity is sure to expend itself, if only you will leave it alone." And it would be expressed with more scientific accuracy in some such terms as these—*Force*, of

any kind, *has a tendency to dissipate itself in activity.* It cannot manifest itself without exhausting itself. It wastes itself in passing from a state of latency to one of active energy; and it wastes itself still further in its continued activity in the latter.

§ 42. (*c*) But even this, we think, does not express all the truth. It would seem that of human faculties or powers; only one half of the truth covered by the term *Inertia* as applied to inanimate matter is at all applicable.

Inertia, of course, it is well known, is one of the essential properties of *matter* as such. Its simplest and therefore most comprehensive definition would be—the inability of any material body to change its condition, whether of rest or motion. Stated more fully, then, it means that any material body at rest has no power to set itself in motion; and asserts it as equally true that any material body in motion has no power to arrest that movement; but that, if unrestricted by friction or obstructions of any kind, it will move on in a right line for ever.

Now—as we have already seen—the first half of this statement might be made about the faculties or powers of man, with as much absolute truth as about inanimate matter. In treating of the first function of Volition—the Evocative function—we saw that the need for its existence rested on the very fact that the normal condition of all these faculties is one of torpor (or, to use the technical terminology of the science of Mechanics, one of rest); and that, as there is in them no inherent power of self-activity, there must go forth from the *Ego* a *fiat* to rouse them into energy at all.

But as to the second half of this mechanical axiom, we find that it in no way (in no practical way at least)

applies to the case in hand. So far from its being true that a faculty once called into activity has in it no power or tendency to cease that activity; the exact opposite of this appears to be the fact.

It would seem that as the normal condition of every faculty is one of latency, there is in each an inherent tendency, when once called into service, to relapse into a state of latency again. It is as though some mighty force—like that of gravity upon all bodies projected into the air from the earth's surface, compelling them irresistibly, sooner or later, to return to that surface again—were dragging back into the dark quiet of absolute torpor every faculty that for the time is roused into energy by the rectoral power of the Ego in Volition. So that for the *continuance* of energy, quite as truly as for its evoking or direction, there is need for the exertion of Volition.

All forms of energy would be spasmodic, erratic altogether lacking in continuity or consistency, were it not possible for the Ego to sustain them, by the exercise of Volition.

§ 43. This being its sphere, an interesting question arises as to the mode of its operation. Is it (*a*) by a number of successive acts of Volition; (*b*) or is it by keeping up a continuous stream of volitional power?

The point is a fine one; and I am not sure that one answer will not be found to be essentially identical with the other. Still it is of sufficient interest to call for, and justify a word or two of investigation.

You will see that it is very much akin to the question (discussed at some length in Sir W. Hamilton's "Metaphysics"[1]) whether in Perception, the mind can attend to

[1] Vol i. pp. 238–245 (specially p. 241, as to sight); also pp. 48–254. Stewart, supported by Brown, maintaining the latter view

more objects than one? Whether—and specially in sight—the mind takes in by one comprehensive perceptive act the whole outline of any object before it, or is compelled to take in (with great rapidity, it is true, yet separately and distinctly) but one point at a time, passing from point to point in succession, until it has traversed the whole by an immense number of perceptive acts.

§ 44. (*a*) On the one hand, it might be maintained that just as a line is made up of a continuous series of points, ranged side by side, so the act of sustaining any faculty in continuous energy for any length of time, is in reality effected by an indefinite number of distinct Volitions, each almost evocative in their nature; though since they succeed each other without any interval whatever, sustentative in their aspect, in result.

Indeed, if it be true that it is a law of our nature that our faculties tend *per se* to relapse from activity into torpor, may we not fairly compare this gravitation to inactivity, to the steady and continuous power of a stream, which without opposition infallibly bears down with it any boat that may be floating on its surface? In that case, do we not get help from the illustration; and have we not a parallel to the sustentative action of the human will, and a hint of what must be the nature of its operation, in the efforts which are needed by any one in a boat to keep it steadily abreast of any object on the river shore? In such a case all that the oars-men can possibly do is rapidly and continuously to make strokes of such strength as exactly to counteract the force of the stream. But as

Sir W. Hamilton the former; and arguing at length to establish the position that the mind must be able to attend to more objects than one; setting the number at 6 or 7.

strokes—however rapid, with however small an interval —they must be distinct and successive.

If such then be at all a fair picture of the case, we must suppose that sustentation of energy is effected by successive acts of Volition.

§ 45. (*b*) Another view of the case however would certainly suggest the second answer to the question. The effect is continuous. Must not the cause then be continuous also?

There is nothing like intermission—even for the minutest portion of time—in the result: can there then be any separateness in the components of the cause? The very idea of sustentation supposes no gap, no crevice, no apparent junction in the effect: can there then be any distinction of parts, however numerous, and closely fitting each other, in the cause?

Does it not rather suggest a continuous stream of volitional power in continuous counteraction of the tendency to relapse into torpor, as the real *modus operandi?*

To take the illustration adduced just now—might it not more completely picture the case did we suppose the instance of a steam-ship, rather than a rowing-boat; or if the conditions could be commanded, better than either, a sailing-vessel? In the case of a steam-ship, a position of relative stationariness could be achieved by keeping the steam-power at an even pressure, and exactly at that point which would cause the screw to revolve at a rate tending to propel the ship at the same speed up the river as the stream would unopposed drift it down.

In that of a sailing-vessel the same result would be obtained if only such command could be obtained of the "breeze that blows," as to secure for the vessel a current of air to fill and press her sails, exactly opposite in direc-

tion and equal in force to that of the waters which sweep against her hull. Wind being thus pitted against wave, the result would be 'sustained.'

And have we not in each a continuous stream of power—in one the power of steam, in the other that of wind?

Nay; may we not almost watch the *modus operandi* of this sustentation in a physical example. I hold a book in my hand in a horizontal position; not for a moment only, but through several seconds, perhaps for several minutes. If my command over my muscular system is pretty full and complete, I maintain it (by continuous muscular exertion) with perfect steadiness during the whole time. As far as the thing can be observed by another (or by myself) the result is one continuous and unbroken whole. Undoubtedly this is throughout a volitional act. Not merely the taking the book in hand, and putting both book and hand in a certain position; but the sustentation of the effort. Now, am not I conscious that the volitional effort is as continuous as the muscular? Am I conscious of anything at all resembling a succession of distinct acts of Volition? I cannot but think that the answers of common-sense men to these two questions would be strikingly similar. To the former, the natural reply is—Yes; to the latter—No.

These considerations would suggest, in all instances of sustentation, a supreme act of Volition, which in itself is competent not only to initiate, but to sustain energy, through a certain period of time—a sustained volitional effort—a continuous maintenance of volitional energy.

But not to discuss it with more particularity, it is manifest that there is ample need for, and plainest proof

of the actual existence of, this *Sustaining* or *Sustentative* function of the Will.

§ 46. It should, however, be noted here that many intellectual operations may be spontaneously begun, maintained volitionally, and then, at a later stage, through the up-growth of a habit, be continued automatically.

§ 47. 4. INTENSIFYING.—But one other distinctive function remains—that of *Intensifying*, or strengthening energy already in activity.

And here but few words will suffice. Cases too numerous either to enumerate or classify are constantly occurring in the course of our daily life, in which we find that the *quantum* of force which we are employing is insufficient to produce the result we are aiming to attain.

One or two random examples will suffice to make my meaning clear.

A workman is set to move a large stone. He fetches his crowbar, and at once begins to use it lever-fashion. His first effort is ill-calculated, and the stone remains precisely *in statu quo.* But he does not abandon his task as impossible. He exerts himself to a greater extent than he did before; and this time success attends the greater effort. The stone rolls slowly over to its place.

Or to take an instance in the region of the intellectual. I sit down to read a book; and bestow upon it as much attention as I have been accustomed to bestow on books of that class. But I soon become conscious that very little (if any) of the author's mind and meaning has passed from his page to my spirit. I retrace my steps, and reread the sentences more deliberately,

with greater concentration of attention, with intenser absorption in the mental exercise, and with more resolute resolve to master his purpose and intent. This time I am rewarded; and from the intricate mazes of his complicated composition I gather precious and suggestive truth.

§ 48. Now, in each of these cases, the object is gained by a Volition, different in its specific function from either that which first evoked the force employed, directed the course of its energy, or sustained it when once brought into play. In each the special sphere of the successful Volition is to intensify or concentrate the amount of power in active exercise. In the case of muscular exertion, the nervous currents are so augmented in their vigour and rapidity, that the tension and contraction of the muscles that are brought into play are largely intensified. In the mental effort, the attention is concentrated; the mental power is gathered up into a focus of greater force than had been evoked before.

§ 49. To explain the process appears to be beyond our power. It seems an ultimate fact in our nature, which we may describe or illustrate, but which we can hardly explain. To say that,—just as the working power of an engine may be increased by allowing more steam to be generated, thus making the elastic, resisting, or expansive power of the vapour used, much greater; in other terms, by 'working it at higher pressure;'—in like manner, the human Ego has the power of 'raising the pressure point' at which it determines its energies to be employed, is after all but a metaphorical parallel; of course, no philosophical explanation. It may make the matter clearer if we use a very colloquial expression to clothe the truth in reference to this special point, and say that this

"intensifying" function of Volition is just "to put on the steam" in any action of body or mind: but it does not really tell us anything of the *modus in quo* it is effected. Though, if we can gather anything, it would be this,—that we can volitionally withdraw energy from some other directions—energy which has been employed in connection with some other faculties—and concentrate it in combination with that used in this one direction, and in the operation of this one faculty. Willing has this fourth function too, and that is all that we can say.

Having thus glanced at the four-fold function of Volition, we are naturally led to a topic, intrinsically interesting and practically important.

CHAPTER III.—ITS RELATION TO THE OTHER FACULTIES.

I. COGNITION.

§ 50. The problem now presented is—the nature of the Relation sustained by Volition to the other three classes of Mental Phenomena—Cognitions, Feelings, and Desires.

Is it one of independent co-ordination; one of dependent subordination; or one of absolute domination? Is the relation the same in reference to all alike; or does it vary in its character in reference to each of the three? These are questions which demand an answer, and which will necessitate patient and calm investigation. And to answer the latter first: the most careless consideration of the subject would suffice to convince us, that the relation does *vary*, and that extensively, in its character.

§ 51. Perhaps at this point it is well distinctly to state what has been hinted before. Though the relation sustained by Volition to each of the other three classes of Phenomena is by no means one and the same, though the nature of its connection with each most distinctly varies; yet, in setting it side by side with them, we can discern one great fact in which it *differs* palpably from them all. While Knowing, Feeling, and Desiring are the three great faculties or powers of human nature by the operation of which all the phenomena of human life are produced, Volition is the faculty by which man manages his faculties; the power by which he controls his powers. While then the other three are mere faculties or powers, Will is a *faculty* over faculties; a *power* over powers. As *Consciousness* is a knowledge of all our mental processes; including those of knowledge itself; so Volition is a power over all our mental powers.

§ 52. GENERAL PRINCIPLE. — Now, by the very phrases employed, is suggested a distinction, which I think we shall find a key to the difficulties, and a guide in the complications, inherent in the subsequent investigation. Power is *active* or *passive;* according to a distinction very ancient and very sound.[1] And it would seem to follow from the very nature of the case, that only of *active* power has man any *immediate control* through Volition. As to *passive* power,—which is the

[1] For discussion of the same, *vide* Sir W. Hamilton's "Metaphysics," vol. i. sec. x. Mr. Picton says, quite in accordance with this distinction (since passive power is capacity, and active power is faculty): "A susceptibility, or a capacity for taking up an impression, is not merely passive, it is active; inasmuch as it re-acts upon the impression, and makes the latter to be what it was not before, a special form of consciousness" ("Mystery of Matter," Essay iii. p. 146).

power of being affected in certain ways; it is manifest that it is in actual exercise only, when some force is acting upon, and so 'affecting,' the nature that possesses it.

No mere wish or Volition can evoke passive power. It waits in a state of latency or potentiality, until some action produces it. It is true that the action may originate with the same being to whom this passive power belongs. But, in that case, the passive power is called into actual exercise only *mediately;* through the preliminary process of calling forth into energy some active power, the play of which upon the nature produces the (conscious) effect which the passive power makes possible.

All that Volition compasses, even then, is to set in operation an active power, the result of which is the calling into exercise of a passive one. But, in numerous instances, it manifestly lies outside the realm of Volition altogether. The passive power is evoked by the operation of a force wholly external to the nature concerned; and in a way such that, if Volition could compass anything at all, it would meet and neutralize the force as antagonistic and injurious.

This seems to be the truth of the matter stated in barest outline, with most rigid abstractness, and most barren generality.

§ 53. But is not its close connection with our topic plain and clear? Can we glance at the classification of our powers, with which we are at present dealing, and fail to notice that the distinction of which we have been speaking is clearly exemplified in them? *Cognition* is most manifestly an *active* power; *Feeling* is as manifestly a *passive* power; while *Desire* seems to be distinctly *neither*, or perhaps *both.*

We may then expect to be guided and aided in our investigation by carrying with us this principle—*Volition* controls *immediately* only *active* power: *passive* power is reached by Volition only *indirectly.*

It leads us to anticipate the general conclusion, that with *Cognition*, Volition has very close and vital connection; that on *Feeling*, Volition has but distant influence; and that to *Desire* its relation is mysterious and complicated.

We must then treat each *separately.* We must look at the nature of the connection between Willing and Thinking, Feeling and Desiring. We shall take them up *seriatim.* But, before passing to this detailed examination, there is one point to which I must make distinct, though brief, allusion.

§ 54. It may here be objected that a most important section of the realm of volitional control is being altogether passed by — viz., Muscular Movement. The omission is, however, intentional. The reason for its omission—save by way of incidental allusion—is the fact that the present inquiry is psychological rather than physical; and this topic of Muscular Movement concerns rather the physical machinery of the faculties than the faculties themselves. It is a most important subject for investigation; but should take the form rather of an appendix, than of an integral part, of a psychological inquiry.

§ 55. Mr. Bain, however, in his dealing with the subject of the Will, has made it figure more prominently than anything else. And no wonder. His position demands that it should take this first place. For, on the one hand, he evidently views muscular movement, as the *one* proper province of volitional control; and, on

the other, he seems to consider the *Will* a gradual outgrowth of spontaneous muscular movements that arise in the gradual development of the human being. It is true, he is not quite consistent in reference to the *first* point; for he adverts to the undeniable fact that we may command our *thoughts*, as an illustration of *Compound Association;* though he considers the operation of the Will in such case as only indirect, as due to the command of *mental* concentration or Attention:[1] but he clearly considers muscular movement the one direct sphere of voluntary control, "the intervention of the Will being restricted to muscular movements." The second point is a natural outcome of the first.

If voluntary control is, primarily and strictly, control of muscles, it is of course all important to trace the origin and gradual development of that muscular control. This he does interestingly and elaborately in the first two chapters of the fourth book of his "Mental and Moral Science," under the heads of "The Primitive Elements of Volition," and "Growth of Voluntary Power."

§ 56. To this method, and its presumptive conclusions, we strenuously object, for the following reasons:—

First. *Will* is one of the *Fundamental Faculties* of a human nature, essential and inherent to it; and not gradually evoked and developed as a product of vital physical processes.

Second. All that is really done in such an investigation is to show how a ready *use* of the muscular machinery provided for each human spirit is gradually acquired, so that its wishes or volitions may be carried out. And this is surely quite a *subordinate* subject for investigation, and does not touch the central functions

[1] "Mental and Moral Science," pp. 157, &c.; 341, &c.

and relations of the Will, as a great fundamental faculty of every human spirit.

§ 57. Suffice it then to indicate what part of the Muscular system is within voluntary control, and what muscular operations are most important in their bearing upon the mental and spiritual life of man. It will make clearer part of what follows, and will fill up gaps that else would cause dissatisfaction.

The muscles are of two classes—the striated, and the unstriated (so named from the microscopic appearance of each): the former composed of bundles or fasciculi of continuous fibres, the structure of which is such that, when laid side by side, the ultimate fibres present the appearance of transverse alternate bands of darker and lighter colour, and so are striped ("striati"); the latter being devoid of striæ, and presenting a more homogeneous appearance. The former are supplied with nerves communicating with the brain directly, or through the spinal cord; the latter immediately with those only of the Sympathetic system. It is the former alone that are under voluntary control. The latter contract and perform their functions in obedience to nervous stimuli created, directed, and maintained by purely organic processes by means of the nerves of the Sympathetic system; the most important of them being those of the heart, throat, and intestinal canal.

§ 58. Of the voluntary muscles, those doubtless are most important in their bearing upon mental development which are connected with the organs of sense, speech, and action: and of these, specially those of the eye, the larynx, and the hand and the arm, as the necessary mechanism for all the important processes of reading, writing, and speaking. All these are closely,

indissolubly connected with the faculty of language, the power of expressing thoughts in symbols, audible or visible, and of interpreting these when made; which (as shown in October number of *Fortnightly Review*, 1878) is the distinctive faculty of man as contrasted with all the lower animals. Interesting, however, as the pursuit of this subject into its minutiæ would be, we must content ourselves with this mere glance at it; and pass to our more proper theme—the relation of Volition to our *Mental* Faculties.

I. COGNITION.

§ 59. First, then, as to the connection of *Will* with *Cognition.* The question to which we are now seeking an answer might be put thus—To the exercise of what proportion of our cognitive processes is Volition necessary? Is the whole of them always and necessarily voluntary? or is any part of them involuntary?

Put thus on the watch, memory cannot fail to remind us of many an instance in which a perception, a memory, a thought, a conclusion, has come to us as much unsought as the leaf which the wind brings fluttering into our face, or at our feet; has been as purely involuntary as the heaving of the breast in the process of respiration, or the beating of the heart in that of circulation. We are at once reminded how sights and sounds (and all the information they convey) have been forced upon our startled attention, when listlessly building castles in the air, or buried in the absorption of some fascinating book. There at once comes to our recollection, a troupe of instances in which the sight of some such familiar object as a leaf, or a desk, have irresistibly called up the vivid memories of scenes visited long ago, or of friends long since departed. Our

thoughts at once recur to many an occasion, when in the midst of reverie or study, some strange conception, some utterly foreign idea intrudes itself upon our mind, not merely apart from, but in direct antagonism, to, our will; and haunts us spite all efforts at abstraction, dogging our steps like some ugly phantom, or our own distorted shadow, wherever mentally we may turn. And without any painful search, we soon recall a multitude of cases, where the very aspect of a countenance, the tone of a voice, the curl of a lip, or the turn of a sentence, has flashed upon our heart a settled estimate of another's character, which we would feign alter or modify; but, struggle as we may, we cannot—our conclusion has forced itself upon us, and no after-effort (however laboured) has availed to reverse it.

It is manifest then that very much of our cognitive processes are *beyond our own control;* are carried on independently of Volition.

And more than this, even those which are primarily Volitional, by frequent repetition become *habitual;* and so, at last, like *walking*, become secondarily automatic, and almost wholly involuntary.

§ 60. But we would ascertain more accurately what *processes* may or must be voluntary; and what, on the other hand, may or cannot but be involuntary.

Let us take Sir W. Hamilton as our guide. His classification of their subdivisions is wondrously complete; though, in its details, it may be susceptible of modification and condensation. We will follow it step by step.

§ 61. 1. *Acquisitive.*— In his distribution of the Special Cognitive Faculties the first is *Acquisitive, Presentative,* or *Receptive;* and this he divides into, that

which deals with the External or *Perception*, and that which deals with the Internal or *Self-Consciousness.*

A. *Perception* is the faculty by which we become acquainted with the external world. Its absolutely indispensable instrument is the senses. Knowledge is acquired by interpreting the sensations which are produced by the action of the forces of the external world on the sense organs.

It is manifest that the amount and kind of knowledge acquired through them will depend on two things: first, the *situation* of the *sensory organs*, either placing them in connection with the external forces, or causing such connection altogether to cease; and, second, the *state* of the *interpreting mind*, whether completely disengaged from all other trains of thought, so that all its observing powers may be directed to this one task of gaining information from the sensations experienced, or partially absorbed in other pursuits, so as to give but little heed to what the senses may have to report of what is transpiring in the world around. Now, in reference to both these conditions, it is not difficult to point out how far Volition may affect them.

§ 62. 1. As to the former—the situation or pose of the organs of sense—in the waking state, the great business of the Will, or of the Ego in *Volition*, is to control and direct this.

Indeed the one grand distinction between the sleeping and the waking state lies in this: that in the latter, Volition rules the senses; in the former, Volition drops the reins, through sheer fatigue, and the senses take care of themselves. Of course it would lead us too far astray to go into the minutiæ of this theme, in reference to each separate sense.

Suffice it to say, that over the senses of *touch* and *sight* the control is most facile and complete; that in connection with *smell* and *taste* it is most difficult, awkward, and cumbrous; and that the sense of *hearing* stands midway between each pair.

§ 63. Though just a sentence or two of explanation may be needed to make my meaning clear. Speaking roughly, we may say that the organs of the senses are as follows: of touch, the finger-tips; of sight, the eyes; of smell, the nose; of taste, the tongue; and of hearing, the ears.

Now, for bringing these severally *en rapport* with their *objects*, the muscular apparatus under volitional control may be succinctly described thus.

The finger-tips are at the extremity of a solid framework attached to the shoulder, but containing a series of no less than six joints; two of them, those at the elbow and the shoulder, admitting of rotary movement round the axis of their length, as well as of flexion in that direction: so that by a combination of movements all under the control of Volition, they may be placed *at any point*, within three-quarters of a sphere, the centre of which is the shoulder, and the radius, the length of the extended arm and hand; and by movement of the body too, at any point within a much larger range.

§ 64. The eyes are under control in the following particulars: the eye-lids may be closed or shut—settling, in this way, the great preliminary question whether *anything* shall be seen or not; the head may be turned, upwards or downwards, to the left or the right, and so bring within range objects which could not be seen at all in its previous position; and the eye-balls can be moved, either together—their axes practically parallel to

one another, so as to direct them upon any distant object which the observer wishes to observe—or at an angle to each other, so that the axis of each may be directed on the object to be inspected, when it is near.

In both these instances, the mobility of the organ is very extensive, and the voluntary control over the sense concerned proportionally great.

The nose and tongue, however, are very restricted in their range. For an object to be *sensized* by either of these; either the object must be brought to the organ by the hand, or the organ must be brought to the object by moving the whole body and inclining the head.

The nose is a *fixture* in the head; and the independent motion on the part of the tongue is very limited in its range, so that its extremity may be brought an inch or an inch and a half outside the mouth.

The same of course may be said of the ear as has just been said of the nose. It has no motion independent of the head. But this defect is more than compensated by the fact, that sound is borne to it from a much greater distance than is odour to the nostrils; and so it practically commands a much greater *range* than either smell or taste.

§ 65. It may incidentally be mentioned here—though the bearings of the fact belong as naturally to what follows as to this—that in controlling *one* sense specially, there is the liability to *disturbance* from one or more of the others.

The Ego may be setting itself to perceive, to gain an accurate knowledge of, the outline and colour of some one object before it, by a judicious and careful use of the visual organs of its body, and it may be disturbed out of its calm investigation in this direction, by some sharp

and sudden sensation which will make its presence felt in some other sense. A sudden rap at the door, or a bursting clap of thunder, may forcibly withdraw the attention from the testimony of eye, to that of ear ; or, may be, the stealthy placing of a friend's hand upon the shoulder, or the piercing pain of a gnat's sting, may very roughly rouse from the quiet heeding of reports of sight, to an involuntary recognition of the tales to be told by touch.

Even while the Ego in Volition is most calmly conscious of its wonderfully complete command over the senses of the body, it may thus be rudely convinced that the command is not supreme or absolute.

§ 66. 2. In connection with the second condition which regulates the kind and amount of the knowledge obtained through perception,—the state of the interpreting mind,—we have brought before us the whole topic of the nature, limits, and sphere of *Attention.*

If that state be one of undistracted vigilance of all presented by the sense concerned, there is attention in its simplest, purest form ; but if, on the contrary, it be one of pre-occupied absorption in some other direction, attention is either altogether impossible, or is possible only in the smallest degree.

Now we have already seen that *Attention* is but *voluntary consciousness*,—consciousness gathered together and despatched in one particular direction, assembled in force at some one outpost of the nature, concentrated on some one point, through the exercise of the directive, sustentative, and, may be, the intensifying functions of Volition.

§ 67. But one fact must be noted in all its significance. Each Ego has only a certain *quantum* of

consciousness at its command. That *quantum* of consciousness concentrated in one point, in earnest attention constitutes a *force* of great resisting power, in reference to any impressions, which in other circumstances would be made upon the mind through any other channel than the sense which is being employed. It enables the Ego to keep at bay a host of other sensations and thoughts which would distract and disturb, if only they had it in their power to intrude, by making their presence felt. But this *quantum* being limited, the resisting power is limited too. It is a match for much; but not for everything that may be brought against it.

There is a point, then, in each individual—varying, of course, with his power of abstraction, or concentration (for these two are correlatives)—at which the forces of the external world, acting upon the other senses, are just equal to the power of *Attention*, when called forth to its utmost in one particular direction. If but, in any one direction, this external force becomes intensified beyond that point, the equilibrium is disturbed, the mastery of the Ego is overthrown, and *Attention* for the moment is destroyed.

Up to this point then, but not a jot beyond it, extends the dominion and the sway of the Ego in Volition, in the region of the external or Perception.

§ 68. But we must clearly bear in mind, that all that the Ego in Volition can compass is to manipulate its powers, not to multiply them. In Volition, it acts as the generalissimo of its forces. It can dispose of them as it pleases; but it cannot increase them. But we see what is involved in this.

It is a very palpable fact, that when only a certain amount of power is at disposal, to spread it over a large

surface is to diminish its actual force at each point, in precisely the proportion to the magnitude of the area over which it is extended. If a general, with an army of one hundred thousand men, wishes simultaneously to guard every point of a frontier of one hundred miles in length, it is manifest he has a force, with which to oppose the invader, of only one thousand men per mile of frontier; whereas the general of the invading army, if it be of equal numbers, may concentrate his whole force upon a single mile, almost a single point, and thus have practically a force one hundred times as great as his opponent for all purposes of warfare. If then the former wishes to meet the latter on anything like equal terms, he must withdraw some portion of his forces from his frontier line. To meet combination by concentration necessitates an abandonment, *pari passu*, of the defence of the frontier. What is gained in concentrated strength is lost in extended guardianship.

Apply the illustration to the case before us. Attention is voluntary consciousness; mental power under the control, the concentrating power of Volition. Now as the mental power or consciousness is a fixed quantity, the more widely it is distributed the less intense will it be at every point of its distribution; and, manifestly, *vice versâ*, the more intense its concentration on any one point, the less is left at liberty to be employed or active in other directions. The law applies most strictly in the case of perception through the senses. The greater the number of senses which are put on the *qui vive*, the less specific and individual attention can be paid to the data of each; the fewer the separate organs which are set in active exercise by the directive function of Volition, the fuller the attention that can be given to the

phenomena they reveal, the intenser and more vivid the consciousness of what transpires in that region.

We have an example of the former truth in its most exaggerated form in the case of a man pursued by enemies, crouching for concealment under the foliage of some thick bush, or behind the shadow of some great rock. His whole nature is on the watch. He has given the word of command, by a most vigorous and sustained act of Volition to each of his senses to be vigilant. Every particle of his mental power is distributed, as equally as he is able, to them all. For he feels that if he is listening more than looking, a passing shadow that should be very significant to him may elude him, until all chance of availing himself of its warning has passed by. And if he be too intent on what he may catch a sight of, in his strained gaze he may not notice that quiet footfall which should have given him premonition of the need of speedy flight. But being thus feverishly alert in all directions at once, the amount of distinct attention he can pay in each alone is miserably and uselessly small. In his apprehensive distraction, he is unable to interpret aright the sensations he readily enough perceives. The moving shadow of the leaves, as shaken in the wind, startles him into a groundless dread lest it be cast by the spear or rifle of the approaching avenger; the sound of his own respiration, he construes into a whisper from some fiend, or the breath of some foe. The man being in every part of his nature on the watch—"all attention," as we say—is utterly disabled from paying calm heed to the information that may be conveyed to any one part.

To pass by all intermediate stages; we may very instructively look at an example of the opposite extreme.

For a typical instance of concentrated attention, in

the employment of one sense alone, we could scarcely look in a better direction than to the study of a microscopical anatomist. There he sits, with his head bent forward, and almost rivetted to the strange instrument, which is his organon for the revelation of truths, which, at that moment, are to him the most important and the most interesting in the whole realm of fact. So long and intently does he gaze on the object, which he has just secured for examination, that you well may say he is "all eyes." The clock may tick as loudly as it likes; the noise of the busy street outside may rise and roar to its heart's content; he does not hear a sound. He may have been just the moment before suffering acutest pain; but, for the time, his visual absorption is so great, that it is utterly forgotten and ignored. You may enter the room, and put your hand upon his shoulder, and there may be an involuntary and automatic shrug; but he was utterly unconscious of it. Touch and feeling and hearing are all drowned for the moment in the intensity of the attention he pays to seeing.

So that in *Perception* the function of Volition is twofold.

But enough, touching the influence of Volition on Perception: we must pass on to the second subdivision of the Presentative Faculty.

§ 69. B. *Self-consciousness.*—The question touching Internal Perception, or Self-consciousness, is naturally and necessarily bound up with what has preceded. For the Ego in Reflection has still a body about it to which it is inseparably bound; and to make Reflection or Introspection possible, by some process or other, it has virtually to benumb it; to treat it in some way, so that, for the time being, it may be as though it were not in existence at all.

Now it is plain that this effect may very naturally be produced by carrying out the process, which is involved in every act of perceptive attention, one step further.

As the concentration of attention to one sense, involves, as we have seen, the abstraction of consciousness from the others;[1] so the concentration of attention on something purely immaterial, which needs none of the organs of sense to enable us to conceive or think about it, will naturally bring with it the end we desire to attain—viz., the abstraction of all attention, or voluntary consciousness, from the whole of the body, as far as it is within the power of the Ego to do so.

We are just on the border-land of loss of all corporeal consciousness when we are intently absorbed in the perusal of some fascinating book. We use the sense of sight it is true, but it is in a purely mechanical, and almost unconscious manner. It is almost entirely a mental, scarcely a sensuous act. All the other senses sleep. We are deaf to all conversation; we are numb to any ordinary touch; we are unconscious of any palatal or nasal sensations; and, indeed, we are blind, as well, to anything but the page we read. We are just slipping out of the region of all corporeal consciousness into that of mental consciousness alone.

Have we not attained it, then, I ask, when with closed eyes and clasped hands, we sit as statues, motionless in the dusk, and excogitate some puzzling problem; or turn in upon ourselves, and search the corners and recesses of our own inner nature? We have; and that is an instance of the operation of the Faculty of Self-Consciousness, or Internal Perception.

[1] For the *Physical* explanation of this *vide* Bain, "Senses and Intellect."

Has Volition anything to do with this, as we have found it has to do with Perception of the external? Everything, we answer. In the ordinary course of things, it cannot exist without it; and, undoubtedly when exerted in its intensest form.

For Introspection to be clear and vivid, is possible only in moments of the most utter mental abstraction; and this, again, is possible only by the most determined, continuous, and energetic exercise of Volition. If I am to learn anything satisfactorily about my "self"—the conscious subject—my attention must be wholly directed within; I must be conscious of no object whatever (not even of that object which every subject must have with him as long as he remains in this mortal state—my body). And this I can effect only by the most resolute and disciplinary exercise of Volition that is competent to human nature. (Day-dreaming is introspection, unregulated by Volition; but psychologically is of little use, and so may be left out of account.)

Volition, then, is inseparably bound up with the very existence, as well as the actual exercise of any Self-consciousness, which is to afford any definite and useful material for a knowledge of my inner life.

CHAPTER IV.—ITS RELATION TO THE OTHER FACULTIES (*continued*).

1. COGNITION (*continued*). 2. FEELING.

§ 70. BUT to pass to the next special Cognitive Faculty, MEMORY, which Sir W. Hamilton divides into the *Conservative* and *Reproductive Faculties;* and to look at these separately.

2. *Conservative.*—By this, first, we mean the purely *Retentive* faculty, that by which we can retain what we have once received in the processes of Perception or Self-consciousness. It is clearly distinguished by Sir W. Hamilton,—and the distinction must be recognised as valid, as soon as it is made,—from the *Reproductive Faculty* or *Recollection.* As such, it manifestly comes under the head of passive, rather than active, power. But, in the fact of its being a passive power, we have what gives us the answer we are seeking. This being the case, Volition can have no immediate control over it. It is merely a retentive capacity which exists as part and parcel of the constitution of our nature.

Whether mental and physical, or merely physical, is a problem the solution of which does not vitally affect the point. To affect or modify it at all directly, would require a power which could alter or control the constitution of our nature itself. It is perfectly certain that Volition, as only one manifestation of the Ego within the limits of this nature, has no such power. It is purely involuntary, as much beyond the dominion of wish or will to produce or remove, as the indelible stains that are made on the skin by the action of chemical agents.

Indeed, in the illustration just employed, we have suggested the actual facts of the case. Each sensation and each thought makes an impression, leaves its mark upon the mind, or—what comes to the same thing as far as the result is concerned—upon the brain, which is the organ of the mind; most likely the latter only. Of course, I am aware that this is only metaphor; but the metaphorical, even in the region of metaphysics, is often the nearest approach we can make to the true.

§ 71. The existence of a Retentive Faculty ensures the persistence of these marks or impressions for a time. The only question is whether it is for a time only, or absolutely perpetual.

In the region of the physical we know that it is but temporary; the persistence of sensible images is but partial. They last only while the vibration of the organ that has been struck continues; only until the echoes of the sound that has been made have quite died away. But in the region of the mental—and those portions of the cerebrum in which those nerve-modifications are produced, which are the physical equivalents of the mental modifications—it would seem eternal; at least as lasting as the nature that is concerned.

Though the sensations die away in the organ,—the retina of the eye, the tympanum, etc., of the ear,—the modification in the sensorium seems to abide—in what form it seems impossible to say; but somehow, and, in most cases (which is the position of Dr. Carpenter), if not in all, as long as the organism lasts—the modifications being maintained even through the change (absolute and complete in seven years) of the material particles of which it is composed, just as in the case of the cicatrix of a wound.

Once made, the mark never wears off; once produced, the impression never wears out. True the marks are made with sympathetic ink, so that they may disappear from actual sight for many a long day, and the surface on which they lie latent may be scribbled over in many different ways and in divers directions.[1] But let only the favourable conditions appear, let only genial

[1] This is an adaptation of an image used in another connection by my revered President, Dr. Reynolds.

warmth be applied; or the peculiar atmosphere they need breathe over them; and they will glow forth as vivid, and stand out as clearly, as on the day when they first were made.

§ 72. Even here Volition may act indirectly. By concentration of attention, protracting the thoughts, the impression is deepened, and connections are made stronger and more multiform; and so more likely to recur in a more vivid and complete form.

Still, as far as the essentials of its operation are concerned, it is part of our nature; independent of our will, as many a man in his death-hour will testify, who would fain abolish memory, and blot out the past; and when the most resolute effort of Volition avails nothing to keep back the horde of phantoms that come trooping in upon his spirit, reproducing with such terrible rapidity with such cruel continuity, and with such awful accuracy, every act, and thought, and feeling, and desire, and volition of his life, as to prove to him incontestably that, *nolens volens*, his nature has retained the whole.

§ 73. 3. But though *Volition* has no direct control over the *Retentive*, is it true that it has none over the *Reproductive?* Here we might be tempted to answer in very uncertain tones; for in the face of facts such as those to which we have just made allusion, we should have to answer in the affirmative here as well; but when we remember the myriads of instances in which by a distinct and conscious effort we *recall* what is not present to the thought, we must as unhesitatingly answer in the negative.

And both answers would be correct. For the Reproduction of the past is twofold in its character.

74. (*a*) Much of it is mere re-appearance, the ghost

of the bygone, starting up before the mind utterly unsought and unasked.

Where this is the case, it takes place in accordance with the Laws of Association.[1] Just as when a row of toy-bricks are placed on end near each other, the knocking over of one involves the fall of all; so often the hitting on one thought will be sufficient to bring quite unbidden a hundred others with it. Or it would seem that thought was bound with thought, as link with link in a chain; and often is it manifestly true that you can no more summon one, without introducing a host of others, than you can take up one link of a chain for inspection without dragging with it all the rest. There is some common word which (though you know it not) constitutes a talisman, possessing the magic power of calling up at its sound a ghostly host of past experiences; and, as unawares you utter it, there spring up at your feet or before your face, as from the very ground, this crowd of bygone thoughts and feelings, which startle you by their suddenness and trouble you with their uncalled-for presence.

Of course, what we say here, does not preclude, is not intended to preclude, the possibility of supernatural agency. It is possible tt so me other spirit than our own, it is possible that the Supreme Spirit—God—may act directly on ours, so as to do the work, effected more laboriously and more slowly by the operation of the Laws of Association, in Suggestion.

Over this much of the work of the Reproductive Faculty, Volition has manifestly no control.

[1] Very ably investigated by Sir W. Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. ii., chaps. xxxi. and xxxii.; and by Bain, "Intellect," chaps. ii., iii., and iv.

§ 75. (*b*) Nor has it much to do with the more connected thoughts, that suggest themselves in the course of an intentional investigation.

In this the process is semi-volitional, the observing faculty has had the mandate given to it, to be on the watch for any thoughts similar to those that are being pursued, which may be *suggested*, or rather that may suggest themselves, in its progress. So much of attention or volitional consciousness is relegated for the special work of encouraging such suggestion. It is, so to speak, bidden to stand by, and welcome each such suggested thought as it appears, so that it may not share the fate of what is irrelevant (though it ever and anon appears), and fall back again unnoticed into the shadow of unconsciousness from which for the moment the operation of the Laws of Association (quite apart from any action of the Ego in Volition) caused it to emerge, but bring it forward, and place it fully before the mind.

This concatenated and significant *Suggestion* stands mid-way, then, between the purely involuntary Reappearance of the past, which it is so difficult to account for; and the wholly Voluntary Reminiscence, which we now proceed to consider.

§ 76. (*c*) In *Reminiscence* proper we pass from the region of purely passive, or even half-automatic, power, to that of power really and intensely *active*. As active it is essentially volitional. No real recollection can be unintentional. For in this special sense it is really equivalent to the kindred word "recalling."

But what is "recalled" is brought back by the express mandate of the Ego, and mandates are expressed, are indeed only possible, in the forms of Volition. *Reminiscence* proper is therefore *voluntary reproduction.*

§ 77. As we have already hinted, the extent of this power will determine the *available* amount of the treasures retained by Memory pure and simple. For it is by this faculty that we are enabled to turn back upon the past, and select from its stores what we need for present use. Unless we can do this, the mere possession is of comparatively little worth.

It is true there is a great advantage in even the mere possession. Though, at the moment, unable to reproduce it, we may by continuous efforts—by a persistent search—be able in the course of time to discover, and at length to bring it forth; when it still may be of service, though not of such pointed use as if it had been secured at once. We all know what it is to say that "we know a thing," and yet be unable to reproduce it. We are morally certain that we have it in our mental stores; but we cannot lay our hand upon it. We know we have not forgotten it; in other words (in a certain sense) we do remember it, but we cannot recollect it.

§ 78. Now, doubtless, different individuals have this faculty in very various degrees of comprehensiveness and strength; doubtless, too, like all other faculties, it may be strengthened by use and drill; and it would be interesting to trace out the laws which regulate this variation and development; but this is beside our main point.

§ 79. Doubtless, too, in effecting its object the Reproductive Faculty works along the lines, and employs the aid, of the Laws of Association (which regulate the entire of the phenomena of Memory, Suggestion, and Reminiscence alike).

Indeed the process seems actually to be as follows: Association is set to work with a fragment—generally

the question to which a solution is wanted. All we do is volitionally to watch the operation—*i.e.*, keep consciousness concentrated on the notions successively suggested, until the right one appears.

But what concerns us most to know and realise is that, in its every act, a distinct and energetic *Volition* is absolutely essential. As Volition is the one power of control which our nature possesses, it is natural that in this matter of Recollection, which is really nothing but a test and manifestation of the control we have over our mental treasures—the accumulated hoard of all our past experiences—we should find *Volition* as its very soul and spirit and life. In actual operation, Volition acts in a twofold way. First, Intensifying, concentrating attention on half the duality; second, Directive, guiding the thought along lines useful and likely to be successful.

§ 80. 4. *Representative.*—The fourth special faculty of Cognition receives from Sir W. Hamilton the name of the *Representative* or *Imagination.*

Any way, it is really a subordinate and ancillary faculty. It waits upon both the *Reproductive* and the *Comparative.* It is that by which a vivid representation of a *past*, or a *compounded*, scene or thought is brought before the mind. It is that which gives clear mental form, distinct mental outline, warm mental colouring, to all that is summoned to appear out of the world of phantoms, to mock the world of outward realities.

But as such it is only an incidental, not a principal, faculty at all. It is only casually that Volition is called forth, to stimulate it to more active exercise, if circumstances require. In itself it is automatic in its action, though the automaton may, so to speak, be wound up to more rapid movements and more complete activity.

§ 81. In its completest form it consists of two parts —Composition and Concentration. The first is the putting together, in new groups and fresh unities, of materials already acquired in the processes of perception, and retained and reproduced by Memory. This is the function of a separate faculty—the Comparative. The second is the concentration of attention upon the product, resulting in the greater vividness of the picture reproduced. This concentration is more specially volitional.

But whenever the Reproductive Faculty is called into play, it too is roused to action—at least to some extent. Of course, in different men it has naturally greater intensity, or vivacity; in some barely existing, in others in the intensity of its life, absorbing to itself a large proportion of the whole *quantum* of power, of which the individual is possessed. A true poet is an example of the latter; in a born mathematician, we have a typical instance of the former. But it is primarily involuntary in its action, waiting on the Reproductive Faculty as a faithful dog or slave will wait on his master; though Volition may come upon the scene to exercise its intensifying function, in kindling it from sluggishness to vigorous activity. *Per se* involuntary, though open to the kindlings of Volition, is the Representative Faculty.

§ 82. 5. *Elaborative.*—Of the *Elaborative* Faculty we may speak almost as briefly as of the Representative. Not because of the barrenness, but because of the certainty, of our subject—the clearness of our theme. It is the faculty by which we make comparisons, and discern Relations; by the operation of which we form Conceptions, Judgments, and Reasonings out of mere Intuitions. It is, truly—what would be suggested by the very term '*Elaborative*'—the manufacturing faculty. By means

of it we work up the raw material of the data of our senses into intellectual forms. We manipulate, analyse, separate, compound, and join, by virtue of this. It is the faculty, *par excellence*, by which we show our power of dealing with what is presented to us by means of all the other faculties. In exercising it, we show that we can alter and change the form of what is given us to suit our fancy and meet our needs. Through it, we manifest our power of *using* it as we wish.

§ 83. And surely it is evident that if *Volition* is at work anywhere, it must be at work, vigorously and constantly, in all this. Just the fact that all these processes do not make themselves, but that we make them, proves that they are none of them involuntary; but all need the direct activity of Volition to produce any or each.

(*a*) If Volition is the soul of Attention; since attention is absolutely necessary to the performance of any of these acts of Comparison, Volition must manifestly be at work here.

(*b*) Since Volition is the very heart of intentional recollection; and reminiscence is an indispensable condition of all acts of Mental Comparison, we have in this a second proof that Volition must be in active energy here.

(*c*) But to pass by secondary reasons, we have in the essential nature of the operations, which are the product of this faculty, the most convincing proof of all. If they are what has been hinted at and sketched, they are the most distinctly purposed, the most unmistakably intentional operations performed by the human Ego. In them we are most clearly conscious of deliberate and set actions of our own.

Though we may have many perceptions glide into

our mind unsought, and many forced upon us quite against our will; though they all retain their lodgment there (either consciously or unconsciously to ourselves) quite independently of our wish, or will; and though, when recalled, the past will always clothe itself in some sort of dress, whether we take any trouble to arrange the garments or not: we certainly never find conceptions manufactured within us in any impersonal fashion; we never become aware of propositions presenting themselves from some dark recesses of our mental nature, where, altogether apart from any superintendence of the process by ourselves, they have been formed by the automatic action of its machinery; and quite as sure—nay, even surer—are we that no laboured argument nor train of reasoning which we can call our own has ever grown up within us, while our Volition was occupied with other things. Any and all of these things to be effected at all, must be effected by means of the directive, sustentative, and often the concentrative functions of Volition. In any of them, and in all, we feel that we are emphatically at work, often hard at work; and at each stage—nay, at every point of it—we must be using our Will, strenuously, sedulously, uninterruptedly. Were we for a moment to let the voluntary become the involuntary; were we to drop the reins but for an instant, or give up conscious control but for a second, all would go wrong—thinking would become dreaming, reasoning would give way to reverie, and the most closely connected argumentation would degenerate into careless and aimless castle-building.

For in the exercise of this Comparative Faculty the mind is in the workshop, sorting and selecting, tearing or condensing, hewing or hammering, carving or model-

ling, as the case may be. True, the artizan uses tools, the engineer employs machines; but the artizan is not an automaton, the engineer is not a machine. There is conscious control in the head and the hand of the workman in every case. By his own skill the artizan directs his tools; of his own intelligent choice the engineer manages and regulates the machine. And just as truly does the Ego, in all these operations of Elaboration, exercise a conscious supervision, a constant control of its faculties.

Most *essentially voluntary*, then, is the *Comparative Faculty;* most absolutely necessary is Volition to its exercise.

§ 84. 6. *Regulative.*—The fifth, and last, of the Special Cognitive Faculties, according to Sir W. Hamilton—but the sixth, if we consider *Introspection* separately from *Perception*—is what he calls the Regulative Faculty. He himself acknowledges that "the term faculty is" here "employed in somewhat peculiar signification." Indeed he declares it to be only "the power the mind has of being the native source of certain necessary or *à priori* cognitions;" and in another place "the power which the mind possesses of modifying the knowledge it receives, in conformity to its proper nature."

In other words, again, it is that, by the operation of which, everything which enters the mind has impressed upon it a certain mental 'form;' in virtue of which everything passing from the region of the external into the internal must be moulded into certain intellectual shapes.

But what is this but the nature and constitution of the human mind? It can hardly with any propriety be called a faculty at all.

Surely, a faculty cannot be called 'a place.' Faculty

is a particular kind of *power:* and 'place' and 'power' certainly belong to categories of thought quite distinct from each other; Place to the category of Space, and Power to the category of Force. And certainly Space is as essentially different from Force as it is from Time. So that by no affirmative proposition can the two be linked together with any logical propriety. You might just as well say, 'a faculty is green.' And yet of this Regulative Faculty he afterwards writes it is the *locus principiorum,*—or place of principles.

Neither is a faculty in any way identical with a 'law,' or any number of laws. For faculty is a kind of *energy;* and a law is that which regulates energy, that in accordance with which energy must be manifested. There is all the difference between faculty and law, that there is between a wheel and the rut in which it runs. And yet —in the same sentence in which he uses the above-quoted phrase—he says, "It is in fact nothing more than the complement of such *laws,*" meaning "the fundamental laws of intellectual nature."

What he refers to under this dubious phraseology is, doubtless, the peculiar constitution of every human intellect, in virtue of which every objective reality which is mentally appropriated as a truth must in the process take a definite, limited, conditioned, subjective form. It is that, in the mind, by which it becomes the source, the *fons et origo* of notions and judgments, which cannot be traced to Experience as its source, though in Experience they find their occasion.

§ 85. But this being its nature, its relation to Volition is a question that determines itself. The *constitution* of our being is that over which we have absolutely no control. Our nature, in its essentials, it is utterly beyond our power

to modify or affect. The 'forms' of the Intellect, then, are manifestly utterly beyond the domain of the Will. The laws of our mental nature are quite out of the province of Volition.

The Regulative Faculty, or Intuition, then,—for, unfortunately, this same word has been used as the name of the faculty of *à priori* notions and judgments, as well as a synonym for any isolated *sense-impression* or simple mental modification — must manifestly be purely involuntary in its operation. Volition has nothing to do with it at all.

II. FEELING.

§ 86. This is a topic replete with interest in itself, and made doubly so by its important ethical bearings. 'The control of Feeling'—its possibility, its extent, its method—is a theme which in its practical issues every man has had to ponder; whether in petulant despair, with irritation and shame; or with determined resolve, in calm earnestness.

It is a theme which, to many, has ever been filled with mystery and confusion, and by many more has never been approached in any other spirit than that of impatient passion. And yet it is one which to calm consideration will yield very clear conclusions. Aided by the result of our previous investigation, we are able, at the very outset, to give in comprehensive outline a complete account of the conditions of the whole case.

"Feeling" is essentially a *passive* power. It is absolutely certain, therefore, that over it Volition has no immediate control. But this does not preclude the possibility of control in any form. What cannot be achieved directly may be accomplished indirectly; and though

there be no such possibility as immediate, there is such an actuality as mediate, control. Volition can evoke our active powers; and from the results achieved by these, the feelings which are desired may arise, or the feelings which are dreaded may be dissolved and dissipated, by the mechanical operation of the law of Cause and Effect.

The truth of this will appear more clearly in a more detailed investigation.

§ 87. 1. First, then, Volition has no *direct* control of Feeling. Feeling is twofold in nature—physical and spiritual: the one arising from modifications in the corporeal, the other from modifications in the incorporeal, nature; the one produced by certain affections of the nervous system, the other the direct result of certain affections of the mind. The phenomena produced in the one case have been called Sensations; those produced in the other, Emotions.

(1) Now, in reference to the first part of our subject, it is almost self-evident that it is quite *beyond* our *power* either to *produce*, or to *annihilate* particular sensation by a mere effort of Volition.

If our body is racked by any violent pain, no effort of Will, however resolute, can *drive* it *out*, and replace it with as keen a pleasure.

Pain is usually the direct result of a diseased, or at least an abnormal, condition of the body, unhealthily affecting the nerves of sensation; and until either the disease be expelled, and so health be restored, or the nervous system be powerfully possessed or affected by some fresh, vigorous energy—the feeling of pain, the sensation of distress, will remain undisturbed and undiminished by the most violent and spasmodic exercise of Volition.

No amount of wishing, however intense, will transmute the unpleasant bitterness of quinine, that, with many, sends a shudder through the system, into the soothing sweetness of the fabled nectar of the gods. The discomfort caused by the excessive bitterness of the quinine, is plainly a direct result of the disturbance of the nervous organism of taste; and it can only be removed in one of three ways: either by the gradual disappearance of the nervous disturbance (which will naturally ensue if the dose be not repeated); or by the production of a fresh impression on the gustatory nerves by the contact of some other substance with the tongue and palate; or, again, by withdrawing attention to some other thought, so vivid and engrossing that no consciousness may be left available in the direction of this particular sense.

Nor is it any more within the region of the possible to *produce* a sensation by mere Volition, than to *remove* one.

§ 88. The instances which might be advanced in refutation of such a position are capable of other explanation.

It is indubitable that, in the course of biological experiments,[1] lads and men have had certain sensations given to them, and removed from them, at the will of the operator. Mysterious as it may seem, the facts are too numerous and too well attested to justify the hypothesis of constant deception. It is evidently possible for one man to bring another into such a physical condition, that,

[1] I am glad to find that Dr. Carpenter, in his "Mental Physiology," takes these and kindred facts into patient and philosophical consideration, and educes from them important conclusions.

by a (vigorous) Volitional effort, he can cause his victim to experience any sort of sensation he may choose. He must have the taste of coffee or rum in his mouth, even when what he is actually swallowing is either tasteless water or repulsive assafœtida, exactly as the operator wills. And certainly this looks like the direct control of sensation by Volition.

§ 89. But a more patient and thoughtful consideration of the phenomena will dissipate this first impression, and only more firmly establish our position. Though the production of the sensation in the victim appears to be the immediate effect of the Volition of the operator, an analysis of the process will show that the path traversed is really a devious one; though traversed with such rapidity as to suggest its being "the shortest distance between the two points" concerned.

The ordinary explanation of these biological phenomena is this. The Will of the operator has such inherent or acquired ascendancy over the Volition of the victim, that, for the time being, it altogether subdues and supplants it. The Will of the operator usurps absolute control of the faculties of the victim; and, as from the very conditions of the case it is far intenser in its strength, and more resistless in its mandates, than that of the nature it invades, the usurper has far more absolute command of the entire of his powers than even the usurped has himself in his ordinary state. So powerfully, therefore, does the operator direct his thoughts and excite his imagination, that the physical and nervous results of the mental state predominate over, neutralise, and supplant those which would be produced by the natural action of any merely physical agent upon the physical organism. An imagined taste, therefore, absorbs

the whole of the consciousness; expels before it an actual; and the strange effect is produced at which all spectators marvel. But it will be seen that it is still only by an indirect process that the sensation is regulated by Volition. For what Volition evokes is the vivid imagination. The sensation is the effect of imagination upon the nervous system, as the organ of the vivid thought. On this explanation, then, the actual series of causes and effects is this: Volition, cause of the imagination; imagination, cause of sensation.

Dr. Carpenter's explanation is in substance as follows. The nature, under the power of a fixed idea—as in gazing intently at the disc used by biologists—loses all self-control, becomes completely passive, susceptible to the play upon it of any idea whatever which may be presented to it. So, not the operator alone, but any bystander also, by the utterance of a word, suggests a thought so powerfully that the corresponding sensation, of which it is the reflex, in the region of Feeling at once follows. He claims to have proved this experimentally. On this view, then, Volition has control of the thought by the utterance of words, the sensation in question arising as the reflex of the thought thus suggested. On both hypotheses, however, it is clear the control of the physical feeling by Volition is only indirect.

§ 90. (2) When we pass from the physical to the mental, from Sensations to Emotions, the same principles still hold true.

To put extreme cases, in which every one must recognise their own experience. We all know that we cannot will ourselves into frames of happiness or anguish to order. If we are plunged into deep grief by the loss

of some dear friend, it matters not what may be our 'strength of will," it cannot avail us to quench the grief through mere energy of purpose to do so. As long as we are face to face with the sad calamity, our spirit is burdened; our heart aches; and, in all probability, with an acuteness just proportional to our volitional strength, our native force of character.

And, on the other hand, we may be filled to overflowing with exuberance of joy. Our physical energies are at their healthy best; our heart is light; our soul is glad; for round us is sunshine, the present is all happiness and success, and the future is all bright with hope. Suddenly, in a moment, we are called upon to pine in sorrow over the lot of some poor African savage, living in besotted and insensate content in a state of superstition and bondage. Probably our first answer to such an unreasonable demand would be: "We can't do it." And at least thus much of the answer would be true. By a mere Volition the thing is impracticable; as impracticable as by a Volition to turn the glory of midday into the gloom of midnight.

It will be a difficult and complex process that will effect it, if it is to be effected at all. A simple and direct Volition is utterly impotent for the achievement of the change. For emotion waits upon thought just as closely and constantly as sensation does upon nervous modification. In each individual nature, a certain class of thought as inevitably and as naturally rouses a certain class of feeling; as each class of tree will bear its own peculiar blossom, and each kind of blossom will die down before the growth of a special kind of fruit. The connection between thought and feeling is just that of phenomenal cause and phenomenal effect. The law

that connects them is almost absolutely rigid, well-nigh immutable. While, then, a parent thought continues present in the mind, as long as the attention is absorbed in its contemplation, it is just a physical impossibility to alter or to quench the emotion, that has sprung out of it, by a mere Volition. In other words, we have as little direct control of our *emotions* as we have of our *sensations.*

§ 91. 2. But we cannot be content to leave this great subject with only this hasty glance at its negative side. We must at least expand into a sentence or two the hint we have already given as to the positive aspect that it wears. Though we cannot control feeling directly, we may do so indirectly, and by a method very far-reaching in its results on our whole nature.

It would be a terrible thing, indeed, were we wholly helpless as regards this large and most important section of our experience. If we could be only the passive and impotent recipients of sensational and emotional experiences; if we were doomed to feel pain or pleasure, sorrow or joy, just as the working of the great impersonal laws, of the universe outside us, or of our natures within us, determined each to be our lot; our plight would be indeed sad and lamentable.

That to a large extent we are so, we must all humbly admit. Though in many respects we may feel that

"Man is man, and master of his fate"—

still, in reference to many an ache and pain, many a thrill of pleasure, many a keen sorrow, and many a glad delight, we know that it is as true that

"We cannot choose but feel"

them. Over these we are constrained to acknowledge we have no sort of control either to create or dispel

them. We must accept them when they come; we must wait until they go.

But over most, we are glad to believe, we have some real power, even though it be only indirect.

§ 92. (*a*) It is clearly so with Sensations. If suffering acutely from some *disease*, we are not compelled, in entire inaction and meek passivity, to wait and suffer until the pain departs with the wearing out of the disease, simply because we cannot wish or will the pain away. It is quite competent to us to exercise our Volition in the direction of taking some specific drug that may abate or expel the disease from the system, and with it cause the pain to cease. Though we cannot wish away a toothache, we may decide (and that through Volition) to apply creosote or nervine to the tooth; and Volition will be as effectual, as far as the end is concerned, in acting indirectly, as though it could operate directly.

Again, it is perfectly true that we cannot appease *hunger* by a wish; we cannot experience the physical comfort that follows a sufficient and hearty meal by a violent Volition to the effect that our famishment shall give place to satisfaction; or, of course, if thus "wishes were horses, then beggars might ride." But if the means and the stores are at our disposal, we can volitionally order our table to be spread, and voluntarily and by appropriate action supply the want, which hunger announces, with savoury viands, the leisurely eating and due digestion of which will bring the condition of physical comfort that we crave. So that in this instance, again, Volition performs in an indirect way, and with quite as satisfactory result (unless the exertion necessary be deprecated) what, in direct method, is impossible.

§ 93. (*b*) Similarly with *Emotions.* Though it be perfectly true that we cannot be sad or glad just "at will," we can volitionally adopt any one of three methods, each practically efficacious in producing the desired result.

First. We can resolve *to fix our thought* on some other subject, either brighter or more serious, as the case may be. This Bain recognises in his chapter on "Command of Thoughts," when he says: "It"—*i.e.*, this power of *directing* our thoughts—"is an exceedingly powerful adjunct in the control of the feelings, being probably more efficacious than the voluntary sway of the muscular manifestations." [1]

Second. We may *restrain the expression* of emotion; and this, unless it be very intense, will strangle or suppress the emotion itself—*i.e.*, the muscular manifestations of which Bain speaks (*e.g.*, laughter).

Or, Third. We may, by a determined resolution, *absorb ourselves* in some active work, and so divert our attention, from what is essentially saddening or trivially mirthful, to what is inherently invigorating, essentially stimulating, healthily cheering.

True, we must sorrow over loss. But because we cannot "will" the sorrow away then and there, we must not allow all our powers to dwindle under its influence, by giving up ourselves to a despondent brooding over the loss. We may volitionally pursue any or all of the three methods just enumerated; and we shall find the sorrow of silence and sloth gradually dissolve into the chastened joy of brighter thoughts, of self-restraint, and of useful service. Through Volition, again, we effect the change, though it be not immediately—only mediately.

[1] "Mental Science," p. 344.

Again, we recognise it as a correct statement of fact that we cannot will ourselves in a moment from open-hearted jollity into honest grief. But if it were not true that by an indirect process we can exchange hearty laughter for real tears, where would be the possibility of *sympathy?* Though we may walk the streets on a visit to a friend with cheerful spirits and elastic step, it is possible for us, if we find on entering that he is bowed down to the earth with some awful sorrow, by degrees to leave the light temper in which we came, and take into our own hearts something at least of his great grief; so that though, when we entered, the boisterous salutation was just bursting from our lips, when we leave, it may be with a very subdued farewell, and with our cheek yet moist with the tears shed in "weeping with those that weep." It was truly by no magic Volition, that in a moment the sad transformation was effected; and yet it was all by *Volition*,—quite voluntarily,—that it was done. By an effort, strong and earnest, we dismissed the thoughts that were so active in our minds before, and with eager attention we listened to the simple story of our friend; and, as he spoke, our hearts began to fill, until the tale had turned the tide of our emotions from buoyant mirth to sympathetic gloom, and the sight of his trouble had deepened our new-born sadness.

§ 94. Bain—taking the position that "The intervention of the Will" is "restricted to muscular movements" —of course has to adopt a much narrower position here: viz., that "The voluntary control of the feelings hinges on muscular accompaniments."[1] And as muscular movements are only one of three elements of the physical

[1] "Mental and Moral Science," p. 339.

accompaniments of Feeling (the other two being (1) diffused nerve currents, and (2) organic changes), the amount of control of particular feelings will depend on the relative importance of this one element as compared with the other two. So that three main cases are presented:[1] First. In comparatively "feeble excitement," the outward suppression tends, not immediately, "but very soon, to the cessation of the feelings." Second. In strong feelings,[2] the muscular repression seems not merely to fail, but to augment the consciousness of the feelings: "as if the nervous currents were intensified by resistance." Third. There is a certain tendency in the muscular expression of a feeling to "induce a feeling, through the connection established, either materially or by association between this and the other portions of the physical circles of effects."

It is a control of Feeling by Volition, none the less real, because indirect.

CHAPTER V.—ITS RELATION TO THE OTHER FACULTIES (*continued*).

3. DESIRE.

§ 95. III. DESIRE.—We must now turn to the last of the three classes of Mental Phenomena (besides Volition itself)—*Desire;* and ask again with reference to it,—What is the connection of *Will* with *Desire?* Are our Desires wholly involuntary; or are they under our control?

It is a perplexing question to answer; but we may be somewhat helped by recurring once more to the dis-

[1] "Mental and Moral Science," pp. 339, 340. [2] Ibid. p. 340.

tinction between *active* and *passive* power. Is Desire purely *passive?*

In the face of the previous analysis [1] we cannot but answer most unhesitatingly, No. For passivity is inert and motionless; merely recipient of effects from external causes: while in Desire there is a movement; there is incipient energy; an actual longing to produce effects on the world around—to impress the "subject" on the "object," the Ego on the non-Ego.

But if Desire is not purely passive, it is as certainly not fully active. For thorough-going activity involves in its complete conception the actual effectuation of appreciable and real results. If it has a beginning, in the evoking of energy; a middle, in the sustentation and direction of that energy; it has an end also, in the fulfilment of its object, the accomplishment of its purpose. Corresponding to, or rather following, the exertion of every fully active power, there must be a real result, an appreciable act. To use a knife upon a piece of wood ends in the result of a modification of its form, and the additional production of a number of chips. To put forth the active energy that is required to move my arm, issues in the palpable phenomenon of the movement of my arm through the air, and perchance the striking of the desk with my clenched fist. The employment of the essentially active power of my Comparative or Elaborative Faculty must find its completion, or end in the production of some definite conception, some decided judgment, or, perhaps, some laboured conclusion. Now in the case of each and all of these fully active powers, there remains as the product of their use some phenomenal result.

[1] 'Desire': Cap. I. § 5, pp. 10–13.

But in Desire there is nothing at all tallying with this. In the very nature of the case there must be an absence of anything like it. For Desire is essentially inchoate, incomplete. The only phenomenal product is the desire itself. As Desire, it remains *unfulfilled.*

As soon as some phenomenon other than Desire appears, we are forced to attribute it to some other faculty.

It is movement in sort, and so is not purely passive; but it is self-movement only, and so is not truly active. The movement dies away in mere motion, without moving ought but itself. Though it is the spring of active energy, and so may be the psychological father of true action, the father is distinct from the child.

§ 96. If, then, Desire holds a medial position in reference to Activity and Passivity, as truly as it does in reference to Objectivity and Subjectivity, may we not conclude that, in reference to the important point of its control by or independence of Volition, it must hold the same middle place? Are we not prepared to find, as the result of the most careful investigation in other directions, that while, as a not fully active power, we have not complete, immediate, and actual control of Desire; yet, as not truly passive, it is not altogether beyond the sphere of Will?

But, not to foreclose the question, or trust too implicitly the cogency of this general reasoning, let us look at this great question as a practical problem of much interest, mystery, and importance.

§ 97. Is it not, on the face of it, one of the greatest puzzles that the psychologist ever has to attempt to unravel—How it happens that the Desires, which strike their roots so deep into the nature, and so entirely

regulate the life and mould the character of each individual, should so widely vary from each other? And, on the other hand, is it not one of the most solemn and perplexing questions which can present itself to the mind of man—How far each man is responsible for his Desires, and to what extent it is possible for him to control or modify them?

There is one word, which is often enough on our lips, and which by its kinship, almost identity, with 'Desire,' will bring up the whole problem in a more striking as well as a more familiar form. I mean 'Taste,' with its correlated concrete, 'tastes'; involving 'likes' and 'dislikes,' as the methods of its manifestation. Clearly this is substantially the same as what we mean by the philosophical term Desire; for we 'long for' only what we 'like'; we 'loathe' only what we 'dislike.'

So closely indeed is *longing* connected with *liking*, and *loathing* with *dislike*, that they may be looked at as only the obverse and the reverse of the same coin. And since longing and loathing are only the opposite poles of the same faculty of our nature, which for convenience we have called by a name which in strictness applies only to the former—viz., Desire; and as liking and disliking are as truly the opposite poles of the same principle which we call by the term "taste" (though that too with more strictness will apply only to liking, '*Distaste*' being rather the correlative of disliking): it is plain that we shall be guilty of no confusion of theme, nor any unconscious shifting of ground, if for a while we talk about 'Taste' and 'tastes' rather than about 'Desire' and 'desires.'

We put the matter then in the form of two plain, blunt questions:

(1) Is there any *accounting* for a man's tastes?

(2) Is a man in any wise *accountable for* his tastes? They are logically distinct: though they are vitally related to each other.

§ 98. (*a*) The first opens up a large subject, which I would prefer dealing with by asking questions and making suggestions, rather than by hazarding dogmatic assertions, or laying down final conclusions.—Is there any accounting for a man's tastes?

Is there any clearer, more ultimate answer, than that they are part and parcel of his *nature?* While a man has such and such a nature, can he have other tastes than those which distinctly characterise it, and which, at least to others, mark its peculiar individuality? Indeed, are not 'tastes' and 'nature' so essentially connected, so organically and vitally related to each other, that to alter 'tastes' would be to change, or, at least, modify the nature?

Again, is not 'nature,' as far as 'tastes' are concerned, largely the result of *physical conditions?* Is not such and such a 'nature' compatible only with a certain peculiarity of physique? And is not a certain tone of physique the sure sign of the prevalence of certain tastes?

It is indubitable that tastes are *very deeply* rooted; even if it cannot be proved that their roots, if traced to their ultimate filaments, would be found invariably twining themselves among the foundation-stones of the 'nature,' it must be admitted that they are so radical in their nature, so difficult at least to eradicate when once implanted, so tenacious in their hold when once they have gained a footing; that there is good reason for the pleading often urged that it is "a hopeless task" to attempt anything for which there is no natural taste.

Indeed, they appear to be innate, inborn, and inbred ; as much so as the colour of the eyes, or the hue of the complexion.

One man is an enthusiastic lover of music; while another has an actual aversion from it. The one, in childhood even, would listen with rapturous delight to the simplest strains ; and, as soon as his tiny fingers could find an instrument on which to move, would draw forth, as with the sure instinct of nature, quite apart from the laborious effort of drill and teaching, melodies and harmonies which astonish and delight any who may chance sympathetically to hear. The other appears to be so physically constituted that from any musical sound whatever there is an actual shrinking. Never, from the earliest dawn of consciousness, can he recall a single moment's pleasure which had its spring in music : nay, rather, it has always been irksome and uninteresting, if not the source of actual discomfort ; and unless death shall work a real renewal of his 'tastes' as well as his 'body,' the only heaven that would be joy in anticipation would be one constructed on strictest Quaker principles.

Again, a true artist has so absorbing a love of the beautiful in outline and tint and composition, that to pass hours of quiet, reverent, contemplative study of some *chef d'œuvre* of one of the old masters is to him so much of paradise on earth. And it has been so from his birth. No childish game ever gave him the pleasure that he had as often as he could get a pencil or a brush, and scribble or daub away at his rude pictures ; and now, he knows no higher joy than to realise in marble, or on canvas, ideals of loveliness or majesty or grace that haunt him like spirits from another world. But another, who boasts that he has too much of practical common-

sense to care to waste his time in such sentimental fripperies, if led through some fine-art Exhibition by force or by a sense of duty (for he will certainly never be led thither by inclination), with careless glance will hurry by the identical picture or statue before which the artist would willingly "sit and gaze himself away." So fundamentally different are his tastes, that it would be no pain to him were all the picture galleries and statuaries and studios in existence destroyed by fire in a single night; or if in one brief day all the loveliness of this earth's hills and valleys, forests and streams, were exchanged for all the dull, ugly, bare monotony of a dead level plain. To him the rich loamy flats of Holland afford much more pleasure, because so much more convenience for the practical purposes of agriculture and commerce, than the grand, though sterile, peaks of Alpine Switzerland.

Again, of two students it would not be difficult to find one in whom a taste for mathematical research is as much inbred, as in the other is that for classical study. For the one the beauties of Homer, the elegancies of Sallust or Ovid, the terse strength of Thucydides, the genial humour of Horace, or the keen sarcasm of Juvenal, are matters of pure indifference; they are to him, each and all, "the Unknown and the Unknowable," while his only sources of scientific delight are the exquisite ingenuity of the Calculus, the translucent cogency of Euclid's "Elements," or the charming clearness of "Theorems" with and without a name. With the other, the figures and symbols and diagrams of Mathematics are cold and dry and hard and enigmatical. They have no charm for him. Rather are they gaunt skeletons, the very sight of which raise in him only disgust and dread. But in all the gems of literature he discovers priceless treasure

trove. In the classics of Greece and Rome he finds endless scope for admiring study; and an exhaustless source of intellectual pleasure in the felicities of expression, in the noble beauty of thought, in the stately pomp of diction, in the harmonious rhythm of the numbers, with which they abound. And in each, these tastes, so distinct, so apparently opposed, have been manifested from very infancy. In fact each seems connate, fixed, unalterable.

To put one other case in a form in which it has been presented more than once. Is not the difference between the godless and the godly also clearly one of 'tastes'? In the latter there is a deeply-seated love of holiness and purity and meekness; a strong and constant desire for communion with God, and for realisation of the 'unseen and eternal.' To the former, all such things are phantoms of fanaticism, the airy offspring of enthusiasm. To the latter, the Bible is the 'best of books,' and Sunday 'the best of days:' with the former, the Bible is the one book that lies unused and covered with dust, on shelves where all its neighbours are moved and handled often; and the 'first day of the week' the longest and most tedious of the seven, one of almost unbearable *ennui* and wearisome dulness. The tastes of the two men are as diverse as are light and darkness; and yet in many cases they are tastes with which each was clearly born. The pious man was the thoughtful child of religious parents; the utter worldling was the careless boy, and the giddy, flippant, scornful youth.

§ 99. Now the question comes, and we should face it fairly, and try to give it a calm and candid answer,—Are not these peculiarities in taste clearly traceable to corporeal developments?

Must not a man with a certain physique have a certain class of tastes, and one with a different physique possess a clearly diverse class of tastes? Can he, in any way, by any means, revise or change them? Or, at least, is the only way to get new tastes to get a practically new body? Does a man alter his tastes, only as his physical frame is altered, by the development of years, or by the modification of new circumstances, or a fresh line of life? Where there is complete renewal, is it only once in seven years, with the complete renovation of the physical particles of which his body is composed? Where the change is gradual—at the time almost imperceptible—does the man grow out of his 'tastes,' only as he grows out of his old body and old clothes? For to this it must come, if the connection between 'taste' and 'physique' is one of cause and effect.

§ 100. But we cannot stop here. If we incline to accept thus much—that the only philosophical way of accounting for tastes is to say that they are ingrained in the physical constitution, and are the absolutely necessary result of corporeal nature; we are compelled further to face the question—and in consistency must be prepared to accept the logical answer to it,—Can a man then be accountable for his tastes?

When the question is put in reference to pursuits that in themselves are morally 'indifferent,' to which there attaches no moral character—that is, otherwise than laudable *per se*—a negative reply seems natural, and to many will be welcome.

The man radically unmusical will triumphantly ask, "How can I possibly be to blame because I have no taste for music; since it is plain enough I never had, and never will have, anything like an ear for it?" Whilst the un-

successful student of Homer will find a sufficient sop for his conscience in the philosophical reflection that, while mathematics naturally give him delight, he "wasn't born with a scrap of taste for classics."

Nor is it otherwise in many quarters—when it is no longer the possession of a musical, a classical, a scientific, or a mechanical 'turn'—but the far more momentous point of religious character, that is in question. It is considered sound and satisfactory reasoning with those who view man only as an 'anatomy,' and the whole of human life as only the self-evolution of physical life, to say in defence of others (or of themselves)—whenever the charge of 'unspirituality' is brought against them —that they are really not to blame because they are not religiously inclined, for their emotional nature is physically small, their glandular system is not highly developed; and so their emotional sensibilities (which they declare to be the heart and secret of all religious fervour) are of necessity reduced to a minimum. And, as further confirmation of their position, they maintain that all religious zealots will be found to be possessed of excessively tender emotional natures; and that, in the physical peculiarities of women as contrasted with men, is the real secret of the often-noted fact that women, as a rule, are far more spiritually inclined than men.

The very momentousness of the question thus incidentally raised, leads me to put it more clearly and pointedly, as the second we proposed to consider.

§ 101. (*b*) Is a man in any wise *accountable for* his tastes or desires? By the answer we feel compelled to return to this question we shall of course further determine what we have already in part considered, and also be placed in better position to arrive at a sound con-

clusion with regard to the point which has given rise to this excursus; viz., the Nature of the relation of Will with Desire.

For, on the one hand, if man is not accountable for his desires or tastes, then the physical theory as to what regulates them may be accepted as true; and we may believe that Volition has nothing whatever to do with them: and, on the other, if man is in any wise accountable for them, this physical theory cannot possibly be accepted, or a man would be as much responsible for having been born with only one ear; and we must recognise it as truth that by Volition we have some sort of control over Desire.

§ 102. Now it will save us much doubtful surmising, and much unsatisfactory reasoning, if we listen reverentially to words uttered by the greatest Teacher this world has known. It is not unfashionable to quote from human thinkers, it should not therefore be deemed unphilosophical to quote from the Divine Master. Every work of controversial philosophy abounds with reference to the opinions and positions of the leaders of thought in past ages or of the present day. Coincidence with them is gladly accepted as strong confirmation of the writer's own opinion; and often, though manifestly in contravention of the fundamental principles of all philosophising, the balance of a catalogue of great names in reference to any point in question is allowed great weight in arriving at the final conclusion. We are not therefore ashamed—since He spake "as one having authority;" an authority we acknowledge as final—we think it the only really wise thing, to accept the *ipse dixit* of Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of God, on this great theme. We shall find that, working from it as from a new starting-point, we shall be led to considerations and conclusions, which will

naturally afford a basis for a scientific explanation of the somewhat complicated facts which constitute the whole problem. See also Note A.

§ 103. It is clear and unmistakable in its general significance and bearing; though its occasion was peculiar, and its immediate reference special and restricted. It occurs in that first great sermon He delivered from the top of a mountain overlooking the shores of the Sea of Galilee. He has been contrasting the external and ritual nature of the Mosaic Law, as interpreted by all the Jewish authorities of his day, with the more inward and spiritual nature of the laws which He lays down as essential to the constitution of that "kingdom of heaven" which He came both to proclaim and to found: and He goes on to say "Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery;' but I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." [1]

The substance of this sentence is clear: the essence of the position is unmistakable. Not simply is actual adultery a sin,—that all men have admitted, and conscience uninstructed clearly testifies. The lustful look, —not simply the *act* determined by Volition,—but the *lusting*,[2] which is mere Desire, is sinful too. Man is responsible as truly for one as for the other.

§ 104. But in the region of morals what is true of one is true of all. If in this case the lust, though unaccomplished, is as truly a sin, as the act to which it prompts; then we learn that every vicious *desire*, every

[1] Matt. v. 27, 28.

[2] Compare the explanation of the word, in 'Desire' cap. iii. § 18, p. 31.

debased taste, allowed and not restrained, is as really sinful in the sight of God as the *action* which would be the complete fruition of the desire, the deed to which the taste would lead. Indeed one of the ten commandments of the Mosaic Law was: "Thou shalt not covet." But if the desire and the taste are sinful; and accounted sin to the man who indulges in them, he is accountable for them, for sin and accountability are logically correlative terms.

In this single deliverance of Christ's, then, we have a clear answer to our question,—Is man in any wise accountable for his tastes or desires? and that answer is unwaveringly *affirmative.*

But if this be so; they cannot be wholly the result of temperament, as far as that term indicates only physical condition. They are not determined wholly by 'physique;' for in that case a man would be as little responsible for his tastes and desires, as he is for his 'physique.'

Moreover it must follow that the facts, which seemed, at a hasty glance, to lead to this conclusion, must be interpreted in accordance with this new light. Of course, it must be recognised and admitted that we are not driven at once to the opposite extreme of maintaining that we are wholly accountable for *every* prompting, taste, and desire; and so must hold that these are entirely and completely under our control. All that we are constrained to believe is that they are *not* the *physical effect* of a *physical cause*, and so utterly beyond the influence of Volition: or, to put the same thing in a positive instead of a negative form,—that to *a certain extent it is within our power, volitionally,* to *modify and regulate our tastes and our desires.*

Thus much, and only thus much, are we shut up to

conclude from this authoritative deliverance of the Great Teacher—that Desire is as truly sinful as the deed. See also Note B.

§ 105. But we are now confronted with the question —as interesting in its way as that to which we have just obtained an answer,—HOW is volitional control of Desire effected? Is it direct as in the case of the Cognitive processes, and physical action; or is it merely indirect, as in the case of Feeling?

A moment's consideration will suffice to enable us to decide which alternative we must adopt.

§ 106. (*a*) Most manifestly it is *not* a *direct* control which is possible, if any is possible at all; else the question would never have been raised. If we could *at will*, and instantaneously, alter our tastes as readily as we can alter the position of our arm, or our hand, of course, it would have been palpably certain that we must be as much accountable for our tastes as for our actions. If we could change our desires as quickly as we can change the direction of our glance, or the field of our vision, there could be no uncertainty as to our responsibility in reference to them. But it is clear that neither of these things is possible. It is just as much beyond our power, by a mere exertion of will, to conceive a liking or have a taste, at this moment, for a thing or a pursuit for which we have had a dislike and distaste all our lives before, as it is by the same means to conjure up an emotion of exultant joy at the very time that our hearts are overwhelmed by some crushing grief. It is perfectly, transparently true, that the cool, and yet zealous mathematician, whatever be the strength of his Will (and that it is strong is evident from the marvels of absorption and abstraction, to which he is daily

showing that he is equal), is utterly impotent, by the mere energy of a Volition, in a moment to conceive a passionate longing, an earnest desire, to revel in all the gorgeous beauties of classic literature, of the very existence of which he has hitherto been cynically sceptical.

Tastes and Desires are plainly quite beyond any immediate control of Volition. The control we have, then, must be mediate and indirect.

§ 107. (*b*) Moreover, we must be prepared to find that it is *only* through a *slow* and *lengthened process* that the control becomes manifested at all.

In the case of *Feeling*, we found that it is only by the circuitous process of first setting in motion a train of thought, or fixing the attention on a class of subjects, or either of the other two methods referred to before (p. 99), which naturally produces the feelings which are desired, that Will controls it at all.

In the case of *Desires*, the object is achieved by means of a process as circuitous, and yet more tardy in the production of its results.

The only feasible method, the only successful process, seems to be this.

(1) Just as for the production of emotions, we are able volitionally to regulate our thoughts, so that our minds may be occupied with such as naturally engender the emotions we desire; so we can volitionally compel ourselves to a course of action, out of which will gradually grow a taste which has never existed before—Desires to which we have hitherto been perfect strangers.

But notice: while an emotion springs up instantaneously, upon the appearance of the thought with which it is naturally connected, to which it is constitutionally wedded, a taste is only the gradual growth of a length-

ened period; it developes only after the frequent repetition of an action, in fine, when it has become almost a *habit.* The method and *rationale* of its generation seems to be somewhat as follows.

§ 108. It appears to be a law of human nature—when unsoured by failure and malice, and undistorted by passionate hatred or sullen and determined evil—that a man shall unconsciously find some solace in any lot he may be forced to bear. The heart would become so withered and cold and dead, had it nothing in which it could find rest and joy, that it is impelled, by very love of life, by the instinct of self-preservation, to invent some source of comfort, in the very hardest, gloomiest path it has to tread. Without pleasure of some kind it cannot consent to exist; for, without it in some form, existence would be absolutely intolerable; and a relief from it would speedily be sought in suicide by any wretch so utterly miserable. So that, if we find ourselves restricted to a certain set of circumstances, however repulsive to us at first, we find ourselves unconsciously manufacturing pleasure out of what before we should have thought almost impossible materials; distilling some sort of nectar —scarcely fit for Jove perhaps—but for the nonce at least very refreshing to us, out of what we had hitherto shunned as veriest poison.

Even the prisoner will find some sort of miserable comfort in his gloomy cell. The mouse that robs him of part of his scanty fare becomes a welcome guest. The lines and marks upon his very dungeon's walls become the subject of interesting study. The single ray of half-strangled light, which, outside, would have seemed to him the symbol of misery itself, is his one greatest comfort now,—a silver line by which he can climb in imagi-

nation right through that high narrow slit, into all the brightness and freedom of the world outside.

And if it be true in such extreme cases as this, it is abundantly true in all others.

§ 109. Now, if *we voluntarily restrict ourselves* to such circumstances, the same issue will gradually emerge.

Let us set ourselves to do a certain task, which, at first, had no interest for us; but for which we have even a positive dislike; and, as we return to it again and again under the lash of our own strong will, we shall begin to find in our unexpected successes a source of pleasure. The successes will gradually become more frequent, and the pleasure more abundant; until at last we shall feel impelled by *Desire* to what at first we were compelled only by the strongest fear or sense of duty.

(1) These statements receive striking illustration, even in the region of purely physical tastes. No one, I suppose, has ever found a child to whom the taste of malt-liquor or animal oil is, at first, anything but repulsive. But only let a doctor prescribe for it, or a parent tempt it to take, *a course* of ale or cod-liver oil, and the working of this principle will soon be apparent. When taken for the first time, it was pure medicine to the child. But, by the time that it has been taken four or five times, the distaste will have entirely disappeared; and the little patient will declare that "he doesn't mind it *one bit;*" and, in all probability, by the time that the authorities have decided that the medicine may be "left off," such a decided taste and liking for it will have been formed, that the little bibber will wish that it was a regular beverage, rather than a casual draught.

(2) These facts are very noticeable too in reference

to the class of music which will afford the listener or the performer the greatest amount of delight. To almost every one in early childhood, classical music is a dull complicated jargon of sounds; while dance music, or the simplest melodies, are the source of intensest delight. But as a lad matures, he finds from those whom he respects and admires, that the most elevated tastes and the most cultured natures revel most in what he has been despising and ignoring. He wishes to acquire the same position as those whom he reveres; and he drills himself watchfully to listen to every scrap of classical music which he can get a chance of hearing. At first the self-imposed task appears dreary and unpromising enough. But very soon, if not on the very first occasion, he discerns gleams of a light to which he has been blind before, and every time he listens, he now finds more to see; until at last, in the masterpieces of Beethoven and Mendelssohn, he finds a world of beauty and glory which entrances him, and makes him feel that his former favourites are, in comparison, paltry and meagre and bare. The acquired taste is lordly as compared with the natural.

(3) Essentially the same thing is realised in the region of morals. It is a merciful provision that what first we drive ourselves to do, from sheer sense of duty, with no natural inclination or desire to do it whatever, by constant and faithful performance, we get to find a pleasure and a joy. We acquire a taste and real desire, which will prove stronger and more lasting than those which are connate.

So that it is clearly true that, largely and beneficially, *we can control* our Desires *indirectly* by the exercise of Volition. See also Note C.

CHAPTER VI.—ITS RELATION TO LAW.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND PLAN.—1. *Law.*

§ 110. Having now (1) assigned Volition its place amongst the four great classes of the mental phenomena,[1] (2) pointed out its essential functions, and (3) shown the relation it sustains to Cognition, Emotion, and Desire, we pass on to the consideration of the all-important topic, of its relation to *Law.*

At once we feel that the transition in subject is a decided and almost startling one. We are regretfully conscious that we are leaving the quiet leafy lanes of tranquil observation for the crowded streets of competitive disquisitions, rival discussions, and emulous arguments; or, worse still, for the yet more densely-crowded arena of the battle-field of antagonistic systems, wilful dogmatisms, and angry theologies. We see that the waters, on which we have been sailing in contemplative safety, are losing their mirror-like placidity—which enabled us to scan the very heavens without any upward glance—for already the ripples just arisen are multiplying and magnifying themselves into waves; and (not so far ahead either) we see the wide waters we are entering all fleecy with the foam of the breakers with which every craft that sails these troubled seas has to contend. Hitherto our task has been merely a calm, but critical observation of facts, with an attempt to analyse them on comprehensive principles. We have felt ourselves comparatively undisturbed, because in this plodding and purely psychological investigation, we feel that we have been treading almost virgin-soil;

[1] This was done incidentally—in connection with Desire: for, in vindicating for it a separate place, in contra-distinction with Volition, Volition *ipso facto* was placed by itself.

ground, therefore, as yet almost undisputed, though, we readily recognise, by no means indisputable. But we are now entering a region every inch of which has been traversed again and again. Every particle of verdure has been stamped out of it, by the constant tramp of pilgrim and warrior feet. Every point throughout the whole expanse has been contested by opposing armies. It is studded all over with the trophies of those who have named themselves the victors in innumerable struggles, bitter though bloodless, of which it has been the scene.

The very mention of the word "*Law*," in connection with "Volition" or "the Will," at once raises the ghosts of almost countless controversies. They come flocking round with a confusing din and a threatening roar, that is enough to daunt the bravest heart. At once we see confronting us the rival Genii of all past and present philosophising upon this theme, "Liberty" and "Necessity," each claiming to be heard and honoured: and, in the very utterance of this dread trio of terms, 'Law,' 'Liberty,' 'Necessity' (and we might add a fourth to complete the *quaternio belli evangelistarum* 'Free-will'), we seem to see glancing across the page the lightning flash that is the sure herald of the thunder peal, and the din and roar of the impending tempest. For we begin to tread upon ground in which the question lies not simply between conflicting theories of accepted facts, but concerns the facts themselves.

It must, then, be with diffidence that we attempt at all to tread this new road, to enter this ancient battle-field, to venture on this stormy sea. Still it is not without a hope that it may have some result, that the territory may be better known, that its features may be more clearly recognised, and that its apparently factious deni-

zens may be reduced to, or found actually to be in, greater harmony and peace.

The plan we propose to pursue is, not to shout a challenge to all comers at the outset, and so provoke a tournament where no fight is needed; but, if possible, to steer clear of all combatants, and quietly watch and listen to all testimonies and claims, that we may cede what is valid, and accept whatever may seem true, having no regard to names or systems; and, if compelled to face a foe, to do so as calmly as we can, with the aim rather of defending the sacred rights of Truth, than of gaining a point or establishing a Theory.

In the whole question there are perhaps no more important terms, than the one already mentioned, 'Law,' and another—scarcely so much dwelt upon—'Individuality.' We shall clear our path, and gain much light on the whole topic, if we first carefully examine the *nature* of each. We shall then be in a better position to understand their mutual relations, and their respective bearings on Volition.

I. LAW.—*Its Nature and Province.*

§ 111. Let us then first try to analyse and so to define the nature and province of *Law.* See also Note D.

A law is always expressed in a *sentence* either *imperative* or *categorical.* But as the former may be reduced to the latter, the manifest characteristics of a categorical sentence, or *proposition*, will guide us to some plain but important facts with reference to *Law.*

That such is the case will be made self-evident, if brought to the test of one or two examples. "Thou shalt not kill" is a Law, divinely given in the form of a sentence *imperative.* It may readily be rendered in

categorical form, thus: "My will is that thou do never kill." So the fiat of Creation—"Let light be"—was a Law given to this still inchoate universe by its Great King, which might have been expressed by the Almighty in declarative form—"My will is that light shall spring into being." A Law may therefore, it is plain, be always expressed in the form of a *proposition.* See also Note E.

§ 112. See then what follows from this simple fact. The teaching it implicitly contains is both *Negative* and *Positive.*

A. *Negative.* (1) It cannot be a *thing*, an *entity*, or any number of things or entities. Else its proper expression would be not a proposition, but a single word or phrase. And yet so loosely is the term used, that we often hear men, who should know better, speaking of the *Law* of *Gravitation*, or the *Law* of *Definite Proportions*, as though they were actual independent existences, which effect certain results, and which have a personal influence or power.

"The Law of, so-and-so, secures this, and restrains that, etc., etc.," are phrases often enough heard; and though, at the moment, hardly intended to be scientifically exact, are made starting points for lines of thought, or are interwoven into the texture of an argument, in a way that is very detrimental to accuracy and correctness.

Jardine has noticed the same thing, and animadverts upon it in the same strain. For he maintains that "to attribute independent reality to a *Law of Nature* is illegitimate;" "and yet we frequently hear Laws of Nature spoken of as causal agents, as producing the phenomena of whose order and mutual relations they are simply an expression."[1]

[1] "Psychology of Cognition," p. 195.

His reason for taking exception to this course is different and characteristic. It is, "Because to 'represent' a Law is impossible, except by imagining a variety of objects related to one another in such and such ways."

(2) It is evidently an error, also, to speak of the *facts* to which the Law applies, in whatever way you may view them, as the Law itself. For these facts (though each may be expressed in a proposition) are scientifically things—entities; which are massed together and collected into groups as, in common, embodiments of the law in question.

Thus it is philosophically faulty to say, with the Duke of Argyll, that "a Law is a certain number of facts arranged in a certain order, or viewed in a certain relation;" for these facts are the subjects, the sphere, the realm of the law, not in any way the *Law* itself. In them each the Law is fulfilled, to them all the Law applies; but in no true sense can we say that of them the law consists, or is composed.

(3) As faulty is it to say, with Jevons, "That a Law is a certain uniformity or agreement;"[1] since it is the assertion of that uniformity or agreement in words:—not the uniformity or agreement itself.

So much that is *negative* is the direct result of the *propositional* form in which every *Law* may be expressed.

§ 113. B. The propositional form, however, has its *positive* teaching.

1. As reducible to a proposition, in essence it must always be, *the assertion of a fact.* The fact, however, may be one of three kinds. It may be a fact about a *thing* or *things;* it may be a fact concerning *facts;* or

[1] "Elementary Lessons on Logic."

it may be a fact concerning the *relation* of some *personal authority* to other *persons* or *things.*

(1) The Law of Gravitation is the assertion of a fact about all material *bodies.* It is expressed in a proposition such as this: "All material substances attract each other with a force directly proportional to their masses, and in inverse proportion to the squares of their distances from each other."

(2) The Law of Wages, on the other hand, is the assertion of a fact concerning *facts*,—the facts of daily commercial life. It may be expressed, as J. S. Mill actually does express it, in a proposition such as this: "Wages depend on the demand and supply of labour; in other words, on population and capital."

(3) Any direct edict, again, is an example of the third class. It is the assertion of a fact concerning the *relation* of some *personal authority* to other *persons* or things,—whether that authority be Absolute Monarch, Constitutional Sovereign, Parliament, Senate, or House of Representatives. Any and each of the Commandments of the Decalogue is virtually the expression of a fact concerning the relation of a Personal God to the human race. The very first might be expressed in a proposition thus: "My will is that thou shalt have no other gods before me."

2. But, further, as involving a fact which may be asserted, or a truth that may be apprehended, the very existence of a *Law* presupposes the existence of an *intellect*, on the one hand to assert the fact, on the other to apprehend and perceive the truth. Its very existence is intellectual. Its sphere of being is mind. Its vital air is a world of intelligences. Apart from intellects, actually thinking—either formulating what they observe, or ex-

pressing their Volitions in distinct decisions—Law has no separate and independent existence. Its existence is essentially subjective, *not* objective.

Were it possible for the world to be going on exactly as it does now; in precisely the same chronological succession of events and mutual relations of part with part,—and yet, at the same time, for every spark of *Intelligence* in Creator or Creature to be extinguished,—there would be no such thing as a law. Though all the data of laws innumerable were there,—and though all the beings in this mindless universe were unconsciously developing and being developed, acting and interacting, with the utmost regularity and certainty,—still not a single law, as such, would have any existence.

A law is the product of a mind dealing with these materials, and putting into intellectual form the facts which exist, whether they are mentally formulated or no.

Hence it follows that the precise form which any specific Law may assume will depend entirely upon the attitude and mental pose of the mind which gives it expression. That form will vary with the direction in which the observing mind looks at, or rather the stand-point from which the intellect reviews, the things or facts with which the Law has relation. Just as in physical sight, every change of posture in the onlooker furnishes a distinct view, a different outline, of the sculpture and the building; so in the region of the mental, the same facts will afford to different spectators the material of many different laws; and even to the same mind, if viewed by him in different aspects and in varying connections, may suggest different formulæ for expressing what is substantially the same *Law.*

§ 114. Now the whole of the objects or things or

beings, with which Law can have any relation may, for great and important purposes, be classed under *two* heads, which comprise under them all thinkable existences—God and the Universe; the Creator and the Created.

It must therefore radically affect our view of *Law*, its nature and meaning, if we think of one of these only, or of both.

The latter course alone can give us completeness in our conceptions, though it may be admitted that the former may lead us to an accurate idea of part of the truth.

Let us fairly face the result of each mode of view. By comparing them we may see the amount and kind of real divergence between them.

§ 115. I. And first, we ask, What must be our conception of the nature, the function, the realm, or sphere of Law, if we look, not alone at the Universe, but turn a reverent gaze and watchful eye to God who made it?

Here we are compelled to realise the constancy of the connection between the one and the other. We must bear in mind, not only that by Him all things were made, but that by Him they are still upheld, and in Him alone do they "consist." We must keep in view the grand truth that He who created, still sustains, His universe by the constant and unceasing operation of His Will. In this aspect, then, *Law* is the expression of the *Will* of God; and therefore speaks of a *Law-Giver*.

§ 116. But, even at this point, there is need of observant discrimination and clear distinction. The created universe is not homogeneous. It is not all organized; *à fortiori*, it is not all intelligent. There are then two great realms—the intelligent and unintelligent

—to both of which God's Laws equally apply. But the Great Law-Giver does not—indeed, cannot (with any propriety)—address Himself to both in the same terms. To each He speaks in specially appropriate phrase, and from each He receives a characteristically different response.

§ 117. 1. In each domain, therefore, every law will have a *form* peculiar to that domain, and different from the forms characteristic of the other.

In the *unintelligent* Universe, where there is no intelligent ear to listen, and no consciously receptive mind to accept, there is *no direct address* in the mandates issued. As throughout the six days' creation, the law ever takes the majestic form, "Let there be." And the result is as unvarying as the form. The command fulfils itself. The imperative surely and speedily transforms itself into the indicative. The *Law* uttered infallibly clothes itself in *fact* achieved. The "Let there be" of the Law, invariably becomes the "And there was" of the fact.

In this connection we may quote, as apt description (not too strictly scientific in the style of its phraseology) of the prerogative and sphere of Law, what Hooker, in his masterpiece, gives as its definition: "That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term *Law*." [1]

(Though it must be noticed, by the way, that this majestic divine falls into the error noticed above, in personifying Law, as though it were an entity or individual. To be true and accurate we should read,—That by the

[1] "Ecclesiastical Polity," Book I. chap. ii. sec. 1.

utterance or promulgation of which God doth assign unto each thing the kind, doth moderate the force and power, doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same is Law.)

In the *intelligent* universe, however, where the sensitive ear can catch the tones of even "a still small voice," and where the percipient mind—whether of archangel, seraph, daimon, or man—can understand utterances that are clothed in audible words or visible characters—the address of Creator to created is *direct*, the mandates are personal and distinct. The Law-Giver gathers before Him His subjects; and either, as at Sinai, in tones of majestic dignity that thrill His hearers with awe, declares to them His will, gives them His commands; or, as with us, through the written roll or printed page, challenges our personal obedience, through words He uttered centuries ago; or, as in every spirit that has breathed—whether he has possessed the written oracle or no—through the earnest whisper and relentless 'imperative' of conscience, writes His laws on the fleshy tablets of our hearts, and utters His august behests in the unwilling inner ear of the soul. In each case, the form the Law assumes is essentially the same. It is ever the direct and personal address, "Thou shalt do this, thou shalt not do that."

§ 118. 2. But the *response* is as characteristic as the form of the command. In the *unintelligent* creation, the response that invariably succeeds is the perfect Amen of infallible and complete accomplishment. But, in the sphere of *intelligence*, it is sadly inconstant and discordant. No uniform obedience follows the utterance. With many to whom it is addressed, it is as though their ears were deaf, or their spirits dead. The glorious una-

nimity of material creation is changed for discord and divergence and contrast, in the realm of spirits. A disturbing element, a variable factor, has entered—the Will, with its power of alternativity, its double faculty of choosing or refusing, of accepting or rejecting, of obeying or disobeying. So that, when the great Law-Giver gives forth His behests to voluntary agents; while from myriads, as before, the glad response is a reverent and jubilant "I will;" from myriad others, the sullen refusal —"I will not"—is muttered forth in foolish but haughty defiance.

Great, then, must be the difference between the Laws of Material Creation—the Laws of Nature, as they so often have been called—and the Laws of the Spiritual Universe—the Laws of Action, as we might designate them. Distinct enough, we see, is both their form and their results.

§ 119. 3. The laws of Nature and Action, moreover, are distinct as to *purport* and *power*.

Into the former *no moral* question enters. No alternative ever presents itself. We have to do merely with facts; which always correspond, and manifest the completest harmony and most admirable regularity. We may therefore in this connection define a *Law of Nature*[1] thus: A *Law of Nature is the Expression in words of some regular sequence of certain facts of Nature, which in their regularity embody, and manifest the operation of, the Will of its Great Creator and Sustainer.*

[1] As J. H. Fichte says: "The so-called '*Natural Laws*' are nothing in themselves, cannot work of themselves, but are only the resultant of a divine *Will* operant on the sphere of unconscious existence—a will, and not an impulse merely, for the force which is operant in this sphere is manifestly an intelligent force."—"Psychologie," pp. 646–69. Quoted by Griffith, "Fundamentals," p. 192.

In the latter, the *moral* element is present throughout. It gives a new aspect to the whole subject, introduces new combinations, and brings about new issues. Here we have to deal not simply with facts, but with *duty*.

(*a*) The Ethical Law speaks not of what is; nor even of what must be; only of what *ought* to be, and what is *meant* to be. It deals not necessarily with the real, but with the ideal; though with the ideal as what ought to be embodied in the real.

(*b*) It expresses the *design* of the Law-Giver—a design, however, that is not always carried out. So that while, from a contemplation of Nature, we may, by a wise and skilful interpretation of what we find there, always discover the Design, and read the thoughts of the Great Creator; from the confusion and contradictions of the actual lives of the Intelligent Creation, it is utterly impossible, by a mere contemplation of the facts presented, to gather any consistent idea of God's laws.

(*c*) Moreover, it is noteworthy that while, equally with the Laws of Nature, the Laws of Duty express the Will of the Law-Giver; in the latter case, Wills are introduced besides that of the Great Legislator—Wills which may thwart and contradict it. In Nature, One Will is continuously and solely active; in the region of the Ethical, there is a multitude of Wills, which that One Will controls, though through opposition as much as by obedience. In each, of course, the central aim is the same. The aim in any law as such is to *regulate*—to produce regularity, uniformity, harmony, subordination. The Law of Nature expresses the fact of such regularity, as well as points to it as its aim; because the aim and the result are perfectly at one. But the Law of Duty only expresses the aim; only sometimes coin-

ciding with the actual result. That aim of course is to regulate the actions, words, thoughts, and feelings of those whom it concerns. That throughout the infinite diversity of lives, there may be the ideal harmony of essential moral resemblance, through the common possession of moral excellence, is undeniably its one great purpose.

§ 120. But, as hinted before, the actual *form* such Law may take may greatly vary.

The point to which I wish just now to draw attention is this: that form will *vary* with the *stage* of the moral development of those to be regulated.

α. In the lowest stage—as in the case of a child, or of a nation not far progressed in civilisation, intelligence, or moral culture—no other form than the plainest and most direct would be comprehended or have any influence. It will always appear in the overt form of the *personal command;* of which we have the plainest type in the injunctions of God to Adam in Eden, or the Decalogue as delivered to Moses on Sinai.

β. In a grade of culture considerably higher than this, when the powers, mental and moral, have been sufficiently trained, and have become sufficiently sensitive to appreciate this subtler method, a *Model Life* is given; and the Moral Law comes to be summed up in a single silent rule—Copy this. Such, to Christians, is the significance of the story of the Gospels. The Perfect Man appears; and, as we watch the Lord, whose life is there so vividly portrayed, we hear Him say (and in the words we instinctively recognise the sum of all Moral Laws for man): "See, I have set you an example"—"Follow me." The Law of God was written on His heart, lived out in His life, so that we know that in copying Christ

we shall be doing God's will; since all the holy "delight" of that pure and spotless life flowed from this one thing —that He ever did the "Father's Will."

γ. In a third stage of moral education, *principles*, which underlie both the laws and the life, are adopted as the general directive rules of action; culled from both by a careful study of the detailed laws, and of the record of the Perfect Life. It is a point, by no means easy to settle, whether this marks a higher stage or a lower than that just referred to: whether 'to act on principles' is a higher thing or no, than to copy an Example.

δ. But there is a stage of moral development yet higher than either of these—even that which finds its first and most conspicuous example in this same Jesus of Nazareth—the great Exemplar of the race. There will come a day, when the great purpose of His life-work in every Christian shall be complete; when the Imitation shall be perfect in each one of His redeemed and glorified saints. Then shall so much of the Divine have been inwrought into the nature, so complete a mastery over it shall have been gained by the Living Law of the Exemplar-Life that, selfishness entirely subdued—the will of the Creature gladly merged into that of the Creator—the will of the man brought into entire and constant and natural harmony with the will of God—the Divine Law of Duty and Love shall work itself out in the *natural impulses* of the life. In the heaven of perfect spirits, there will be no need of uttered or written command to be listened to or pondered, not even of the Model Life as a something external to themselves to be studied as directive stimulus to constant and conscious effort, nor of principle as an intellectual rule; all then, of mere nature,

—the new nature perfected and matured—though all voluntary and conscious, will "serve Him day and night in His Temple," perfectly do His Will, constantly live His law of Love and Life.

The *Laws of Life*, therefore, as distinguished from the Laws of Nature, may be defined as the *Expression in intelligible form of the 'Will of God' as to the character and conduct of His intelligent creatures.*

Let this suffice as to the nature and purport of Law, when our view is (what it ought always to be) as comprehensive as the universe to which it applies (or rather which it concerns); when, in fine, we remember the God who made and upholds it; when we contemplate Creation in its constant relation to the Great Creator.[1]

§ 121. II. But this has not always,—indeed we might more truly say, has seldom,—been done. By those who have pondered this theme most patiently, have treated the subject most thoroughly, and have reached the most tangible and definite results, the God-ward side of the whole topic has been almost entirely ignored. Indeed it would appear that, the more clearly the Reign and Realm of Law has been explored, the more completely has the thought of a Personal King, and Actual Active Ruler of these, been set aside or left alone.

In the regularities of this law-ordered universe the Great Regulator has been forgotten. The more fully the perfection of the intricate complex machinery has been displayed and perceived, the farther has the con-

[1] That this is the only satisfactory view of the case, even if all we sought was a 'working hypothesis' is shown in a very cogent and masterly way in Sir Edmund Beckett's "Origin of the Laws of Nature." (1879.)

ception of the skill of the Great Mechanician receded into the background; and the more frequently has the strange notion been broached that so clever a machine may have been clever enough to have brought itself together, without any Intelligent Artist at all.

This much at least is true, that, even with those who concede that God is the real Author of all, the real Fountain of the Order they perceive, and Source of the Laws which that order reveals, they seem to fancy it better taste, or a more reverent fashion, or a more manly method, or, at any rate, in some way or other, the more philosophic and scientific plan, not to be speaking always of God, as in direct relation with these things; not to place Him in the midst of His handiworks, as ever busy, ceaselessly employed: but rather—having prefaced their investigation with the admission, that God has a general connection with His universe, and that it has a vague but comprehensive dependence on Him—to refer to Him as in distant Dignity, carelessly, and yet with sufficient efficiency, watching the whole from afar; and then proceed with their investigation with sole reference to the facts before them, and with complete absorption in the natural phenomena they review—apart from any reference whatever to the Supernatural that may be their Substantial Cause.

But when looked at from this point of view, it is evident that Law must appear a very different thing. It must seem to have quite another centre. Rather, viewed thus from a different stand-point, the effect of perspective must be to make the centre appear quite in another spot. Its very essence will appear quite different from, quite other than, what it seemed before. What was central and potent then, will now become hidden, in-

visible, with an inevitable tendency to disappear, and be forgotten; and what was only radial, will now become the axis on which all turns. What was the cause and source of all, will now be ignored; and what was only a consequence, will now be of primal importance.

If we look at this Universe apart from, and quite possibly on the hypothesis of there being no such Being as, God; Law will concern *facts* alone, and have nothing whatever to do with (that which we have found to be of its very essence) *Will.*

§ 122. Perhaps no writer has treated the matter, in this a-theistic or naturalistic fashion, more clearly than J. S. Mill. His analysis of the Laws of Nature, and of their ultimate characteristics phenomenally, is a masterpiece of investigation, which alone would suffice to give a permanent value to his scientific *chef d'œuvre*, "A System of Logic." We may, therefore, be quite assured in quoting his words and conclusions as authoritative, and as truly representative of this view of Law. He has shown very clearly that all Laws of Nature, when analysed completely, and reduced to their essential elements, are only particular instances—individual consequences or embodiments—of the one comprehensive *Law of Universal Causation.* This simply stated is:—Every phenomenon is an *effect* produced by some *cause.* It is manifest, then, that if we gain a clear notion of the full scientific meaning of the term 'Cause,' we shall have an adequate idea of the true characteristics of every 'Natural Law' or 'Law of Nature,' from this purely naturalistic point of view. Now, in summing up his investigation of this point, in the fifth chapter of his third book, he says: "We may define, therefore, the Cause of a phenomenon to be the antecedent, or concurrence of

antecedents, on which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent."[1]

The Law of Universal Causation, therefore, may be stated in some such words as these: "Every phenomenon is invariably and unconditionally consequent on some other phenomenon or concurrence of phenomena; so that, whenever such phenomenon or concurrence of phenomena occur, the first mentioned phenomenon will invariably and unconditionally follow." And any special Law of Nature might easily be expressed in some such formula as this: "This particular class of phenomena invariably and unconditionally follow or accompany that other particular class of phenomena, or concurrence of particular classes of phenomena."

§ 123. What, then, is the essence of any and every Law of Nature thus viewed? Clearly but one thing; the assertion of a certain 'order' in the occurrence of phenomena. And what is that but the assertion of a *constant recurrence* of facts? Laws, in this scientific sense, then, are only assertions of "constant, invariable, and unconditional co-existences or successions" between two phenomena, or two sets of phenomena; one of which constitutes the logical antecedent or cause, and the other the logical consequent or effect. So that, in this view, Law concerns merely the *regular chronological relations* of events, and makes no attempt whatever either to deal with the basis and ground of that relation, or to explain or expound the nature of the bond that links them thus regularly to each other. It is distinctly Positivist in its character. It restricts itself to the indication of these general facts. It refuses to regard the reasons for those facts.

[1] Sec. 5, p. 377. Fifth Edition.

It deals with the Universe as a monster machine, exquisitely regular in its working, and wonderfully harmonious in its infinitely elaborate complexity of parts; yet not to be examined by the Law-investigator, with any view to the exhibition of the skill of its constructor, or the appreciation of the Mind that planned and regulates its working; simply to be scrutinised with this one restricted aim, to find out and tabulate the special uniformities which, in their mutual action and interaction, result in the grand harmony that characterises the vast Uniform whole.

The one pre-supposition, axiom, or primary belief, on which is built up this whole theory of scientific Law is what has been well called, *The Constancy of the Order of Nature:* "That the same facts in the same circumstances will always be followed by the same results." All special laws are but the formulation into general propositions of the special uniformities above referred to, which are nothing but particular instances of this Order of Nature.

§ 124. This being the Scientific conception of Law in the most technical application of the term 'scientific,' it is not difficult to indicate the main point in which this restricted conception differs from the broader and more truly philosophical view which we expounded first.

In the purely Naturalistic sense, a law is simply "that *in accordance with* which certain antecedents *are* invariably and unconditionally followed by certain consequents;" in the broader and Theistic sense it is, "that *in obedience to* which certain antecedents *ought* always *to be* followed by certain consequents." In the former case, it is only a scientific formula; in the latter, it is an expressed Volition. In the former, we stop at

facts, though of general character and with wide sweep; in the latter, their reason, their explanation, and their source is a Personal and Supreme Will.

§ 125. In the reign of the material creation, and indeed in the whole of animal creation up to man, the "ought to be followed" of the latter is absolutely and actually identical with the "are followed" of the former; but in the case of man the identity is only partial, since the "ought to be" of duty, or moral law, is often widely different from the *is* of practice and actual fact.

But if so, 'laws,' as the expression of uniformities of sequence, are not deducible from a contemplation of the phenomena of human action, in the same way, or at least to the same extent, that they are from a scientific investigation of the phenomena of the material universe. The irregularities are so frequent and so startling, that it is simply impossible to lay down any apparatus of laws, so comprehensive and complete, that the cause of every individual action, or feeling, or thought, may be traced unerringly; or that, even with a complete knowledge of the antecedents in any particular instance, it would be possible, with unfaltering assurance, to predict unerringly the consequent result. Though many[1] aim and hope some day to tabulate "The Laws of human action" as accurately, and to catalogue them completely as the Laws of Chemical Action, or the Laws of Motion, I am convinced that from the very conditions of the problem the aim can never be achieved, the hope must be frustrated. Such laws, if they are to be at all definite and accurate, must be very few and very broad; in fact,

[1] *E.g.*, Herbert Spencer, in his series of articles in the *Contemporary Review*, on "The Study of Sociology." Now published in a separate volume.

only such as may be arrived at by observation on the widest scale, and will be true, not universally, but of a certain average proportion of cases. In fine, they can only formulate that amount of uniformity in human action which is traceable to the predominance of natural and material circumstances over those which are characteristically moral and spiritual—in a word, personal—in their character, and which, in every case of irregularity, are its source and cause.

§ 126. In fact, a science of human action is possible only on the following limited conditions:

First. If it deal with man as he is—sinful, "fallen," wayward, impulsive—it must content itself with drawing up a select series of laws of the utmost vagueness and generality, applicable only to that part, or those portions, of his life in which the uniformities of the animal predominate over the eccentricities of the man. Or

Second. If it deal only with ideal humanity, and professes to be prospective and prophetic merely; looking forward to the time when men shall be all renewed, and therefore in all things completely conformed to the Divine Will; and then a complete Ethical System will be tantamount to a complete Science of Human Action.

But that the grounds for this conclusion may be clearly seen, it will be necessary at once to examine the nature of Individuality and its relation to Law.

CHAPTER VII.—ITS RELATION TO LAW (*continued*).

2. INDIVIDUALITY.

§ 127. LET us, then, look next at the Nature of Individuality.

Plainly we are here entering quite a new region. We are by the very phrase, rightly interpreted, placed upon a new platform, and assigned a new stand-point. From this platform we may again expect to have revealed to us a new class of facts; and, even if that were not true, we might reasonably expect that, from an entirely new stand-point, old facts would assume so entirely new an aspect, that a new set of relations would be discovered, and therefore a fresh set of truths would be brought to light.

Hitherto we have been contemplating what is general, even universal; we now approach the *special* and the *personal*. It is clear that it is quite competent to the investigator of human nature to view man in these two aspects, either as one of a class or as a distinct personality. In the one case, the phenomena of the physical and mental nature of the individual are examined only as those of a specimen of a species; and only those are regarded and analysed which are common to every member of the race; in the other, those points are sought which are special to that individual as such. In the former, the man is investigated simply as a sample of his kind; in the latter, his nature is searched for characteristics which are peculiarly and solely his own, which are shared with him by none of his kin.

Of course, it is to the former that all science at first and most naturally turns. The great aim of science is

to gather together a connected body of general truths, and weave them together under the influence of broad and mutually related laws, into one harmonious system. And scientific investigators quite naturally look to the apparent points of similarity between the various members of a class as the readiest and most fruitful source of the general truths of which they are in search. Indeed, so natural is this course, that there is a temptation to pursue it exclusively. And so it is often forgotten, or perhaps not recognised as a fact, that in what is peculiar, personal, individual, there is as important a field for philosophical research, — which demands as clearly explanation and investigation,—as in the general similarities that are most apparent.

§ 128. It may, indeed, seem foreign to science altogether to investigate what, from their very speciality, must be detached and isolated facts. Such, it may be said, can only be catalogued. From their very nature they cannot be systematised. But this would be to ignore the fact that even here the element of generality and universality does enter to this extent, that *every* member of the species has its *individuality*. So that, though there can be no science of the actual facts which are peculiar and special, there may be a science of Individuality itself; and so, under the impulse of the conviction that there is such a thing, we ought to try to obtain a clear and sufficient Doctrine of Personality.

Thus far, in general. But now more in detail.

Up to this point we have been examining the generic characteristics of man as man, as far as his faculty of Volition is either directly or indirectly concerned. We have been trying to eliminate from all the phenomena of Volition which we have reviewed what is common to all

men. We have in the main been taking what Grote in his "Exploratio Philosophica" calls the "Phenomenalistic" view of the whole topic. We have been acting simply as anatomists of the spiritual life—as natural philosophers—aiming only at a natural philosophy of Volitional phenomena. But we would now leave the general for the *special*, the external for the *internal*.

§ 129. At the outset we may assume, as a position that no one would attempt to gainsay, that there is in man such a thing as *Individuality*. It is almost a truism to assert it; for it is manifest that, if there were not certain 'marks' or 'attributes' by which each *individual* man is distinguished from all other men, in the presence of the 'marks' and 'attributes' which are possessed by all alike it would be impossible to *distinguish* individuals, though they were numerically distinct, or to recognise them again, even when once distinguished. But as it is perfectly certain that we can not only distinguish one man from another, but also recognise each individual as thus distinct from all others, it is plain that there must be certain 'marks' or 'attributes' which characterise the individual, and which do not belong to any other of the race. Such 'marks' or 'attributes'—it might be only *one* 'mark' or 'attribute'—constitute each man's *Individuality*.

§ 130. But these will differ according to the point of view from which we examine each individual. If we look upon him from *without*, we shall have one set of peculiar 'attributes' or 'marks' presented to us; if we look upon him from *within*, we shall be brought face to face with quite a different set. In the one case, we view the matter *objectively*; in the other, we view it *subjectively*. We may therefore distinguish the two sets

of specialities by different names; and call the first *Objective Individuality* and the second *Subjective Individuality.*

The *Objective Individuality* of a man, then, will consist in "these objective marks by which an observer may detect the difference of one man from another, and recognise him as the same whom he has seen or conversed with before." The *Subjective Individuality* may be defined as "The conscious separateness or isolation of being which is recognised and felt by each man for himself."

§ 131. So important is it that we should have full and accurate ideas on this subject, so vital moreover is this distinction between the two kinds of Individuality, in its bearing upon the nature and prerogatives of the *Will,* that we must look somewhat minutely at each kind separately.

(1) First, then, we have *Objective Individuality.* In the investigation of this subject, we deal with things from a purely 'phenomenal' point of view. We stand outside the facts we review, and deal with them in a method purely objective. The element of subjectivity does not enter at all. So that this kind of Individuality is not restricted to self-conscious beings, like man and the races of intelligences that rise in an infinite series of gradations above him, even up to God Himself. It extends to, is shared by, and may be investigated in, any and every part of the lower creation. In each of the great kingdoms of Nature—from the lowest to the highest, including the inanimate as well as the animate—it may be exemplified and illustrated. Every lifeless object as well as every living thing has its Objective Individuality, by which it may be differentiated in the eyes and in the thoughts of the observer from all others.

§ 132. It will, of course, vary widely in its fulness and complexity, with the nature of the object or the being to which it belongs. In some, as hinted in the definition given above, it may consist of one 'mark' or 'attribute' alone; in others, it consists of a peculiar combination of a great variety of attributes possessed in peculiarly balanced proportions. Its fulness, or complexity, moreover, will vary exactly with the position held by that which it characterises in the scale of creation. The lower we descend, the fewer and simpler will be the elements of which it is composed; the higher we rise, the more numerous and complex will be the attributes of which it consists.

§ 133. The simplest form will be found in the *mineral* kingdom; because in point of structure the objects comprised in this kingdom are absolutely the simplest, and therefore are placed in the very lowest scale, of the whole realm of Nature. Here the only forces at work to effect any modification of the molecules of which every object it contains are composed, are—the forces of Gravitation, any of those that are productive of Mechanical Motion, and of Chemical Attraction; the laws of whose operation are formulated in the sciences of Statics, Dynamics, and Chemistry. The only points, in which differences are possible, are the number, character, and arrangement of the ultimate particles of which each object consists.

To take a familiar object as example; let the object whose Objective Individuality we are seeking be a common pebble from the sea-shore. It is a member of the "class" pebble; by virtue of all those attributes and properties which it possesses in common with all other pebbles. None of these, therefore, are reckoned as any

part of its Individuality. This consists simply and purely in its particular form, size, and colour. For, as soon as any of these are altered — whether by violence, by attrition, or by chemical action—it ceases to be the same pebble that it was before. If shattered into fragments by being dashed upon a rock, its Individuality has gone. If worn into other shapes by the unwearying movement of the sea, its Individuality, as constituting that by which it may be distinguished from other pebbles, is changed. Its partial continuous identity may remain, but its Individuality is altered. And if, subjected to the action of fire, and, under its potent influence, it becomes melted into a viscid and glistening liquid, its Individuality as a pebble utterly disappears—it is a pebble no more.

Indeed we might conceive a case simpler still. Perhaps it is merely hypothetical; still it is conceivable. We might easily imagine two pebbles, formed from the same rock, quite homogeneous in internal construction, and, therefore, exactly resembling each other, in the varying shades of their colour, both within and without, and acted upon by such agencies as to have given them precisely the same size and outlines. In all essential characteristics, therefore, they would be exactly alike. In none of these could their Individuality consist. The only point in which they could possibly be distinguished would be their *position*. Did not the fundamental law of Mechanics come to their rescue, that "two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time," they would be hopelessly confounded; nay, for all practical purposes, they would cease to be *two* and become but one. The Objective Individuality of each, at any particular moment of time, consists simply in the *position* which at that

moment it happens to occupy. The only way of continuously distinguishing the one from the other, would be by continuously noting the movements of each as they changed their respective positions. This, of course, is an instance of the ideally simplest form of *Objective Individuality.* It consists of the one 'note' or 'mark' of '*position in space.*'

§ 134. When we leave the region of the inorganic for that of the organic, and ascend the scale of creation to the *vegetable* and *animal* kingdoms, we come upon a phenomenon, unique in kind, and utterly inexplicable as to its nature, which constitutes in every member of every class a persistent ground of Individuality; a ground of Individuality as lasting as the being itself. The phenomenon to which I refer, of course, is LIFE. Wherever a *life* appears, it appears as the *centre* and *focus* of all sorts of forces,—an essentially *unifying* principle, which is constantly rejecting some particles, and appropriating and combining others,—constituting that in the midst of which it operates and rules a *living being*, a *continuous unity.*

As Grote, in his "Exploratio Philosophica," has suggestively pointed out, *life* is the *one phenomenal principle* which effects *phenomenally*, what the mind of man alone effects philosophically;—the reduction of what would else be a confused chaos and imbroglio of detached and disordered atoms into distinct units and separate entities. So that, wherever a *life* comes into being, at once, that collection of material particles, which it arranges round itself and through which it acts upon the world of atoms in which it finds itself, is constituted an *individual* —an individual, moreover, the continuous identity of which is assured to it, spite any change of the material

particles with which it is so closely linked—as long as the life itself lasts.

Manifestly, then, the individuality of every 'living being,' throughout the organised creation, consists, in 'ground' or 'source,' in its 'life.' For, plainly, in each living thing its *life* is the one thing, always and continuously proper and peculiar to itself; since, whatever may become of the material particles in which it manifests itself, 'the life' is a something which cannot be transferred intact or identical to any other being whatever. But though the 'life' may constitute the 'Individuality' of each animated being, it certainly cannot justly be called its '*objective* individuality.' For it is so subtle in its nature, that we can neither see, nor handle, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste it. It can never become an '*object*' to our perceptive faculties; and so cannot be called objective at all. For its very existence, though a certainty, is only an *inference*. We know it to exist, but only as the unperceived cause of perceived effects. It is not a phenomenon, it is only the insensizible cause of the phenomena which we do sensize, being what they are. So that, since 'the life' itself escapes the perceptive powers of the observer, he must content himself with a careful scrutiny of the phenomena, through and in which this inscrutable individualising principle makes itself known.

§ 135. Of course, in the *vegetable* kingdom the problem is a simpler one than it becomes in the animal; and mainly for this reason. Leaving out of consideration that mysterious, though interesting, group of beings which occupy the borderland of these two great realms, and are so strangely fashioned that it becomes difficult, to any but the expert in physical science, to determine whether

they be plant or animal; one broad difference between them consists in this;—that (while in *both* there is *movement*, the result of growth) in the *vegetable*, it is movement combined with *attachment to a fixed point*, and in the *animal*, it is movement combined with *almost constant*, often rapid, *motion* of the whole organism from place to place. In the plant, the development is *stationary*; in the animal, it is *locomotive*. In the case of the former, therefore, save in rare instances of transplantation, the *situation* of the plant would be enough to serve most men as its Objective Individuality; while, in the latter, it must be something much more complex than this. Nor would it be enough to satisfy a botanist or a gardener, even in the case of a plant. While it would be enough for an ordinary observer that a tree of a certain kind grew in a certain spot, the gardener or the botanist would want such 'marks' or 'notes' as to enable him to detect the trick, were another tree of the same kind, but of inferior worth, put in the place of the one which is the object of his care and pride. And such 'marks' or 'notes' he would have—in its size as compared with its ascertainable age, the healthiness of its growth, the direction of its trunk, the outlines of its branches, the profusion of its foliage, and the grouping of its buds or flowers or fruit.

§ 136. But when we seek the Objective Individuality of an *animal*, we find it to consist in an assemblage of particulars which need the most intelligent study of the habits of the race, and the closest acquaintance with the form and habits of the individual to discover and select. To the mass of mankind, whose only acquaintance with sheep is either the stray glance at the living flock as, grazing on the downs or in the field, they add to the

quiet picturesqueness of any English landscape, or the contented contemplation of some section of the dead individual, in the form of a roast shoulder or boiled leg of mutton,—it may seem almost incredible that each sheep in a flock of five hundred or a thousand can be unerringly distinguished from every other. To most of us, "one sheep is much like another;" but to the shepherd and his dog, there are specialities of shape in head and legs and body, differences in colour and quality and growth of wool, even peculiarities of walk and voice, that are the sure index of 'personal identity,' and that, to their trained eye, form an immediate recognisable 'objective individual.' Of course, illustrations of this kind might be almost indefinitely multiplied, in reference to horses, dogs, cows, or any domestic animal. The one truth that will be exemplified by each and all, is this,—that, with the increasing complexity of the organism and consequent multiplicity of the capacities and powers, of the genus and species that are concerned, there will be a corresponding increase in the number and variety of the points in which difference may be manifested and in which the great individualising principle may be phenomenally embodied and expressed.

§ 137. It is emphatically true of the most highly organised of all the animal creation, *man.* Whether in his physical frame, mental constitution, or moral character, there are, in every individual, points of peculiarity which, if only accurately noted and distinctly known, would ensure his distinction from all the myriads of the human race.

Looking only at his *body;* it is certain that in form, height, outline, complexion, and a thousand other purely physical particulars, no man is the exact counterpart of

any other; each has something, which, if duly observed and recorded, would mark him off as distinguishable from every other. In face of the mysterious case, in which the Personal Identity of a certain "Claimant" to large landed estates was an unsettled question for seven years, and chained a jury to their seats for hours five days in the week for six months consecutively, it may seem hazardous to make such an assertion. But, on reflection, it will be admitted that the difficulty, in such case, does not arise from the fact of there being no crucial points of distinction, but from the fact that these had never been accurately noted nor carefully recorded in any way that would ensure the reliability of the record. There is no reason to question the truth of the statement which has often been made — that "no two faces are exactly alike;" so that, even if the face alone had been fully scrutinised, and all its peculiarities completely known, there would have been enough in the specialities of his face alone, to have finally settled this vexed and vexing question whether the Claimant is the real Sir Roger Charles Tichborne or no.

Nor does the individuality of each human life manifest itself in peculiarity of body alone. In the *spiritual* part of his nature it becomes as clearly apparent. In the character of the thought, the general tone of feeling, the prevailing type of desire, the characteristics of the decisions of the will, or in the peculiar proportion in which they are combined,—there is that which, if clearly discerned, would suffice completely to distinguish each personality from all others. One man may be rigidly logical in his mode of thought, frigidly impassive in his style of feeling, with all his desires under sternest control, and calmly deliberate in all his decisions; the emotions

of a second may be intensely fervid, his aspirations nobly elevated, and yet his character lack decision, and his intellect be wanting in clearness and force; while a third —hasty in his conclusions, shallow in feeling—may lend the strength of his will only to give immediate effect to the impetuous impulse of his passions.

The above, of course, are only instances taken at random, from a class of facts, which are almost unlimited in their number and variety of character; and it is in the existence of such facts as these that the *Objective Individuality* of Man consists. In such facts as these are manifested phenomenally—so that they may be discerned, observed, described, and recorded—the unity, distinctness, and separateness which belong to each human life as an isolated entity.

§ 138. (2) *Subjective Individuality.* But we must now pass to the second kind of Individuality, which has been indicated, *Subjective Individuality.*

In approaching this topic, we change our stand-point altogether. We cease to contemplate each man as what Grote [1] calls a "phenomenal individual"—because possessed of a *life* numerically and phenomenally distinct from all other lives. We now view ourselves as *noumenal* individuals possessed of a life and inheriting a destiny both of which *consciously* belong to and concern *ourselves alone.* No longer do we attempt to get out of ourselves, calmly to inspect and investigate the objective phenomena of human nature and life as illustrated in individuals. We now sedulously remain within, and confine ourselves wholly to ourselves, that we may candidly and carefully exercise our power of Introspection (or 'Reflexion,' as Locke calls it), to observe and note what

[1] "Exploratio Philosophica," chap. ii.

we may see about ourselves from within. It is not, now, as physiologists of a decided positivist type, that we attempt simply to arrange that series of phenomena which make up our lives; with a view to a discovery of those laws of chronological antecedence, coincidence, or consequence, which regulate the order of their occurrence. We take up our position centrally; and, with an intense and sustained realisation of all that is most clearly *egoistic*, attempt as psychologists proper, to learn something of our own inner spiritual nature, its foundations, principles, and relations.

§ 139. And, at the present moment, we have most immediately this special purpose, — to investigate the ground of our *Subjective* Individuality in its ultimate relation to our moral constitution. For we find that this Subjective Individuality is, if possible, a clearer and more indisputable fact than the Objective Individuality we have just been considering. We are brought face to face with this sublime and awful fact,—that we each live *alone*, 'apart' from all others in all that is most truly our own; that, in the existence of each 'Ego,' there is a conscious isolation from all others, and that, in its essential features, this loneliness is eternal.

In treating this theme, therefore, it will at once be seen that a transition from the plural to the singular is not only seemly but almost necessary. You must each use the first personal pronoun of yourselves, as you follow what I say about myself.

It is quite true that, in some aspects of my character, and in certain phases of my life, I am 'bound and tied' to other persons and other things; inasmuch as many of the phenomena of my own experience are plainly the effects of other phenomena both material and spiritual,

and compelled to be what they are, and only what they are, by the stern force of the bonds of inexorable and inalternative law. To the extent that I am thus tied and bound, moreover, I must admit myself to be only one of the myriads of links, that form the vast chain which girdles the earth, as the realm of Law; and, in that aspect of the case, must allow that the only individuality I possess is that which one link possesses, as contrasted with, or as distinct from, another.

But, if I retire to solitude, I find it no difficult, much less impossible, task to disconnect myself in thought from all other existences. Indeed, when I come to scrutinise carefully, and analyse persistently, the life that I have lived amongst my fellow-men, it is no large and no important part of it, whether in thought, or feeling, or desire, or volition, that I can fairly or genuinely attribute to them. In by far its largest and most important part, I can attribute it to no one, charge it upon no one, but myself. I find that, though sometimes my experiences are only phenomenal effects, or phenomenal causes—effects and causes, I mean, of other phenomena—many of them are such that they force upon me the conviction that of them 'I' am, in *myself*, the real and ultimate cause. I am compelled to realise the fact that in and of myself, 'I' am a distinct *centre* of power, a separate *source* of efficiency, an isolated *origin* of action. And, in this fact, I feel my essential distinctness, separateness, isolation, in one word, my *individuality*, in a way which while it may oppress me, I cannot avoid. However much I may have to do with, and may be affected by, other men; in many vital points, I am disconnected from them all, I am 'one' and 'alone.' I may have companions, communion with whom may be real and close

friends whose sympathy may be so full and deep that, at first impulse, I might be inclined to say that between us there was a partnership of lives with scarcely any distinction possible between the *meum* and the *tuum;* and yet I have with a sigh to confess, that between myself and every one of them there is after all "a great gulf fixed," so that they which "would pass to me cannot," nor can I pass to them. This burden of innermost 'loneliness,' is one of those burdens which every man must bear for himself. I must, as regards all that is most vital and momentous to me, live and die *alone.*

§ 140. Now this sense of isolation, this consciousness of Subjective Individuality is revealed to me in a two-fold way: (1) in the Phenomena of Feeling; (2) in the Sense of Responsibility.

(1) It is revealed to me in the 'phenomena of Feeling;' because, on reflection, I find that in a most important and significant respect, Feeling differs from all other mental phenomena.

In reference to all others, I can have an approximate certainty, 'that they have been experienced by other persons in precisely the same form as that in which they have entered my own mind.' I can describe them, and define them, with such accuracy that I may rest satisfied that those with whom I am conversing have about them substantially the same ideas as myself. I can, so to speak, take them out of my own mind, and, by means of clear and suggestive language, can hold them up to the view of any one with whom I may be speaking. I can, therefore, so far separate them from myself that I can make them the object of common contemplation to a circle of listeners and to myself as well. I can thus describe my 'longings' and my 'aversions,' so as to ascertain

whether they are shared by my friends or not. I can express the decisions of my 'will' so clearly that I can be sure whether they have been anticipated or not in the experience of my interlocutor. And as to 'thoughts' in the strictest sense of the words—as equivalent to Sir W. Hamilton's Cognitions—it is the one aim of all conversation to exchange thoughts, to convey one's own ideas to others, and receive new ones from them in turn. They are so *objective* in their character, that we can mentally manipulate them as freely and independently as we can coins or bank-notes; interchange and circulation of 'ideas' being almost as facile as those of merchandise or money.

But, with my 'feelings,' I am at once persuaded that it is quite otherwise. So intensely *subjective* are they, that I feel that language utterly fails me in any attempt to describe them, or convey a true idea of their nature, to any other. So inevitably must they vary with the tone and type of the nature of the individual concerned, that though I may be impelled to use the vocabulary of emotion in talking to my friends, I am sadly conscious all the while that the terms I use may to them mean something quite distinct from the experience I am trying to describe. I can tell my brother how 'glad' I am at the success he has just achieved, and yet be aware that that word 'glad' means with me—characterised as I am with a buoyant, fervid disposition—something essentially different from what it meant with him, with his calm, almost sternly repressed, nature, when he was so generously congratulating me the other day. I may be told by a friend that a relation of my wife was full of 'sadness' when he saw her, at the loss of her little child; and all the time feel that, with his stolid unemotional temperament, his idea of her sadness was as unlike the keen wearing ache of

her almost broken heart, as the horny palm of a labourer is unlike the delicately sensitive skin of a little child; and that, even with my own more natural sympathy, the fruit of a closer likeness of inner nature, I am far from understanding the real hue and intensity of her great grief.

The words of the wise king, whose wisdom in many of its utterances has the touching tones of so deep a melancholy, express a truth, applicable not only to the extremes of sorrow and joy, but to every form that feeling may assume,—"The heart knoweth his own bitterness, and a stranger doth not intermeddle with his joy." There is such a word as 'sympathy' it is true, and its meaning is 'fellow-feeling,' or feeling *with* another. Far is it, moreover, from my mind to deny that there is no reality corresponding to that word and meaning. It is possible, of course, to rejoice with those in joy, and to weep with those in grief, and who weep. The feeling of the sympathiser is of course *akin* to that felt by him to whom the sympathy is shown. But never can we be sure that the *kinship* approaches to anything like *identity*. Indeed, the only thing that we may be certain about, in such a case, is that there can hardly fail to be a *difference* in tone and shade between the emotions of the one and the other.

In the region of the physical, the truth is more evident still. Attempt, if you will, to describe the precise 'pain' from which you are suffering at any moment, and at once you feel how hopeless is the task. Even if you use precisely the same phraseology which I remember having used myself in reference to some painful illness; yet, knowing as I do that nervous systems are strung so differently, I am satisfied that, if we could only lay the

two experiences side by side and compare them in every aspect and particular, we should find that they were, in some of their phases, radically distinct. No; these sensations and emotions are so essentially subjective in their character, that they must partake of the essential peculiarities of the nature and constitutions of the individual. I therefore feel that, in the case of every Feeling I experience, I am in it shut up to myself; so really that no one can enter its sphere to share it with me. None can know *exactly* what it is I am feeling but myself. *Homopathy* is impossible; *homœopathy* is the only thing that is possible. I have revealed to me the inner loneliness, distinctness, separateness of my life. It brings very clearly and unmistakeably before me the Subjective Individuality which belongs to every member of our race.

Still this is not the phase of Subjective Individuality, which is most important in its bearing on the matter in hand. Though every emotion and sensation is 'peculiar' or 'proprial' to myself; it is only a certain kind of emotion which fully reveals my essential isolation of spirit. What has just been glanced at, therefore, I would call '*phenomenal* subjective individuality,' as distinguished from '*noumenal* subjective individuality,' to which I now direct your attention.

§ 141. (2) As the former is brought home to us in the Phenomena of Feeling; so this latter is revealed to us in the *Sense* of *Responsibility*.

In the former, the *Individuality* revealed was a mere passive separateness. In the *experiences* of feeling, I am conscious of impressions produced on myself alone; of gladness enjoyed and sorrow suffered wholly by myself; indeed, so wholly, that none can be my partner in them. But, in the case we now approach, we are introduced to

an Individuality, which is an Active Isolation, or Isolation of Activity. In the case of Feelings, though they are indubitably 'my own'—so peculiarly my own that they can never and in no wise become the feelings of another—I may not always feel that to myself, or at least to myself alone, I must attribute their character. On the contrary, I may often feel that they are the phenomenal effects of experiences (in thought and perception) which, instead of being self-originated, are forced upon me from without. Such feelings, then, while in one aspect they remind me of my inner loneliness, in another, as infallibly cause me to realise my connection with and dependence on others. In themselves, they are *individual;* in their origin, they are *alienable.*

But we are now brought face to face with the *inalienable*, as well in *origin* as in *character.* It all arises in the presence of a fact unique in its character, still a fact as undeniable as it is unique. It is undeniable because it is a 'fact,' an 'ultimate *datum*' of consciousness; and consciousness is our court of final appeal. This 'fact' is as unquestionably given us in consciousness as that of the 'existence of the external world;' whose phenomena are essentially distinct in character from those of the internal world, and the regularities of which we put down to the sole action of *law-ordered forces.*

§ 142. The fact to which I refer is that which I have already designated—'The Sense of *Responsibility.*'[1] This sense every human being must acknowledge himself to possess. Englished, it is 'The *Sense* of *Answer-*

[1] To resolve it, as Bain does, into *Punishableness*—whether the punishment be that of legal penalty, or the disapproval of society, or the anticipation of that disapproval by ourselves—is so superficial and trivial, that I do not stay to refute it.

ableness.' Every one feels that for many of his thoughts, feelings, desires, and deeds, 'he' is fully answerable, and 'he' *alone;* while, in the case of nearly all, he is conscious that he is answerable, though not for the whole, still for a considerable portion of their character.

But it is a mere truism to say that a man can be answerable only for that of which he is, directly or indirectly, personally the 'author.' For Responsibility, in its completeness, has two sides—a positive, and a negative; a *positive*, inasmuch as, in reference to the thing in question, I have to bear the burden of it myself; and its correlative *negative*, stipulating that I cannot, in any way, shift the burden of it on to another. But I cannot feel it right that I should bear the burden of, be accountable or answerable for, anything of which another was the author, any more than that I should attempt to load another with the burden of that which I acknowledge the sole authorship myself. The very existence of this 'sense of Responsibility,' in every man, therefore, involves the further truth, that every one is a true 'author' of a large proportion of his actions or activities. Perhaps 'activities' is the better word, as more naturally covering 'thoughts,' 'emotions,' and 'desires,' as well as 'deeds,' which are 'actions' proper.

§ 143. But, brought thus far, we are led farther still. In the very idea of 'authorship,' in its deepest and only accurate sense, is involved the possibility of *free alternative* action. I cannot be said to be the 'author' of any course of action, in which I was deprived of my liberty, and simply driven by main force, tied and bound, along a certain path. I refuse utterly to be held answerable for anything in which I had 'no alternative.' My whole *θυμὸς* rises up in passionate indignation at the bare

thought that I should be held accountable for any event or state of things over which I had no independent control. If, by the operation of any necessitating cause external to myself, or of any law-ordered force the action of which I cannot escape or even retard, I am 'shut up' to a certain course of action; manifestly that course of action cannot with any fairness, justice, or truth, be traced to me as its author. It is not *I* who am responsible for it. The real author of the action is that 'external necessitating cause,' or he who set in operation the unavoidable law, and the expression of whose strong resistless will it is. His alone is the responsibility.

§ 144. In such case as this, the part I play is but a *subordinate* and *secondary* one. My 'nature' becomes but the passive instrument of action; or, the mere channel for the conveyance of power other than my own; or, simply a link or two in the chain which connects the Initiator of this course of action with its final results; or, at most, only the medium through which the cause external to myself transmits his energy, and works out his purpose and plan. It would be about as just or reasonable to hold me responsible for this, as to charge the revolver with which Booth assassinated President Lincoln with the crime of murder. For the sense of Responsibility to be allowed—the part which I play, in that for which I am held responsible, must be *principal* or *primary*. That is to say, I must be the *real source* of the action. It must have originated with me. 'I' must be its 'first cause'—not merely one of its conditions; 'I' must be the *centre* from which the energy has streamed that has had this issue.

But when this is the case, I learn the meaning of my *Individuality*, my Personality—in its deepest and pro-

foundest sense. For then—though then only—as a *source* of energy, I am individualised from all streams and all other sources too; just as the deep sea-spring is discernible and distinct amidst the shifting masses of the ocean above and around it. As a *point of origination*, I am marked off from all movements, and from all other starting points for movement, as well. As a *centre*, I am distinct from the circle that grows around me, and from all other centres also. I cannot be merged in, or confused with, any other. As the Responsible Author of my actions I stand, I live, I must die—alone. The isolation is utter, the loneliness is absolute.

§ 145. All this is clear enough when stated in the abstract. But there is no experience, in which it forces itself upon the heart and conscience so vividly as in that which may be either hopeless misery, or the birth-agony of a new and higher life of joy. I mean of course the consciousness of 'guilt,'—the sense of 'sin.' This is no phantom raised by an over sensitive imagination, as some would hint (and as Mill suggested, when he sneeringly compared a period of wretchedness in his own experience with what the Methodists would call 'conviction'); it is the greatest reality of a human life. It is the consciousness of grievous wrong committed that might and ought to have been avoided. It is the conviction of a Broken Moral Obligation, which should have been fulfilled. It is the bitter acknowledgment that the 'Thou shalt' of God's holy Law has been met with the 'I will not' of man's perverse and stubborn will; that there has been wilful opposition to the Holy Personality of God on the part of the sinful Personality of man. And with it comes the sad, firm conviction that for all this, punishment is due, doom is merited, death is earned. And these thoughts rest heavily

upon the heart. The burden is an awful one. But what makes it more awful still, is the fact that it is a burden, which each must bear alone. He cannot shift it on to his brother. He cannot share it with another. "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son." The account must be rendered by each of *himself* unto God. And in nothing can the consciousness of our isolated individuality be impressed upon the heart so clearly as by this. Under the consciousness of *sin*, for which I must "give account," I feel—as I feel in no other circumstances and at no other time—that I am 'alone;' to be dealt with by God as *distinct* from all the myriads amongst whom I have lived and moved; as distinct, too, from Himself; by the very sin severed from Him by a measureless abyss. "My sins have separated me."

Let this however suffice for our investigation of the nature of Individuality.

CHAPTER VIII.—ITS RELATION TO LAW (*continued*).

3. RELATION OF INDIVIDUALITY TO LAW.
4. RELATION OF VOLITION TO INDIVIDUALITY.

3. *The Relation of* INDIVIDUALITY *to* LAW.

§ 146. IN the very statement (p. 141) that there may be a Science of Individuality, "and that we should try to obtain a clear and sufficient Doctrine of Personality," it was suggested that a relation of some sort does subsist between Law and Individuality. For the science of any

subject is just an investigation into and a summary of the *laws* which obtain in that sphere. And it is clear that one Law at least may be laid down in connection with this theme, and that—that *every member of every species or class has an Individuality;* and more specially *that every human being has a distinct and separate Personality.*

But the question to which we now seek an answer is this,—Is the 'Individuality' or 'Personality' in each case merely the result of the interaction of Law-regulated forces, external to the individual concerned,—or is it a something independent of, and superior to, all mere *Law* altogether? In other words,—Is it a matter of *sheer necessity* that the individual shall be what it is and no other? or has the individual any voice or hand in determining what its Individuality shall be?

Our answer to these questions must vary with the kind of Individuality referred to.

147. (1) In reference to *Objective Individuality*, we find—not only that there is nothing in its nature incompatible with *Law*, most strictly rigid, or most absolutely universal in the regularities which it secures; but that, in every case, it is its inevitable product.

It is but a superficial sophism, to argue that since *Individuality* is only another term for 'exceptionality'—'non-conformity to general type or class'—and, as the one function of Law is to produce classes, by ensuring conformity to a type, therefore, Individuality is simply and solely a standing protest against it, and must be looked upon as its essential antithesis or opposite. The sophism lies in confounding the 'individual' with the 'individuality.' The 'individual' of course stands alone; and cannot, with reference to its peculiarities, be put side by side with anything else of its class. But the peculiar

characteristics, which constitute its 'objective individuality,' may be, and are universally, the effects of 'law'; though, of course, the laws which, by their mutual interaction, ensure these special effects differ from those which, in their operation, have secured the uniformities which constitute the class. This may, at least, be admitted as the truth of the case in its general outlines; with such partial modification and exception as will appear naturally in another connection.

For an illustration, let us take the very simplest case possible—a flint. It is one of the simplest cases we could take, as we have seen—because it belongs to the mineral kingdom, the lowest in the scale of creation; and consequently (as seen in the sketch given above) presenting 'Individualities' with as little complexity as can anywhere be found. As contrasted with every other member of the class 'flint,' this particular one has its individuality in its peculiar form, and size, and weight, and colour. But these specialities are not fortuitous, much less are they self-determined. The weight and colour are the result of chemical action; the size and form are the direct effect of motion and attrition. But all chemical action takes place in perfect accord with the laws of chemistry; and all movement and attrition are determined absolutely by the laws of dynamics. So that the specialities, which in one aspect—that is, collectively—constitute the individuality of this particular piece of flint, in another—that is, if taken separately—are found to be the orderly effects of forces working according to great natural laws. What gave to this piece of flint this particular form, size, weight, colour, and position, was simply the special set of circumstances in which these law-abiding forces worked out their proper results. And if—to pursue the

analysis a step further—we ask,—What is the philosophical meaning of this familiar phrase 'set of circumstances'? we shall gain a satisfactory reply from Mr. J. S. Mill;[1] who shows, that the actual 'state of things,' at any particular moment, is the special result of the interaction of contemporaneous or coexistent causes, and that this contemporaneity or coexistence is itself the proper effect of the operation of necessary laws, through successive ages, on what he calls the primary "collocation of permanent causes;" though, as we shall have to notice again and again, he omits one constantly varying element of real efficiency, which is more important than any other in connection with our immediate theme.

But what will apply to the simplest case will apply to the most complex, so long as the essential conditions of the problem are the same, and no new element is introduced. We may then say that *all* Objective Individuality is not only compatible with Law, but is itself the result of its action; though, again we have to add, even here, not of Law *alone.*

§ 148. Such a conclusion, as applicable even to the outward observable marks of human character, mental power, style of thought, tone of feeling, which constitute the 'Objective Individuality' of man as a spiritual being, is that reached by a very different path by Mr. Thomas Solly in his book "The Will, Divine and Human:" though—still another 'though'—we cannot go quite so far as he.

The sum and substance of a large portion of his argument is the establishment of the position that, while

[1] "System of Logic," Book III. chap. xvi. secs. 2–5, vol. ii. pp. 42, *et seq.* Fifth Edition.

"the province of '*liberty*' as opposed to '*law*' is to be found in the subject or unity of consciousness"[1]—the whole of "the Objective Element" in human action or experience is the proper province of Law. But since the 'Objective Individuality' of which we are speaking, from its very nature, forms part of this Objective Element, according to the general principles laid down by Mr. Solly, it will naturally fall into the province, and therefore be completely under the dominion, of *Necessary Law*.

§ 149. 2. In the case of *Subjective Individuality*, on the other hand, it will as clearly appear to be utterly incompatible with the sole reign of Law, or the inalternative compulsion of Necessity.

The preceding analysis of its true nature and significance will have already virtually established this conclusion. Pointing to the fact that the Ego in each man is a separate centre, source, origin of action—and revealed most intensely in the consciousness of that *sin*, which is *transgression of Law*—it is clear that such *Individuality* can be neither itself the result, nor under the absolute sway, of laws external to the Ego. Indeed, its very essence is the consciousness of at least a partial independence of that great machinery of Law by which each personality feels itself surrounded. It is born of the conviction that the life it lives is not a mere series of effects produced through the operation of necessary laws, by causes outside itself, but is, in part, but in that part very really, the result of its own energy as itself a primal cause.

§ 150. For only put the case in imagination of the *whole man* being within the limits and under the absolute dominion of Law; and it will be seen that the conscious-

[1] "The Will, Divine and Human," chap. v. p. 167.

ness of a separate Subjective Individuality, at least of the noumenal order, at once becomes an utter impossibility. If 'I' am wholly 'under Law'—in all my experiences, 'the creature of necessity';—if all my mental and spiritual modifications are determined in the order of their sequence to invariability and unconditionality;—then the sense of my 'spirit' being in any sense the conscious cause of any of them is gone, and with it must vanish all idea of conscious, active individuality. It is impossible for me to feel, in any full sense, that 'I' am 'isolated,' 'alone,' 'individual,'—if I am assured that there are no facts in my life which are not effects of outside causes, and that every part in this life is in turn simply an effect of external causes, and a cause of other external effects. On these conditions, I am inseparably linked in every part of my being with the great universe of Law about me. I am not a conscious individual, I am only a miserably cheated and self-deluded living link in an endless chain—a conscious cog in a vast machine.

The fact then is evident,—The absolute and universal supremacy of Law would *ipso facto* abolish the possibility of a 'Subjective noumenal Individuality.' But since we find this 'Subjective noumenal Individuality' an ultimate datum of consciousness, our only legitimate conclusion is, that (since Subjective Individuality is utterly incompatible with the reign of universal Law or absolute necessity) Law is not absolutely universal, Necessity is not supreme in God's universe.

§ 151. The justification for this special attention to the general subject is, that its usual treatment by many modern philosophers is so onesided as prejudicially to affect their handling of all connected with it. The only 'individuality' recognised by such thinkers as Bain and

J. S. Mill is the 'objective.' That 'subjective' individuality, which we have seen has such special and prominent importance in connection with our subject, is utterly ignored by them.

No wonder, then, that in that Individuality, in which others have found an impregnable fortress for Liberty *versus* Necessity, they have professed to find, not a foe, but a friend. For it is undeniable that the 'individuality' we have called 'objective,' in its general lines, is in no wise an exception to their doctrine of Necessitarianism; nay, in those general lines, it may be triumphantly adduced as an instance and proof of the comprehensive sway of the Great Law of Universal Causation.

This and this only do they take into consideration. The spirit of all their philosophising is so objective in its character, that the objective alone meets with any fair attention. The subjective, as the region of emotion and feelings, is suspected as unreliable and misleading. And so it comes to pass that, even in the strange irregularities of human character, taking (as they do) so purely "phenomenalistic"[1] a view of the matter, they find only an illustration of their position. With them 'character' is as much the result of the orderly working out of the Law of Causation, as is the peculiar shape of a stone, the particular form of a tree, or the special characteristics of a dog. In every instance, according to their showing, an individual character is the strictly necessitated effect of a *human nature* moulded and altered by the influence of circumstances, education, society, and food. "What is, must be" is a maxim that, with them, applies to human characters as certainly as to anything else. Given certain surroundings and con-

[1] Grote, "Exploratio Philosophica."

ditions, and a character of a certain type will infallibly be produced. Vary the conditions and a concomitant variation in character will as infallibly result.

§ 152. That this is no misrepresentation of Mill will be readily seen on a careful perusal of the fourth book of his "System of Logic." This thought is there wrought out with undoubted ability, and at considerable length, though a subtle sophism running through it spoils it of its seeming strength.[1] The ideas there broached have been taken up and elaborated into a suggestive volume on "The Study of Sociology," by Herbert Spencer.

That it is practically the view of Bain is shown by the very mould into which his great work on Psychology is run—the two volumes, "Sensation and Intellect" and "Emotions and Will."

In the second book of his first volume, he is dealing with the great subject of "The Intellect." Most significantly, he rejects (as a fictitious and therefore useless method of dealing with the subject) the usual classification of Mental Powers into Faculties and Capacities, each with their special function, and simply gives the three great *Laws* in accordance with which all those mental modifications take place, which in continuous series collectively form 'experience' or 'life.' The classification of Faculties or Powers is altogether too subjective a thing to fit in with the general cast of his system. It is with the phenomena of human thought, and feeling, and desire, and volition in their sequence and chronological relations alone, that he concerns him-

[1] The question—here only glanced at—will receive more careful treatment in a separate chapter on "The Relation of the Will to Character."

self. This apparently is all of human life, which he thinks it competent for the philosopher to deal with or investigate. The powers, by which these phenomena are produced, he does not regard as a philosopher's sphere. So that a philosophy of the Intellect with him, must consist simply of a summary of the Laws in accordance with which different classes of ideas and judgments are produced. And so, we find that section of his work mapped out into chapters treating severally, "The Law of Contiguity," "The Law of Similarity," "The Law of Compound Association."

When he comes to deal with Emotions and Will the same general method is strikingly apparent. The same objective view is taken, though in Feeling and Volition we have the most intensely subjective phenomena of human life. The radical similarity of the former with Sensations is insisted on, and the development of the latter out of the former, through the intermediate links of involuntary muscular movements, is maintained. The object, or, if not the object, certainly the tendency, of the whole treatment is manifestly to show that in the spiritual parts of human life, quite as truly and absolutely as in the physical or corporeal, Law reigns supreme.

§ 153. In such systems as those of Mill and Bain, then, it is clear that there is no room left for the irregular and disturbing element of *Subjective* Individuality, such as we have found it in its fulness to be. It, with all its striking and momentous peculiarities, is ignored, as though it had no distinct existence; or is supposed to be but another phase of that Objective Individuality for which they find it so easy to account on their own pet principles.

Indeed the manner of this treatment of the whole subject suggests the thought that, at the outset, this eccentric and wayward element was not at all in view; that, thinking only of those almost innumerable instances, in which seeming incongruities are shown on investigation to be in perfect harmony with, and indeed the actual result of the interaction of, clearly ascertained *laws*—the case in point (Individuality, including Personality and irregularity of Character) was hastily and provisionally classed with these, and the system perfected and completed in the hardy hope that it (with all other apparent anomalies) might, by the exercise of a little logical ingenuity, be shown to be confirmations of what they seem to contradict.

In an odd corner of the field of their examination, they come upon this queer and awkward fact of Individuality. In some of its forms they found it possible to fit it in a niche manifestly adapted for it. Others, it is true, will fit nowhere. Their corners are so jagged and irregular that no socket throughout the intricate system can hold them with any security. What is to be done? Apply the chisel: trim off the awkward projections. The difference is only one of *form*. No real injury will be done to the universe, and the desirable end will be attained of having "a place for everything and everything in its place." And so it comes to pass that, since Subjective Individuality, in its natural shape, cannot possibly be made to fit into a System of Universal Necessity, it is so manipulated in subtly deceptive words, that it is put down as only another *phase* or form of that Objective Individuality which has its proper place in the Kingdom of Law.

Let us pass from the theme, with the reflection that

such dealing is unfair and unphilosophical; and that it would be far better to acknowledge the inadequacy of the completest system we have been able to devise, than to mutilate any part of that Truth, for whom every system is designed to be only a fairly-ordered dwelling.

4. *The Relation of* VOLITION *to* INDIVIDUALITY.

§ 154. This relation is a very close one, in reference to both the objective and subjective varieties of it; but that sustained to the latter is far more vital, and almost infinitely more important, than that sustained to the former.

1. In connection with *Objective* Individuality, as little shall be said as possible:

(*a*) In the *first* place, it is manifest that of many natures the one most salient point, the most characteristic feature, is the prominence and force of the volitional energy. Indeed a character that is specifically denominated, 'strong,' in contrast with a 'weak' one, is so characterised simply on account of the 'strength' of the 'will' manifested in daily life. A strong will makes a 'decided' man; a weak will a 'vacillating' one.

Moreover, when that energy transcends the limits of a due regard to the wishes and the claims of others, it usually passes by the name of 'wilfulness;' and so the characteristic epithet we bestow on such headstrong and impulsive, or stubborn and dogged, natures, is that of *wilful.*

Thus often, in broadest outline, the Objective Individuality is determined mainly by the degree of Volitional Development.

(*b*) But even where this is not the case, it cannot but be that the general type of volitional energy will be

among the elements which must be taken into account, in collecting the 'notes' or 'marks' which, in aggregate, make the 'objective individuality' of the person concerned.

Two persons may, in other respects—intellectually, emotionally, and in the general tone of their prevailing desires—be closely alike, "as like as two pins;" and yet differ in this one point, that the one is fairly *decided* in his action, and the other comparatively *forceless* in methods of procedure: so that practically it is the volitional type that determines the Objective Individuality of the one as laid side by side with the other; although, comparing each with a multitude of others, it would not be in Volition that either would be most readily distinguished from the mass of men.

Let these few words suffice as a hint of what might be said on this side of the question.

§ 155. 2. The connection of *Subjective Individuality* with Volition is much closer and more vital.

As previously expounded, it consists in that inner *noumenal isolation*, which is brought home to the heart in the sense of *personal responsibility*, for all those actions of which the Ego is consciously the *author* or 'first cause.'

Only analyse any case of this nature, and it will be seen that the action in question is essentially a *voluntary* one. As clearly will it be seen that for *no involuntary* action can we consider ourselves directly responsible, and that in no involuntary process is our Subjective noumenal Individuality brought home to consciousness. Both the positive and the negative tests are equally conclusive.

Take an instance of clear and indubitable responsibility. A man deliberately, and with perfect immunity from all compulsion, forges a defamatory letter, with

the set purpose of creating deadly enmity between two quondam friends. The whole guilt and burden of that act the man in his inmost consciousness feels is resting on himself *alone*. And why? Simply because, being deliberate, it was a *purely voluntary* act; the unhindered and unfettered result of a resolute volitional [1] determination.

Or to take an instance of the opposite nature. One of the poor Lascars,[2] so recently murdered by his captain in a British merchant vessel, was *forced* to sign a paper produced for the defence, with the cold muzzle of the captain's loaded pistol against his forehead all the time. It was argued by the counsel for the prosecution that the paper could not be adduced as valid testimony; because, as the signature was extorted from the wretched victim by the momentary expectation of death, it was *not*, strictly speaking, the man's own 'act and deed.' It was not properly voluntary, and since done 'against his real will,' he was not responsible for the act. Common justice clearly demanded that such a declaration should be considered utterly invalid.

But let us look a little more closely at the conditions of the problem.

§ 156. Subjective noumenal Individuality emerges only in cases of clear Responsibility. Responsibility is fairly felt only in cases of true *authorship*, *origination*, *causation*. Our point is, that 'authorship,' 'origination,' 'causation,' are acknowledged only in actions which are

[1] N.B. Whedon's distinction between volitional and voluntary. The voluntary is post-volitional, the volitional element is merely the *act* or determination of the *Will;* the voluntary is the clothing, carrying out of that determination in thought or action.

[2] It will be seen that this was written some six or seven years ago.

purely, fully voluntary. In another place I have tried to show that—as Cousin maintains—the very *conception* of 'causation' and 'a cause' is given us in its completeness only through, and on the occasion of, our voluntary acts; more specifically, in cases where such involves an *effort*. For, properly considered, that conception involves more than mere regularity and unconditionality of sequence—though this is all that J. S. Mill admits as its scientific connotation—and has as its vital and central notion that of *efficiency*, *force*, or *power*. Now, it is in the act of Volition that we become conscious of the exercise of 'power.' In willing we consciously *exert* a *force*, we realise 'efficiency.'

I will to read a book, and as a consequence I chain my thoughts to its contents; and in that act, I am conscious of effecting a result, in other words, I am consciously the *cause* of that phenomenal *effect*. I will to pluck a rose, the exquisite tints and sweet perfume of which has enchanted me; and at once the mandate of the Will is embodied in muscular energy, my arm is outstretched and my fingers clasp and snap the twig. Again, I become conscious of the 'authorship' of such a deed as this. My Volition was *my own*, my own in a way that nothing else can be, and that has just been translated into muscular movement or outward act. That movement and that act are therefore truly and wholly 'mine.'

In these two instances—if there were any moral worth in the one, or any wrong in the other—the credit and the blame would be wholly resting on myself. None can share with me either the one or the other. And this—note—simply and solely because they were purely and strictly *voluntary*.

So clearly is Volition the assertion of Self; for it is

just that by which the Self *controls* and *directs* its energies or powers. They are only felt to be 'our own,' as we *command* them. Our lordship is realised only as our faculties do our *bidding*. That *bidding* is *willing*. It is only, then, as our faculties carry out these biddings or willings that we *own* their action; and this, again, is in other words to reassert the point that *only the voluntary can be called 'our own.'* Just in the proportion that our actions approach or depart from the *purely voluntary*, do we feel that *Self* has been asserted, or something other than *Self* has been at work.

§ 157. On the other side, moreover, if anything is done *against*, or *apart* from, our *Will*, we feel most distinctly that we cannot charge ourselves with its wrong or claim its merits.

(*a*) This is clear enough with what transpires *outside the limits* of our own *nature*. We feel ourselves responsible for only so much of what others do, as is a *direct carrying out* of our commands, or is the real result of deliberate action of our own. For ought else in the conduct of our fellowmen, we have as little to answer as for the movements of the planets in their orbits, or for the desolation caused by a furious tempest. Of what transpires, moreover, in the inanimate world, only so much can we 'father' on ourselves as may be directly traced to some distinctly voluntary action of our own. For nothing which takes place in the world of Nature around us, apart from our express and deliberate Volition, can we feel that we have any responsibility whatever.

§ 158. (*b*) As truly, too—though perhaps not so unmistakably—is all this true, in reference to all that passes within the region of our own nature.

Much there is that is wholly and utterly independent of our wills. Our heart's pulsation ; the injurious effects of poisonous miasma ; the circulation of our blood ; the nervous twitchings of St. Vitus's dance—these, and a thousand other things, are as wholly independent of volitional control as the volcanic disturbances which, astronomers tell us, take place on the surface of the moon. Although, therefore, this *body* and its various organs are *ours* to a degree and in a way that no other part of the non-Ego can be, these corporeal movements, these physical changes, these organic processes are *not our own* in any sense which would involve any responsibility for their character. Since they go on without any exertion of volitional energy on our part, and since no volitional effort, however intense, would have the slightest influence upon them, we are in no way their 'author,' their 'cause,' or their 'ruler.' We do not realise through them any *self-power.* They can never become the occasion of our realising our noumenal Subjective Individuality.

§ 159. (*c*) But we may go a step further, and say, whatever in the region of the *mental* or of *outward action* is, strictly speaking, *involuntary*—that *ipso facto* is excluded from the circle of responsibility, and, in every other respect, must be classed with those physical processes of which we have just now spoken. The possible causes of such involuntary acts are two; physical processes having their reflex in the region of the mental, or external force.

a. Of *physical processes* which have their immediate *mental effects*, without the intervention of Volition, we have two classes of examples.

1. The first includes the phenomena of dreams.

somnambulism, delirium, and actual madness. The only way in which responsibility may be said at all to enter, is in connection with the fact that the physical condition, which is the immediate cause of the special mental or physical phenomena of these peculiar states, may have been induced through a course of conduct in its main lines purely voluntary: and in most of these cases so much of responsibility does enter.

In the case of *dreams*, it is true that we cannot burden ourselves with the awful responsibility of the vile, cruel, odious thoughts that enter into and give the main colouring to so many of them; nor of the 'foolish' or even 'evil' words that may escape our lips when 'talking in our sleep.' But though we may disclaim them severally as in no true sense 'our own,' I am not sure that there is not laid on us the responsibility of their general character in most cases, as the physically produced overt manifestations of what really passes through our minds, and is often voluntarily harboured and cherished there, in our waking hours, though *then* suppressed into utter silence—not allowed to be clothed in act, and so kept out of the sight and hearing of others—by the constant energy of the Will. It surely must be admitted that in some cases there is no more faithful unveiler of the 'secret things' of the heart than the broken sentences that are muttered through the teeth in sleep.

In many forms of *somnambulism* exactly the same may be said.

Who does not recall that most thrilling scene in "Macbeth," in which the usurper's wife—though with such bold and subtle hypocrisy she has disowned good Duncan's murder, and done all she could to fasten it on his guiltless sons,—*in the strange mental state into which*

the awful guilt of the crime has driven her, half-delirium and half-somnambulism, blurts forth the horrid secret in broken passionate sentences in her sleep-walking at the dead of night?

The "Doctor of Physic" has been called in to watch the strange actions and sayings of his royal patient. The "Waiting-Gentlewoman" has just been telling him how, "Since his majesty went to the field, she has seen her rise from the bed, throw her night-gown upon her, unlock her closet, take forth paper, fold it, write upon it, read it, afterward seal it, and again return to bed; yet all this while in a most fast sleep,"[1] when Lady Macbeth herself enters "with a taper." Utterly unconscious of their presence—for though "her eyes are open" "their sense is shut"—she rubs her hands, and utters ejaculations which recall most vividly to the reader's mind Macbeth's wild sentences just after his commission of the deed, and the knocking of Macduff and Lennox at the palace-gate. Macbeth had soliloquised in his sudden remorse:

> "What hands are here? Ha! they pluck out mine eyes!
> Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood
> Clean from my hand? No; this my hand will rather
> The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
> Making the green, one red."

And his wife, entering to overhear him, had taunted him on his faint-heartedness, and rallied him with these words,—

> "A little water clears us of this deed."

But now a guilty conscience forces her, in her fevered

[1] "Macbeth," Act V. scene i. v. 3, &c.

sleep, to utter her guilt in words more desperately remorseful than those of her more reluctant husband.

"Yet here's a spot."

"Out, damned spot! out, I say!—One; Two: Why, then 'tis time to do't!—Hell is murky!—Fie, my lord, fie! a soldier, and afeard!"

And again,

"What, will these hands ne'er be clean?"

And, in a moment, still more poignantly,

"Here's the smell of blood still: all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand. Oh! oh! oh!"

Just at the close, too,—that long knocking of the two princes at the gate, which the crabbed old porter would not heed for so long, and at which Macbeth had cried that bitter cry—

"Wake Duncan with thy knocking! I would thou couldst,"

has its echo in the incoherent words of his now half-maniac wife,—

"To bed, to bed; there's knocking at the gate. Come, come, come, come, give me your hand. What's done cannot be undone! To bed, to bed, to bed!"

Though the words and actions may themselves be involuntary, it is yet true that, as far as they are the direct results, the faithful reflections, of words and actions strictly voluntary, the responsibility of their general character does most justly rest with those who utter them.

And the same may be said to be true of *delirium*, and actual *madness:* though, of course, in these diseased and abnormal conditions of the brain and nervous system,

the proportion of such words and actions is very much smaller than in the case of ordinary dreams or even somnambulistic phenomena. By far the largest number of the words and deeds of patients suffering from mental diseases, are disconnected altogether from the responsible life that preceded, save as to the *materials* of which the ravings are composed. Their *grouping*, their composition—that which gives them their peculiar and repulsive character—is the direct result of the physical condition of the subject. So that, in all these—while the *Objective* Individuality of each, their *idiosyncrasies* (as we should call them) is retained and manifested—*Subjective* Individuality is almost wholly lost;—and in that exact proportion responsibility disappears.

(2) The second class, to which I refer, are those mental processes which, through the perfection of the drill, and constancy of the 'practice,' through which the cerebral mechanism has been put, are performed in a semi-automatic way. As semi-automatic, they are not severally and individually traceable to 'me' as their cause; but, as over the whole process I maintain a constant voluntary supervision, they are really and practically 'my own.'

Enough, then, as to those cases of *involuntary actions*, in which physical processes, taking place whether normally or abnormally *within the corporeal frame*, are the real cause or source of the actions themselves; even the most intelligent of these being only the embodiment of mental processes which are the reflex of the physical.

§ 160. *β*. One word of those which are the products of *forces external* to the *body*. And one word only: because the principles involved are identical with those

referred to just now. A typical instance or two will most readily express my meaning.

(1) The crudest and extremest case is one of literal physical *compulsion.* If I were bound or chained in a sitting posture, and my hand were then grasped by some villain of giant strength, a pen placed by main force between my fingers, and my hand guided by him so as to trace the letters of my name at the bottom of some pretended will or agreement, it is very clear that such subscription is not really *my* signature, and is indeed as little my 'act and deed' as though it were written as a deliberate piece of forgery by the man himself. My hand, in such case, is as purely an instrument, and as little an agent, as the pen itself. Just as just, and just as unjust, would it be to blame the pen, as it would be to blame me.

(2) All instances like that of the Lascar sailor, and the brutal captain, though one degree removed from absolute physical compulsion, are so near it, that only the barest shade of voluntariness appears; and the element of individuality in the form of responsibility is reduced to a minimun. Though the instrument used is no longer sheer brute force, and is only *intimidation;* it is intimidation in its extremest form,—mortal terror, the threatening of instant death.

It is true that, in natures of high moral tone, the dread of death would be overmastered by the supreme dread of doing what was palpably wrong. The fear of God may, and sometimes does, conquer this fear of man. The love of God and truth is stronger than mere love of life. But, where this highest motive is absent, or the moral tone is not elevated, the natural shrinking of human nature from the agony and darkness of such

sudden death are constituted into the most powerful influence that can act upon the man; and in a court of law, at the bar of human justice, it is treated as a case of *virtual compulsion*, and no responsibility is imputed, since the act is viewed as practically involuntary.

(3) It is but a truistic corollary from such cases as these to say,—that, just in the proportion that powerful external influences have been brought to bear upon the individual concerned,—just to the extent that he has been prevented by circumstances from arriving at a calm and deliberate volitional decision,—just to that extent, and in that proportion, is the action *not his own*, and his individual responsibility is lessened.

To summarise the whole investigation, then, the truth seems to be, that *Individuality* in its *subjective noumenal* aspect, *varies directly* as *voluntariness*: that *individual responsibility increases or diminishes exactly in proportion as the action* is *voluntary* or *involuntary*.

§ 161. At this point it is natural, almost necessary, to point out the fact that many thinkers, with Cousin, have considered the connection between Individuality and Volition to be so close as to amount to *identity*. Dwelling upon the law just expounded, they have taken its full significance to be that *Personality is Volition*,—that the *Ego is* the *Will*. Seeing that the Ego is expressed, that Self is asserted, just in the proportion in which Will is freely exercised, that the action becomes responsible just in the degree that it is voluntary,—they have considered the true explanation of all this to lie in the doctrine, that the centre and essence of the former lies in the latter; or more decidedly still, that they are one and the same under different names. Morell thus sets forth Cousin's position: "We all feel conscious that there is something

we call ourselves, which possesses and can exert power, and to which, as a fundamental unity, all the multiplicity of our thoughts and feelings are to be referred. This power, however, or energy—which we variously call the *Will*, the acting and knowing principle, or *the me*—is not an infinite and absolute power."[1]

The premises we may admit; but must protest that the conclusion is by no means fairly contained in them. For there is strange confusion here of what should be kept most clearly distinct. The *Will* is itself as much a faculty or power, as that of thought or feeling. To identify *the Will* with the "acting and knowing principle," is to say that the "acting power," or "power of action," is the same as the "acting principle;" whereas of course the 'principle' is that to which the power belongs. The truth is that the 'me' or 'Ego' *possesses* the power of '*willing*,' just as truly as it possesses the power of thought. To be consistent, therefore, it must be maintained, either, (1) that the Intellect, and the Emotions and Desire, are truly the Ego as well as the *Will*, a position which no philosopher has ever maintained: or (2)—as is clearly the only defensible position—that *the Will*, quite as truly as the other three, is a faculty by which the Ego manifests itself. Its speciality, it is true, gives it a sort of *sovereignty*. While the others are mere faculties, mere servants, which do the work; it is a faculty over these faculties, that by which power is realised *over* these other powers; and so in sort the 'suzerain' or 'satrap,' in the 'empire' of the nature. But the sovereignty is subordinate and representative, not ultimate. The satrap is still a servant, the suzerain still acts only in accordance with the express

[1] "History of Modern Philosophy," Introduction, p. 51. American edition, 1856.

dictates of the supreme master. That supreme master, absolute emperor, is the *Ego;* which does not divide its power with, but exercises it through, the Will.

Though the sole *executive* is Volition, the monopoly of *administration* rests with the Ego. Though the channel and instrument of all action is the Will, the fountain of all authority, the source of all Power, is the Ego itself.

CHAPTER IX.—ITS RELATION TO LAW (*continued*).

5. *Consequent Relation of* VOLITION TO LAW.

§ 162. HAVING considered already the relation of Individuality to Law, and observed the close and vital connection of this Individuality with *Will*, we have only with care to 'put two and two together,' to determine in its general outlines the point now before us.

I. Broadly speaking, the case lies thus:—*Subjective noumenal Individuality is incompatible* with the absolute *reign* of *inalternative Law;* and *Subjective Individuality is realised exactly in proportion to the free manifestation of the Will;* or, in other words,—since *Subjective Individuality*, in its intensest form, is revealed to us only in the sense of *moral responsibility*,—*Responsibility* is *realised* only in *the truly Voluntary*, and it is the purely *voluntary* alone for which we are *responsible.* It therefore necessarily follows that the *voluntary* varies *inversely* with the *absoluteness* of the *reign* of *Law. Law, absolute and universal*, means the *volitional* and *voluntary*, in its full sense, *eliminated* and *extinct; Law subordinated and itself moulded, permits* the *clear activity of Will* to emerge and manifest itself. See also Note F.

§ 163. With this principle as our guide, we may therefore classify the phenomena, which in series form our daily life, into (1) those in which the orderly sequence of Law predominates; and (2) those over which the Will has most immediate and effective control.

Both classes are sometimes indifferently named 'operations' or 'activities:' but an 'operation,' properly speaking, presupposes an 'operator;' an 'activity' an 'actor'—in each case the 'author,' and responsible cause, of the phenomenal product. These terms should therefore, strictly speaking, be reserved to those phenomena which are more immediately voluntary in their character. But, if that cannot be done, it cannot be too clearly recognised that the two classes exist; or, if you please so to phrase it, that there are the *two sources* of *production*, within the limits of every human nature—the direct authority of *the Ego in Volition*, and the impersonal operation of *Law* in its invariable order of sequence.

§ 164. Yet the "love of unity," which in all ages has been the snare of philosophy, quite as truly as its one stimulating impulse, has led to two opposite extremes, which are equally erroneous. If the German Absolutists, especially the disciples of Fichte, have gone too far in the one direction,—of Egoism,—resolving everything into the evolution of the Ego; and making the whole, not only of human life, but of the phenomena of the external world, the result of its free development: so certainly do we see the swing of the pendulum to the other extreme in the Mental Physiologists (for this title they deserve far more truly than that of mental *philosophers*) of the present day, who reduce the whole of the phenomena of human life to the action of

Law-ordered forces upon the physical organism, action as regular and irrevocable as that to be witnessed in the realm of the material world.

In justice to Dr. Carpenter, it must, however, be added that, while the title which his last great work bears is so closely akin to the name I have used (*i.e.*, "Mental Physiology"), he has throughout shown his clear appreciation of the essential distinction between the *mental* and the *physical;* and, while most elaborately and suggestively expounding the dependence of the former on the latter, never hints that the one is in any way to be resolved into the other. He shows their close correlation; but never suggests anything approaching to identity.

That there is much truth in the latter direction we are ready unhesitatingly to admit; but that the position covers the whole truth we utterly refuse to allow. Perhaps we may adopt the conclusion of Solly, that everything which may take the form of 'object' to our mental faculties—the whole 'objective' element of our mental phenomena—by that very fact comes within the sphere of *Law;* though by this we are almost insensibly led to forget a thing which we must yet always bear distinctly in mind, the constant action of the pure Ego behind the scenes, above and beyond the plane of the operations of Law, modifying and guiding the course of these phenomena, or more truly, constituting and determining them as its effects.

§ 165. But a mere glance at the four great classes of mental phenomena—Cognitions, Emotions, Desires, and Volitions—will suffice to convince us that the elements of responsibility, individuality, authorship, or voluntariness, on the one hand, and of inalternative law, on the other, enter into them severally in very different propor-

tions. Indeed, does it not practically come to the old inquiry as to the amount of *Volitional* control over the different faculties?

That there are laws of Thought is palpably evident; laws of Feeling we are ready to admit; laws of Desire even, we do not deny. All these, and the various modes of their operation, Bain, in his great work, has delineated with great skill and care.

In connection with *Thought*, Bledsoe, in his Theodicy, has put the same thing with much force. We *cannot help* thinking, he reminds us, that 2 + 2 = 4. When 2 + 2 are presented to the mind as a causal phenomenon, 4 results, by a *law* of the mental nature, as the phenomenal effect.

So, too, with the rise of *Feelings*. In one and the same nature, on the presentation of certain objects and sensations, feelings of a certain hue and quality, whether those of pleasurable, or painful, or neutral cast, cannot but be experienced, with the necessity and regularity of caused effects.

So, too, it would seem in the case of *Desires;* though perhaps, a more undecided tone would be more appropriate here. In any given state of a given human nature; any particular emotional experience will produce a desire for its continuance, or annihilation, just as regularly as a cause proper in the domain of the material must invariably and unconditionally be followed by its proper effect.

§ 166. As far, then, as the essential characteristics of these three classes of phenomena—Thought, Feeling, Desire—are concerned, we find nothing incompatible, or inconsistent with the ideas of *absolutely mechanical regularity*. Whatever Edwards may say of the matter, we can therefore full well conceive of a *thinking*, *feeling*

desiring MACHINE. The great American theologian seems to think it self-evident that the fact of its thinking, feeling, and desiring makes it *not a machine.* With him the conception of consciousness and a *machine* seem mutually *contradictory* and *destructive;* and, of course, we readily grant that, in any machine made by *man*, the element of consciousness must be absent: but I think, simply for this reason, that the conditions of its existence are beyond man's control to create, if not to destroy; and are within the sphere and prerogative of the Great Creator alone. But the essence of a '*machine*,' the core of the meaning of the term, is not materiality, nor unconsciousness. These are no part of the definition or connotation of the word. That consists in the *absolute regularity* of the movement of its parts, provided they are in order, with the view to the attainment of some definite end; its utter and entire conformity with law—the law imposed upon it by its inventor, or constructor, by the special arrangement of its parts, and the peculiar method of its construction.

In the mass of the objects to which we usually apply the term, it is true, the material of which it is composed is solely dead matter, utterly unconscious. But the presence of an immaterial element in their structure, or even of consciousness in its lowest forms, would not interfere with their truly mechanical character; or, in plainer words, with the fact of their being *machines.* Thus it is that we may look upon the lower orders of the animate creation—those, at least, in which no cerebral structure is developed—as *machines*, exquisitely adjusted in their adaptation to their special circumstances, and withal endowed with the property of feeling as part of the mechanism; but still so absolutely restricted to defi-

nite muscular responses to external stimulus, that their action may be calculated and foretold, in any special set of surroundings, with as complete certainty as the evolutions of Babbage's machine. Indeed, it would seem a fair definition of *Instinct*, to call it that *impersonal impulse to certain end-attaining courses of actions which in man would be the result of intelligent deliberation and personal decision.*

Clearly, then, in the central and characteristic features of Thought, Feeling, and Desire, I do not necessarily feel my 'self' involved as a responsible individuality. As a matter of fact, I may, and very often do, have this feeling as well; but, in any such case, it will be found to result from a super-added fact not involved in the nature of the phenomena in question. Of the occurrence of these phenomena and their mutual relations, I may construct a science which shall be largely physiological in its character—a thing which has been actually done and ably done by Bain, and more recently by Dr. Carpenter.

§ 167. But with the fourth class of mental phenomena—the *Volitions*—all this is utterly impossible. And simply for this reason; because, in *willing*, the *Ego* manifests itself as '*author*,' in the strictest sense of the term; as *responsible source* of the *operation*. *Volitions* are not the inalternative results of the operation of causes regular in their action, but in every case are products of the *alternative activity* of the personal Ego, as a consciously separate fountain of force and energy. So that, while we say, in reference to Thoughts, Feelings, and Desires, that in the nature of the phenomena themselves, there is nothing to interfere with their being produced with the utmost mechanical regularity;—

though as a matter of fact, from the introduction of another element, there may be the most startling and incalculable irregularity in the order of their actual occurrence: in the case of Volitions, all this must be reversed, and we must say, *in their nature* they are *incalculable*, and (as far as what is *conceptually possible* in each case is concerned) their occurrence defies the prediction of Law; though, *as a matter of fact*, circumstances may be super-induced, which so submerge the characteristic attributes of Volition as such, that practically they may be predicted with a fair amount of accuracy.

§ 168. To hint the true solution of the latter part of the problem in a word or two:—There are two cases of possible calculability of the volitional development of any human being. The one is that of a being so degraded as to have become little more than a brute; the other is that of one so morally and spiritually elevated that he has become practically sinless.

In the one case, the sovereign prerogative of *mastery* of self and circumstance has been basely relinquished; so that the man has disrobed himself of that dignity in virtue of which

"Man is man and master of his fate,"

and has become the creature of circumstances and the slave of passion; and, therefore, you may infallibly foretell his action, if only you know his circumstances and animal temptation.

And, in the other case, the right of *self-rule* has been nobly and freely surrendered to the direction of the Divine Law of Holiness, Purity, Godliness. In this case, then, to know the dictates of that Law, in any particular complexity, is to know infallibly what will be the course the man will pursue. The noblest Ethics, applied to the

circumstances as they appear, will afford a perfect means of prediction of the life.

But of any middle case, *i.e.*, of a man of ordinary cast, no such prediction in the line of inalternative Law is possible.

As a rule, therefore, the volitional is *not* strictly *calculable*, because in any given set of known conditions the result is an alternative one.

§ 169. Perceiving this, however, we have the key to those cases in which phenomena of the other three classes are incalculable, and are clearly not amenable to the regular action of inalternative law. The one condition of their being of this nature, is *the proportion* in which they are *voluntary*. Their being *voluntary* is just the fact, not essential to their nature, which, when superadded, at once introduces the element of responsibility for their character, and so far removes them out of the region of the sole action of *Law*.

To what extent and in what degrees they may be voluntary, has been dealt with under the head of the Relation of Volition to the other Mental Phenomena. In the course of that investigation, it became clear that, though Volitional control was *direct* only in the case of Cognition, it was real, though indirect and partial with both the others: so that, from this consideration, we might quite fairly draw the conclusion, that in *origin* and *order* of *sequence* there was no single class of phenomena *wholly* under the dominion of absolute inalternative Law.

But we might put the whole matter in quite another way. Suppose it *proved* that the links, in any chain of thoughts, feelings, and desires, are links of adamantine and inexorable Law, so that 'thought,' whether perception or representation of a certain kind, *infallibly* produces a

certain 'feeling' or emotion, and no other; and so that, when such and such a sensation or emotion is experienced, there invariably and unconditionally follows, as an absolutely necessitated effect, a certain 'desire' for, or aversion to, the object which caused it;—still, if I can by *Volition* move the first link of this causal chain— and its position does not always depend on the sole action of Law, but as often on my willing to think of such and such a thing, while I might just as easily will to think of some other—then, of course, through being responsible for the thought which was determined by my Volition, I am responsible for the whole of the resulting feelings and desires, and for the effect of all this upon my character. Possessing volitional control of my thoughts, I volitionally interfere with the rigorous operation of Law in the region of the consequent feelings and desires.

§ 170. There is one way in which this view of the essentially '*alternative*' character of the action of human Volition may be reconciled with the universal reign of *Law*, and that is by altering the meaning usually attached to the term 'Law'—or rather that attached to its correlate—'Cause.' We may accept it as axiomatic that the "*Law of Causation*" is of absolutely universal application; that, whether in the region of the material or spiritual, it is but another form of the "Law of Sufficient Reason," which is one of the mainstays of all logical thought whatever: so that it must be as true that "every effect must have its cause" in spheres where the volitional comes into play as in those where it does not,—if only we say, with Whedon, that *causes* are of two kinds, *alternative* and *inalternative;* and maintain, with him, that every responsible agent in the universe, whether God, angel, spirit, or man, is an instance of the

former; and that all other existences, whether animate or inanimate, are instances of the latter. For in the introduction of the idea of *alternativity*, there is a recognition of what is the alienable property and vital characteristic of Volition as such.

§ 171. I believe this way of putting it expresses the truth; but my great objection to it is that it uses the terms *Law* and *Cause* in a way in which they have never been used before. Regularity, calculability, inalternativity, have ever been considered *integral*, and indeed the *most prominent* parts of the connotation of the terms, and especially of that of the term *Law*. It seems, therefore, a more hopeless task to think of getting people to use the word in this larger sense, than to get them to see and admit that, in its usual and restricted sense, Law, and law-regulated causation, do not everywhere unrestrictedly apply. I have much more hope that the important and suggestive phrases 'alternative' and 'inalternative' may gradually be naturalised into the English language. And by always speaking of the 'EGO,' as an '*alternative cause*,' whose alternativity of action is manifested by the alternativity of its possible *Volition* in any particular set of circumstances, and always referring to the phenomena of matter and the lower creation as 'inalternative' causes or 'inalternative' effects —I have great confidence, that true thoughts about this great matter will gradually find a real home in a large number of minds. But, in speaking with those who have been schooled solely under the influence of such masters as Bain and Mill, let us not flinch from asserting boldly the position that, in the formation of our volitions, we are NOT under the domination of *Law*—in the sense which they attach to the term; and that the volitions themselves

are not the *effects* of *causes* produced after the only fashion which is contemplated by their definitions of the terms, and which we admit to be the generally accepted meaning which they bear.

§ 172. Still, it is undoubtedly true that, while the great difficulties that beset this problem have largely arisen from the restricted connotation which has invariably been given to these terms, 'cause' and 'law;' this again is the direct result of the partial, and therefore unphilosophical, method that has been pursued in order to get at the true notion which is to be attached to these terms.

The idea of *Cause*—as *what in the same circumstances invariably produces the same effect*—which is substantially, nay, almost verbatim, the definition given by Mill in his "Logic," is clearly derived from a contemplation of the phenomena of the material universe alone. And to apply this at once to the spiritual phenomena of human life, as so many do, is to proceed in a manner as rash as it is unwarrantable. It is to determine the laws of the action of spirit, before we have examined the nature of spirit. *A priori*, we might expect to find something in this region unique in its character, and very possibly in a point which will involve a radical modification of our notions on this important matter. The only sober method of procedure, then, is to be prepared to find, upon examination, that the nature and constitution of the *human spirit* is in some *essentials* radically different from those of external nature. If thus we set out, we shall candidly allow the full significance of all points of clear difference; and we shall not be so slow, nor so stubbornly reluctant, to acknowledge that the difference appears in the precise point which makes it illogical and

unphilosophical, to transfer the idea of *cause* derived from the sole contemplation of external nature to this region. If we first examine, open-mindedly, the phenomena of the spiritual life—as a psychologist is bound to do, and as we have attempted, in our investigation to do ourselves—we shall find that the *human spirit* as a *cause* is vitally different, in the mode of its operation, from the causes observable in the external world; and that the difference consists in this very thing,—that, whilst the latter are absolutely calculable, because inalternative, and following the mechanical regularity of *Law* in its most rigid sense, the former are incalculable, because alternative in their decisions; in every case, equal to the task of volitionally and deliberately *choosing* between two or more courses, each equally possible with the rest.

§ 173. II. But while, in general outline, it becomes evident that in the nature of the case the *Will* is an alien to the domain of *Law*, it must be admitted candidly that in the *conditions* of its exercise—*Law* does still reign.

Perhaps—it is only a suggestion, not a conviction—the truth lies thus. Man's nature is dual—material and immaterial, matter and spirit. In Volition, his *spirit*-specialities come into play; in Willing, considered abstractly, and with regard to the essentials of the problem, he transcends the sphere of inalternative Law. He asserts and manifests his spiritual function as an alternative cause. But his only instrument for the actual embodiment, or exercise even, of this volitional power is his body, which, as composed of matter, comes under the rule of inalternative Law. So that, in every instance of actual Volition, the essential alternativity of the

Willing spirit becomes conditioned, in a strangely contradictory way, by the inalternativities of the physical instrument.

The Law thus involved, broadly stated, would seem to be a threefold one:—*Physical Vigour*, in some degree or other, is the *absolute condition* of *Volitional control;* the *exercise* of *Volitional control involves* the *expenditure* of *physical energy;* and, *those operations* which do *not involve Volitional control*, do *not entail any* proportional *consequent exhaustion.*

§ 174. The truth, then, assumes a threefold aspect.

1. *Physical Vigour*, in some degree or other, is the *absolute condition* of the exercise of *Volitional control;* and it would seem that the degree of *fulness* of the *latter* varies exactly with the degree of the completeness of the former. It is true that the physical vigour may sometimes appear to *outmatch* Volitional control. There are times when the tide of healthy physical life seems to bound along so full and free, that Volition seems outmastered. On a bright morning, in a bracing air, the young man may feel so full of buoyant, boisterous spirits, that his self-command seems for the moment gone; and he becomes as wildly playful as the lamb gambolling in the sweet sunny meadow: and not one of us can fail to remember how, when a boy or girl at school, the school-hours over, the physical energy that had been accumulating as in a reservoir, without any proper outlet, through lesson-time, seemed to burst forth "at its own sweet will" in maddest pranks or wildest romp, over which our Will seemed to have no control at all.

But this is an extreme case which, in virtue of its being extreme, cannot be said to interfere with the

truth in reference to all instances of an intermediate character.

§ 175. (*a*) Undoubtedly we have *the most complete* Volitional control of all our faculties, when the 'tone' of the physical system is *firm* and *healthy*. Never do we feel so completely *masters* of 'ourselves' and all our powers, as when we experience the freshness of full vital energy. When the head is clear, when the muscles are braced, when the whole digestive apparatus is in comfortable working order, we are conscious that our power of self-command is at its height. The moment when the instrument is in best condition, is just the moment when we feel best able to use it; the time when the machine is most perfectly in order, is the time when we feel most equal to the task of guiding it.

§ 176. (*b*) But let only this sense of *freshness* give place to that of *weariness* or *fatigue;* and the power of control is *weakened* to a corresponding degree. The mind becomes *jaded* as a consequence of bodily *exertion;* and just to the extent that the state approaches one of *exhaustion* does the direction and exercise of all the faculties become a difficult, and does it approach, an *impossible* task.

It is not merely that muscular tiredness makes it a difficult thing for the Ego volitionally to direct the further exercise of muscular power; but that the command of the thoughts, the concentration of attention, the restraint and control of emotion, aye, even the regulation of desire and passion,—in the case of each and all, possible (if possible at all) *only* by the use of *Volition*,—become less easy and pleasurable just in proportion to the fatigue that is felt. I have many a time come from a long walk, or a spell of hard work in the garden, determined to

busy myself in some thoughtful book, or set to work at correspondence or composition, and have found, to my dismay and vexation, that my thoughts were not so amenable as usual to my control, and that my mental faculties would not obey the whip and rein as they ought. The experience, I know, is only a sample of what is felt by other men; and proves that in the exhaustion of the power to be exerted, there is involved a weakening of the power of control. True, by persistent and resolute effort, or by taking some artificial 'stimulant,' the object may be obtained — the tired steed may be lashed and goaded to the work; but, in the former case, the effort must be more persistent and resolute than that which is usually required; and, in both, the consequent reaction and weariness is in corresponding proportion greater and more utter.

§ 177. (*c*) Still further; when the weariness becomes *exhaustion*, so as to end in either *sleep* or *faintness*, the power of control seems wholly to die away and disappear. Have you ever watched yourself, when trying, though 'terribly sleepy,' to continue to read a book or listen to a sermon? The sensation is confessedly a very miserable one. The reins, we feel, are dropping from our hands; and though again and again we may start up, as they slip through our fingers, to clutch them more firmly than before, the process is repeated again and again, each time the period of conscious mastery of self becoming shorter, until Morpheus has us completely under his spell; and all Volitional power is gone. It is just the same in a fainting fit, only the physical process is more resistless in its action.

In all these cases, the immediate physical cause of the phenomenon seems to be the *draining off* of *the normal*

supply of blood to the brain. It becomes unfit to be the organ of thought. Its modifications and nervous currents become too feeble to be the occasion of corresponding mental modifications. Total unconsciousness supervenes; and, without consciousness, Volitional control becomes no longer possible.

Clearly, then, it is a fact, that—within the limits of the *ordinary*—*Volitional control varies directly with the amount of natural physical energy.*

§ 178. 2. But further; *long-sustained effort weakens* the *power*, in proportion to the *length* or *intensity* of the *effort* which is maintained.

Not that we are necessarily to suppose that the power of control is *dissipated* or *weakened* by its exercise. Of course, in 'the nature of things' (if we allow ourselves to use such an expression, which probably means nothing more than 'what is conceptually possible to us individually') there is nothing to prevent us supposing that the power of Volitional control tires with exercise, like all the other powers of our nature; that there is only a certain *quantum* available, and that, the more this is drawn upon, the less is there to be used up, unless there be some process by which the waste may be repaired.[1]

But the facts of the case—as far as they are observable by us—seem rather to suggest another explanation. It looks more as though the waste or diminution is a waste or diminution of the power which is exerted and controlled, than of the power of control itself.

That this waste or diminution of power is involved in the protraction or intensification of its exercise, we know is demonstrable truth. No faculty can be exercised continuously beyond a certain period. So that, the more of that period which has passed, the less power of

necessity remains; and, the more sustained an effort be, or rather, the more protracted that effort has been, the less *energy* is there left to be further exercised. Just in the same way, too, no faculty will bear a strain of more than a certain degree of intensity. The waste of the *quantum* of energy in that direction proceeds at a more rapid rate. So that the more intense the effort has been, the less energy must there remain at any given point of time to be exerted and volitionally controlled.

But, viewed in this light, the present thesis appears rather as a natural corollary from the assertion just laid down, than as a fact pointing to an inherent wasteableness in Volitional power itself. For, if "Volitional control varies with the amount of natural physical energy," it will follow, as a matter of course, that in a sustained effort the power of Volitional control will diminish in the proportion in which the effort has been protracted or intensified.

§ 179. But, I think, we may be more definite than this; and say that, since *physical energy* means *nerve power*, the power of *Volitional control* depends on the degree of *freshness* or *exhaustion* of the *nervous* system. For nerve power is the condition alike of healthy mental action and of muscular exertion; and it must be borne in mind, for the explanation of certain exceptional cases, that it is possible for the physical condition in some respects to be abnormal—alarmingly or even fatally unhealthy—and yet the nerve power supplied to the brain to be at a fair average, or even beyond it. It is clear, moreover, that nerve-force cannot be manufactured by the digestive and circulatory systems at more than a certain rate, or beyond a certain amount in any definite

period. Now the physical equivalent of the exercise of any of our faculties whether muscular or mental is expenditure of nerve-force—in the case of thought, the nerve-force of the brain ; in that of muscular action, the nerve-force of the nerve-fibres which convey the nerve-currents which stimulate the muscles to activity. So that when the process is protracted, or intensified beyond a certain point, the nerve-force is literally *exhausted, i.e., drawn out*, so that the reservoir is drained—the fountain *is dried up for the time.*

But further ; the sensational condition, indicated by such terms as 'feeling of freshness' or 'sense of weariness,' is simply the reflex of the condition of the nervous system. 'Freshness' can be experienced only when the supply of nerve-force is *full ;* when there is ample reserve to draw upon, and when the digestive and circulatory apparatus are so healthy as with promptitude to supply the waste that may take place, so long as it is not unduly protracted or increased. The sense of weariness must follow, if the supply begins to fail, or if the other parts of the physical system are not in condition to repair the waste as it takes place ; while 'exhaustion,' terminating in 'faintness' and 'utter unconsciousness,' must supervene when the failure passes a certain point.

So that, to put the point in its barest and most distinct form, we may say that *the amount and even the possibility* of *Volitional control* is *conditioned* by the *state* of the *nervous system—the amount of nerve-force actually available* or *obtainable as occasion requires.*

§ 180. 3. But a further fact, *e converso*, seems to point in the same direction ; and tends to show that, as a matter of actual fact, *power, Volitional control*, and *physical freshness* (in the condition of the nervous system) are corre-

lates—the one a function of the other. I mean, the fact that in the case of *involuntary actions* there is, in ordinary circumstances, *no sense* of consequent *exhaustion.* In the processes of circulation and digestion innumerable muscles are almost incessantly at work; but *Volition* is not needed to keep them up, and by Volition it is impossible to interfere with or accelerate them. Nature therefore is left alone; and the apparatus, furnished by the Great Creator to supply the nervous waste, as it occurs, in the working of this vast unstriated muscular system, does its work so effectually that nothing like exhaustion is ever experienced as the result of the action —that is, in a state of health.

§ 181. This position, in its main outlines, is abundantly confirmed by Dr. Carpenter in his "Mental Physiology." In § 312, he makes it clear that it is an undoubted fact that there are physical conditions for the exertion of Volitional effort; so that such an eventuality is possible as that it shall be distinctly and exactly true to say, "*I cannot will* to do such and such a thing. I want to do it; but I cannot will to do it. It is no use my saying, 'I will do it:' for I am perfectly persuaded that 'I cannot will or determine to do it.'" His exact words are: "There are states of absolute incapacity for such effort; the mental desire existing while the energy needed to carry it into effect is deficient." Indeed may we not say that such a statement virtually substantiates the precise position advocated above? It is the absence of 'energy' (according to Dr. Carpenter) which makes Volitional effort impossible; and what is this but deficiency of *power*, as first maintained; or, more definitely, deficiency of available nerve-force?

§ 182. The sad case of *habitual drunkards*, when

fairly examined, gives still further confirmation of this thesis. On the one hand, no fact has been brought out, in the recent discussions which have so 'abounded' on every hand upon the qualities and effects of alcoholic drinks, more clearly than this: that the distinct and specific tendency of their excessive use is to *weaken* the power of *Volitional control.* So distinctly is this viewed, by the medical profession (almost universally), as the *physical result* which invariably follows, that Dr. Moxon proposes to treat confirmed drunkards as *irresponsible agents*, to be caged in proper establishments as wild beasts would be, so as to keep them from polluting general society and injuring their families and associates. The power of control at last is quite gone. Volition as an independent faculty dwindles, shrivels, and at last disappears. In a confirmed drunkard, then, we have an extreme case of *Volitional impotence.*

But what do we find, on the other hand, is the physical condition of such a man? Just what we might expect were the above thesis true. Unhesitatingly are we told by medical authorities, that the part of the body most directly affected by alcohol is the nervous system; and as distinctly are we told that the special effect produced is the shrinkage and induration of the whole of the nervous apparatus. The brain of the 'sot' is shrivelled so as not to fill the skull, and the nerves are hardened so as to become very imperfect means of communication and stimulation between the head and its members. And here, surely, lies the explanation of the dwindling almost to the point of annihilation of Volitional power. The '*nervous force*,' which is its absolute condition, and which we have suggested is the real measure of its facile exercise, is generated in very meagre amount

and the whole apparatus for its diffusion and distribution is in such a withered and unworkable condition, that the little there is is not available—in the sense of being at the disposal and under the facile control of the central authority. Such a wretched creature has therefore reached the lowest point of degradation; for he is, *practically*, '*shorn*' or '*bereft*' of *one* of his four great powers; and that—the power which of all others constitutes his highest glory—the power of *willing:* so that, though he may have an infinity of Desires, he lacks the Will to fulfil any one of them himself, and what are fulfilled fulfil themselves. He has a name to live: but is 'dead.'

§ 183. 4. This general position is still further confirmed by the remarkable fact that actions which at first had to be initiated and controlled by close attention and distinct Volition—and as such involved considerable mental strain and physical fatigue—when they have become habitual by long practice, in the exact degree in which they have thus become secondarily automatic, or involuntary, are attended with less weariness and fatigue.

§ 184. III. At this point of the inquiry it seems natural to ask the question, though it is by no means easy, and it may be impossible, to answer it—Does Law in any way regulate the amount of Volitional decision in each man's nature—an amount which we find to vary so remarkably in different individuals? In other words—Are the physical conditions of this most noticeable Volitional difference ascertainable?

That the difference exists none can deny. From birth, one appears as possessed of "*a most determined will;*" while another is 'pliable,' 'easy,' with very little strength of character.

Now, what do these phrases mean philosophically?

It is not simply that the one has a more complete and facile control of his own powers, physical as well as mental. It means this: but it means more. It means that his is a power to control others, to impress his wishes on others, to over-master the wishes of others by his own, in a degree which others do not possess.

Now does this mean that the *quantum* of *vital energy* is greater with him than with another? I think not. For it is no uncommon thing to see a narrow-minded and shrivelled-hearted man out-master, in this volitional determination and force, another of much greater *calibre* than himself. Does it not rather mean that Volition *as a faculty* may be developed much more fully, in proportion to the other faculties, in one individual than another? that, in precisely the same way that one man is emotionally stunted, though intellectually matured,—while another is emotionally matured, but intellectually stunted, —precisely in this way, one may have Volition normally or constitutionally strong, and another have it naturally and constitutionally weak?

CHAPTER X.—ITS RELATION TO MOTIVE.

§ 185. NO treatment of our great subject would be either complete or candid which did not include an examination of the relation of Volition to motives. For the way in which this matter is often handled contains in it a very summary disposal of the whole question raised in the previous section.

Motives are spoken of and treated in such a way, as to suggest that their constant presence as antecedents to Volition is the clearest proof, and the most palpable

illustration, of the fact that the Reign of Law is absolutely universal, and is not excluded from the sphere of Volition.[1]

Now, at the outset, it is of the utmost importance to take a step we have found it wise to take in connection with other matters; and very carefully examine the term thus introduced with a view to ascertaining its actual and its legitimate meanings. The fact is that there lurks, in its very form and etymology, a phantom which, if the word is unduly pressed, may at any moment take definite shape, and appear to wield weapons in themselves decisive of the whole question.

§ 186. The word '*motive*'—originally an adjective, though now used as a noun—is derived from the verb, *moveo*, "I move;" through the noun *motus*, "movement" or "motion." According to analogy then (as the termination '*ivus*' has only the general force of 'belonging or pertaining to')[2] 'motive,' as an adjective, would mean *pertaining to*, *accompanied by*, or *ending in* movement. Its correlated verb in English is the Latin verb transplanted into our language almost without change—to 'move.' Of course it has a neuter or intransitive sense, in which it is equivalent to 'to change position.' With that meaning, however, we have nothing to do. It is its active or transitive meaning that concerns us now.

In this sense, it may have a *physical* or a *moral* application; and, in these two cases, we find a difference which at first may seem slight, but which is really of

[1] The examination, in detail, of the different forms which 'motives' may assume, their varying moral significance and influence, and the nature of their relation to the moral worth of actions, though full of interest, belongs rather to the special science of Ethics, than to the general one of Psychology.

[2] Donaldson's "Latin Grammar," p. 214.

vital importance, in its bearing upon the immediate question. And for this reason. We shall discover the same amount of ambiguity or comprehensiveness in the noun as in the verb; and, in the unconscious passage from one of these slightly different meanings to the other, the most vital point at issue in this great controversy may be lost.

§ 187. To look first, then, at the verb 'move.' In the *first*—the *physical*—sense, it means, "to cause a change of place" in something which in the process is quite passive and inert. Thus when I 'move' my pencil from the table to my writing-desk, the pencil is perfectly passive in my hand. Again, if I am weak from illness or paralysed in my limbs, I may be 'moved' from the chair to the bed, or from my bed to the chair; and, in either case, all the activity displayed is in my kind attendants. 'I' am 'inert' from the beginning of the process to its close.

In the *second* sense, however—the *moral*—it has a less positive, a less absolute signification. In this sense, too, it is observable—whether the fact has any further significance or no—that it is almost exclusively used in the passive voice. Whenever, at least, it is used in the active voice, the subject of the verb is some such abstract noun as 'inclination,' 'duty,' 'passion,' or 'impulse.' In the former and more usual case, it means only 'to be strongly urged to a certain course,' to have a strong inward 'tendency to that course.' The 'urging,' however, has *not* the *compulsory* power, which the physical action has in the previous class of cases. I am conscious, in each instance of this *moral* 'movement,' that the 'tendency' may be neutralized, just as a temptation may be resisted and overcome. It is in this way that I say—"I am strongly *moved*, I confess, to give way;" though, in

all probability, I should add,—and the addition would show that the restriction I have mentioned is actually present to consciousness,—"But I cannot, I will not, alter my resolve."

§ 188. Now, exactly reflecting these two grades of meaning in the verb 'move,' are the two grades of meaning that may be covered by the noun 'motive.' As ordinarily used, it can scarcely be denied that it is the second, or *merely moral*, meaning that is attached to it. Any unbiassed person will most certainly explain a motive to be 'any *inducement* to a particular course of action,'—'any consideration *prompting* to it.' Thus, Webster gives as its meaning: "(1) That which incites to action; . . . (2) that which may or ought to incite to action."

But, clearly, all the power excited by, or resident in, 'a motive' is that of 'moral suasion'—the moral effect the consideration may produce when it is presented to the mind: an effect depending quite as much upon the humour and disposition of the person to whom it occurs, as upon anything in the nature of the consideration itself. It is *not* the power of physical compulsion. It is not 'invariably' and 'unconditionally' followed by the action to which it incites; in other words, it is not the *cause* of the action, according to the clear exposition of the nature of a cause as given us by J. S. Mill. It always presents an alternative—its non-acceptance. It has not the force of inalternative Law.

And yet it is often spoken of as though this were the case. Though, when it is so, it is invariably by those engaged in this Free Will controversy: and, clearly, almost invariably as the result of a distinct conviction that the Law of Causation, as usually accepted and defined, must have universal application; for, as I have

already said, the natural, common-sense account of the case would be that, as we often have before us a great number of conflicting and competing motives urging us in different ways, and have ourselves to choose between them, and decide which prompting (in other words, the prompting of which 'motive') we shall follow; the 'motive' cannot possibly be the *cause* of the action which ensues, but the moral agent who makes the choice, and pursues the course which this choice involves.

And let me here express my deep conviction that this 'common-sense' view is the only truly philosophical one.

§ 189. Still it is abundantly clear that many do take the position—so plainly that of the doctrinaire — that *motive* does perform the function of a true 'cause,' and that human actions are as unequivocally illustrations of the operation of the Law of Causation, as any physical phenomena whatever; that, in each and every case, human action follows as the inalternative effect of the 'motives' preceding it. Indeed the authority I have just quoted (Webster), though, in the second meaning he gives, he recognises the fact that the *motive* is not always followed by the corresponding action; and, in that part of the first which I have cited, does not imply more than any would be willing to concede,—since to 'incite' does not necessarily mean to stimulate *successfully*,—and indeed, quite as naturally, signifies only 'to spur on to a course,' whether that course be taken ultimately or no; yet concedes a point to the doctrinaires—Edwards and his brother Necessitarians—if he does not positively show that he is one of the party himself, by adding after the words I have quoted the further explanation — "that which *determines* the *choice or moves the Will.*"

§ 190. The position, too, is sustained with very plausible and subtle argument, by those who hold this view.

In its general outline, that argument usually takes a course somewhat as follows. It is clear that actions must each and every one, like everything else, have a 'sufficient cause.' There must be a *reason* why this particular action was performed rather than any other;—and what is this but to say that that 'reason' was the *cause* of the Volition being what it was rather than anything else?

If it is argued that, in certain cases, the 'reasons' or 'motives' are so evenly balanced, that a state of absolute 'indifference' is produced;[1] and that it is still perfectly possible to decide upon one course rather than another,—so that this presents the case of an absolutely 'motiveless action,' and destroys the boasted universality of the law, that every action, or in other words, every actual decision of Volition, is produced by some determining *motive*,—the rejoinder is ready on the part of the Necessitarian, that the *motive* is present even there, in the *whim* or *humour* which substitutes for any calmly rational consideration the *wish* of the individual to prove his *independence*, *freedom*, or *power* of absolutely unfettered choice. And so the very *wish to show our freedom*, in such cases, the Necessitarian says, is manifestly a *motive determining the choice*.

§ 191. At this point, I hasten to indicate how far, and how fully, I admit the position here laid down. I have no wish to question the assertion that in such cases, of *apparently* absolute indifference, there is, in the issue, *almost*

[1] This, in substance, is the great 'Indifference Argument' which played so prominent a part in the Free Will Controversy of the time of Edwards.

invariably some slight consideration which does act as a reason why one course is actually taken rather than another; and that, in most cases, it is a consideration which on examination of the special instance, may be detected and described. Although the *most palpable* motives may be about equally balanced; so that no morally important reason can be assigned as a worthy motive for the act, when once the resolve has been formed to prove one's actual freedom of choice; I am free to concede that the actual decision is generally prompted, on the one side or the other, by some subordinate consideration of convenience, or proximity, or the reverse.[1] Though I believe action has been taken, in some few cases, without the determination of even such slight considerations as these. Nothing whatever of a mental character has been presented to consciousness, and the actual cause of one course being taken rather than another, the 'sufficient reason' of the action being in one direction rather than another, has been a merely physical one. Just as the muscular movements of an infant (though, of course, each must be distinct in direction and range from any other) are due to mere spontaneous activity under the determination of nervous stimuli of a strictly local and physical character; so here, the precise action performed may be due to the *mere decision* to act (that decision taking the place of 'spontaneous activity' in the parallel case) *under the direction* of merely *local* and *physical stimuli*, which are the outcome of the particular circumstances of the case.

[1] The usual instances, used as test-examples, are the direction taken in going out 'for a walk,' when there is no object to be gained by going one way rather than another; or the placing of a single piece on a bare chess-board.

It is perfectly true, as is often argued, when such cases are cited as crucial instances of the 'absolute freedom of volitional choice,'—that, if they are to be taken as typical of what Free-choice is capable of or equal to, they are not calculated to give a very exalted idea of its worth or prerogatives: as, in the one set of instances, mere 'whim' or 'humour' is the predominant feature of the whole set of circumstances; and, in the other, what is most prominent is the utter absence of any mental element whatever in the actual decision. So that to lay much stress upon these, as was done in an earlier stage of the controversy, would be to accept as the most characteristic companions of Freedom either *caprice* or *unintelligence.*

Now I am careful here to say, that such is not my conception of Freedom; but as careful would I be to make it clear, that, on the other hand, I do not admit that to concede the presence of distinctly recognisable motives (which may be intelligently stated, and are distinctly before the mind previous to decision), as necessary to give intelligence and moral worth to any action, is at all equivalent to the concession that all actions are *necessitated by the motives* which lead to them—or, in other words, that each action is the *effect* of such motives; so that the same motives presented to the same mind, in the same circumstances, must infallibly be followed by the same action—or, in other words, that motives operate as invariably upon the mind as causes, as do other phenomena in the world of inanimate matter. And for the following reason.

§ 192. There is here, surely, the grave confusion of 'conditions' with 'cause.' Just as, in the great question as to the origin of certain ideas and judgments,

it is clear that while *experience* (*i.e.*, the employment of the different cognitive faculties upon the materials presented in the external world of matter, and the internal world of mind) is the necessary *condition* of their rise in consciousness, affording the *occasion* without which they would never have been distinctly realised; but that the *human mind* itself is their true cause, their real *fons et origo*, from which they start forth fully armed, as Pallas from the brow of Zeus; so here, though we may admit —and unhesitatingly do admit—that 'motives' do always precede any action that is rational or of any moral value; and that the presence of distinct motives is necessary to give an action 'moral' worth; nay, more, that, in the case of a man of high moral character, the presentation of motives of a certain class will almost invariably be followed by decisive action in one definite direction; indeed, further still, that when the moral character is matured, mellowed, perfected, it will be easy to say *what* will *infallibly* be the course of action in certain circumstances, under the influence of certain motives, or in the face of certain definable claims of duty: still, when asked to admit, as a mere corollary from all this that *in the nature of the case it must be so;* that the motives are as infallible and inalternative in their causal operation as physical phenomena, I answer firmly—NO. Against that position my whole nature rebels. In each case, an alternative was physically possible; though in varying degrees, according to the character of the man, morally improbable. Else the action could have had no moral character.

The presence of considerations of some kind or other is necessary to give the action the character of *intelligence* —true. The action is performed with reference to one

rather than to any of the others, thus determining the special moral character of the action in each case—also true. Further; the motive with reference to which the action is decided on in each particular case, as compared with the rest which are disregarded, may be said 'figuratively speaking' to 'win the day,' to be the 'master-motive'—also true. But if these figurative expressions are pressed as though they were literally exact, and the case is represented, as though the man were played upon by the forces inherent in each of the motives that occur or are presented to his mind, and as though in each particular case some one of them proved itself to be possessed of greater power in connection with his particular nature, character, and circumstances, than any of the others, and so *produced* the correspondent action—just as infallibly as a proper stimulus at the extremity of any afferent nerve will produce a muscular contraction of a certain kind, through the corresponding efferent nerves, in every case of a simple 'reflex action;' then, I say, we have the *pure fiction* of rhetoric pressed to service quite beyond its province, and not a calm and accurate representation of *fact.*

For the Ego, in all such cases, is not the helpless spectator of what takes place, as in such a representation it is made out to be. It is not the utterly shiftless *medium*, through which motives pass and repass in their mutual action and reaction, merely throwing the light of consciousness on what would otherwise take place in exactly the same order, and with precisely the same results. These 'motives' are 'conditions,' it is true, but the *cause* in every instance is the Ego, and it is the Ego which, in each case—in which the moral element enters at all distinctly—determines in accordance with which

motive action shall be taken. The 'motive' does not produce the action, but the 'man.' The 'motive' does not determine the course: that is to attribute force or power to a 'thought,' 'consideration,' or 'desire,' which no thought, consideration, or desire really possesses. (When such language as this is used, a little calm and careful thought is sufficient to show that it is not literally, only figuratively, true.) It is the 'man' who determines what impulses he will follow, what motives he will regard, and what motives he will neglect and set aside.

§ 193. I had intended at a little earlier point[1] introducing a brief reference to the form in which the Rev. T. Fowle deals with the case of 'Indifference,' in an article contributed to the *Nineteenth Century* of March, 1879, on the relation of Will to the Doctrine of Evolution. But it will fit in at the point we have now reached just as well: for there seems to be as curious a confusion between 'thought' and 'thing' in his treatment of the matter, as there is between 'condition' and 'cause' in the line of reasoning to which I have already made reference.

He says that in such a case,—any case, I mean, in which the action is decided on in the absence of any apparent motive, or in opposition to the 'preponderating' motive, as so declared when the competing motives are put in the balances of reason,—the motive that does decide or determine, is "the wish to assert *self;*" and further, that thus incidentally is given to us the 'motive,' which above all others is the *master*-'motive' in all moral activities, viz., 'self:' and he then proceeds to show that this strong motive, which is just the measure of the strength of the *Will*, comes into play, like *conscience* and all *moral distinctions*, through the operation of the Law of Evolution,

[1] See p. 207, before the words "At this point."

in the course of the 'struggle for existence' and the 'survival of the fittest.' That argument we cannot follow: though it does not commend itself as particularly conclusive.

§ 194. But, in the course of his argument, he seems to *glide* into the identification of 'self' with the 'wish to assert self,' as the great motive which determines our actions. And so the rise of 'self'-consciousness he views as the origin of *Will;* 'self'-regard as the great agent in its development; and 'self' itself as what mainly governs its decisions. Distinctly avowing the 'Determinist' position, his most specific point seems to be to lay emphasis on the idea that practically 'self' is the great 'determiner'—the most important element in the determination—of the course of all our actions. Herein, I think, it is pretty plain that he becomes guilty of confusion in the meanings which he attaches to the word 'self.'

Starting with the comprehensible signification, of 'wish to assert self,' or 'distinct realisation of the position and claims of self,' as condensed in the single word; the meaning passes (insensibly almost) into what is naturally and more properly the meaning of this important monosyllable, 'the central personality,' or more technically, 'the Ego.'

§ 195. But this change of meaning in the word 'self' brings in its train a change of meaning, as subtle, but as important in its bearings and issues, in the word 'motive.'

As used of 'self' in the first sense, it retains its proper and accurate meaning. In this sense, 'self' does undoubtedly often present itself as a powerful motive to 'the man,' to his 'Ego' or 'self,' in the stricter sense of the word, to take a course or perform an action which

shall prove his influence and power. Thought of 'self,' one's *claims* and *duties*, may be readily admitted as a very prevalent, even a paramount, motive to decision and to action.

But when we find it used as really equivalent to 'Ego' or 'person,' it clearly involves the use of 'motive' in the sense of 'mover' or 'agent.' In other words, it identifies 'motive' with 'acting *cause*.'

Of course the truth is, that *it is* 'self' which, in all truly voluntary actions, *does determine what action it shall perform*, what course it shall pursue; but, in nearly every case, that decision is come to by 'self,' in view of some consideration, which, with a number of others, has been presented to the mind as 'Motive,' but which has been selected from among them as that, the suggestion of which, in this particular instance, is to be carried out. To speak of 'self,' therefore, as the 'motive' in such cases, is fatally misleading. It is to confound the actual 'motor' with the *motive;* and to afford a fresh illustration of the subtle fallacy, which at the outset I pointed out as lurking in the very etymology of the word.

CHAPTER XI.—ITS RELATION TO CHARACTER.

§ 196. THE problem presented in the heading of this chapter is manifestly twofold. To deal with it completely we must face, and try to answer, two questions:—What is the influence of Character on the decisions of the Will? and, What is the influence of the decisions of the Will on Character?

I. The first comes naturally in the train of the subject we have just been considering. In discussing the question

of the relation of Will to Motives, it could hardly escape notice that 'character'—the character of the person before whom the 'motives' are presented—appeared with great prominence, and as playing a very important part.

We could not but recognise it as a fact, that the character of the man, in each particular instance, very vitally affects the question as to what *motives* he will respond to, and what motives he will disregard. Or, to put the same thing in words which get their particular tinge or tone from the Determinist position and theory, it is clear that *it depends upon the character of the man, as to what class of motives will* 'win the day,' *and what decision will be made.*

We are, therefore, called upon in all fairness to ask, What is the full significance of this fact? Manifestly, the matter may be readily put in a way that looks like a re-establishment of the Necessitarian position; even though it may be conceded that the argument drawn from the nature and operation of motives breaks down as inconclusive. For it may easily be put—nay, it seems to suggest itself—in some such form as this.

§ 197. Although it is true that the same considerations do not weigh equally with all; though one and the same motive may have overpowering force with one person, and yet have no force at all with another, so that it cannot be fair to say that the 'motives' operate in the same indifferent and undiscriminating way, with the same quiet, irresistible causal efficiency, as *mechanical* forces in their action on any *material* object; and so it cannot be maintained that they have the same absolute causal power, which clearly belongs to the more prominent forces in Nature: still, it may be maintained that *their relative power* as *real causes*, is *constant.* That is to say,

it may be maintained that *with the same character, the same considerations, in the same circumstances, will invariably meet with the same response;* and, if so, the 'invariable' and 'unconditional' element is introduced in another form—an element which always proves the antecedent to which it attaches to be scientifically a *cause;* and so the causal efficiency of 'motives in relation to character' is re-established.

§ 198. A further point, moreover, emerges when the subject is dwelt upon in this light. The vexed question as to '*what determines the strength of motives*' is made a little clearer. The Necessitarian position, put in its broadest form, is often stated thus—that the cause of each Volition is the 'strongest motive.' The motive that 'wins the day' is evidently the 'cause' of the decision. But it is very aptly rejoined by the Freedomists, that the poverty of such a statement very palpably reveals the weakness of their opponent's case. For to answer the question set them, "How can the *motives* be said to be the cause of a Volition, when some of them are disregarded and some are not?" as the Necessitarians do, by saying, "Of course, it is the *strongest motive* of those which are presented to the mind which is the *cause*"—is tantamount to uttering the magnificent truism—that "the *motive* which is acted on is the one which leads to the action," or that "the motive which 'wins the day' is the one which is victorious over the rest." For it is quite fair to argue further, If this motive, which 'wins the day' in one case, does *not* 'win the day' in another, clearly the victory does not depend upon, or result from any inherent *force* or *power* in the motive: and, that being the case, it is not, as the Determinists plead, *a vera causa.*

Indeed, it is natural that the case should be put—as it often is by the Freedomists—that the very varying fortunes of one and the same consideration as a motive clearly prove that its *strength* as a motive is so far from inherent, that it depends for its amount and intensity in each case upon the *person* called upon to decide; in other words, that it is the *free-agent* himself who, in the exercise of his freedom, either endues motives with strength by paying heed to them, or reduces them to absolute powerlessness by mere and sheer neglect; and that, therefore, his freedom is shown, and the fulness of its force, by the completeness with which it is in his power to determine, by the magic power of his choice, what shall be the relative strength of the motives presented to him.

§ 199. Still, it is rejoined — and well rejoined — by the Determinists, that, though one and the same motive has a very different fate in one case as compared with another, that difference occurs only in *different men*, and not in the same men at different times. "It is true," they will concede, "that, while a consideration of *self-interest* may, in some men, at once and infallibly determine the choice of a course of action, and so with them may safely be said to be the *strongest* motive: in others, it will be *powerless* beside the claims of *duty;* and, in others again, will have no chance whatever in competition with the promptings of *ease* or *pleasure.* But," they will urge, "with the first, self-interest; with the second, duty; and with the third, ease or pleasure, will *always* win the day:" and they may fairly ask, "Does not this mean that the *type* of *character determines* the *strength* of the motive, and so ensures the *decision* in any case in conformity with that considera-

tion?" They may appeal to facts, and ask, "Are not the decisions of the will clearly decided by character? Is it not distinctly calculable what the course of a man will be in any definite conjunction of circumstances, if we know his character? calculable, because in each case it is the result of the operation of an easily ascertainable law?"

"Is it not an undeniable fact," they ask, "that to the truthful man any inducement to a course which would involve him in deception or a falsehood will be at once set aside and disregarded? that to a generous man, considerations of mere self-interest will have no motive-power, if they appear in competition with the claims of suffering and trouble, on his pity and compassion?" It must certainly be admitted, as they claim, that, *as a rule*, the question, "What course will this or that man take in certain given circumstances?" may be answered with tolerable accuracy if his *character* is known.

Of a man of truly pious disposition it would be safe to predict that temptation to what was godless or glaringly sinful would be sternly resisted, with the reflection, "Can I do this thing and sin against God?" With a miser, it is pretty certain that any course which would put hard cash into his chest would 'win the day,' as against the prompting to any higher but less 'paying plans.' And where there was a deadly quarrel between men or women of malicious or revengeful spirit, that course would at once be adopted which would afford to either the opportunity of injuring or humbling the other. Such general laws are the basis of all true 'knowledge of human nature.' To work on the probabilities of human conduct, as indicated by these, is the part of a politic, shrewd, or worldly-wise man. And in the average of cases, success attends such 'canny' action.

All this is so true, that it seems a fair conclusion to draw, that, on the one hand, *the decisions of the Will are infallible indications of character;* and, that on the other, *the type of a man's character is the surest guide to what will be the decision of his Will.*

§. 200. Still, tempting as the generalisation is, a little reflection is enough to show that it would not be strictly accurate. For, while it may be true that *character* is the *surest* guide we have, as to what the decision of the Will may be, it is *not* an *infallible* one. While, 'as a rule,' action is a fair index of *character*, it is not *always* so. There are such things as hypocrisies and 'inconsistencies:' instances in which the course actually taken does not 'consist' with, does not *harmonise* with, does not bear out, the general tenor of the previous life. Though there *is* a 'general tenor' in it; though, taking it as a whole, there is a definable *tone* pervading it; though, looking it right through, it would be perfectly true to say that there is upon it the distinct impress of a ruling idea; though it has its assignable 'notes' or characteristics —and this is what we correctly mean when we say that it (or the man who lives it) *has a character;* again and again, in its course, we come upon words and actions which do not 'square in' with this. They look like impertinent intrusions; like the seams or bands of volcanic matter, filling up cross-wise, the 'faults' which appear so unexpectedly in the general direction of the strata.

§ 201. Now, it is our business to ask,—What is the philosophical significance of a fact so palpable that none can deny it?

It would get rid of the difficulty, of course, to say,— "These cases are mere 'abnormalities,' and have no real significance at all. It is only what is normal and

general that we must regard; and the testimony of this is clearly enough in the direction of establishing the law, that character determines the strength of any particular motive to any particular man, and, as a consequence, what shall be the decisions of his Will."

But this quietly implies that these *inconsistencies* are not strictly *voluntary* actions. That is to say,—*Only on the supposition* that, in each and every case, they *are involuntary*, can it be fairly argued that they are *not* cases 'in point,' and have no significance for us in this question. For if, *in any instance*, they are strictly *voluntary*, they are then cases of 'decisions of the Will;' and so cases perfectly and entirely 'in point,' although they so sadly spoil the generalisation there is so much temptation to make. The fact of their *irregularity*, their *spontaneity*, their *exceptionality*, does not interfere with their true pertinence to this debate.

Now, that again and again, they *are* as strictly and purely voluntary, as those which are what we might expect, there can be no reasonable doubt. That counsel of Solomon, "My son, if sinners entice thee, *consent* thou not," has corresponding to it a real *fact*. The character of the tempted one may be definitely and clearly 'good;' yet the 'enticement' of sin is presented to it; and, while many a time it is unheeded, there comes a *moment* when its allurement is so vividly realised, that it is *consented to*—and the wrong is done. And it *is* 'consent'—'the consent of *the Will*'—that is given. I do not mean to deny that there are some—it may be many—of these palpable and sad inconsistencies, in which the surprise is so utter, the sudden whirl of impulse so overwhelming in its force, that the consequent action may be viewed rather as the reflex of the physical en-

icement than as the voluntary decision of the 'man.' But such a concession does not, in any way, mitigate the force, or alter the significance, of facts in instances where this is not the case. It is *not* that there was any *compulsion* of physical force to the act. The fallen one confesses afterwards: "It was my own doing; I listened of my own accord; I looked; I dwelt upon what was fascinating in the proposal, and quite *willingly* I gave way. I know it was wrong; but I can blame no one but myself. I need not have done it. I had often resisted before; I might have resisted then. The sin is on my own head." So it was with royal David. A character, in its general tone, heroic and noble and pure; yet, in the mood—it was more than the hour—of sensual temptation, descending to what was basely selfish, cruel, immoral, and mean: yet after it, there is no attempt to throw it upon circumstances, or to avoid its responsibility. "Against Thee, Thee only, have I *sinned*, and done this evil in Thy sight."

§ 202. Now, in all such cases, the significance of the facts can be only this—that the generalisation is an imperfect one; that the law assumed does not hold: in other words, that there is no such 'law' in its strictly scientific sense; that even this modified position,—that certain motives in conjunction with, or in their play upon, certain characters have causal efficiency, in absolutely and inalternatively determining the volitional decision,—is *not true*. This fuller analysis of the facts in such cases only, after all, establishes more clearly our distinctive position as against the Determinists; that *Volitions* are *not within the realm of Law*, and are simply and wholly the decisions of a personal *agent* morally *free* to *choose* between alternative courses.

§ 203. II. This, however, is only half the problem presented as to the relation of Will to character. We have dealt with the question,—What is the nature of the *influence* of *Character* on the *decisions* of the *Will?* The question now presents itself,—What is the *influence* of *decisions of the Will on Character?* and we might put it in a larger and wider form,—*What is the true philosophy of the formation of Character?*

In this second form, however, the problem is so vast and intricate, that it would be unwise to attempt to discuss it at all in detail here. Only in barest outline can we touch upon the larger question—the philosophy of the formation of character—paying more special attention to the one point which has more direct bearing on our immediate subject, viz., the influence upon it of the decisions of the Will.

§ 204. No doubt, on the one hand, the *physical constitution* with which we are born into the world is a most influential factor. In the nervous temperament, and physical tone, of one as compared with another, is involved special susceptibility to certain classes of influence—special sensitiveness to the play of certain forces special facilities in some directions, and peculiar difficulties in others; and this carries with it *connate tendencies*, inherent predispositions, natural tastes, inherited prejudices.

The 'circumstances,' moreover, in the midst of which the lot of each is cast, have an influence in the moulding of the character, which is not easily overrated. In the *surroundings* of one, there may be nothing refined and elevating, but everything to degrade and deprave; while in those of a second, the very atmosphere may be one of refined taste, and all the objects which meet the eye may be pure and beautiful.

As great a difference, moreover, is there in the *type* of those *with whom* and *amongst whom* the life is lived. It must produce a very different result, if the nature is always in contact with stern, wilful, domineering, coarse, selfish, vicious men or women, or only with those of a loving, gentle, responsive, pure, and pious disposition.

§ 205. Now, the influence of all these things must be great; and for as much of the net result as may be legitimately traced to them—as the physical effects of physical causes—the burden of responsibility cannot rest with the individual concerned. But it would be a great and serious error to represent the case as one in which these were the sole influences at work. It is *not* simply that a certain physical constitution, with corresponding and correlated tastes, faculties, tendencies, is just played upon by surrounding forces: the forces of physical circumstances, early education, habitual society—the latter at every stage modifying the former; and the former, as thus modified, changing the exact shade of its susceptibility to impression from the latter—this is not the whole case: there is at work, at every moment of the life-long process, *another agency*, and that central and effectual.

If it were the whole, as it is so often represented, the phenomena would have their exact parallel in many purely physical ones. In so many points, indeed, is this parallel true, that such physical phenomena are often adduced as clearly illustrating, and almost proving the fact, that the formation of character is purely and completely the result of the operation of inalternative Law. The sort of instance which seems most in point, is one in which the interchange of modifying influences is most obtrusive and apparent. Such is the shaping of a pebble

on the sea-shore, or of an erratic boulder in a 'giant pot' in the bed of a glacier.

Clearly, in the former case—as, in the ceaseless surge of the sea, each pebble is driven against its neighbours—a twofold process is going on: the abrasion takes off some particles from the neighbours to the particular pebble in question, *as well* as from *itself;* so that when next they come 'cheek by jowl' the shape of each having been altered, the actual effect will be different from that produced the first time they came into collision.

So, too, in the latter instance. Not only are the angles of the erratic boulder worn off by violent friction against the walls of the hole, ground out of the stone glacier-bed; but the walls themselves grow larger in the process, the exact mode of it depending as much upon the shape of the boulder hurled against it in the spiral swirl of waters, as upon the force and volume of the water-stream itself.

Now, in each instance, it may be said, and said with truth, not only is the individual object being moulded and changed in form by the constant force of surrounding circumstances, but the *circumstances* themselves are being changed by the constant 'play' upon them of the individual object; so that the influences which determine its particular form are at every moment being moulded and determined in part by itself. Yet, spite the fact that the alteration of circumstances is effected in part by the stone, the whole process in each instance is purely and exclusively the result of the operation of Law-regulated forces.

§ 206. This is what Mill must mean in the ingenious paragraph[1] in which he tries to show that the true Neces-

[1] "Sytem of Logic," Book VI. chap. ii. sec. 3. pp. 416–419.

sarian need not be, as is so often alleged, a Fatalist. As he puts it, the Fatalist "believes, or half believes (for nobody is a consistent Fatalist) not only that whatever is about to happen will be the infallible result of the causes which produce it (which is the true Necessitarian doctrine), but, moreover, that there is no use in struggling against it, that it will happen, however we may strive to prevent it."[1] Such an one, he shows, must accept the position that "his character is formed *for* him, and not *by* him; therefore his wishing that it had been formed differently is of no use—he has no power to alter it. *But this is a grand error.* He has, to a certain extent, the power to *alter* his character. Its being, in the ultimate resort, formed for him is not inconsistent with its being, in part, formed *by* him as one of the intermediate agents. His character is formed by circumstances (including among these his peculiar organisation), *but his own desire* to mould it in a particular way, *is one* of those circumstances, and by no means one of the least influential."[2]

§ 207. Reading these sentences, and the paragraph of which they form part, for the first time, one would be inclined to think that all which the Freedomist can want is ceded by this stout champion of Necessitarianism. If a man's character, to any extent, is formed *by* him, to that extent, he is a real agent in the matter; he must have the power of wielding, at such times, and at such points, a power '*central* and *effectual*' (p. 223), which is not included in the forces external to his nature which play upon it and mould and form it for him; and which is itself not directed and determined from without, but wielded by the 'man' himself. And this is all that the Freedomist demands.

[1] "System of Logic," p. 417. [2] Ibid. p. 418.

A little closer inspection of it, however, dispels the fond illusion. Even the assertion, or concession rather, that it is "in part formed *by* him," is qualified by a rather ominous qualification, "as one of the intermediate agents." It leads one at once to suspect that an *agency* which he characterises as 'intermediate,' cannot be an agency such as we demand; cannot be that of an 'agent' at all, in the proper sense of the term—the only sense in which it at all meets the claims of the genuine Freedomist. It prepares one to find that the *qualification* robs it of that *originality* or *centrality* which alone can make it the basis of a Sense of Responsibility. The man must be *agent*—as *origin* and *source* of the action—*fons et origo* of the decision,—if he is morally free. He must be a *prime* agent, not an *intermediate* one. For that word 'intermediate' suggests that 'he'—his personality, his nature—is only a link in a chain of causes and effects mediate between antecedent causes and succeeding effects,—merely the 'happy (?) medium' of the influences which are in operation; and which in their mutual action and interaction produce the effects, but over which 'he' has no central, nor primary, nor efficient control.

§ 208. Now the suspicion started by this ominous qualification is only strengthened by the sentence that follows. For, instead of the words "by him as an intermediate agent," we have now the phrase, "his own desire to mould it" (*i.e.*, his character); and this "desire" is described as "one of the *circumstances*," "and not the least, influential," which form it. So that the "he," as a *personality*—the only possible source of the central efficiency demanded by the Freedomist—is now *lost;* transmuted into "*his own desire*"—one of the *mental phenomena* of which 'he' is conscious, it is true—but no more '*himself*'

than an ache he feels, or a thought he excogitates. But, having moved quietly so far from the central ground, which at first we fondly hoped had been given us by Mill, we find that—as we might have expected—we have moved into a region where *efficient causes* and *true causal efficiency* are not to be found; into that world of mere phenomena where absolutely *inalternative* Law—*necessary Causation*—reigns without a break or flaw.

For, when we go on to inquire, how far and in what sense this *desire* to mould his character is '*his own*,' we find that it is so only in as far as it is the desire *he feels*, not one of which he is in any sense the author. Mill's own words are "the *wish* which induces us to attempt to form it *is formed for us*." This being so, we need not follow him in his question, and the answer he tries to give to it, "and how?" Because it matters not in what way it is done; if it is not done by *us*, but by something other than ourselves; though it may be ever so intimately associated with us,—as closely as our clothes are with our bodies, or our skin is with our bodily frame,—being done *for us:* it clearly comes to this. Our character is formed largely for us by *circumstances* external to our personality; but *largely also, by us* as 'intermediate agents;' which means, "by our desire to mould or alter it;" and this desire is "formed for us;" so that the qualification amounts to, "but largely also by something that is formed for us;" and the whole assertion comes to this: "Our *character is formed largely for us; but largely also by something which is formed for us.*"

§ 209. Now what *relief* this is from the Necessitarian, as equivalent to a Fatalistic, position I fail to see. What is formed "by something that is formed *for* us," is no more formed "*by* us" than if it had been *directly* formed

for us. The second remove in "*being formed for us*" makes it if anything a less original formation; certainly, as little our own action as if that deceptive epithet 'our own' had not been introduced at all.

The "desire"—which arises momentarily to modify our character, and which is not, it is true, a part of the external surrounding circumstances which remain the same—is after all only the parallel to the 'form' of the pebble which is chafing against the pebbles which surround it on the beach, or of the boulder which is kept furiously grinding out the native rock in the glacier-bed: each moment changing, and so each moment varying its effective force as against, or acting upon, the neighbouring pebbles or native rock; altering its circumstances or surroundings by being altered itself, and yet as precisely 'determined' to the shape it bears each moment as though it remained unaltered in shape all along: as truly an illustration of the operation of the forces of impersonal Nature, along the lines determined by the inalternative Law of Cause and Effect, as though it wore a shape absolutely unalterable and fixed.

So that the *relief* which Mill offers from the *fatalistic* position is *no relief* at all: since, if the power to alter the character is bound up, not in the *man*, but in the desire to do so—which is *itself* formed *for* him, and not by *him*—the power is not *his* power after all; and the assertion of the *Fatalist* is justified, that the Necessarian position does involve the denial to the man of the power to alter his character.

§ 210. If Mill meant what he said, that a man's character is *in part formed by him;* it could only be by attributing to him a *power* of moulding it, lodged in HIMSELF, as its centre and source. But, then, that

would involve a break in the scheme of Necessity; because the power lodged in 'him'—in such sense as to be *his own*, must be one really, and not simply apparently, 'under his own control;' so really so, that it shall lie with *himself* ultimately in what way it shall be exercised, and not be *determined for* him, or even *in* him, by the operation of forces (personal or impersonal) under the absolute sway of the Law of Cause and Effect.

But this is just the one thing claimed by the Freedomist in opposition to the Necessitarian: a *power possessed* by each *man*, distinct from and additional to the powers or forces included in the term 'circumstances,' (interpreted in the most liberal and comprehensive manner possible)—described already (p. 223) as "central and effectual"—the power of *choice*, the power which the Ego exercises in every decision of the Will. It is not, then, as Mill puts it, "the desire to mould or alter the character," which is the Saviour of the spirit from the bondage of fatalism; but *the faculty of choice*. Yes; it is this, which may be exercised at every turn, and almost at every moment, throughout a man's life; and it is this, which every time it is exercised, produces a deep and lasting effect upon the 'character' of the man; and it is for thus much of his character that he is really answerable; though how much, in each case, this may be, is known only to the Omniscient eye of the Impartial Judge of all the earth.

§ 211. Whenever, in the course of events, there is such a combination of circumstances that there is, strictly speaking, "no alternative," there is, clearly, no opportunity for the exercise of this central power of 'choice.' In such case, the character is further and so far moulded and formed under the influence and by the force of 'circum-

stances,' pure and simple, in the operation of which there is the rigid inalternativity of mere and pure Causation. But it much more often happens that there *is* an alternative, that more than one course *is* open, whether the fact is duly appreciated or no; and in all such cases, therefore, it lies with the *man*, as a morally responsible agent, to determine what course he shall pursue: the decision, in each instance, having a bearing as important, and an influence as effectual, in the moulding of his character, as any of the surrounding *circumstances* which are undoubtedly constituent and influential factors of the case. Nay; a bearing much more important, an influence much more effectual, and for the following reason.

§ 212. It is a commonplace of practical ethics, that to do a thing *only once* is to make it much easier to do a second time; and the special significance of that maxim in this connection is very obvious. It is this. If only, in any given set of circumstances, where an alternative course is presented, each with its strong inducements, the mind be resolutely braced to look the rival considerations in the face; and weighing the competing motives in the balance of duty, the considerations which have hitherto prevailed, and the motives, the promptings of which have hitherto been obeyed, are found to be wanting, and by a strong effort the *decision* be once formed to obey these no longer, but to take the course of duty instead; that one magisterial decision of Volition will do much, very much, to alter and to strengthen the character. The next time a case at all similar occurs, so supreme an effort will not be needed: to the old temptation the 'No' will be said with greater ease and with greater firmness, and the path of duty will be entered after a less painful and less protracted pause, with greater promptitude and with a more elastic step.

So that the ease or difficulty of doing the right, at any particular moment, depends as much, as really, upon what have been the previous decisions of the Will, as upon the nature of the immediate surroundings of circumstance and temptation ; and this much is *the man's own work*, and for it he alone is responsible. Moreover, as this ease or difficulty is only the outward index—the practical reflex—of the condition of the man's character, it becomes abundantly evident that one of the most important of the principles or elements formative of character is the *successive decisions* of the *Will.* Upon the decisions you have made in the past, largely depend the decisions you will make in the future. Upon the way in which you use your imperial power of choice and determination *now*, will largely depend the ease or the difficulty you will find in the future in pursuing the paths of virtue and duty.

§ 213. Moreover, from an educational point of view—as is shown very clearly by Dr. Carpenter, in the Introduction to the last edition of his "Mental Physiology"—this is morally the most important element for the individual himself to constantly bear in mind. Let those who have the training of a child in any measure in their hands, by all means, recognise practically the great importance of suitable surroundings, by seeing to it that the circumstances in which the young life and character are being developed be kept as favourable as possible to the fostering and development of the good, and the exclusion of all overpowering temptations to evil ; but, in their personal intercourse with the child, let these be alluded to as little as possible ; and all the stress, and the utmost stress, be laid upon the part he has to play, the *work* he has to do, in the great task of

building up a perfect character; on the importance of deciding promptly for the good; on the danger of dallying with temptation; on the happy effects of choosing resolutely the right—as just the things which are within his power, are his business, and for which he alone is responsible. In this way, and in this alone, will that 'sense of responsibility' be fostered, which is the very backbone of moral strength; will that consciousness of self-determining power (in the only legitimate sense of the term), that self-reliance, be strengthened, which are the only conditions of robustness of character.

If this be kept prominently before the mind of the child—that the way in which he *wills* largely determines what he will become—the care will be always to will *rightly*. The *willing* rightly will become a *habit* of the life; the first impulse, instead of the last, will be,—'this is *right* and must be done;' and so the Will will gradually be *fashioned* into harmony with the Divine Will, until it becomes, what Mill quotes as Novalis's definition of '*Character*'—but what, I suppose, would be more truly taken as the one *condition* of a noble and perfect character—"a *perfectly fashioned Will.*"

CHAPTER XII.—THE GREAT CONTROVERSIAL PHRASES.

1. THE WILL. 2. FREEDOM AND NECESSITY OF THE WILL.

§ 214. THUS far we have kept as clear as we could of the great controversy. We have tried to ascertain the facts of our nature, as revealed in a strictly psychological inquiry; though, in the last two chapters, we were

drawn into it by sheer necessity. Let us now turn aside to see what we find in the systematic conclusions of others. The whole battle rages about certain phrases. Let us first examine them separately; and then try to estimate the actual truth covered by them.

The *terms* which form the *pivots* of the controversy are three: (1) The Will; (2) The Freedom and Necessity of the Will; (3) The Self-Determination of the Will.

Let us examine them in order.

§ 215. (1) *The Will.* This phrase has been used without objection by almost every philosopher who has treated of this theme. Its simplicity and conciseness seem to have commended it to thinkers on this subject, however opposed to each other in their views. Of course all that is really meant by it is "the power possessed by the Ego of Willing." But its *substantive form* so naturally suggests a substance or *entity*, having independent or at least *distinct existence*, that the unwary use of this convenient phrase has become the fruitful source of error and confusion.

So ready and subtle is the reflex influence of language on thought that '*the Will*' in man becomes spoken of as a separate source of influence or power; and—just as in the case of the term '*Law*'—an *abstraction* is credited with all sorts of prerogatives and functions which cannot possibly belong to it, simply because it has not real and substantive existence. And so I cannot but think that in the use of this term, 'The Will,' consists "the head and front of the offending" of many who argue on this subject.

It naturally suggests those other terms, used much in the same way, "The Mind," or "The Intellect," and

"The Heart." And the very use of them, even after they have been most carefully analysed, is apt to lead us unawares into the error of thinking of them as parts, sections, or divisions of the soul.

§ 216. The error has been recognised by the critical thinkers of modern times, and by the acutest of the ancients. Most clearly is it exposed by Sir W. Hamilton in his twentieth lecture on Metaphysics; in which he distinctly lays down the caution that the *faculties* of which he is giving the classification are not distinct, objective *entities*, but only the *peculiar modes*, or rather the distinct kinds, of the self-manifestation of the Ego.

No one, either, could be more explicit on this point than President Edwards himself. In dealing with the Arminian position, with reference to the "Will's self-determining" power, he says: "I shall take it for granted that when they speak of the Will as the determiner, they mean the *soul* in the *exercise* of a *power of willing*." Although, as we shall see a little farther on, the definition which he gives of *Will* involves this very error.

Yet the acutest thinkers allow themselves to be misled by the terminology they employ. Even such a thinker as Bledsoe can talk of the "sensitive part" of the human soul; and I think we must admit that, even in our most critical and wary moods, there is a tendency we cannot always resist, when we use the phrases 'the Mind,' or 'the human Intellect,' or the 'human Heart,' to think of distinct sections of the soul, the special function of the one being to think; and of the other, to feel and to desire.

In the same concrete manner, too, '*the Will*' is spoken of, or written about, as that part of the soul

which decides, determines, controls; in other words, which produces volitions or '*wills.*'

§ 217. That this is, strictly speaking, erroneous needs no elaborate proof. No laboured argument is necessary to convince any one that it is all the grossest metaphor—impersonation as purely fictitious as any found in the lines of purest poetry. To say distinctly, in plain prose, what this poetry or rhetoric must mean, if it is pressed literally; that such phrases, 'mind,' 'heart,' 'will,' correspond to, and are the names of *sections* of our spiritual nature perfectly distinguishable, actually distinct, and each organically homogeneous and complete—has only to be said to prove its absurdity.

If it were true, moreover, we should have to undo our classification of mental phenomena, and adopt the American. For that alone would fit into this trinity of terms. According to it, we have the threefold division into *Intellections*, *Sensibilities*, and *Volitions;* and, as tallying with it, we might very naturally say, '*the mind*' is the source of the first, 'the heart' is the fountain of the second, and 'the will' is the origin of the third. But such a classification we have seen ample reasons to discredit and reject, and with it the quasi-ground for the retention of the usual phraseology at once disappears. Indeed, we are tempted to ask, Is not the real, though perhaps unconscious, ground of the American division of mental phenomena to be found in this trinity of popular phrases?

§ 218. Still the poetical impersonation has become so interwoven into all kinds of speech and writing, that it often holds its own in that which is intended to be most scientifically accurate, and unconsciously moulds many a line of argument; and has a warping influ-

ence upon much reasoning, which is both vigorous and incisive. So that it is quite worth our while to face the fallacy, put it in very distinct outline before us, look at it well, so that, having become thoroughly acquainted with it, we may realise the different forms it may assume, the specious guises in which it may appear, and so be prepared to recognise it, in whatever subtle connection it may be presented, at once detect it, and drive it with shame and confusion from the arena of sober controversy and serious discussion. What then is the notion which we must thus earnestly repudiate? What the idea that in any form or relation we must relentlessly refuse to admit into our arguments?

In its nakedness, the notion is this: that the soul is mapped out into four regions corresponding to the four great classes of mental phenomena; is divided into four parts, each of which is '*told off*' to do a certain part of the work of the soul. In its more rhetorical, or picturesque form—a form, too, less dangerous; because in this the personal *sovereignty*, the central *authority*, of the Ego is preserved—the idea is this: that the Ego is to these four fundamental faculties, as the head is to the four limbs, or a sovereign to his four princes, or satraps, who are empowered to raise, collect, and distribute the revenues of his dominion, each with a sort of power of his own.

§ 219. Now, as opposed to all this, we cannot too emphatically maintain the soul's *unity* and indivisibility, nor too clearly apprehend, too distinctly represent to ourselves, nor too constantly bear in mind, the true relation which the noumenon, or Ego, sustains to each of these four classes of phenomena. It is a repetition of what we have learnt long ago, I know, but in view of this

special controversy about '*the Will*,' it is not needless to assert it again.

It is not '*the mind*' as a part of the Ego, but the Ego itself, one and indivisible, that *thinks*. Much less accurate *à fortiori* and much more misleading, clearly, must it be to say, that because there are so many proofs that the brain is the physical organ of all thought, and that there can be no 'psychosis' without 'neurosis,' in this special connection—no thought without a corresponding and appropriate cerebrate modification—"the brain thinks." Yet even such a man as James Hinton could bring himself to say and to write it again and again.

That it is not '*the heart*,' as a part of the soul, but the soul in its essential unity, which both feels and desires is as incontrovertible; but that it is not '*the Will*' as a separate entity in our spiritual nature, but the self, 'the spiritual noumenon' as the controlling centre of all its powers, that wills, is what most distinctly of all, in this connection, we have to realise.

As in the case of some of the other faculties, there have not been wanting distinct disclaimers on the part of distinguished thinkers, in connection with this one of Volition. A more distinct one I could not quote than that of Morell.[1] "The Will," he writes, "is not a real thing distinct from the mind and its operations; it is merely the *mind itself viewed in relation to effort and action*." With the negative part of the statement I heartily concur. To the second half of the sentence—its constructive definition—it is not easy to give unabated praise. It has so unmistakably the serious defect of vagueness and lack of precision.

[1] "Elements of Mental Philosophy," part vi. chap. i.

§ 220. But this reference to a *definition* naturally leads me to state a rather startling consequence of the truth which we have been thus dwelling upon. If the term 'THE WILL' must be treated only as the name of a 'logical fiction,' convenient enough, but to be used safely only with very great care and caution, and not as that of a distinct entity; any definition which gives it, or involves in its terms the idea of a quasi-separateness or independence, must be ruthlessly cast aside as chimerical, absurd, and dangerous.

We may, of course, admit on these strictest principles the definition of 'a Volition;' for that, as the phenomenal product of the operation of willing, is a phenomenal entity: though practically it is impossible, owing to the fact that the *idea* '*Volition*' is a simple, incomplex one, which though it may be '*described*,' or its conditions and consequences analysed, cannot strictly speaking be *defined*. But of the phrase 'the Will' we must repudiate the idea of *a definition* in any form, except as equivalent to 'the power the Ego has of willing;' because in reality there is *no* distinct entity corresponding to the term.

From the very conditions of a definition—which generally include the presupposition that what is to be defined shall have real existence of its own—we may naturally expect the insidious appearance of the error of treating 'the Will' as a distinct entity. As a fact this expectation is realised. Even in the most unexceptional, more is tacitly involved in the use and definition of the phrase than is strictly legitimate. None is more unexceptional than that of Whedon: "Will is the power of the soul by which it intentionally originates an act or state of being." Yet that phrase "power of the soul" though quite defensible, may very easily be played upon so as to treat

it as separable from the soul itself: and it needs all the emphatic distinctness of the disclaimer contained in the concluding paragraph of his first chapter to warn the student of this danger.

In other cases, it is clear that this important point has not been observed. In the critical instance of Edwards, this is one of the foundation-errors into which he has fallen. The definition he adopts most unmistakably reveals the fact. It runs thus: "The Will is *the faculty* of which we are conscious as the *immediate cause* of our actions." Here the *faculty* is spoken of as the "immediate cause" of our actions. It is by implication *separated* from the 'we;' while the strict truth is that 'we'—not the faculty—are the cause of every action that may be fairly called 'our own.' The view presented by such language is, that our actions, while immediately caused by one of our faculties, are simply watched by ourselves as objects of consciousness. But the central fact, that of them we are distinctly and emphatically the authors, is passed by, and kept in the hazy distance.

§ 221. What we must clearly realise is that the term 'the Will' covers only the logical distinguishableness of one of the faculties of the Ego; and, whenever used as the grammatical 'subject' of any verb, must be viewed as only a condensation of the ampler and more accurate phrase, 'The Ego, in willing.' If we allow ourselves for the sake of compactness or brevity still to use the term in such connections as the following: "The Will determines;" "The Will is not subject to Necessity;" "The Will initiates this process or that;" we must always command and restrain ourselves sufficiently to realise fairly and fully, that all that is truly meant by such language,—the real facts covered by this slightly rhe-

torical phraseology, are these: "The Ego, by the exercise of Volition, or in the act of Volition, *determines;*" "*the Ego*, in every exercise of Volition, is not subject to necessity;" "the Ego, in this process or that, in the act of Volition, by the decisions to which it comes, *in willing* is *its actual initiator, origin*, or *cause.*"

§ 222. (2) *The Freedom and Necessity of the Will.*

The consideration of this more complex phrase naturally follows that of the simpler one with which it is compounded: and the first remark which I am compelled to make, as a direct corollary of the preceding investigation, is that *strictly speaking it is unmeaning and unintelligible.* For, most clearly, if there is no such distinct entity as 'The Will,' these grand phrases—'The Freedom of the Will;' 'The Necessity of the Will'—examined in reference to reality, and translated into their logical equivalents,—mean only 'The Freedom' or 'The Necessity' of a nonentity, or, at most, of a mere logical abstraction. Closely pressed, therefore, they are found to be 'strings of names,' and nothing more.

§ 223. Now this is just the conclusion reached by thinkers from whom, on the points to which these senseless phrases have reference, I altogether and diametrically differ; though, as may be readily imagined, from considerations and along lines of thought very distinct from that just indicated. These thinkers have typical representatives in three great English philosophers—Hobbes, Locke, and Bain.

In his "Letter about Liberty and Necessity," Hobbes says:

"I hold that the ordinary definition of a Free Agent, namely, That a Free Agent is that which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can

nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction, and is Nonsense."

Locke, in a section headed (Liberty), "Belongs not to Volition," says: "Liberty is not an idea *belonging* to *Volition* or preferring, but to the person having the power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct."[1] Soon after, in the same chapter (sec. 14), he says still more strongly: "Liberty belongs not to the Will;" and adds, "If this be so (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and, I think, unreasonable, because unintelligible, question, viz., whether man's Will be free or not? For, if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said that the question itself is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask whether a man's will be free, as to ask whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square; liberty being as little applicable to the Will as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue."

Bain too, in his "Emotions and Will,"[2] expresses the same opinion in much the same way. "The terms," he says,— meaning of course "Liberty and Necessity,"— "have no application to the subject. The question put in some one's mouth by Carlyle, 'Is virtue then a gas?' is not too ridiculous a parody on the foregoing." In a former part of the same paragraph he has also written: "The term 'ability' is innocent, and has intelligible meanings, but the term 'Liberty' is brought in by main force into a phenomenon to which it is altogether incommensurable."

§ 224. Are we, then, it may be asked, to pass this

[1] "Human Understanding," Book II. chap. xxi. sec. 10.

[2] "The Will," chap. xi. sec. 3. p. 545.

whole question by, because it is shown that the phraseology employed is inexact? Are we to acquiesce in the conclusion which Locke and Bain would bring us to, that there is no intelligible issue raised, or to *be* raised? There is no doubt that, as a matter of history, great battles have been waged about these phrases. They have been the 'bone of contention' in successive philosophical strifes. These are the standards, around which have rallied the opposing armies, each eagerly striving to tear to tatters, or riddle with bullets, the standard of the other; or, better still, to carry it off in triumph, draggle it awhile in the dirt, and then burn it to ashes in the fire of merciless and relentless criticism, or hang it in their halls as trophy of a crushed and defeated cause. Can we quite believe with Locke and Bain, that they have been but phantom banners; that it is but a 'shadow,' an unsubstantial 'nonentity,' about which these great hosts have been contending with such earnestness and vehemence and fire, age after age, ever since man began to think seriously at all? Most unhesitatingly I answer for myself that I cannot. It is a deep conviction with me that underlying the one phrase is a great truth, and underlying the other a deadly and deadening error; and, while thus recognising the inaccuracy of the phraseology employed, it must be our object to extricate the truth and exhume the error.

There is undoubtedly a great and grave question in debate; and it concerns this point—the *nature* of the connection between a volition and both its antecedents and its consequents; and one great, vital difference between the opposing schools lies here, that in investigating this point the *Necessitarian* confines himself strictly to the region of the phenomenal, while the *Freedomist* feels

that justice cannot be done to all the facts of the case without keeping in view the *noumenal* element as well.

§ 225. (*a*) The Freedomist is prepared to find and ready to admit the fact, if it presents itself, with all its consequences, that the true *antecedent* or *cause* of a Volition may transcend, may be altogether outside and beyond, the region of the phenomenal.

While he may admit the broad conclusion of Solly, that *Law*, inalternative and absolutely rigid and invariable, is the great *conditionating* principle of *phenomena;* it is, with him, at the outset, a possibility he distinctly recognises—which becomes an increasing probability, the more fully and deeply he investigates the matter—that, in the region of Volition, he may meet with phenomena not amenable to this great inalternative Law of Cause and Effect. For, fully to understand these, he has to pass the region of the phenomenal ; he is brought into regions where the conditions of the phenomenal do not apply. In seeking candidly, and without prejudice, the *cause* and *origin*, as distinct from the mere *conditions*, of *Willing*, he is brought into the region of the noumenal; in each case, he is brought face to face with the *noumenal Ego*, as the *author* and *source* of all strictly voluntary action.

§ 226. But, this being so, he recognises the fact that this question is unique in its character, standing quite alone, and in important particulars apart from all other questions of scientific investigation. For it is the one matter in which the sphere of the phenomenal is pierced. It is the one thing, in the whole range of our experience, which acquaints us with the noumenal. To this extent, the investigator finds himself an *Ontognostic*—though he concedes that Ontology as the 'science' of noumena

is impossible—because in *Volition* we are made acquainted with our 'selves' or *conscious-subjects*, as the central source of all control. Though, from the very nature of the noumenal, the nature or mode of its connection with the phenomenal cannot be *formulated*—since all *formulation*, as the laying down of a formula, expressing a rule of action or law of operation, pertains wholly to that region of the phenomenal which is the special domain of law—still, in the one significant fact, of the production of Volition, this connection as an actual reality is pointed out and forced upon our attention.

But, this being so, the Freedomist, in the very recognition of the fact, that the full history of any genuine Volition carries us beyond the region of the phenomenal, will not be confounded or dismayed, if he do meet with that which is *extra legal;* in other words, with what is '*supernatural*'—if this term is accepted in the sense Dr. Bushnell gives to it—as properly including everything that is above and beyond and out of the sphere of Law-bound Nature.

§ 227. (*b*) With the Necessitarian, on the other hand, the region of the *phenomenal* is the only one he recognises; and within the limits of this region, therefore, he strictly confines his investigation. The only question, therefore, asked by him is, What is the sort of connection existing between the Volition as a phenomenon, and its phenomenal antecedents and consequents? It is not difficult to anticipate what will be the result of such an inquiry. But of those who pursue this method, it will be convenient and useful to consider separately the position of the *two classes* into which they may be divided.

§ 228 (1) The *first* of these confine their inquiry

entirely to the determination of the nature of the connection between the Volition and its phenomenal *consequent.* They imply, by the course they pursue, that the question touching its *antecedent* is immaterial and quite irrelevant. By the phenomenal consequent, of course, I mean the *action* which is the external embodiment of the Volition.

They see that to 'freedom' man ever clings with pertinacity and desperation, as to his great distinguishing prerogative, and that he has ever persisted, and ever will persist, in claiming it; however imperious the demands and apparently irresistible the arguments of philosophers: and they seek to persuade him that he has all the freedom he can want, if, in the natural sequence between Volition and action, there is interposed no physical barrier or hindrance. If there is nothing to prevent the actual performance of the action which is decided on in the act of Volition; then, say these philosophers, the man has *all* the 'liberty' he can reasonably desire. If a man wills to do a certain thing, and accomplishes his design, because *able* to put it into execution and unhindered in this course, the man is 'free.' For, with these, 'liberty' consists solely in "the ability to *do* as the person concerned pleases, chooses, or wills." This is the 'freedom' of Hobbes, Locke, Collins, Edwards, and many others of the same school —these terms being precisely those which are used over and over again in their expositions.

With the connection between *Volition and its antecedents* they do not trouble themselves—as bearing in any way, I mean, upon the 'freedom' of the agent in the case. So long as the action dictated by the Volition is secured, they do not care to inquire *how* the Volition

that prompted it came into existence; because, say they, though it were proved to a demonstration—as they claim that in every instance it may be proved—that it was the purest example of the sole action of the *in-alternative laws* of Cause and Effect, there would be as much 'liberty,' as complete 'freedom,' in any reasonable interpretation of the word, as if it could be shown that it made its appearance purely 'by chance.'

That question, they maintain, is quite apart from and unconnected with that *Freedom* which they are willing to concede, as thus interpreted, is the one condition of Moral Responsibility.

CHAPTER XIII.—THE GREAT CONTROVERSIAL PHRASES.

2. FREEDOM AND NECESSITY OF THE WILL (*continued*).
3. SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE WILL.

§ 229. (2) THE second class of philosophers, to which we referred in the previous chapter, lay the emphasis on the point which the first set aside as in the connection quite irrelevant. They avow it as their conviction, that it is important to investigate accurately the kind of connection which exists between the Volition and *its antecedents*. With them the question is, Can there not always be traced and distinguished, amongst these, phenomena which constitute—on the strictly scientific definition of that term—the phenomenal *cause*, of which it, the Volition, is the phenomenal effect?

§ 230. For here it is well, afresh and distinctly, to realise—what I have already referred to by anticipation

—that it is *only* the *phenomena* that is recognised by them. This is clear enough from the direct statements of J. S. Mill—who is an able representative of the class—in his treatment of the subject of Causation. Just pointing out that what is here called 'phenomenal cause,' and by Solly[1] is spoken of as 'conditioned cause,' is the exact equivalent of Mill's[2] "physical cause;" and that what I have spoken of as 'noumenal cause,' and is Solly's 'unconditioned cause,' is Mill's efficient cause; I refer you to his words.

He (Mill) distinctly says: "I premise, then, that when, in the course of this inquiry, I speak of the cause of any phenomenon, I do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon. I make no research into the ultimate or ontological cause of anything. To adopt a distinction familiar in the writings of the Scotch metaphysicians, and especially of Reid, the causes with which I concern myself are not *efficient*, but *physical* causes. They are causes in that sense alone, in which one physical fact is said to be the cause of another. Of the efficient causes of phenomena, or whether such causes exist at all, I am not called upon to give an opinion."[3]

§ 231. Now I cannot help remarking that, candid as seem these avowals, charmingly modest as are these pretensions (while there is significance in his ambiguous *reticence*, though that is not exactly the point here), it would have been well if he had more carefully restricted himself to his own proposals. If he had strictly confined his attention to the sphere he thus proposes to himself, if he had limited himself to the investigation of purely 'physical facts,' one thing is certain, we could have no

[1] "The Will," p. 22. [2] "System of Logic," vol. i. p. 364.
[3] Ibid. pp. 363, 364. Fifth Edition.

reasonable ground for quarrel with him in this connection. And just for this reason. On this principle, he would not have touched the subject with which we are now concerned.

Distinctly restricting his inquiry to the elucidation of the way in which one "physical fact is the cause of another," as all that "the theory of Induction requires," he would not have touched this problem of Volition at all. For, by the canon of procedure he so clearly lays down, any question into which an element not purely physical enters—in which the *metaphysical* is involved—*ipso facto* passes out of the region of his research. Yet, from a direct and unprejudiced examination of Volition, apart from controversy, we have found that this is just the one question into which such element must enter, with the very fundamentals of which this element is intertwined.

By the very nature of the subject, Mill's method and data are incompetent to the complete and thorough-going investigation of it.

§ 232. One might have supposed, at least, that there were superficial differences enough between the phenomena of Volition and ordinary 'physical facts' to make it at least questionable whether the method, quite sufficient in the one case, would be fully applicable in the other. Or, at any rate, we may say, these differences are so palpable, and, to the mass of thinking and earnest men, so important—connected so inextricably, too, with what is so vital in its various issues—that they called for a clear and candid examination of them, with a view to *prove* that the differences are only apparent, and to explain how it is that men have come to build so much upon what has really no existence. But no. He passes in the

fourth book of his "System of Logic," to this question of Volition, just as though it were as purely a 'physical fact,' as simply and wholly one, as the 'formation of dew,' or the action of poison on the human frame. This is cool enough: strange enough.

§ 233. But it is startling, quite staggering, to find such an admission made by such an acute reasoner as M'Cosh. Is it through his unconscious desire to save the position of Calvinism? True, he concedes, "We believe him (man) to be free, as his Maker is free." Still this is what he says: "It is by an intuition of our nature that we believe this thought or feeling could not have been produced without a cause; and that this same cause will again and for ever produce the same effects. And this intuitive principle leads us to expect the reign of causation, not only among the thoughts and feelings generally, but among the wishes and volitions of the soul." [1]

§ 234. And the result is what one might expect. Eliminating, to begin with, or rather quietly ignoring, all that is unique in the question—everything in which Volition is radically and essentially different from any of the purely physical processes of nature—he finds the methods of Induction quite as sufficient to deal with the phenomena of Volition, as to guide the researches of the natural philosopher.

And another result, quite as natural and most sig-

[1] "The Divine Government, Physical and Moral," Book III. chap. i. sec. 2.

I must just remark, in passing, that we may admit that it is by an intuition that we believe— must believe—that every Volition *has* a *cause;* and deny, as in fact we do, that by an intuition we are obliged to believe that everywhere and always the same cause must produce the same effect.

nificant, is that, from his consideration, and from that of all who go along his lines, the investigation, or even the recognition, of any *efficiency* in the cause ; and any *bindingness* in the *Necessity* which, he claims, links cause with effect, are alike excluded and disclaimed.

For it is solely with the phenomenal antecedents of the phenomena of Volition that such concern themselves ; and with these, only so far as to answer the question,—Are there any among them on which the particular Volition in question is invariably and unconditionally consequent? If there is, that antecedent or set of antecedents—according to Mill's discriminating definition of a phenomenal cause—is the phenomenal cause of the Volition. But, in this case, of course, it is evident the only thing inquired into is *order* of *sequence* of the one or the other. In other words, What is the ground of the necessity which makes the latter always tread on the heels of the former? is not gone into ; is, indeed, a question precluded from scientific investigation.

§ 235. The contention of these thinkers is that, to each particular Volition, there *is* such an antecedent or group of antecedents : so that, whenever such are presented to the mind in consciousness, that particular Volition, and no other, will invariably result. In this connection, the antecedents are specially called 'motives,' and the position of these phenomena, such philosophers maintain, is such that, in each case, the 'motives' urging to the course decided on are the 'phenomenal cause' of the *decision* of *Volition* ; so strictly that, on the one hand, it is impossible that any Volition should be absolutely *motiveless*, since that would be tantamount to saying that there were in the region of Volition *causeless effects*—a logical absurdity, and a real impossibility ;

and, on the other, whenever the same motive, or set of motives, was presented to the same mind, it would infallibly result that the same course of action would be determined on—in other words, that the same decision would be arrived at, and identically the same Volition would be willed. In the fullest sense which they give to the terms 'cause' and 'effect,' therefore, every *Volition* is the *effect* of the *motives*, and in every case the *motives* are the phenomenal cause of the Volition. Further; as according to this view, *Necessitation*, or *Necessity*, is simply equivalent to "happening according to *law*;" *Volitions* are as entirely and strictly within the realm of Necessity as any physical phenomena.

Being, according to them, perfect instances of the operation of the Law of Causation, they are of course perfect examples of pure Necessity. And, therefore, as *Freedom* is the logical *contradictory* of *Necessity*, they do not (like those to whom we have just referred) shelve the question as insignificant or irrelevant, but distinctly claim that the Will is not *free*, any more than any thing else in nature, but is *necessitated*; or, as they sometimes phrase it, boldly assert that the true position is absolute '*Determinism*' and *not* '*Liberty*.'

§ 236. Now, having seen, in our inquiry into the nature of Motives and their Relation to Volition, that in this discussion there has been the serious confusion of merely phenomenal 'conditions' with the *true* 'cause'—in this case, emphatically ontological or noumenal—namely, the *person* (Ego) willing; having seen, too, that the very essence of the operation, as a *choice*, presupposes an alternative possibility; we may say, both of their attempts to cashier the whole question as a mere logomachy, founded on the use of phrases, strictly speaking,

utterly unmeaning, and of the stern logical argument which would shut us up, in this matter, exactly as in the case of purely physical phenomena, to the absolute regularities of the Law of Universal Causation—"none of these things move me."

Spite all the pelting of Necessitarian argument and sophistry, we are still persuaded that there is a truth, perhaps half-concealed and only half-revealed, underlying this phrase, the 'Freedom of the Will,' which they so superciliously reject.

§ 237. Very roughly expressed in ordinary phraseology, it impels me still to say: "I certainly believe in the 'Freedom of the Will.' I must believe that man is free. I am convinced that *I* am free. I *feel* that my *will* is free. I feel that I am free in willing. If I did not, I could not be accountable for my actions: for I could not be responsible for what I was forced to do." These strong expressions *will* burst from the lips; this *stock-argument*, if you like to call it, will return with invincible force to the mind.

Of course I admit the looseness, inaccuracy, and logical error, in much of this phraseology. It is true, the sentences—"I must believe man is free;" "I am convinced that I am free"—might be reconciled with, even to the extent of being taken as a fair expression of, the position held by Edwards and Locke, that all the liberty there is, is freedom from external constraint or restraint —"ability to do as we please or choose." On the other hand, moreover, the next sentence, "I feel my will to be free," is open to a double objection: 1st, that there is no such entity as 'The Will;' and 2nd, that *liberty* is not properly attributable to Volition, but to *the man*.

Still the next sentence, "*I feel that I am free in*

willing," is not liable to any of these objections; and its connection with what follows expresses compendiously the argument from the nature of Responsibility which, in its solid strength, has been untouched by, and is absolutely impregnable to, all the assaults of Necessitarian logic.

§ 238. Let us then take this sentence, "*I am free in willing*," as a text which formulates, in terms which are logically unobjectionable, the great truth, obscurely and inaccurately covered by the more common phrase, 'The Freedom of the Will.'

It has the advantage of meeting the demands of one of our greatest opponents. It cedes his point, as a true one—that *freedom* is attributed to *the man*, the 'I,' and not to 'the Will.' But only in this one point; for while, with Locke, it is 'in action' that the freedom is conceded; with us, it is 'in willing,' which is, as we shall see, a very distinct and different thing.

It also meets our own demands that no mention be made of 'the Will' as an entity, or any hint given, by the form of expression used, that such a thing has separate or real existence. For observe, mention is made alone of "I—WILLING": and this tallies exactly, and strictly fits in, with the conclusion reached in the preceding section (p. 239)—that all that is really covered by the term 'the Will,' is that the Ego or 'I' repeatedly manifests itself phenomenally in Volitions, and can be viewed as only a condensation of the ampler and more accurate phrase—"The Ego in *willing*."

Our text, however, simple as it is, needs *exposition*. Not, of course, in its first term—'I;' nor, in its last, 'willing.' Both these we have already thoroughly investigated. The middle term, 'free,' does, however; for,

familiar as the word is, on its exact interpretation, in this connection, hinges the whole question.

§ 239. What then, we ask, is its true meaning? Let the Necessitarians define it.

From our point of view, we may be satisfied, they will be sure so to define it, as that, in the controversy in which we are engaged, it shall be no 'question-begging epithet.' If we adhere closely to their definition, they can then, of course, find no fault with our use of terms. If we can only establish our position by this means, we shall, David-like, be cutting off the head of this grim Goliath, Necessity, with his own trusty sword.

We will then take our definition from one whom all the host of Necessitarianism would doubtless gladly accept as champion of their cause, Professor Bain.

His words are: "The notion of Freedom . . . is not an intuition, any more than the notion of a double decomposition of salts. There is a collection of remembered Volitions, and a comparison drawn between them and one particular situation of sentient beings, the *situation* of *being unloosed from an overpowering compulsion from without*, as when a dog is loosed from his chain, or the prisoner set at liberty."[1]

§ 240. Just a word or two as to the illustrations here used. Of course it follows from the very form of his sentences, that, in Mr. Bain's opinion, 'the chain,' in the case of the dog, and 'the cell' in the case of the prisoner, are each "an overpowering compulsion from without." But this is a little loose and vague. If the dog were held down by main force by the ears to the ground, or pushed bodily into his kennel; or if the prisoner were pinioned

[1] "The Will," Vol. II. chap. xi. sec. 12. p. 562. The italics are my own.

to the flogging frame, or thrust by stalwart warders, in spite of his utmost resistance, into the police-van, it *would* be "an overpowering compulsion from without." But, where the "overpowering compulsion from without" is, when the dog is simply restricted in his movements by the length of the chain, one end of which is fastened to his collar, and the other to a hook driven in the wall or his kennel; and when the convict is simply limited in his movements by the extent of the stern, stone walls of his cell—I cannot quite see.

Indeed, were I inclined to banter with Mr. Bain—as Edwards is so fond of doing in that wonderful treatise of his,—about the most wonderfully subtle specimen of scholastic logic and word-jugglery that the world has ever seen—I should say to him: "So far, my friend, from the chained dog and the incarcerated prisoner being *paralysed* by 'an overpowering compulsion from without, they both have *within certain limits*—determined, in the one case, by the length of the chain; and, in the other, by the walls of the cell—*full power* and *perfect liberty* to *move about.*" (Indeed the similes are admirable illustrations of the *freedom* which Locke concedes to the *agent* in any case. He may 'do as he pleases;' only in certain circumstances he must please in a certain definite way. So both dog and man may take healthful exercise; but it must be within certain definite limits. Yet this metaphor does not accurately picture his position. For there is the liberty within the defined limits, in the illustrations; whereas with Locke and Edwards, necessity, in any case, *determines absolutely* what the Volition, expressing what the agent pleases, shall be; although all restrictions and hindrances are removed out of the way of the Volition being embodied in appropriate action.)

Clearly Mr. Bain has not hit upon the exact phrase, or the exact illustration that he wanted. For certainly they do not at all closely correspond.

§ 241. However, let us take first the one, and then the other. Looking at the illustrations,—which, as concrete examples, rather than abstract language, are more likely to exemplify his true opinion,—we gather that, as the function of both the chain and the cell is to impose *limits* to movement, which cannot be passed by either dog or convict, with him 'liberty' must mean "being *unloosed* from *impassable limitations.*"

What then becomes the Freedomist position, as this definition of the word 'free' is substituted for it, in the formula we have selected as our text? Simply, and distinctly, this. 'In Willing I am *unloosed* from all impassable limitations.' And this is practically the position we maintain, with reference to that which, in this controversy, is the great bone of contention, viz., *Law.* Most clearly the essence of Law is to impose *limitation,* to lay down *boundaries.* And the special way in which Law would operate—if, as our opponents maintain, it did reign here, as it does elsewhere,—would be that, whenever a certain motive or set of motives was presented to the mind, then a certain Volition would infallibly follow as an effect. Law cuts a channel, such that whenever water enters the one end of it, it must and cannot but run between the limits, and in the direction, marked out by its sides. Law is the cell which inexorably limits the area of the movement of the prisoner. Law is the chain which restrains the movements of the dog beyond the circle of which it is the radius. So that, worded specially with reference to essentially limiting Law, our formula appears thus: "In willing I am un-

loosed from impassable limitations of Law;" "In willing I am shut up to no one course by the limitations of Law."

§ 242. Turning from the illustrations, to the more abstract language which Mr. Bain employs, we reach much the same position. In this case, it is "overpowering compulsion from without," unloosing from which constitutes Liberty. The terms may be applied to Law, with almost the same appropriateness as those just noticed. To use the words in the laxer way which is so common (and the exact meaning of which we pointed out in our treatment of the nature of Law, §§ 112 and 119), we may fairly say,—Law *compels*, as well as limits. In the region of the physical, it *ensures* regularity of sequence, and it is only a rhetorical mode of expressing the same fact, when we say that Law 'compels' the *effect* to *follow* the *cause*.[1] It is rhetoric, but a rhetoric that fairly corresponds to the physical fact, if we say that it is, "by the overpowering compulsion from without of the strict and absolute Law of Universal Causation," that the effect invariably and unconditionally follows its cause.

So that again we may accept the position, which would be expressed in this slight modification of our formula—'In willing we are unloosed, as no other part of nature is, from the overpowering compulsion from without of the Law of Universal Causation.'

For our contention is that, in *willing*, we are free from the limitation and determination of any such law

[1] It is true that Mill disclaims this 'compulsion,' as any part of Philosophic necessity. But it is really there. The 'regularity of sequence' is only the "outward and visible sign" of the operation of that Supreme Will which *maintains* the creation It has formed: and so *forcibly ensures* the *order* it has planned.

as that, whenever a certain motive or set of motives is presented to us, a certain Volition must infallibly follow; or that, with these before us, we must infallibly determine on a certain course, or that there is only one decision which it is competent to us to form. We protest, *per contra*, most earnestly and most firmly, that the language of every morally responsible agent may,—nay, must be: —With exactly the same number, strength, and character of motives before me, it is possible for me to will either of two alternative volitions, or any one of many possible volitions, as the case may be. I am not 'shut up' to any one decision. I can *will* in any one of many different ways; in other words, I can issue any one of many different volitions, in precisely the same set of circumstances. In Whedon's admirable phraseology, "I am *pluripotent* in my willing: I am *not* an *inalternative*, but an *alternative* cause."

§ 243. Hobbes's definition of Freedom is not so available as Bain's. He says: "Liberty is the absence of all impediments to action, that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent."[1] Now, on the one hand, the last clause may be so construed as to admit of the very thing which we deny, namely, that in "the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent" are contained the elements of absolute determinism; that they are such as that, in the formation of volitions, the Law of Causation is as rigidly exemplified as in the production of any of the physical phenomena which pertain to his physical nature. On the other hand, moreover, the natural meaning of the term 'action' is so strictly confined to corporeal operations that it can only be

[1] "My opinion about Liberty and Necessity," Works, vol. iv. p. 273. Bohn Ed., 1740.

applied to 'willing' by a stretching of the term to which, doubtless, Hobbes himself would have strenuously objected.

§ 244. The position, then, to which consciousness gives clear and unwavering testimony, and which the ordinary phrase, 'The Freedom of the Human Will,' is intended to express (though it does so in such clumsy and inaccurate form) is this. At no point of our life, when we are acting as morally responsible beings—*i.e.*, in connection with no actions for which we are morally answerable—are we shut up, chained or tied to, one Volition, and one alone. At every moment in which we realise our dignity and our peril as such, we are fully and completely competent to more than one Volition, and are 'free' to will any one of them all.

Or to put the same thing in another form. In every genuine Volition, side by side with the consciousness that in that act I am putting forth myself, or my own central power, I have a second consciousness equally plain and strong that I might have refrained from the Volition, or willed something else. I have an ineradicable conviction, that no *power outside* me, no power 'from without,' no law in heaven or earth, compels me to the course I adopt: but that it is *my* act, and therefore to *me*, and to me *alone*, the action, its qualities, and its effects, are to be attributed.

With the very idea of *willing*, then, is coupled inseparably—as inseparably as the two sides of a sheet of paper—the idea of its 'freedom in choice,' or in more scientific phrase, 'its essential alternativity.' By direct appeal to consciousness, or (what comes substantially to the same thing) by examining the natural answer given by common-sense, practical men to the question,

"What about the Freedom of the Will?" we have arrived at the conclusion, that there is, half-hidden and half-revealed, in that phrase, precious and substantial truth.

Of course it may be objected, that 'consciousness' after all is not a very reliable court of appeal. We will not stay to answer the objection—as Sir W. Hamilton has very well shown it may be answered—that nothing is more fluctuating, mobile, or deceptive than the 'feeling' 'I feel this, and I feel that,'—which is its essence and which lies at its root. We content ourselves with remarking, that to the very same conclusion we have been irresistibly led by another path. As the issue of our analysis of the nature of Subjective Individuality, in its close and vital connection with the Sense of Responsibility, we found that, for its very existence, we must posit the power of *choice:* 'pluripotence' in the willing Ego, 'freedom of the Ego, in willing,' from the determination of any necessitating limiting Law.

§ 245. We did not mention it at the time; it is perhaps more in point in connection with this personal and historical controversy: this general argument runs along the same general line as Kant's method of establishing 'the liberty of the subject' or 'the Freedom of Man,' in his "Kritik of Practical Reason." The apophthegm which summarised his one great argument, was this: "I must, therefore I can." In this 'must'—the "categorical imperative," as he called it—the *duty* or *obligation* it expresses, involves the idea of *Responsibility;* and, finding in it the foundation of alternative *power*, because there cannot be a duty where there is no power to perform the duty, makes his argument tantamount to that which we have wrought out under this head.

§ 246. But let us now pass to a glance, at least, at the third phrase enumerated.

(3) *The 'Self-Determination,'* or *'Self-Determining Power' of the Will.*

Read literally, as indicating that 'Self-Determination' is a quality belonging to, and that the 'Self-Determining Power' is a power possessed by, 'The Will;' it has no consistent meaning. As Edwards himself points out, it would be "the plainest and grossest absurdity." And for this reason. It is attributing to 'the Will' an attribute or a power, as though it were an entity, or agent: whereas it is itself only a *power*. The only accurate phrase at all corresponding to the first would be: 'The Self-Determining power of *the Soul in Willing*'; and to the second, 'The Self-Determination of the Soul in Willing.'

§ 247. But though Edwards thus clears up the initial inaccuracy, he proceeds to demolish the Arminian position, as expressed in these phrases, by as pure a piece of logomachy as can be found in the whole range of mental science. He tries to prove its absurdity and manifest inconsistency thus. The Arminian position he sets forth in these terms: "The Will itself determines all the free acts of the Will." But he proceeds to argue that, as the Will can determine only by willing, from this maxim it follows, that the Will determines its own acts by willing. Thus each determination of the Will requires another or previous act of the Will. But that again requires a third. And so, either we are landed in an *endless series* of *acts of Will;* or, taking an absolute starting-point in some first free act of the Will, we are reduced to the absurdity of speaking of an act of the Will *prior* to that *first*, by which this act was determined.

Now can there be a grosser verbal sophism than this?

We will leave the question as to whether Edwards's text-sentence is a fair exposition of the Arminian position. We can leave the Arminians to defend themselves. We do not care to range ourselves on the one side or the other. All we care to do is to examine the general phrase, as we have that other one of the 'The Freedom of the Will,' with a view to seeing whether there is not substantial truth under the inaccurate terminology.

§ 248. The fundamental unfairness of the above method of treatment lies in a too *literal* and too narrowly grammatical interpretation of the phrases, 'Self-Determining' and 'Self-Determination.' In each case, the first word has been taken strictly as the object of the verb contained in the second: as though each meant—'The Will *determines itself;*' or even—with the more correct interpretation of the phrase—'The soul determines *itself*' by a Volition. Put thus, of course, it is easy to raise the question—*Why* does it so determine itself in each case? There must be some 'sufficient reason' for it, which *determines* it to *determine* itself thus, and in no other way. And so, after all, there must be, it is argued, an assignable *cause*, which, by the sheer necessity of the operation of *Law*, *determines* or produces each *Volition;* even though you choose to call it a 'self-determination.'

But this is an unfair construction to put upon the phrase. What is determined when the soul wills, when the Ego exercises its power of Willing, is *some course of action.* When *I will*, I do not determine *myself;* much less do I determine *my will:* I determine *what I shall do.* I have had several possible courses of action before

me; and what I do when I come to the actual Volition is to *choose one* of them, to *decide* which shall be carried out, to determine what my action shall be. Whenever I say—'I will do this; I will not do that, or any other thing,'—I put an end to indecision and vacillation, by the edict of Volition. I might, therefore, use the phrases—'Self-choice,' 'Self-decision' of the Will—in much the same way, and clearly with the same general meaning as the one before us—'Self-Determination.' But it would be too absurd to argue—though it would be on exactly the same principle of interpretation as that on which Edwards acts in expounding the last phrase—that, because I used these phrases, I must hold that in *willing* I *decided myself* or *chose myself.*

§ 249. What is palpably intended by these phrases is that the *determination*, the *decision*, the *choice* are the *acts* of the *soul*, the *self—not* the *products* of *any other agency*, whether personal or impersonal. And in defending the phrases, the point which I feel it so vitally important to retain is, that, if the Volition is determined necessarily by causes which operate with absolute regularity of sequence, and with which the 'soul' or 'self' cannot in any way interfere, it ceases to possess one of the essential properties of a Volition in its full sense. It ceases to be *voluntary.* It is not worth calling a Volition; for it ceases to be a *choice.* It is, in this case, *inalternatively determined:* is not, as every Volition proper must be, a *determination* between alternatives.

It is a mere play on words, to say the *Volition* must be *determined.* The *Volition is* the *determining* or the 'determination.' And that which *determines* is the 'soul' or 'self.' It is frivolous and foolish to ask, —But what is it *determines* the soul to determine thus

rather than in any other way? Because, if you answer that question at all, you contradict, you destroy, the statement for which you ask an explanation. If you say *x determines* it, then *really*, and as far as any responsibility can enter into the question, as far as the morality of the action is concerned, *x* is the real *agent* in the whole question; whether it be the causal power of a motive, or the irresistible power of the Will of a personal being; and while *x* determines the soul to *determine* on such and such a course—the soul's determination is only a phenomenal, phantasmal, unreal determination; not *original, real, efficient*. So that in such case, really, most truly, you must say that, *in Volition*, it is *not* the *soul* that determines, but *x*, which is the contradictory of the proposition you started your question to explain—viz., "The Volition is the determining or determination; and that which determines is the soul or self."

§ 250. The same thing emerges from a fair consideration of the word 'choice.' This phrase, 'Self-Determination of the Will,' means that 'in willing' the Soul or Self 'chooses' one of two or several alternative courses; and denies that its decision *is determined* by the operation of motives in such a way—that the presence of those motives would invariably, at any other time, in the same circumstances, secure the same course of action. And for this simple reason. If it were so, such *decision* would not be a *real* CHOICE; nor indeed a 'decision,' in the proper sense of the term.

§ 251. If with the *same man*, in the same circumstances, the *same motives* must *infallibly* bring about *the same course of action;* the fact of there having been several *other* courses of action *ideally possible* does not, as is

sometimes urged, make the proceeding on that particular course a 'genuine decision' or 'real choice.'

For such a case has its exact parallel, in all essential elements, in the case of a ball upon a billiard table. If at rest at a certain point, movement from that point in any direction whatever is *ideally possible*, under the impulse upon it of different forces; and if in actual motion along a certain line, deflection in any other direction whatever is ideally possible, if there be brought to bear upon it some other force acting in the required direction. Of course we know, that the same forces in the same direction, will, in every instance, in the same circumstances, have the same effect: and, that being the case, the mere fact that before these forces began to act, it was theoretically possible for the ball to move in a thousand other directions beside this one, does not make the actual determination of that direction an instance of real *decision* or *choice*. At any rate, it is not the decision or choice of *the ball*. No one would dream of using these words with reference to the course taken, the movement executed, by any inanimate object. If there be any decision or choice in the matter, it must have been that of a moral, voluntary agent, who set in operation the particular force which, as a matter of fact, sent it in one direction rather than another; as is the case when the ball is set in motion by the cue of the billiard-player, or when, while it is actually in motion, it is struck by another at any given angle or with any given force.

I say, the case of Volition, as explained on the Determinist theory, differs in no vital point from this case of the billiard-ball. The presence of intelligence and consciousness in the former, and their absence in

the latter do not affect the vital and essential elements of the case; as was shown in the previous discussion of what makes an action or a process '*mechanical*.'[1]

For clearly, if each Volition is *determined* by what is external to, and separable from, the Ego willing—whether it be strong physical force, or merely intellectual considerations, presented objectively to the mind in the form of 'motives'—it is no choice at all; simply because there was really 'no alternative' in the matter. It was no *decision* of the *man*, but a determination effected *for* him, or we may even say *in* him,—if that phrase may be used with such latitude as to mean 'within the limits of his nature,'—by forces, the operation of which he can only watch, but which will bring about the same result in similar circumstances, at any other time, without the possibility of his ordering it otherwise.

And our contention is—and this is the special point which is meant to be covered by the phrase, 'the Self-Determination of the Will'—that *in* every *Volition* there is a *Determination* by the 'Self' or 'Ego' of the course to be taken, of the action to be performed; or rather, that the *act* of decision or choice is that in which the 'Ego' or 'Self' *determines* what course of many possible courses it shall take; what action, of many possible actions, it shall perform.

CHAPTER XIV.—THE ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS PHENOMENA.

§ 252. THOUGH what I purpose urging in this section is implicitly contained in what I have already said;

[1] Vide § 166, pp. 184–186.

though its essence is scattered sporadically along the path we have been pursuing; it may be useful to state it here explicitly, to express it as precisely and concisely as I can—or, in other words, to focus into distinctness what has hitherto been only diffused, and what, by its very diffusion, may therefore have escaped notice.

I have incidentally made the remark (p. 243) that "Ontology as a *science* is impossible." By that, of course, I did not mean that any conviction as to the existence of 'noumena,' as truly *τὰ ὄντα*, is unreasonable; else, of course, I should be precluded, by the demands of self-consistency, from saying anything on the theme of the present section. I meant only that, if we attempt to give a scientifically connected account of noumena, as *τὰ ὄντα*, such as is needed to constitute it an *-ology* at all comparable to the *-ologies* in other departments of science,—a thing that could be achieved only by giving a distinct account of the *qualities* they display, the attributes they possess, the characteristic actions, activities, or processes of which they are the noumenal causes,—in the very nature of the case we should be abandoning the sphere of the noumenal, since all these things are *phenomenal* (and must be, to be observable at all); and so we should be constructing not an Ontology proper, but a Phenomenology after all.

But I said, it will be remembered, at the same time, that in a candid investigation of the phenomena of Volition, we perforce become '*Ontognostics*'; though we cannot become, in the full sense of the term, Ontologists; *i.e.*, that, in the phenomena of Volition, as in connection with no other class of phenomena, the candid analyst of them is brought into cognitional relation with

a *personal noumenon*, has forced upon him the conviction of the existence of a central, noumenal Ego, as the Ontological cause of these Volitional phenomena.

It is this point that I would now emphasize, and open out a little more at length.

§ 253. The crucial question of Mental Philosophy, in any age, is after all an ontological one. In its most usual guise, and phrased in popular language, it assumes this form—What is man's nature, essentially and radically—material or spiritual? Is he a highly organised body, or is he a spirit?

Susceptible as the question is of very various answers; very various answers have actually been given.

§ 254. 1. One extreme reply has been: Man's nature is *wholly material.* But this rank materialism has been rarely held. Though Dr. Darwin (Erasmus) may be cited as a genuine champion of the position; it is extremely questionable whether any thinker of the present day unequivocally accepts it in its breadth and depth. Rather, we should say its 'narrowness and shallowness;' for, strictly speaking, it involves the startling, nay, astounding contention that *mind* is nothing other than a special kind of matter modified in a peculiar way—that 'thought' is one and the same thing as, only another name for, 'cerebral modification.' It declares that the distinction usually made between the 'mental' and the 'material,' and which is generally supposed to involve a difference of nature absolutely incalculable and unmeasurable, is 'all *moonshine.*' The idea so widely spread, and so widely accepted, that in *nature* mind and matter are 'wide as the poles asunder,' is met by the true Materialist by the flattest contradiction uttered with a tone of calmest supercilious-

ness,—"It is nothing of the sort. So far from being 'asunder' at all, they are one and the same thing. Rather the one thing is matter: and what we call 'thoughts,' 'feelings,' 'desires,' and 'volitions,' are only movements and modifications of the molecules composing the nervous system; specially that part of it called the brain."

§ 255. 2. Another answer, as extreme—at the other pole of philosophic thought—is that man is essentially and wholly 'spirit' or mind. In this answer is involved the position that the contrast between the mental and the corporeal is only a phenomenal contrast. There are two distinct and easily distinguishable sets of phenomena; but only apparently, not really, do they point to a difference of corresponding noumena. Consciousness reveals the spiritual: and what we call the 'material' is only a special modification of the spiritual. This is the answer of thorough-going 'Idealism:' a system which has taken very little hold of the mind of the practical Briton, who is abundantly satisfied of the *reality* of *matter*, whatever may be his opinion as to the claims of the invisible and spiritual.

§ 256. 3. But an answer may be given to this question, acknowledging the validity of the contrast between the 'material' and the 'mental' or 'spiritual,' and so declaring man's nature to be both the one and the other—partly material, and partly spiritual; but declaring, at the same time, that no ontological element is involved at all. The sole realities, such maintain, are the phenomena which, because of their numerous and remarkable points of difference, are called by these two names.

Man is clearly, they say, both material and spiritual; for plainly his conscious experience is made up of two

distinct sets of phenomena—*mental*, consisting of his thoughts and feelings, and desires and volitions; and *material*, including physical sensations and corporeal movements. But beyond these *phenomena*, we are not called; indeed, we cannot safely or reasonably go. 'The man' is simply a compendious phrase, covering 'the conscious experiences' of any one moment, or the continuous series of such which form his life. This is the substance of the Positivism of the present day.

§ 257. 4. Still another answer is given by others, who have a larger following, and a greater hold, perhaps, than any other school of thought, upon the minds of the present generation.

Of the *reality* of *matter*, these have no doubt whatever. They clearly do not believe only in material *phenomena*. They believe in matter as the one palpable reality; about which no common-sense person, and certainly no scientific man, can have the shadow of a doubt. They believe in matter, as 'stuff' made up of 'molecules,' and these again of 'atoms,' which have an actual and real existence. In philosophical terminology, they have a very distinct and tangible Ontology; to this extent, that they believe in these 'molecules'—or, perhaps more strictly, in the 'atoms'—as *τὰ ὄντα*, as the primordial principles generative of the Universe, of which the 'external world,'—that which is given us to investigate as 'Nature,' and of course including in it the whole human race,—is the phenomenal result. Fundamentally, therefore, their position is one with the 'rank Materialism' mentioned above. But in its actual form, it does not adopt the extreme position of pure Materialists.

It is true that, in coming to human nature, they come with minds saturated and steeped and preoccupied

with notions formed and framed in the scientific examination of material phenomena. The one thing, clearly, with which they start, is the palpability, or palpable reality, of one part of it—the body. And without any hesitation, of course, they answer thus much off-hand: Man is, without any doubt, 'material;' whether he is *wholly* so, or not. This physical organism, they point out, is as tangible, as much possessed of material qualities, as amenable to the laws of matter, as any other corporeal structure.

But they admit more than this. They admit that in 'man' there is a 'mental' element, distinguishable and very different from the *material:* and herein they abandon the position of 'rank Materialism' as above expounded. Man's nature, they admit, is *in a sense* 'mental' as well as 'material.' But notice, not in the *same* sense as that in which they admit its *materiality.* For while its materiality, with them, clearly involves the *reality* of *matter*, as a substance in which all material phenomena inhere; its mental character, its spirituality, does not, to them, carry with it the convincing evidence of a *spiritual* substance, a distinct Personality, the noumenal centre and cause of all the mental phenomena. The material phenomena, they claim, have a clear ontological significance, but to the mental phenomena they cede none.

§ 258. The way in which they represent the matter is somewhat as follows. In analysing any mental process to its elements we find that, on the one side, we have certain mental modifications, such as thought and feeling; and, on the other, we have certain material modifications, in the molecular changes which take place in the substance of the brain. These two things, they admit, are both equally real, and completely distinct. Clifford, for

example, unhesitatingly and fully endorses the representation of the case given by his philosophical master —Bain, in his "Mind and Body." There he sets forth clearly the radical contrast between the two sets of phenomena—the one extended, and the other unextended. So radical is the distinction that the one cannot be resolved into the other. In tracing, link by link, the chain of mutually related phenomena which are involved in any, even the simplest, mental process, they acknowledge that when they come to the last traceable nerve-modification—say, in the cortical layer of the cerebral convolutions,—in the transition between that and conscious thought or feeling, between the ultimate neurosis and the most elementary psychosis—there is a great leap; seemingly a great gap, apparently a yawning abyss.

But, admitting so much, they do not admit what we imagine would almost force itself upon their minds, as they acknowledge the real distinctness of the series of mental modifications from the series of cerebral modifications with which they tally, viz., that there must be a *substance* underlying the one, as *real* and as logically distinct from them, as the *atoms of matter* underlying, and the 'real' cause of, the other.

§ 259. The 'idea' Bain propounds, so tentatively and tremblingly, in his "Mind and Body," is that man with his twofold nature is *one substance*, which *by alternate fits* is material and mental; and that the only scientific expression of the relation of the one to the other, at all satisfactory, (though not so very satisfactory, after all!) is that it is a change, or rapid alternation, of states, the one of 'extended consciousness,' and the other of 'unextended consciousness.'[1] This idea is thrown out so

[1] "Mind and Body," pp. 137, 138.

tentatively, that it can scarcely be accepted as his settled conviction, as to the 'ontological significance' of the phenomena of human nature. As far as it is expressed, it is a form of the Absolute Identity Theory of Hegel. But it is not wrought out with any boldness or consistency, and we are left almost as much in the dark, as to his precise position on this fundamental question, as we are in his other works, where we are, again and again, tantalised by the hope that some distinct statement will be made, and then the crucial point is eluded or evaded after all.

It is pretty clear, at any rate, that this 'one substance' theory, neither matter nor mind, but both 'mental and material' by fits and starts, has not been adopted by Clifford, or many others; and those of whom he is a representative seem to have taken up the general position to which, I must confess, the general drift of his writings leads a careful reader—one or two passages of a different stamp notwithstanding—that the *psychical* is in all cases the effect of the *physical*, and that the one *substance* in the case is 'material,' of the ultimate atoms of which the body is composed. For though they will not give you any distinct expression on the point, it is clear they are so deeply impressed with the dependence of the psychosis on the neurosis, that they cannot get away from the conclusion that the former is always and only the *mental equivalent or effect* of the latter; that 'thought' is really the function of the brain—though they will not adopt so purely material a way of putting the thing as to call 'thought' a 'secretion' of the brain (as though thought were itself *material* in its nature),—and that all that is mental is only a special or peculiar function of the material. So that, while to 'matter' they attribute real,

substantial existence; to 'mind' they do not. Only 'mental' *phenomena* do they allow as *distinct* from material phenomena; and yet so completely the mere correlates of material phenomena of a special kind, that practically they are purely and wholly their effects.

Now, it is against this position that I would specially plead the significance of the phenomena of Volition.

§ 260. But here I would make two brief remarks by way of preface.

If I do not attempt to refute the other positions I have enumerated *seriatim* and in detail, it is partly because I do not think they are positions taken by any considerable number of thinkers in the present day; and partly because anything like an establishment of my own position would, *ipso facto*, involve a repudiation of these as inconsistent and at variance with it.

§ 261. I must also say that the *ontological reality* of the *mind* or 'self' in each man, as the central substratum of all mental phenomena, is also involved in the exercise of *Self-consciousness*, as well as in the phenomena of Volition. A true analysis of the 'contents' of Consciousness, or better, of what Consciousness in its nature and exercise *involves*, would bring us as clearly to the same point, though along a line of argument perfectly distinct.

It will be remembered that, in speaking of the general functions of Volition, I was led incidentally to call attention to the parallelism between Consciousness and Volition with reference to the extent of their *range*. But there is this further and more important likeness between them. Not only is Consciousness the 'knowledge' of all *mental phenomena* (whatever their special nature); but in consciousness are revealed the *distinctness, reality, and continuous identity* of the 'Ego,' as that

which is conscious of them all in continuous series, as truly as in Volition, though in another way, and under a different aspect. The consideration of this point, however, belongs to another place. Here we are directly concerned with Volition alone. Suffice it then to say, in general, that in Consciousness, the Ego is revealed as that which is *aware of* all that transpires in the region of the mental; in Volition, as that which *does*, or *produces*, all that is performed. In both, the logical distinctness of the 'I' or 'Ego' from the mental phenomena, and its equal *reality* with them, are clearly manifested: in the one case, as the 'underlying' substance of which they are the phenomena; in the other, the ontological 'cause' or 'source' of all those, amongst them, which I can most truly call 'my own.'

To the full bearings of this second assertion alone, I am anxious now to draw special attention.

§ 262. But the use of that last phrase, 'my own,' suggests a line of argument so cogent, that,—as the kernel of it is virtually contained in much that has preceded, though in form it is not precisely what I was about to lay most stress upon,—I cannot refrain from referring to it here. It is a line of argument in substance elaborated with much masterly keenness by Mivart in the earlier part of his "Lessons from Nature." These two words are '*personal* pronouns;' and their use most clearly involves, and most naturally suggests, that 'distinct personality' is attributed to those of whom they are used. By employing so constantly these words 'I,' 'he,' 'we,' 'you,' 'they,' we are at every turn *implying* the very thing I am anxious to establish in this chapter.[1] They have no proper signi-

[1] This argument, in substance, though in a different form, is the same as that which Reid employed in attacking Hume, and championing the position of Common Sense. "An Enquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense," chap. ii. § 3.

fication, unless there are distinguishable entities, each possessed of central consciousness and central power, corresponding to them. And yet, as Mivart points out, those who deny the distinctness and reality of anything like an 'Ego,' and allow reality only to mental phenomena, with the strangest inconsistency, use these personal pronouns—with no explanation of the fiction they must maintain lies in them one and all—as often as any one else.

He shows up the ingrained absurdity of such thinkers writing philosophical treatises at all; specially those of which the great aim is to prove that there are no such separate or logically separable entities as 'souls' or 'spirits' at all. For what can be the object of writing and printing and publishing such treatises? Surely, if it be for anything, it is to prove this philosophical tenet to those who may purchase and read them. But that phrase 'those who' virtually implies the very point they deny. Personality, the existence of a '*thinking being*,' is involved in these pronouns, demonstrative and relative, as really as in the simply 'personal' pronouns. When challenged thus directly, however, they answer: "But this is only a popular fallacy, hidden away under a popular mode of speech. What you call 'my personality' is only 'my conscious experiences,' produced in succession by the successive modifications of my brain." So that they want us to believe that these works are written as the product of the 'cerebral action' in one human body, with the purpose, generated by the mere neurosis of one brain, to affect the course and character of the neurosis of another brain, in order that, as the collateral effect of this specially modified neurosis, its psychosis may be different from what it otherwise would be. But, if such a position as

that be admitted—which I do not believe any man in his senses would deliberately and fully admit—then, in all philosophical consistency, and with the view of naturalising true philosophical ideas in the brains of the human race generally, 'they' must abolish the use of the personal pronouns altogether; and, if any of 'us' are convinced that that would be more philosophical, you and I must drop the use of any words that seem to imply the fallacy—such as 'you,' and 'I,' and 'we'—and keep to the neuter '*it*' when speaking of any one else, and the noun my *brain* when speaking of myself. But see, the best intentioned effort is a gross and utter failure. The '*personal*' words '*myself*' and '*my*' pursue us as doggedly and persistently as our shadow does in sunshine. For if, disowning a 'personality' distinct from the body, I say, "the argument presented to *my* brain does not convince it:" in that word 'my' the whole fallacy and fiction comes up again.

No; it is a hopeless task. The fact, clearly, is that what is involved in these 'personal' words and phrases is so inwrought into the very texture of our thought—that it is an absolutely essential and integral element of it in any and every form it may assume; and that is, that there are 'personalities' corresponding to these 'personal pronouns' for which they are the compendious verbal symbols. When 'I' address 'you'; one being conveys by the material symbols used—whether words spoken or words written or printed—thoughts or feelings, which are 'his,' but not 'himself,' to another, who may appropriate or reject them as part of his mental furniture, but which are not to be *identified*, in logical strictness, with his personality.

Such, in outline, is an argument, involving the point

to which I wish now to draw special attention, which to most minds carries with it self-evidencing power.

§ 263. The thesis I would now maintain is this: that the logical distinctness and reality of the 'Ego' as a noumenon—what has been spoken of throughout the preceding paragraphs as 'personality,'—is shown most fully, is established most firmly, by showing that it is the *vera causa* of many of the phenomena with which our opponents would identify it; and that it has a real control over processes, some of them mental and some of them physical, which, it is alleged by them, are all physically produced.

Now these are just the points which have forced themselves upon our notice, again and again, in our examination of the phenomena of Volition.

I have spoken of '*causation*' in the one sentence, by speaking of the 'Ego' as a *vera causa;* and of '*control*' in the other. Let us refer to the latter first.

§ 264. That this 'power of control' is realised only, but realised fully, in Volition, has, I trust, been made abundantly clear. That, in general terms, it is the special function of Volition was shown in § 30, on pp. 38, 39. It is a work performed by no other faculty. The function of the faculty of Cognition is, of course, not to control our knowing processes, but to know. Nor is that of Feeling to control in any way our sensations and emotions, it is simply to feel; and much less, if anything, is that of Desire to control our longings and aversions, since it is only to conceive them.

The evoking, the sustentation, the direction, and the intensification, of any or all of these activities—which are the four integral elements of 'control' in its fullest sense and range—is the work of a distinct faculty. But,

as we have seen, that control is real only when it is the result of an unfettered *choice* between equally possible alternatives. Those operations are not 'under control,' in any proper sense of the term, if their order and occurrence be determined by the operation of Inalternative Law—unless, indeed, they are the result of a free *decision* between alternative plans. Now, the one thing we have learnt, if we have learnt anything at all, is that this "unfettered choice," this "free decision," are the special characteristics, constitute an integral element, of every genuine Volition—are, in fact, the crowning prerogative of the Ego in Volition. Thus clearly '*the power of control*' of phenomena and processes is essentially revealed in, bound up with the very nature of, the phenomena of Volition.

§ 265. Even more fully, if possible, is that 'causation,' of which I spoke as having important bearings here, bound up with this same 'Volition.'

1. In the first place, it is in connection with the phenomena of Volition, that our *idea* of 'Cause' is gained, that our 'judgment of Causality' is formed. We have already seen, in an earlier part of our course, how, while maintaining most stoutly that the *origo*, the true 'source' of the idea is *à priori*, — its very 'necessity' proving that it is 'mental,' not experimental, in its origin —its *exordium*, the actual 'occasion' of its realisation, is always some exercise of Volition; and for its fullest realisation, some voluntary action which is accompanied with a 'sense of effort;' the proof of such being only its 'occasion,' and not its true 'source,' lying very palpably in the fact that any *action* whatever of *that sort* is as 'good' an 'occasion' for its realisation as that in connection with which it actually arose in consciousness.

I know it is objected to this that so special and physical an occasion must intrude, perforce, so much of what is purely sensational into the notion of 'cause' thus formed as *seriously* to contaminate its purity, and to make it so grossly anthropical an idea, that to apply what has had such an 'upbringing' to anything outside us—specially to what takes place in the regularities of the order of Nature—is a piece of mythical and misleading anthropomorphism. But I do not consider it a valid objection.

It is true that 'the sense of effort' is purely an accident of the process; and to keep that as part of our notion of what 'causation' is, wherever exercised or operant, would be highly unphilosophical. But that we need not, and, I maintain, we do not, actually do.

Further; we may recognise that its presence is necessary to enable us to *realise* the idea of 'power' and 'efficiency,' which is the very heart and essence of the idea of Cause: and yet, when once that is gained, drop what is so palpably accidental to the case, so that it shall form no part of the connotation of the term, as we use it in philosophical discussion, or even in ordinary conversation. The 'sense of effort' is a sensation realised only when there is a want of perfect adequacy in the power exerted to the task which has to be performed; and this, whether the process be muscular—as in lifting a heavy weight; or mental—in working out a difficult problem. In each case, the sensation is the reflex of the abnormal strain put upon the physical organ employed—the muscles in the one case, and the brain in the other—by the employment of power at a higher pitch of tension than usual. But the fact is that, but for this 'accident' of the case, we should never become properly *aware* of the presence of *power* as that the operation of which produces

the effect. The *sensation* is here, as in all cases of cognition, the condition of knowledge. It is exactly so with most other things. We should never become aware of the beating of our heart experimentally, unless, on the one hand, it palpitated violently; or, on the other, we adopted the artificial expedient of putting our hand upon our side. It would be only a *speculative* knowledge, until by sensation, of the one sort or the other, we had palpable evidence of its beating. So, too, as to the materiality and 'power of resistance' of the invisible fluid surrounding us. We know it only secondhand and and in a very imperfect way, until either the wind blows strongly, or we pass our hand very quickly through the air. When once we have *felt* it, however, we understand its *material* qualities in a way which we are not likely to forget. Just so with this notion of 'cause' or 'causation.' Apart from the special sort of experience of its nature which we gain when we have a 'sense of effort,' we should have only a speculative, formal, skeleton-like, or shadowy notion of what it was. And this is just what some thoughtful men want us to reduce and minimise it to again.

§ 266. This merely formal intellectual idea of it, as that which is "the *invariable and unconditional* antecedent," —which is J. S. Mill's definition of Cause, and virtually the notion which Sir W. Hamilton was content to adopt of it, that he might show it to be an illustration of his pet doctrine of the "Law of the Conditioned"—is a miserable ghost of 'Cause,' complete and proper. For of that, 'power,' 'efficiency,' is the central and most important factor: and the knowledge of what 'power' is, and what 'efficiency' is, is realised first and most completely in this special case of Volitional *Effort*. When it is an 'effort,'

we are made *conscious* of the exertion and expenditure of power; we *feel*, we are positively and distinctly 'aware' of the employment of 'force.' At other times, though the power is exerted, and is in active operation just the same, when the effect is easily produced, we are *unconscious* of the forth-putting of it: and so, were all instances of its exercise of this facile kind, we should never understand properly what 'causation' is. But, once having gained this positive and distinct idea of power and efficiency, whenever, in Volition, we decide to do a thing, and the thing is done; we know, not simply that the muscular action had a cause, but that it was the effect of the exertion of the power which we have found in a very substantial way belongs to us and is under our control: and when, moreover, we see anything produced, or take place, in the realm of External Nature, we are not simply convinced, as a matter of logic, that it must have had a 'Sufficient Reason' for its production or occurrence; nor only, as a matter of Science, that there must have been some antecedent or group of antecedents on which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent; but that it must have been *produced* by the operation of some *Power* —some *force*, or concurrence of forces—adequate to its production, whose efficiency actually brought about this effect.

§ 267. 2. Now, not only can we watch such 'causation,' in its complete and proper sense, within the realm of our own nature; but, in the case of every *voluntary* action, we become aware of the fact that 'we' are properly and truly the *Causes* of the operation. It is 'we' who 'decide' upon a certain course; and it is 'we' who, in the act of Volition, direct and control the power needed to effect the object we elect.

And this, I maintain, is the best and most practical proof we can have that 'we' are *distinct* Personalities—entities possessing the power of central and independent control of our faculties.

§ 268. "Yet," say those with whom I am just now contending, "it is not so: the only 'we' or 'I,' in any particular case, are the thoughts, feelings, motives, desires, which are the objects of consciousness at the time." See, then, to what they are driven, in explaining or expounding the *direction* or *control* which I claim 'I' can and do exercise over my mental processes or muscular movements. 'Direct' or 'control,' remember, means—if it mean anything—"make them take a course, or assume a form, other than what they would assume or take, were they left to themselves." Further, remember, these mental phenomena—the "thoughts, feelings, motives, desires"—have no existence apart from, or other than as, the psychical counterparts of certain cerebral modifications, or 'neuroses.' They have no sort of independence of the 'neuroses' of which they are the psychical equivalents; much less can they have any causative power, seeing they do not, in any wise, even *produce each other;* but, on this view, they merely follow one another, as the corresponding mental equivalents of the *cerebral modifications*, which, as physical phenomena, like others in the external world, do determine and cause one another, in accordance with certain laws of succession.

That being so, however, such terms as 'direction and control' have no assignable meaning, or involve the grossest contradiction. For the facts, thus interpreted, are as follows. A neurosis—say, neurosis No. 1— is followed, in the *ordinary course of things*, by another—call it neurosis No. 2. And as 'the ordinary course

of things' is the course of *Law*, absolutely inalternative in its operation, that means—that neurosis No. 1, as physical cause, produces neurosis No. 2 as its physical effect. Corresponding to each is an equivalent psychosis —call them, respectively, psychosis No. 1, and psychosis No. 2. According to the explanation given above, at the successive moments in question, the psychoses—*i.e.*, the mental modifications that constitute the conscious experience of that particular moment—are the 'Ego' or 'I' of that moment. To say, then, that 'I' 'direct' the course of my thought in some definite direction, deliberately chosen, or 'control' the current of my thoughts upon freely determined lines, means, if it mean anything at all (upon this hypothesis), that psychosis No. 1 is not followed by psychosis No. 2, but by some other, say psychosis No. 3, which is either directly produced by psychosis No. 1, or indirectly, as the mental equivalent of another neurosis No. 3, which is itself produced directly by psychosis No. 1.

But this is—*ex hypothesi*, absurd and impossible—possible, at least, only by a miracle, a distinct breach of the order of Nature. For the 'order of Nature,' as above expounded—the 'Laws of Nature,' as laid down by those whose views we are examining,—assigns or allows no independence whatever to 'psychoses' of any kind whatever, and represents them as solely and wholly the mental equivalents of neuroses, which are the only order of phenomena in which obtains anything like Causation.

The thing is impossible on this representation. But . . . the *thing* is a FACT: a fact of every day experience, a thing realised every time we exercise a genuine Volition. *Ergo*, the representation must be false. It cannot be that the only 'Ego' at each moment is the

'psychosis' of that moment. That Ego must be a real entity—so independent of, so distinguishable from, its psychoses, or mental phenomena and intellectual processes, that it is the *vera causa* of many of the latter, and possesses real and effectual *control* over many of the former. For it is surely self-evident that that which can control its psychoses, so as to secure other neuroses than those which would take place were the brain left to itself, must be other than the brain, and must use it as its instrument. That which is a *vera causa* of certain mental or physical operations must be distinct from the mental modifications or physical organisation which it produces or employs.

§ 269. Now this is just the essence of what has been established in different parts of our examination of Volitional Phenomena. We saw (§§ 141 to 145, pp. 153-158; specially p. 156) that, in all really voluntary acts, the correlate of the Sense of Responsibility, which we realise in them alone, is our 'authorship,' our true original *causality*. Throughout our treatment of the Relation of Individuality to Volition and Volition to Law, what was clearly established was this very thing, that in Volition is given the ineradicable conviction of the reality and distinctness of our Personality, as to be confounded with neither our mental faculties, on the one hand, nor our mental phenomena, on the other. The special temptation to identify, with Cousin, Jouffroi, and Mansel, the Faculty of 'Will' with the Ego or 'Self' was noticed—(§ 161, pp. 179 to 181)—to be carefully refuted; andt he metaphysical chaos produced by the confusion of mental modifications with the Ego has just been exposed.

"The ontological significance of the phenomena of Volition," then, when carefully and candidly examined,

is the establishment of the position, that the word 'I' is the name of a *real* spiritual entity; that the controlling agent in Volition is a *spiritual* Personality which has an existence distinct and distinguishable from the mental phenomena and processes it controls, and from the physical organism which it employs for the attainment and effectuation of objects, freely chosen from alternative courses, and decided upon in the exercise of this regal power of choice.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.—Volition and Miracle.

§ 270. The nature and possibility of miracle have been of late years the subject of the hottest debate and of the fiercest controversy; though, for the moment, the fierceness of the heat of this great discussion appears to have somewhat cooled down.

By those who are its strongest opponents, who identify the 'miraculous' with the impossible and the simply mythical—who would therefore excise, as utterly unworthy of credence, any section of the Sacred Narrative in which the miraculous element is implied or involved—'Miraculous' is looked upon as a synonym of 'Supernatural,' and the Supernatural as involving an actual breach in the Universal Law of Causation. The attack is directed against miracle, only in the form of a breaking of the fundamental Laws of the Universe; an intrusion upon, an interruption of, that majestic 'Order' of Nature, which secures reliable results to the use of appropriate means, and is the earthly and physical reflection of 'heaven's first law.' Assuming, therefore, this identification of miracle with iconoclastic shattering of the beautiful framework of things, rude and forcible dislocation of the noble order of Nature, erratic and spasmodic irruption into the completed circle and cycle of Nature's operations, startling and terrifying infraction of the great system of Law by which God maintains and rules this great universe—the tone of irritation, and even passionate antagonism, with which it is attacked and repudiated, is somewhat comprehensible.

On the one hand, it is easy to see that the devotee of science may resent anything that seems to indicate that the regularities of sequence which he loves to trace, and formu-

late into his laws, are not ultimate and irreversible facts—part and parcel of the nature of things: though it is rather strange to find such writers as the joint authors of the "Unseen Universe"—whose aim is to maintain their Christianity side by side with their attachment to science—betraying such a peevish impatience of anything that might bear such a construction. (And the special line of their objection, when examined carefully, will be found a little unreasonable as well.)

One can understand, too, that our modern Epicureans, who can only feel a comfortable reverence to a distant Deity—One whom, in their profound deference, they would with all humility bow out of His universe—cannot welcome, nay, will not tolerate, if they can avoid it, anything like this, which would so palpably prove that He is a God "nigh at hand, and not afar off;" and Whose near presence and actual personal working would disturb them out of all self-possession and ease of mind.

And, on the other hand, nothing is more natural than that the Positivist,—who has 'settled for ever,' as final truth, the principle that all that can be known is the regularities of sequence or contemporaneity in the phenomena which constitute the universe of things; and, having formulated these into a nexus or framework of mutually related and mutually supporting laws, sets them up as the only fair and noble object of contemplation for his mind, and the only reasonable authority to guide and regulate his life,—should loftily sneer at as utterly unreal, and hoot down as scientifically impossible, anything that threatens to show a seam even in the garment of this Great Dagon which he has set up, or would hint that the great framework, in which all phenomena are set, has in it any joinings or parts, as indication that it was ever put together, and therefore is in the hands and under the power of its Author.

§ 271. But we are apt to forget that this is not the form in which the miraculous appears in the Sacred Writings, but merely one which is imposed upon it by modern science: in the first place, by scientific opponents of the miraculous,

and then often accepted, unchallenged, as a fair representation of it by those who stand forth as its champions. Still, it cannot be too distinctly realised at the outset, that this phraseology is not the phraseology used in Scripture; and that it is, in consequence, by no means self-evident that the aspects under which it is represented by such phraseology at all fairly correspond to those naturally presented by the language of Scripture. Or more clearly: it is by no means self-evident—it is therefore a point which needs patient and careful preliminary investigation—whether the interpretation thus put upon 'the miraculous,' and the indications so broadly and dogmatically given of what must be involved in it, are a fair representation of the claims tacitly or avowedly made for it in the Scriptures themselves.

§ 272. What, then, is the phraseology actually employed in Scripture?

(*a*) The words in the Old Testament translated 'miracle' are three: אות, מופת, and נִפְלָא (though this last occurs only in the feminine plural, נִפְלָאוֹת). Of these, the first properly means a *sign*; radically, perhaps, that which assigns and determines; and hence, and more usually, *that which indicates*, the outward and visible symbol of something which else would be unnoticed and unknown. The second is from the root יָפָה, 'to be fair or beautiful,' and so etymologically means something *beautifully* done: something admirable, and attracting attention from its unique characteristics, and thus is 'a wonder.' Indeed, it occurs with this translation in the singular only twice (Exod. vii. 9; and 2 Chron. xxxii. 24), and once in the plural (Deut. xxix. 3). The third, from the root פלא, to separate, or distinguish, is really a Niphal participle; and so means 'that which is separated, or distinguishes itself' before the eyes of men as *remarkable*, unique; a marvel, a marvellous achievement. It may be remarked that the cognate word פֶּלֶא, with an identical meaning, and which is used to describe those very events and actions which are elsewhere described as 'miracles,' is translated '*marvel*' in Exod. xv. 11; '*wonders*' in Psa. lxxvii. 11,

14; and lxxxviii. 10; Dan. xii. 6; '*marvellous things*' in Psa. xcviii. 12.

In both the second and third of these forms, then, what is brought most prominently before the mind, are the outward characteristics of the deed, as striking, unique, commanding attention and reverent wonder; and, in the first, the clear purport or aim of each of them is, to be the index of something that would else escape notice, or be misinterpreted.

As to their inner or intrinsic character, scientifically considered, the words say nothing. All that they convey is, on the one hand, their remarkable character; and, on the other, their moral or spiritual aim.

(*b*) It is the same with two out of the four words used in the New Testament. These four are τέρας, σημεῖον, ἔργον, and δυνάμις.

In the first and second we have what may be looked on as practically the Greek equivalents of the Old Testament terms: τέρας is practically the synonym of both מופת[1] and נפלא;[2] and σημεῖον is the Greek counterpart of אות; the former being literally Englished into '*monstrosity*,' *wonder*, or *marvel*; and the latter into *sign*.

In the other two Greek words we have a fresh idea introduced, that of *active power*. The simpler notion contained in ἔργα, *works*, things performed, *actions* wrought, of course, underlies the two Hebrew words, מופת and נפלא. They both characterise *actions*, or *achievements*, attributed to the Most High. What is special to the term δυνάμις, is the idea of *might*, or *power*, and places before us explicitly, what may be said to have been contained implicitly in all the others, the thought that these remarkable events were each and all the results of the operation of *vast powers*, majestic might.

§ 273. To sum up, then, the characteristics of the Scrip-

[1] In Exodus vii. 9, it is so rendered by the LXX., whereas in 2 Chron. xxxii. 24 the LXX. render it σημεῖον, the word regularly used for אות.

[2] So translated in LXX. in Exod. xv. 11, but in Psa. lxxvii. 11, 14 by θαυμάσια; also in Psa. lxxviii. 12, and lxxxviii. 10; and Dan. xii. 6.

ture miracles as expressed by the descriptive terms used to denote them in Scripture itself, they are—

1. *Unusual;* unlike ordinary events, drawing the attention of all to them as remarkable and wonderful.

2. The *work* of *vast power*, such as the ordinary powers of man would be wholly unable to perform; and indicating the presence and actual operation of might, quite beyond the range of human nature.

3. *Attributed* directly *to God*, specially throughout the Old Testament. They are *God's* doings, not man's, even when accomplished through a human medium. They are *God's* marvels, *God's* wonders, *God's* wonderful works.

4. *Done with an ulterior purpose;* as a sign or index of something behind and beneath them; the aim being clearly enough to strike into the hearts of those who witness them the sense of God's own nearness to them, and His actual working in their midst, and that in two ways: either to protect those who fear Him, and to punish those who neglect or scorn Him; or to *endorse* and give distinct and public sanction to the man, through whom they are wrought, as specially commissioned by God to teach, to warn, to reprove, and to guide his fellow-men.

§ 274. But notice that, in all this, there is no allusion to '*the reign* of *Law*.' As far as the representation of Scripture is concerned, it is a perfectly free and open question as to whether these extra-ordinary displays of Divine power are consistent with this or no. Of course the reason of this is not far to seek. This view of the universe, as the constant illustration or embodiment of a vast net-work of great, all-embracing Laws, had not entered the mind of man: and it evidently was no part of God's plan in Revelation to present it to him from without. It is a view, which is the offspring of scientific research, of that patient, analytic, inductive type, which had its origin in England in the two Bacons, Roger the Monk and Francis the Chancellor; and which has only by degrees attained a form such as to have become distinctly Epicurean, or even anti-, and a-theistic.

What Scripture does is to narrate these remarkable phenomena as facts, and to represent them as the outward and visible signs of the operation of Divine power, wrought with distinct and elevated purpose of a moral and spiritual nature.

§ 275. Now the special question we have to ask is, What light (if any) is cast upon this subject by the phenomena of Volition?

I. At the outset, it may be premised that, accepting the Scriptural account of them as correct, what we have discovered of the essential characteristics of Volition, makes them so far from incredible, as to be, in the highest sense, what we might expect.

They are represented as the effect of the operation of God's power—His power exerted as a Personal Being. Now, as such we must view them as the manifestations of His will. They are emphatically actions, which He chose to perform, with the deliberate intention of producing great moral and spiritual results. Their unusual character would of course be perfectly accounted for, on this representation, by the fact that the power which produced them was not human, but Divine. But further; their unexpectedness, their incalculability,—an element almost as important as their remarkable character, in the production of *wonder*, and in striking the attention of all beholders,—is just the characteristic we have had again and again to remark as pertaining to what is voluntary. That in a human life which most puzzles by its unexpectedness, most startles by its defiance of all ordinary calculation, is often just that in which the free choice of the agent in resolute and determined Volition has been brought into play. So that, granting God's Personal Existence—the one grand presupposition of the whole Bible—in these miracles, as acts which are specially intended to be recognised as His direct, personal activity, we might well be prepared for both the extraordinary character which would be the natural result of the operation of power, not human, but Divine; and that unexpectedness or incalculability, which is the characteristic of actions that are

emphatically and peculiarly voluntary. On this grand condition, their unusualness does not justify their rejection as untrue.

§ 276. II. But what about the point which has been raised, not by the Scripture claims as to miracles, but by scientific opponents of the Supernatural—their relation to Law?

Their unusualness is declared to be so pronounced, their irregularity to be so portentous, and even monstrous, as to be utterly incredible.

With the general argument of Hume on this head we are not here concerned. It has been abundantly met by Birks and others.

But they are declared to be incredible, according to the more modern form of the objection to them, on *scientific* grounds, because their *strangeness* and *monstrosity* involve the *suspension* or *infraction* of *Law*—the *great Laws* of the universe; and, doing that, they are clearly impossible fictions, whether on Positivistic or Theistic principles.

§ 277. 1. On *Positivistic principles* they are clearly and abundantly impossible. For these dispense with a Deity altogether. To the Positivist, to suppose that there is a Personal Intelligence, controlling, and sustaining the present order of things is an anthropomorphic superstition, belonging to the first crude stage of mental evolution, which all men of real scientific culture have cast away for ever. The only and sufficient explanation of this order of things is the impersonal, continuous, absolutely regular, and inalternative operation of a network of mutually supporting Laws. Irregularity, therefore, in the sense of lawlessness,—even to the extent of a thing not being explicable by, or referable to, the combined operation of definite and ascertainable laws,—is absolutely impossible. Seeming irregularity there may be; but no *real* irregularity. The Positivist is satisfied, that, as many things, which seemed inexplicable ages back, have been shown to be the result of the quiet, regular working of great Laws, more or less recently discovered; and, as each year adds to the list of clear scientific

explanations of what hitherto had been looked upon as unique and inexplicable problems; nay, as scarcely a month, or even a week passes, but the scientific world is startled by the solution of some fresh problem which has hitherto been accepted as insoluble, so, certainly, all indubitable facts may be viewed as susceptible of scientific explanation—meaning by that, that all such are, and will ultimately be found to be, embodiments and illustrations of the operations of Law; either of some *fresh and unsuspected* combination of laws already discovered, or of some law which has not yet been recognised and formulated. And if anywhere, or on the testimony of any one, it matters not of whom, a record is found of an event which would be a *real* irregularity,—the occurrence of which could not possibly be explained scientifically,—that record must be unhesitatingly rejected as untrustworthy, as a myth, or fiction; that event must be unhesitatingly declared to be impossible.

That, of course, is the character attributed by all Positivists, the Tübingen school of higher Biblical criticism, and others, to all those portions of the Scripture narrative which relate miraculous events, and to all the Scripture miracles thus related. To take a single crucial instance. They firmly believe —and in this we cordially agree with them—that a man once really dead, whose body has for sometime been absolutely lifeless, and in which corruption and decay have already begun, could never come to life again through any combination whatever of natural forces, working along the lines of their respective laws. And hence they boldly declare 'the resurrection of the dead' to be absolutely impossible in any circumstances, and at any time whatever; and the record of any such resurrection, whether in the Old Testament, as in the case of the widow's son at Sarepta, or in the New, as attributed to Jesus Christ in three distinct cases, or as having been achieved in His own person after His entombment—they as boldly and unhesitatingly stigmatise as a foolish myth, a worthless fiction.

§ 278. But to such a view of the universe, we enter at once

a strong initial objection; an objection based on our investigation as to the essential characteristics of Human Volition; and one quite independent of the Theistic position. Even were there no such being as God, yet, in the very *nature* of *man* we find, in the essential characteristics and prerogatives of Volition, what at once destroys and shatters this wholesale, imperious, and imperial objection. A candid and impartial examination of this subject has made it clear that Law—the Inalternative Law of Cause and Effect—has *not* an absolute, universal reign; does *not* determine or account for every thing that occurs in this universe; nay, so far from that, that in every *genuine Volition*, in every deliberate decision of a human personality in Will, we have a phenomenon which is not *law-determined*, and *law-regulated*, and *law-explained;* a phenomenon, therefore, which, in this respect, is exactly *like a miracle* according to the representation given of it by all Positivists; in this one point, that *it is produced by something* which is *essentially outside of*, or *above*, *the realm of Inalternative Law*—that is, by a *Personal Intelligence* possessed of the power to choose for himself between alternative and equally possible courses, and who exercises this power precisely in this form. Strictly speaking, therefore, every Volition is an instance of 'real irregularity'; that is, of something not produced by the impersonal working out of the great inalternative Laws of Nature; in other words, of the very thing which is declared so boldly by them to be impossible.

(This sweeping statement of theirs we cannot possibly receive. To do so, and accept its consequence and corollaries, even in connection with the practical problems of human responsibility and the conduct of human life, would involve the denial of the fundamental factors of our moral nature. It would reduce us to automata, possessed of no power of choice, —which choice we know, if we know anything, we do actually possess,—and so, utterly unaccountable for our actions.)

§ 279. But, for the nonce, retaining our hold clearly and firmly on this purely *human truth*, it is not difficult to see, how completely the ground is taken from beneath the feet of

those who roundly declare, that these 'miracles' recorded in Scripture are *per se* IMPOSSIBLE.

It may hardly seem a very profitable speculation, as we all the while very clearly avow that we do not think it is the true explanation of the phenomena; yet it may be of some service to point out that—on a purely human hypothesis, *i.e.*, on the hypothesis that no power but human power was exerted, and that no beings but human beings were involved,—the *possibility* of such events as those narrated may be maintained, even though the Scriptural explanation of them be rejected. Not that we gravely do so; because, if the Scriptural explanation of them were not admitted, all reason for retaining our *belief* in them as facts would be taken away.

Still, that the events and achievements recorded in Scripture, accepted as 'miracles,' were 'marvels' which actually occurred, may be *accepted;* and yet be accounted for as produced by the combination of exceptional human knowledge and exceptional human skill. Indeed this is the suggestion of the Authors of the "Unseen Universe."

Their argument may be fairly put somewhat as follows. In an earlier age, any one who claimed to be able to control the movements of armies on the other side of the globe, by the simple movement of two wooden handles fixed outside a mahogany box set on end; or to hear exactly what a friend was saying ten or twenty miles off, though he were in a house with every outer door and window shut, and in a room with the inner door quite closed, and even detect, so as to be able to describe, the very tones of the voice, and the varied emphasis given to different words; would have been laughed at as a fool; and if he had proceeded to do these things, to the conviction of all gain-sayers, he would next have been worshipped as a god, or, at least, as a man miraculously endowed by supernatural agency from either above or beneath. Yet we know as a fact, that these things are being done every day; the one, through the telegraph, the other through the telephone; and without the intervention of anything but human skill applying the results

of human knowledge. Nor need we travel back in imagination to the past; we have but to read the narratives of Stanley's travels in Central Africa, to see that the marvels of modern civilisation, as embodied in such now ordinary and commonplace machines as a breach-loading rifle, a repeating watch, or a musical box, are viewed by the natives, and even by such enlightened rulers of them as M'tesa, Emperor of Uganda, as pure 'miracles,' as the proof of the possession of *magical* powers, which, in plainer words, means the assistance of supernatural agencies. Yet, the fact is patent enough that these wonderful results are achieved simply by the ingenious combination of elements all found in nature, by the skilful direction along selected channels of powers which are at the disposal of every member of the human race.

§ 280. Further; it will be recognised as an indubitable truth—though its full significance is not properly recognised, nor borne in mind, as it should be—that 'the marvellous' is altogether a *relative* thing, in *no sense absolute.* It is clearly so in the cases adduced. What would have been well-nigh incredible to our ancestors is looked upon with simply solid and stolid satisfaction by our own advanced generation; and is indeed rather impatiently criticised because of some practical difficulties and imperfections in its actual working. What to the Emperor and subjects of Uganda seemed a veritable miracle, is thought of by an ordinary Englishman as a very simple mechanism, very easily understood.

Whether any one thing will seem a *wonder* or not, whether or not it will impress with astonishment, depends wholly upon two things—the *amount of knowledge and experience already possessed by him who witnesses it;* and the *state of his heart,* or the *disposition of his mind.*

§ 281. (*a*) To the proud, self-conscious man, who dwells rather upon what he has gained, than on what yet remains beyond his reach; who finds matter for exultation in what of explanation is possible, rather than for lowly humility in the vaster regions of the hitherto unexplained, and the ultimately inexplicable—the

natural tendency is, to *wonder less the more he knows.* In such is the assertion of the apostle verified. "Knowledge puffeth up." The aim of such, with the Stoics of old, is to attain that lofty pinnacle of complacent and imperturbable assumption of a complete comprehension of everything, that familiarity with all the secrets of Nature, which will justify a lofty disdain for her, and will therefore secure the *Nil admirari*, which the Stoics thought the acme of perfection—immunity from the perturbations and agitations of *wonder*, as of something which is ever tantamount to and involves a confession of ignorance.

With such, the progress of scientific investigation and invention will be constantly diminishing the number of 'marvels;' induces them to hazard the prophecy of the advent of a day when 'marvels' shall have ceased, and all things shall have been scientifically explained; and leads them to suggest that then the 'marvels' at which we still stand aghast as altogether beyond the reach of human power, in the Scripture miracles, will excite no wonder at all; because they will then be seen, as we should see now, had we completer scientific knowledge, and a more comprehensive acquaintance with the resources of Nature and the laws of her working,— to have been effected by peculiar combinations, and skilful applications, of purely natural forces.

§ 282. On these principles, therefore, it may be maintained, that Moses, Elijah, the Apostles, and Christ, were simply men far in advance of their age, in their acquaintance with the secrets of nature, who made skilful use of their scientific knowledge for the production of startling effects; and it is specially urged, in connection with the miracles of healing, that the progress in the art of therapeutics has been of late so prodigious, as to make it quite within the bounds of probability, that all the cases recorded in Scripture will have counterparts in the daily practice of ordinary medical men at a not very distant day; and that it is even within the bounds of the possible, that those who have been hitherto pronounced as actually dead—and so have passed to that 'bourn whence no traveller

returns'—may, by the application of proper means, be brought back to life.

With such, the *facts*, it will be admitted, are *possible*, on the supposition that they were not the pure 'marvels,' the inexplicable problems which at the time, and up to the present day, they appeared.

§ 283. I need hardly say that such a view as this I unhesitatingly reject, as it would be tantamount to a charge of the most unprincipled and infamous imposture against all the workers of these miracles; including even, and most applicable to, our Blessed Master Himself. Nothing is clearer, on the one hand, than that Jesus distinctly claimed to do what He did "by the finger of God;" and, on the other, than that all the rest, in Old Testament as well as New, did not pretend that it was by their own power, or superior knowledge, or skill, that they achieved these mighty works; but expressly acknowledged, in every instance, special Divine assistance, so that these wonders were alluded to by others as "the mighty works of *God*."

§ 284. (*b*) But I cannot pass by, without just a sentence of explanation, what is the issue of this progress of knowledge, with minds of a different cast, and natures set in a finer mould. With those who have achieved what Socrates called the end of all knowledge—the knowledge of their own ignorance—each fresh advance of scientific exploration does but open up another endless vista of possible research:—yes, endless; for when pushed to its extremest limit, the only achievement of scientific explanation is to place the mind face to face with a gigantic generalisation, instead of a single fact, which when formulated is dignified with the high-sounding and mysteriously potent title of Law, the 'why' and 'wherefore'—the ultimate "rhyme and reason," of whose working is as insoluble a mystery as the individual facts which are exemplifications of it, and of which it is advanced as giving the final explanation. Verily, to such a mind, the advance of human knowledge does not lessen, it rather *multiplies marvels*. It reveals to him the fact that what is most simple and most common-placê has ever its roots in the

absolutely inexplicable, in mysteries (such as "The Mystery of Growth," so strikingly handled in a published sermon of Rev. Edward White) that are absolutely insoluble; and it bears in upon him the conviction that he "lives and moves and has his being" in the midst of *marvels*, essentially as 'wonderful' as the miracles recorded in Scripture. So that, so far from it being the case, that these must be expunged because they are so inexplicable, he acknowledges that what is most ordinary, orderly, usual, in the phenomena of this every-day world, is ultimately as inexplicable as the most *extraordinary* of these Scripture miracles.

This, too, of course, *may* be; and yet he who holds it may see no reason whatever for attributing either the ordinary, or extraordinary, to anything but the combined operation of the forces of man and Nature. It *may* be; but is scarcely likely to be so. For this temper and disposition is most often bred, as it is the natural ally, of a firm belief in the existence and constant operation of a Personal God. And the natural result of the fuller unfolding of the sublime harmonies, and yet sublimer mysteries of this great Universe, will be rather to lead him to conclude that God is not alone, or so very specially, in these singular demonstrations of His power—in miracle; but as truly, and as really, in every one of these every-day phenomena, the fundamental mystery of which so forcibly suggests, and finds its only relief in, the thought that everywhere, at every moment, and on every hand, *He* doth *work*, upholding, directing, controlling all.

§ 285. But we must now pass on to deal with the objections to Miracles on the Theistic hypothesis, to the consideration of which this thought forms a very natural transition.

2. There are men in these modern days who profess a firm belief in a *God*, who yet, as in the awful presence of the achievements of modern Science, enter a *protest* as *firm* as any *Atheist* against the possibility, because against the reasonableness, of Miracles. The ground of the objection is generally one of two allegations. The one is that this sort of *action* would be *undignified;* and the other, that it would be *inconsistent.*

(*a*) The first allegation is, *that to work miracles*, whether directly, or indirectly through a human being specially commissioned to perform them, *would be undignified.*

To this charge it is unnecessary to devote any very lengthened consideration. It has been answered, and answered *well*, again and again. So far from its being an undignified procedure to intrude His presence, by direct and extraordinary working, into the midst of His beautifully ordered and regularly working universe, it is the reverse. Never to do so were to exclude Himself from any immediate relation with His creatures, and tempt them to believe that He had left them to themselves. As the Israelites said of Moses during his forty days' seclusion with Jehovah on 'the secret top of Sinai,'—"As for this man, we wot not what is become of him;" so the absence of any striking proof of His presence, might be taken —is not this the philosophy of the *atheism* of modern Positivists?—as proof of His absence, and as casting doubt on His very existence.

For God to leave this vast mechanism of Law to go on working out its vast results without ever touching it—under the feeling that having once made it and set it in motion, He must never meddle with it—were to abdicate His dignity as its Great Artist, its Supreme Ruler.

While the Judge is the mere executor of the provisions of the Law, the Sovereign, as its Source and Fountain-head, may sometimes lay the strict letter of the law aside, and exercise his supreme prerogative, in pardoning one whom the mere judge had no option but to condemn. Nay, more; He is sometimes best administering the law, when he will not allow it to run its usual course. For sometimes, in the very act of pardon, he is carrying out the spirit and the aim of the whole code of laws,—that which was the aim of their enactment,—more completely than were he to allow the purely legal verdict to take effect.

Only *he can* do it, but *he* has the power; and, so far from its being 'undignified' for him to do it, his royal dignity is then most nobly and indisputably shown. And so it is with God.

He has devised, and set in operation, this vast system of harmonies which it is the business of the man of science to trace out, and which when discovered he formulates in what he terms the 'Laws of Nature;' but He only shows His glorious supremacy, He only proves His ineffable dignity, as the author and framer of them all, when,—in special circumstances, and more fully to carry out the great aim with which He first laid them down, the true welfare of His creatures, and the highest glory of His 'great and holy name,'—He acts apart from them. For the moment, He dispenses the highest justice and the highest mercy by dispensing with them; so bringing that to pass which could never have been achieved had He not personally interposed.

§ 286. But does not this 'breaking in upon' the order of Nature involve, not only a want of dignity on the part of the Creator, but an end to all *security* and safety for His poor creatures? That is part of the frightened remonstrance of these law-loving Theists. If we were to admit such interposition as possible, should we not be plunged into the midst of most intolerable insecurity and uncertainty? Such is the reasoning of the authors of the "Unseen Universe." These scientific Christians are so loyal in their allegiance to the Divine Order, that they become veritably its bondsmen; forgetting that the Divine Order is only the servant and creature of the Divine. And they cry out that if, in the prosecution of their scientific investigations, they were haunted by the thought that they might suddenly come upon *a break* in the working of this glorious machine, upon some direct interposition of the Divine Himself, they would have to abandon their work as liable to utter frustration and fatal deception. Nay, according to them, it would be useless to enter on such investigations at all, if the miraculous were possible.

§ 287. But surely such protestations are not only unworthy in spirit, they are very unreasonable into the bargain. The spirit is that of peevish children, who declare they "won't play at all," if there's the least chance of any one coming to

join them unexpectedly, or interrupt them even for an instant. And the reasoning—the argument is implied if not expressed—is sadly wanting in coherence and cogency. The argument is this. *Order* is the very condition of the discovery of *Laws*, and of security in planning any course of action. So that any 'breaking in' upon the order makes law-discovery impossible, and is an end of all security. Scarcely this, however. Were the interferences often repeated; were the irregularities as frequent as the observances of Law; it would be so indeed. This would be to exchange order for disorder, and cosmos for chaos. But this is not the case with Miracles. They are but infrequent occurrences in the pages of history. They were miracles, marvels, because *extra-ordinary;* and *extraordinary*, because *exceptions*—seldom appearing—to what was ordinary. The ordinary, then, that is, the *orderly*, that which takes place according to the Divine order, still exists; and as such, '*as a rule*,' as *the* rule, prevails.

"The exception," here, as elsewhere, in the deep sense of that old proverb, "*proves* the *rule*," by its very *exceptionality*, which is at once recognised as such; proves that that, in contrast with which it is exceptional, is *the rule*—is still that which may be ordinarily expected and relied upon. Of course *the* '*exceptions*' are not to be expected, though they are the *possible:* the *normal*—that which is the embodiment of the rule, that which is ordinary and regular—is that which must still be expected and calculated on as the *probable*. And still as ever, as Bishop Butler so pithily puts it, "Probability is the guide of human life."

It is mere trifling to say that a belief in the miraculous would make it unwise to lay any plans, because a sudden interference *might* frustrate them; to use ordinary means for the attainment of certain ends, because a Divine interposition might render them ineffectual. As wise would it be to say that we must not set our hands to any task whatever, because, before we had completed it, it is possible that Death's chill touch *may* have paralysed our hand for ever. Because the

Apostles had given to them the power of treading upon serpents, or because St. Paul shook off the viper from his hand without any hurt, no Christian, however profound and implicit a believer in the truth of these things, would take to trifling with serpents, on the presumption that a miracle would be wrought to save him from the natural results of his folly. The very fact that they are *extraordinary* exhibitions of superhuman power would constitute a reason for believing that —except in some very extraordinary conjuncture of circumstances—the ordinary effects would certainly follow such heedless folly. The appearance of Miracle upon the stage of this world's history does not, then, affect the stability of its general course.

§ 288. Nor does it any more imply any diminution of God's dignity as the God of Order and the Fountain of Law. Nay, rather, *Miracle*, if by that is meant any action on His part that is not along the lines of the great laws of His material universe, seems needed to manifest the largest and grandest part of His glory. Law has the dignity of being *impartial*, but in the very thoroughness of its impartiality, it becomes utterly and purely *impersonal;* and so looses, cannot lay any claim to, the higher glories and dignity of *personality*. But is God to be to His creatures as only a great Impersonal Power? though infinitely wise. This He must be, if His only method of manifestation be along the lines of these great impersonal *laws*. No; He will not abrogate, He has not abdicated, this His glorious personality. He does not, as He would on the Law-theory, deny Himself the power of dealing personally with His creatures. He shows it, and shows that it is the personality of Fatherhood, by dealing directly with them—of His own free, loving choice, leaving the devious tracks, though of His own planning, and most useful for all ends, which all law-ordered forces must travel; and, by direct action, dealing immediately with them in all spiritual things. Because He has chosen that the universe of material phenomena shall manifest a glorious regularity in its general working, He does not deny His crea-

tures the high privilege of witnessing, in these miracles of holy power, the clear proofs of His personal freedom of action, of His personal interest in their welfare, and His personal relations with the race.

§ 289. But we must pass now, and lastly, to deal with the second allegation, which Theistic opponents of the miraculous, bring against it.

(*b*) It would be *inconsistent* for Him thus to act. And this, because they maintain it must involve an *actual suspension* or *positive infraction* of *Law*.

Law, when thus most broadly spoken of, of course, means the *Inalternative Law of Cause and Effect*, which, stated most comprehensively, is, that *every effect must have a cause*, which would invariably produce it, whenever it appeared. It is asserted, moreover, that any real miracle is an infraction of this law, and that this is equivalent to the Creator undoing with one hand, what He has done with the other.

But let us look a little more carefully at the matter. We who accept the miraculous do not say, that it was not the *effect* of Causation, that the miracle was *causeless*. No, *per contra*, we maintain that for every such 'wonderful work' there must have been an unusual cause in operation, for the cause to be,—as it must be on this very principle of Sufficient Reason, which the great Soul and Spirit of the Law of Causation,—for the cause to be *adequate* to the stupendous effect produced. And we take it that, as no combination of known natural causes acting along the lines of the Order of Nature can be viewed as equal to the task which has been performed, it is only rational to conclude that the cause at work must have been supernatural; the one great Cause to the operation of whose boundless power alone, we can attribute the existence and sustenance of that Nature, the glorious Order of which we see to be Divine. We view them therefore—and we maintain that this is the only truly reasonable and therefore truly scientific view of the case—as but the legitimate effect of this adequate Cause. Admitting that this supreme power exists, as that to which the present system

of things is due, it is surely a logical inconsistency for a Theist to object that the miraculous is impossible, as involving an infraction of the Law of Causation, and therefore a glaring inconsistency in the administration of the Universe.

§ 290. But granting that it is possible—as far as the existence of a power adequate to the production of the effects in question is concerned—the Theistic objector still protests, because a direct exercise of supernatural power is the intrusion of a *new* element into the law-regulated universe of things; and that such *intrusion* is tantamount to an *interference* with, and *dislocation* of, that order which is the noblest and most glorious expression of His character, as the changeless "I Am." To work these miracles, then, they argue, would be—by this spasmodic, erratic, incalculable intrusion of a new element into the world—an *inconsistency* in Him who has revealed Himself as "The Father of Lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of a turning."

§ 291. Now, to meet this objection fairly and fully, we must admit at once that the view we advocate does involve this intrusion of a new element; an element new, at least, to this extent and in this sense, that it is *additional to*, and *distinguishable from*, that law-observing power, which secures the regularities of sequence in the phenomena of Ordinary and Orderly Nature. Though we must be careful to notice by the way, that it is not new in the sense of being a Power numerically distinct from, and having a source and centre independent of, that which created the universe and sustains it in its orderly working. It is the same Power, which, though in its essence it is boundless and limitless, in the ordinary course of things, is content to operate along the lines which it has laid down, and so bounds itself, binds itself as a rule, to keep within the limits of these channels; it is this same Power, on special occasions and for special purposes, *acting freely*, amongst these different lines; but not shattering nor dislocating them, and not, I conceive, at all necessarily withdrawing any of the power usually coursing along them, for use in this special way.

This *intrusion*, therefore, is *not* necessarily *interference*. It is rather, that between the lines, and with such admirable skill as in no way to dislocate or injure them, God *interposes* a power free from the limitations of law-ordered force; and thus, without any suspension and infraction of existing Law, effects what could never have been brought about by the automatic working of any combination of the law-bound forces of Nature. But this is not *interference*, in any sense that can be construed fairly into an 'inconsistency' on the part of God. It surely cannot be argued that, because God has chosen to administer this material universe by self-limitation of His power along definite channels in the ordinary course of things; that, therefore, in *this* single manifestation of His power and His wisdom we have a *full* and complete unveiling of the whole of the character of "the Father of Lights." The only view this gives us, is of an ultimate, all-wise, all-mighty First Cause, absolutely rigid in the regularity of His action, and without the trace of a free Personality capable of choice. It would make part of the character of this Being, *Impersonality*. We should have to talk of this Law-bound Source of Law, this impersonal Fountain of inalternative powers, as 'It,' not 'He.' And how could such a Being be "the FATHER of Lights"? An *impersonal* Father! Away with such a mocking metaphor! If there be inconsistency any where, it would be here.

No; if God be a 'Father,' if we can speak of God as 'He,' we must not rob Him of the power of *alternativity* of *action*. And *with* such a character, it shows no 'variability;' it manifests not even "a shadow of a turning" from the fulness of that glorious character, sometimes to depart from that method of action which is the more usual with Him in His relations with His universe, and to give manifest and unmistakable proofs that He has the essential prerogatives of a real Personality, and can act aside of the order of merely impersonal operation, in the free exercise of that boundless Power which is His and His alone.

§ 292. We must not deny to Him what we claim for our-

selves; and in Volition we possess what, in this one point at least, intrinsically resembles the power God thus exercises in Miracle—that it is *additional to*, and *has a centre free of*, the great world of forces which obey inalternative Law.

It is here, that the phenomena of Volition cast such a suggestive light upon those of Miracle, and go far, as I conceive, to show that, no more in the latter than the former, does the interposition of something outside the realm of inalternative causation, in any way involve a suspension or violation of Law.

We have seen that what is characteristic of Volition proper is, that it is *not the sport of circumstances*, that it is *not*, like the forces of Nature, *determined* by the *impersonal operation of the Law of inalternative Causation;* it is, in each instance of its exercise, the Free Determination of a human Personality. As far as we know, moreover, it cannot generate power. We cannot by the mere exercise of Will, bring into play any fresh, any additional energy. All we are able to do is to *control existing* energy, whether within the realm of our own nature, or that of the world of Nature around us. In the former case, this control may be exercised in any of the four ways enumerated at the outset of these Lectures, *i.e.*, either by evoking latent energy, or by sustaining, intensifying, or simply directing energy already in activity. Over the forces of Nature, however, our control is not so ready or complete. Only indirectly, or mediately, can we either *evoke*, *sustain*, or *intensify* (*i.e.*, gather up or concentrate) these. The only thing we can effect at all directly or immediately is to *direct*, and so *combine*, forces—by moving one object to another. (I. Boyd Kinnear.)

Very restricted, therefore, is our power of control; and yet, restricted as it is, see what vast results Man, by the exercise of this simple power, is able to achieve! Every one of the magnificent triumphs of science and civilisation are directly traceable to this. Acting on the suggestions of scientific discovery, man has volitionally just combined and directed, or, in other words, deflected, the mighty forces that are surging and seething all around him—not freeing them from the bonds of

Law, but simply setting them coursing along the lines determined by it, in connections and combinations different from those which they would pursue had he not stepped upon the scene—and he has been able to achieve the marvels of steam-navigation, railway-locomotion, telegraphic-communication, photographic art, electric lighting, and of the myriad forms of modern manufacture.

§ 293. But if all this can be achieved by *man*, whose only prerogative is that of 'direction'—without, in any true sense of the term, 'interfering' with the grand order that prevails—why may not all that is recorded in Scripture, nay, any marvel which we can conceive (though not recorded) as 'miraculous,' be achieved by *God* with *as little real 'interference'* with this great order, which He Himself has brought into existence; seeing that His is the prerogative not merely of directing energy already in existence, but of drawing upon the exhaustless resources of His omnipotence, and bringing into play at will fresh power over which none has any control save Himself?

Man is able to use law-obeying forces to attain his own self-chosen ends; and, by his simple but imperial power of *control*, bring about results which at first sight look like contradictions of great laws, without infringing one of them. The result, which at first glance is startling, is found always to be the law-observing resultant of the law-observing action of a combination of natural forces determined by human choice.

That a heavy body should be seen rising with great velocity into the air, might be said to be a *contradiction* of the great law of gravity, in accordance with which all material bodies on the earth's surface are drawn irresistibly, when free from any support, to its greater mass. But, of course, we know there is no real infraction of this Law. The result is due to the action upon that body of some other force the tendency of which is to impel it from the earth's surface. That force, of course—as in the case of the fragments of rock, and the clouds of ash that are vomited with such prodigious violence from the mouth of a volcano—may be generated, and set in motion, in a purely

impersonal fashion, solely by the interaction upon each other of the law-ordered forces of Nature herself. Nor is she by these proved to be "a kingdom divided against itself." Or it may be one, set in operation, or, at any rate, directed and controlled, by a human personality, choosing freely the means for the attainment of a deliberated, chosen end: as when a shell is fired from a mortar, or a ball is thrown upwards by the hand. Clearly, in both cases, the forces which effect these results are not newly brought into existence for the occasion, and are as law-observant in the mode and limits of their operation as the force of gravity itself. So that the consistency of Nature is preserved in the apparent contradiction.

By some, too, it is maintained that, in the case of Scripture Miracle, there is no need for supposing *new* force, or fresh or special power, to have been brought into existence. And to those who feel that the introduction of any *new* element, any real addition to the energies of the universe, is a thing strongly to be deprecated, if it can possibly be avoided, it may be conceded that it is quite conceivable that every miracle recorded might have been wrought without this. A special endowment of knowledge may have been equivalent to the gift of special and superhuman power,—on the principle that "Knowledge is power." An intensification of any one of the less observed of the conditions of the occurrence of the event—made possible by, and actually effected at the suggestion of, a *clearer insight* (given specially by God with this special end in view) into the whole of those conditions, which together form the scientific 'cause' of the event;—such an intensification or exaggeration, may have produced, in a way quite compatible with Law, what, to the mass of men, would seem a contradiction of it, and would naturally be attributed to the direct action of superhuman power, when it was really directly due to the exercise of superhuman wisdom.

But the idea that in such cases, new power, either specifically given for the purpose, in the case of human agents, or freely used out of the boundless treasury of omnipotence, by the Divine Son of Man, was actually employed, seems more

consonant with the most natural interpretations of the phraseology of Scripture; and in itself can seem improbable only when the mind is surcharged with an exaggerated jealousy for the honour of the last great generalisation of Modern Science, the Doctrine of Conservation of Energy—a mind not as open as it should be to give the Divine Author of all, freest scope and perfect liberty to employ what He will of His boundless resources. But, either way, we see that 'miracle is possible;' and most probably, in every case, was performed without the infringement, suspension, or infraction of a single law of Nature: and so the objection to it, on the ground of its involving either want of dignity, or inconsistency in the Character and Action of God, falls powerless to the ground.

APPENDIX II.—Will, Divine and Human.

§ 294. It may seem strange that I aim at saying nothing about the question touching Divine *Foreknowledge* and Human Free Will.

In the former stage of the controversy, I know it was the most prominent point.

In Edwards, and in all the older Necessitarians, the thing was supposed to be settled by reference to this point.[1] But I do not lay the stress upon it which a separate paragraph would

[1] Though I might have gone farther back, and have had recourse to Hobbes—of all men in the world—as giving this theological objection, in as distinct and cogent a form as can anywhere be found. At the close of the "Letter about Liberty and Necessity" (from which I have already quoted), he says:—"To which I could add, if I thought it good Logick, the inconvenience of denying Necessity; as it destroyeth both the Decrees and Prescience of God: for whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by Man as an Instrument, or foreseeth shall have come to pass, a man, if he hath Liberty (such as his Lordship affirmeth) from Necessitation, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass; and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things should be as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass."

imply; because I conceive that this difficulty has been dealt with; and that the real difficulty lies in another direction.

The substance of the argument was as follows:—If God *foreknows* what men will do, there can be no *uncertainty*, no *contingency* about their actions. Knowledge is of *one* thing, which must be one thing with no possibility of any thing else as an alternative. So that all alternatives, the possibility of another or any other thing, is out of the question.

If He foreknows the future, He knows what man will do. If, then, it were possible that they could do anything else than what He foreknows they will do, His knowledge would be liable to be contradicted. It, therefore, depends upon, and involves the absolute certainty of that happening which is foreknown. So that any alternative is excluded.

§ 295. But there are two ways at least of meeting this objection. First, what is foreknown does not take place *because* it is *foreknown*, as is implied, when the fact of its being foreknown is said to disprove the freedom of the agent. It is foreknown, because this is what will happen in the actual event. Thus the knowledge of God is the *effect*, and not the *cause*, of the action of man.

§ 296. Second, the *modes* of God's foreknowledge are *not* necessarily *the same* as ours. Nay, we may assert the opposite. In this sense, "God's thoughts are not as man's thoughts;" *i.e.*, in their *conditions* and *limits*.

With reference to both the *present* and the *past*, what has been argued above is transparently clear.

When using my *eyes* and *ears*, I know, and can declare with certainty, what you are doing and saying, at a clear distance from me. I can with dogmatic confidence describe and announce to a blind person what you are doing; or to a deaf one, by manual signs, what you are saying. But that does not in any way effect the character of your speech or action. Both are the effects of *free* activity, of entirely unrestrained choice on your part. Because I can speak with such certainty about it, it does not prove that there was not anterior uncertainty about

it to you; that you had not a free choice; that there was no alternative before you, either in speech or action. The method of its production, whether an automatic necessity, or freely chosen responsibility, has nothing to do with it. I see what you do, and say what I see, because you do it: it is not that you do what you do, because I see it, or because I say it. Just so with what I hear. I hear what you say, and say what I hear, because you say it: it is not that you *must* say what you do, because I hear, and because I say it. The truth of any announcement does not imply the necessity, or inalternative character, of your action.

Clearer still, if anything, is it with the *past.* I recall something which you did ten years ago. My memory in this case is vivid and accurate, and I narrate the facts with unfaltering decision. It is true the past cannot be altered. It must be what it was. There is the inalterability of what *has taken place.* But no one would be absurd enough to say, that the clearness and certainty of my declaration about the past is the *cause* of its having been what I declare it to have been. Of course, the knowledge of that past is the *effect* of what *took place*, not its cause. *It* was the cause and condition of my knowledge; not my declaration and knowledge the cause of *it.*

Yet, mark, this does not interfere in any way with the action which was actually done by you, being one of two or more courses which were equally open to you, before you committed yourself, in the decision of Will, to one rather than either of the others. Because having happened, it cannot be altered; because once done, it cannot be *undone;* it does not follow that before it was done, it was the *only* thing that could possibly be done. The fact of my clear and certain knowledge of its having taken place does not in any way determine that it, and no other action, could have been performed.

As palpably as anything can be proved, then, it is patent and plain that the *clearness* and *certainty* of the *knowledge* of anything, in either present or past, does not involve the *necessity* or *inalternativity* of the thing itself.

§ 297. But when we come to speak of the *future*, it seems *otherwise.* Our minds being constituted as they are—*to us*, *foreknowledge* is possible only when there is NO *alternativity*, only where there reigns absolute regularity of sequence between cause and effect.

Eclipses may be foretold with unerring accuracy hundreds of years before their occurrence; because the *laws* of their occurrences are so perfectly ascertained, because cause is followed by effect, with such absolute and calculable accuracy. Whereas, of course, if there were the liability, the possibility of the moon's diverging from her path to any considerable extent, and suddenly taking to a circular instead of an oval orbit; or, without any warning, sometimes to alter the pace of her motion, and for the next thousand years travel at but one half her previous rate, prediction would be perfectly out of the question.

Knowledge of what will take place in the human mind can only be secured, when the successive links of the causal chain can be tracked out, in thought and by calculation: and this can be only where the regularity of the sequence is perfect; and the causes are all accurately known. With a purely human intelligence, then, the power of prediction is the *correlate* of calculability; and that again of absolute regularity, in accordance with clearly ascertained laws of inalternative causation.

And the old argument virtually was, what is true of human intelligence, must be true of the divine. Therefore, wherever there is prediction or foreknowledge, there must be necessity; there cannot be a *contingency* (that was the favourite word), or in more modern phrase, there cannot be *alternativity*. Now in Scripture there is clear prediction of many events, where human action is involved. There is absolute and certain foreknowledge on the part of *God* of what each individual will do. Therefore, in what each individual actor does and will do, there can be no *alternativity;* in other words, in human actions, there is as absolute *necessity*, as perfect inalternativity, as in the material universe, else *God* could not *foresee* and could not *foretell.*

To this our answer is, the transition is an unjustifiable one. We might have anticipated, or suspected, the argument even in reference to ourselves. For what the action of another will be, even though we know him well, his general character, and his whole course of life, we can only *shrewdly* suspect, we cannot absolutely foretell. We may be right in nine cases, and egregiously wrong in the tenth. Indeed, as explained before, it is *on the average*, in which the calculable elements come into play, on the average merely, that we can predict at all; and consequently, when our calculations are most coolly complete, the actual fact often most absolutely befools us and proves us to be no prophets; but only clever reckoners who get curiously out with their reckoning although the reckoning has been most carefully calculated. Human action is shown, as a matter of fact, to be incalculable; and therefore, by human faculties, not to be unerringly *foretold*. But this does not shake our belief in its being unerringly *foreseen*, or in the possibility of its being clearly, calmly, distinctly foretold, by *God:* simply because we maintain that *with God* the condition of foreknowledge is not (as with us) *calculability*, or *inalternativity*.

§ 298. Our view is that *knowledge of the* FUTURE, with Him, is as simple, as direct, as immediate, and therefore as easy, and as natural, as is ours of the *present* or of the *past;* that this knowledge of the future by God, as little involves the absolute necessity or inalternativity of what is *foreknown*, as our knowledge of the past does of what we *remember*, and that it as little involves any exclusion of *contingency* or *alternativity* in the method of its production, as does our knowledge of the present, in what we *see* or *hear*.

And this leads naturally to a reference to a putting of the thing, which, to my mind, clears up the difficulty arising out of the Divine Foreknowledge most completely.

Solly throws out the suggestion that "God sees through time as we see through space."[1] Quite in harmony with this suggestion, we familiarly speak of God's Foreknowledge, as

[1] "Will, Divine and Human."

fore-*sight*, and say 'God *foresees*;' or, more absolutely, God's knowledge of the past, and *future*, as well as of the present, is *immediate*, is *intuitive*. It is merely the recognition of the truth, apart from any intermediate means such as condition man's knowledge, both with reference to the future as well as to the present and the past.

§ 299. The real difficulty arises, not in *Foreknowledge* but in connection with Predestination, which is Fore-willing. How can this Fore-willing, or Pre-determination, be compatible with alternativity?

It can easily be brought to the point of logical contradiction. The subject may be approached in different ways.

(1) In connection with *Providence*. True the word literally means *fore-sight*, and so properly is the same as foreknowledge, and, thus interpreted, would amount only to the difficulty dealt with above. But *practically*, it means *fore-ordering*—watching over the course of events, so that nothing shall take place contrary to His will, and contrary to the true interests of His great kingdom, or to frustrate His great plan.

It thus involves an *all-including* PLAN. Everything thus viewed is part of God's great purpose; nothing happens which was not contemplated by it. In other words, *everything* which happens *is distinctly purposed* by God.

In this "everything," of course, must be included all *human actions;* and of these, not merely those which are involuntary or secondarily automatic, but those too which are voluntary. Every one of these actions, then, on this great view of Providence, is arranged for, *predetermined*. God's will has settled beforehand what it is to be, so that it can be no other. Yet, on the other hand, *as voluntary*, it is only one of alternative courses; else there could not have been in it the element of *choice*, without which it could not be *voluntary* in the true sense of the term.

See, then, the pure contradiction to which we are brought. Every voluntary action, as such, is one of two or more—equally possible to the agent—who alone, by the free exercise of Will,

determines which he shall perform; yet, as part of the plan of God's Providence, this same action is the only action possible in the case, because predetermined in the Eternal Counsels, as that which shall be done and no other. The same action therefore is, at the same time, not the only thing possible (else it would not be a *voluntary choice*), and the only one possible, else it could not have been *predetermined* by Divine Power, which by the Law of Contradiction is impossible and absurd. *Voilà*—Contradiction No. 1.

§ 300. (2) Let us look at it again, in connection with the Doctrine of *Divine Sovereignty*.

Divine Sovereignty seems to involve the universality of the Divine *Willing*, as *Divine Omniscience* does that of Divine *Knowledge*. God cannot be *Sovereign* truly, unless His will is *done*. If His will is really *frustrated*, He does not have His way. He is not *supreme*. The confidence of all Theists is expressed in the line—

"Thou everywhere hast sway."

That "The Lord Omnipotent is King," that He "*rules* among the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth," is the faith of all who believe in the *supremacy* of God, in the real Divinity of God at all. Whatever may appear to the contrary, such affirm and believe that the will of God shall be fulfilled; nay, is fulfilled, moment by moment. He holds the reins, and nothing is beyond His *control*; or, in other words, nothing can break the bonds of His stern and sovereign *will*.

Yet nothing can be clearer than that there is such a thing as 'sin.' Sin is the transgression of the law. The *law* is the expression of God's will. Every sin then is a breaking of the express command of God, a crossing of God's *will*. It is man, in the exercise of his strange prerogative of freedom, confronting God's calm, majestic utterance, "My will is that thou do this," with the determined and fatal response, "My will is that I do it not." And the action is proof, in actual fact, of the crossing of the Divine Will by the Human.

But says the Theist: "God's will is *supreme;* it cannot but be done." And so we are brought to direct and clear logical contradiction.

This *action*, as part of 'all things' in which the Divine Will has sway, is *Divinely willed*, is willed by God, is in accordance with the Will of God; and, at the same time, as sinful, is a breaking of God's law; and is *not* in accordance with the Will of God. Q.E.A. Contradiction No. 2.

§ 301. (3) I know it may be contended, that I have put the Doctrine of Divine *Providence* too *broadly;* that it is not maintained that God prearranges *everything:* all that is petty as well as all that is important; all that is unworthy, as well as all that is heroic; all that is wrong, as well as all that is good and pure, in our lives. It is put often that all which God fore-ordains, and pre-determines, is what is important, what is heroic, what is good and pure; and to ourselves is to be traced all the rest —the petty, and the unworthy, and the wrong. The great God *predestines*, such say, only what is *great*, physically and morally.

But this distinction will not hold.

(*a*) To the Lord God, *nothing* is *great:* as compared with His infinity, in truth, all is *small*. And, on the other hand, to His omniscience and prescience, nothing is *small*. What seems to us *trivial*, so *trivial* as to escape our notice, is in reality often just the pivot-point, on which hinge and turn the destinies of nations. Creasey's "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World" would show this, and so would the faithful history of any individual. The most important issues have flowed from a hasty word, from the effects of irritation from a gnat's bite, from the loss of a train through the inaccuracy of a watch, or from impatience, bred of indigestion caused by eating a sour apple.

Unless, then, God's Providence takes in all these *petty* details, it is utterly ineffectual. It would often be omitting from its precautions and plan just the most salient and momentous features of the case. It would be leaving a chink in the armour, through which the fatal thrust of the enemy's weapon would be sure to enter.

(*b*) Further, with reference to the distinction between wrong and right:—Does God fore-ordain *only* the *right?* If so; in like manner, He ordains only what, in many cases, are the least influential elements in the evolutions of history. If all the wrong things are excluded from God's plan, then those are omitted from it from which ultimately flow the greatest issues in human history.

Humiliating as it may seem to human nature, humbling as is the view it gives of actual springs of human actions, it still remains indubitably true, that the words spoken in jealous anger, or with absolute and intentional falsehood; and deeds performed with intensely malicious intent, with 'malice aforethought,' are the occasions of indirect blessings to the community at large; and have proved the actual fountain of streams of benefit to the human race. The more patient and more impartial the investigation of history becomes, the more strangely apparent does it become that the *motives* and *personal feelings* and *characters* of the principal movers in the great events of history,—The glorious Revolution, the more glorious Reformation, the Emancipation and the Redemption of races and nations,—were always mixed and impure, and often selfish, immoral, and sinful. If, then, these formed no part of God's plan and fore-ordaining, there have happened without Him, outside the limits of His control, the most crucial and critical events in the career of the human race.

Clearly, if Providence is to be believed in at all, it must be accepted as including in its all-embracing sweep, the wrong as well as the right, and we are brought again to the glaring contradiction, of a Holy, Pure, and Sin-hating God, ordaining, making part of His plan for the government of the world, actions and feelings which are unholy, impure, and sinful.

Summarily, then, in two ways, do *Divine Sovereignty* and *Divine Providence* involve the most glaring contradiction: in the one, what is the antithesis of a most central fact of human nature; and, in the other, what is as absolutely inconsistent with the Divine character. In both the Divine Will is brought into

clashing contrast with the Human. In the first, the very supremacy of the Divine Will is seen to be logically contradictory of the freedom of the Human; in the second, it brings additionally the contradiction, as absolute, of a Holy Will ordaining what is unholy—its all-controlling power involves what is most completely contradictory of itself, its willing to be done what it wills shall not be done.

§ 302. What, then, shall we say to these things? Are we to cling to the *Law of Thought*, and reject either Divine Sovereignty or Human Free Will? Can we reject either the one or the other? As Theists, accepting the Bible as revealing to us the nature and workings of God, we cannot relinquish the idea of God's supremacy: that would be to rob Him of His glory, and dethrone Him. As unprejudiced psychologists, accepting the testimony of consciousness in the sense of Responsibility, and all that it involves, we cannot give up the Freedom of the Will, in the power of alternative choice.

Must we not, then, give up the *Law of Thought*, as no trustworthy ontological guide, where the elements of the Infinite and Absolute are introduced? The logical contradiction is clearly involved. But, in these matters, *logic* is not an adequate measure of Truth and fact. Truth, in this, and in all matters of kindred dimensions, reaching out into the vast and immeasureable region of the unlimited and unconditional, embraces in a unity, our finite minds cannot comprehend, these two *facts*, which to them seem inconsistent and mutually repugnant, simply and solely because they are limited and conditioned, while one term of the relation involved is unlimited and infinite.

We cling to it *stoutly*, therefore, that *Man* is *Free;* that, in the decisions of his will, he has alternative and equally possible courses, between which he freely decides: and as firmly we reverently believe *God* to be *Supreme*, His glorious purpose never failing of accomplishment, His pure and holy *Will* never brooking, or really never meeting, effectual opposition.

§ 303. Must we then leave the matter there, in a hopeless state of chaotic contradiction?

Scarcely so. Many considerations may be adduced as *alleviations, partial explanations*—though not a full *solution*—of a problem, we accept as *finally insoluble.*

I. The Freedom of Human Will is the one condition of a moral nature, and that, of any service worthy God's acceptance.

II. There is a real difference between *permitting* and *ordaining.* We cannot accept it that sin is ordained.

III. A *light* is shed upon the problem in the *power* of good men over their followers and instruments.

IV. A further relief—even in view of the reign of Law, side by side with that of Will both in man and God—is found in the parallelism between games of skill and the great realities of human life.

§ 304. I. With reference to this first principle; it is mainly its bearing on the Divine claims and character that we have here to consider. That there would be no moral dignity in man were he not free, in the sense of having power to choose one of two or more courses, has been shown already. It is the condition of his being the responsible author of his actions. If you remove it, you reduce him to a conscious machine. You degrade him in the scale of creation; and he becomes the head of that scale of animated being, only in virtue of his mechanism being more intricate, and his construction and constitution being more complex.

The side of the question, however, with which we are concerned now, is the bearing of this on the legitimate claims and expectations of God. It does involve, as we see, the possibility, and has, as a matter of fact, involved the actuality, of that *sin*, which is a *thwarting* of the *Divine Will*, is an affront to the Divine authority, is a contradiction of the Divine character, and is the one element of confusion and disorder, which destroys the fair harmony that would else prevail throughout the universe.

But it is true, *per contra*—and this is the consideration we would urge, as an alleviation of this logical contradiction and moral difficulty—that were it removed, all that God could re-

ceive would be *automatic* service, *mechanical* praise, *law-necessitated* homage! All, it is true, would then be in accordance with His will; but so, only because it could not be *otherwise.* There would be a fair and even reflection of His glory; but it would be only the reflection of a *mirror.* His behests would be infallibly obeyed; but only because there was not power to disobey. What man could do, and would do, would then be only the same *sort* of *service* as that rendered by the material creation, or the lower animals. Thus "the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork." The birds chant His praise, and the beasts of the field work out in unconscious fashion His great purpose for them. And as He looks at it all, He may still feel satisfaction in the contemplation, and pronounce it all "very good;" but to his feelings of loving care, there is no intelligent response of grateful affection. The only gratification obtained is that which a mechanician has, when he has produced a piece of mechanism, which embodies his idea and works out his plan.

And were man, though endowed, as now, with intelligence and feeling, bereft of freedom; if he thought, and felt, and desired, and willed, in such and such ways under the impulse of necessity; if, in certain circumstances, he could not think, or feel, or desire, or will otherwise than he does; though all that thought was thought of the greatness and glory of God's character, though all that feeling were feeling of gratitude for His gracious working, though all that desire were desire for more complete likeness to God Himself, and all his volitions were along the lines of God's own will; the pleasure God would thus receive in the homage and the praise of man would be in kind exactly the same. It would be the higher pleasure of the Artist, who has devised and produced a mechanism more elaborate in its construction, more varied in its movements; a work that more completely embodied His ideas, and more fully expressed His purpose and plan.

True, it might be said, that the service was now intelligent; His feelings would meet with the response of grateful feeling

in return, His loving designs would have their glowing counterpart in the desires of His creatures, and His grand Will would be countersigned by the *wills* of His subjects. But as it could not but be so; as, in this case, it would be all perfectly regular in its occurrence—secured absolutely by His own supreme will, without the chance or possibility of its being otherwise—it would after all be but a fulfilment of the dream of the "*Coming Age*," where the possessor of the secrets of *Vril* is able to deliver himself from all the annoyances and irritations and impertinences of domestic servants, who are possessed with a will, and with fancies, and with humours of their own, by furnishing himself with a complete set of *automata*, which, by being merely touched at certain points, perform all the menial duties of preparing a meal, waiting at table, and executing all service of the household, without a flaw, with perfect decorum, and without any crossing of the master's will. It is after all, only the service of a machine, though possessed of the power of producing thoughts, and feelings, and desires, and volition.

There is no *heart-satisfaction* in that. There is no pure spiritual joy in that. Though there be correspondence and response: if it be not spontaneous, originated from within (as could not be the case were there no freedom), it would be the correspondence of an image in the glass, and the response of an echo; the image and the echo produced by him who is to receive the pleasure.

But what is this, in either the one or the other, as compared with the *likeness* of the *living imitation*, of a father by a child; or the sweet tones of the voice of a friend, pouring forth his confidence from the fulness of his heart into our ears? And why? Just because, they come from another heart, another nature, each with its own centre distinct and separate from my own; because though the imitation is so close, the confidence is so full, they might have been *withheld:* and so are the *free gift* of loving admiration in the one case, and of loving trust in the other.

But that is only saying in other words that God can

receive the highest satisfaction, the purest joy only from creatures who have the *power* to do *otherwise than as He wills.* Only those *truly* 'give' who have the power to 'withhold.' That praise, then, alone has moral worth which comes from those who have the power to *blaspheme* and *to curse.* That service alone can give the fullest pleasure, which is rendered by those who have the power to spurn the authority and break the law of the great King. That admiration, and thoughtful admiration, is most worthy acceptance which comes from those who *can* think hard thoughts, as well as loyal ones. That gratitude is most welcome that comes from hearts which may be filled with indifference or hatred. Those aspirations constitute the most grateful tribute which are the glad acknowledgment of the superlative goodness of the object; but in beings to whom there is the fearful possibility of the heart being set on vanity, or sensual passion, or sin; and, finally, only that "I will love thee," "I will serve thee," is in the highest sense *worthy* the acceptance of God, which is uttered by those who have the equal power to say, "I will *not* have Thee to reign over me," "I will go my own way and live my own plans."

And that this is the case is the presupposition of all Scripture.

It would be but *mockery* for God to say, "My son, *give* me thy heart," if he could not *but* give it. It could have significance only to one who had it equally in his power, either to keep it back, or give it. Christ would never have said, "Ye *will not* come to me that ye may have life," unless there had been the power with them to whom He spoke, of either coming or staying away. In other words, it is clear that the one condition of God's receiving His due, in its highest form of love and trust and service, from His creatures, is their being so constituted as that these shall be all 'their own,' 'within their control,' either to *give* or *withhold;* and that is possible only as they have the power of *choice.* Holy service is possible in its highest form, only where rebellion is possible; love, where hatred, and aspiration, where aversion, is equally within reach.

All this being so, we can understand that God should *choose* to make man thus. Knowing all it would involve, He did so, because only thus could "His delights" be "with the sons of men;" only thus could He have communion with them in any worthy sense; only thus could His loving heart have full and free response from the hearts of His creatures.

§ 305. II. A *second* real relief is gained, by realising and emphasising the difference between *permission* and *distinct causation* or *pre-ordination.*

Will is in operation in the one case as in the other. Where a thing *might* be *prevented*, and yet, with full knowledge of its being about to take place, events are allowed to take their course—a certain share in the event is entailed on the person, who does not interpose his hand to prevent what he might have prevented, had he chosen. Such *action* becomes, in part, *his* action, *as well as* that of the person who performs it. That is to say, he does not abrogate his power of control over the events in question; though he does not exercise it, as he might, to put an end to it. In such inaction, he remains as truly Master of the Situation, as if he were energetically to act. At any moment he could interpose; and so his voluntary and intentional self-restraint is consistent with, and becomes actually part of, the display of His power of supreme control.

Yet, be it observed, such deliberate inaction does not alter the moral character of the action which is thus quietly, tacitly, passively *allowed.* That the action might be *prevented* or stopped by *another* person, does not give it any other moral character than it would possess, if no other being in the universe were able to interfere with its execution. Its moral character depends wholly upon the motives with which it is done by an agent who is free to decide to do it or not to do it, without any external pressure, or the compulsion of any internal necessity. The *primary* and real responsibility for the character of the thing done rests with the agent. Only a *secondary* and less distinct responsibility falls upon the other. To him, the permission of the occurrence of the event may have relation to

other ulterior and higher ends; which,—as *he* does not perform the act, and it is done by one who *need* not do it, save as he freely elects to do it,—it may be *right* for him to *allow*, though it would be *wrong* for him to *do* himself.

I think thus much of distinction may fairly be made. I may not feel warranted to interfere with violence, forcibly to prevent the commission by another of an action that I know is wrong, though by taking this high-handed course I might prevent the wrong being done. More harm might in the end be done, by this infringement on his liberty, and by such interference with the after lessons which he might learn from the ultimate issues of the action, than by the action itself.

Moreover, even did I prevent it by force, the *guilt* of the action would remain with the man, though he did not actually perform it; since guilt lies in intention, and not in actual performance. (According to the law of Christ: "I say unto you, whoso looketh upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her *already* in his heart.")

Now all this is true in connection with the relation of God to *man*. We cannot believe that God distinctly *wills* men to sin, that He predestines them to do *wrong*, in such a way that they *cannot* do *otherwise*—that they have no *alternative*. Else two things would follow. (1) What the man *could not but do*, would lose its *moral character*, since it would *not* be *his* action at all; but that of Him, owing to the strong predetermination of whose will he did it: and (2) it would become *God's act*, though He used the man as His means of performing it; and we should have the *moral* contradiction, which is a much more appalling and astounding and confounding thing than a merely *logical* contradiction—viz., a *Holy God* doing what was *wrong*. Or if we chose to put it another way, it would make what is *wrong* in man *right* in *God;* which is to abolish the reality of all moral distinctions.

But we see, as a matter of fact, that *God permits* sin: which He would not, and *from the very perfection of His nature could* not, Himself perform. It is true He might prevent it.

And it is argued that by permitting it, when He might prevent it, He practically becomes the *author* of it and responsible for it. Now it is *this* we deny, and on the grounds of the distinction now explained and emphasised. He does not become the 'author' of it. The actual *performer* of the sinful action remains the *author*, just as he would be, were there no Being in the universe who could prevent him (as God can). He is the 'prime' and 'proper,' and, in the strict sense of the term, the '*sole*' author of the deed; in virtue of his volitional freedom. Now this freedom would be infringed, were he *prevented* forcibly from *doing* it, without removing from his spirit the weight of internal responsibility for the guilty intention; and would be *absolutely destroyed*, if he were forcibly *prevented* from deciding on which course to take; or were *determined* by an *internal* necessity to take one course rather than another. The exercise of this undoubted prerogative of God to prevent it, then, in the first case, might be on the whole *unwise*, and *not* for the *ultimate good* of the man himself, or of others; and, in the second case, it would *destroy* his *moral character*, and that of his action altogether.

In certain circumstances, of course, it might be best to *prevent* the act: though the responsibility of the intention would still remain with the freely *deciding* agent. And this clearly is what God does. According to that Scripture, "He makes the wrath of man to praise Him," *i.e*, He *ordinarily* permits him to take his course: "but the *remainder* thereof He *restrains*," *prevents its execution;* though *wrath* is allowed, and so the freedom and the responsibility, which that freedom brings, still remains with the man.

The suggestion, then, which I would here make by way of relief, is that the *permission*, being *voluntary* on the part of God, is as much part of His voluntary control of all things; that supreme supervision which must be claimed for Him as the Supreme Will in the universe—as anything He does directly Himself—and yet is compatible with the freedom of the Will of man: while, even in the cases in which *permission* is changed

into *prevention* of the outward act, the freedom of previous decision, in accordance with personal intention, is not interfered with.

§ 306. III. A further *help*, amid the logical difficulties of this matter, is gained from what we observe to be possible amongst *men*.

Sovereignty we find here to be compatible with *others' liberty*. I do not mean the sovereignty of a *monarch;* for that is secured by the maintenance and operation of *laws*, which have as their special object the guarding of royal prerogative; and effect it by, to just the necessary extent—often, too, to a very unnecessary extent—*restraining the liberty* of the *subject*. The large liberty and special honour of the one is effected by lessening the liberty and by restricting the honour of the rest.

I refer rather to those instances of *leadership*, which are realised wholly through *moral forces;* without the passing of any laws, and without interfering with the liberty of any one else. The "great men" of history, the 'heroes' of a party, the leading spirits of society, gain ascendancy over others, by the sheer force of spiritual superiority; and the ascendancy is so complete, that their slightest wish is observed and anticipated by many, while others, quite unwillingly, are made to serve their ends, even when they fancy that these ends are being thwarted and frustrated. Such a man is surrounded by a crowd of enthusiastic friends and subservient satellites, who 'are made willing in the day of his power;' and even through those who shun him, who keep at a distance from him, or even try to work against him, he effects his purpose, and carries out his plans.

In neither case is there any infringement of moral liberty. Those who consciously and intelligently carry out his expressed wishes, do so because, under the impulse of profound admiration for his character or talents, they of their own free will yield themselves up to his guidance; distinctly making up their minds, that ultimately it will be better both for themselves and the world at large, to lend themselves to carry out his plans

and pursue his methods, than merely to act out their own devices. And in the case of those, whom, spite of themselves, he *uses* for his own ends, *liberty* is, if possible, still less infringed. They still pursue their own courses unhindered, often under the impulse of dislike and antagonism to him. He gives them 'rope.' They have full *tether*, its extent being limited only by the range of their own inclinations and tastes and plans.

May it not be somewhat thus with God? He rules and reigns. His purposes never ultimately fail. But it is not by the *exercise* of *omnipotence*, of mere physical force. That would be to break in upon the moral character, and destroy the responsibility of the creature. He leaves *men* in full exercise of their *moral freedom*.

Some He *uses*, with their free consent, as "fellow-workers" with Him, in carrying out His gracious plan of Redemption. This is the high calling, the noble employment of His saints, who, with glad self-surrender of their will to His, "*delight* to do His *will*," and find their highest joy in furthering the coming of His kingdom in the world.

Others, indifferent to Him, He employs, though they know it not, to achieve His purposes; while their only thought is—and a true thought it is as far as it goes—that they are achieving their own. Thus of Cyrus the Great Jehovah says, through His Jewish prophet Isaiah: "He is my shepherd and shall perform all my pleasure" (Isa. xliv. 28).

While others, again, whose hearts are set against Him, and in fiendish glee imagine that they are overturning His rule and destroying His kingdom, He allows to carry out their fell purposes to the full—when He sees their ultimate issues turn to *good*, the good of most, the good of all; and quietly interposes to hinder their accomplishment whenever that will not be the case.

So that while "Man is man, and master of his fate," God is still "King of kings, and Lord of lords."

§ 307. IV. Still further; the illustration used by Cox (in his Bible Expositions)—of the chess-player—to show the compati-

bility of the play of free personality with the maintenance of rigid law, may be adapted to throw still further light upon the subject. Though it is interesting to note, by the way, that a similar metaphor had been used before by Goethe. Froude remarks: "Goethe compares life to a game of whist, when the cards are dealt out by destiny, and the rules of the game are fixed; subject to those conditions, the players are left to win or lose, according to their skill or want of skill." [1]

In both these illustrations, man is considered or treated only in his relations with his fellow man. But put as one of the players in this high game of life and death and destiny, the Supreme Himself; and you will see what I mean. If the game be *chess*, on the one side is God; and on the other, *humanity:* each individually, or all collectively. And if it be whist, God has as His ally, those who are His willing coadjutors—the saints and the redeemed; whilst, against these, opposed to them, are the indifferent and the openly impious. In either case, the final victory goes to skill, not to physical force. There is no physical compulsion; the liberty of each personality is preserved within the limits of the laws of the game.

At the outset, alternative courses are before each player, which he is free to select and decide, according to the dictates of his own fancy, or judgment, or calculations; though, as the game proceeds, with the growing complications and the fresh circumstances produced by each successive move, the alternatives may diminish in number, and the range of possible plan may be gradually restricted for the losing player. And yet, in the end, it remains true, that the most *skilful* player inevitably gains the day, though no physical compulsion is used to secure that end.

The reason that I introduce these illustrations, in addition to the parallel already drawn (in sec. III.)[2] is that, in these, the existence of clear and definite laws are a prominent feature of the case; and so the complexity of the actual case, as regards the problem of the Will, Divine and Human, is more palpably paralleled here. As, in the problem we are considering, we

[1] "Cæsar," p. 2. [2] § 306.

have *Divine Will* Free—yet not coercive—in relation with *human wills*, uncoerced and preserving their moral liberty, in a universe in which *Law reigns* as well; so, in these games, we have the three elements too—the free personalities in the players on both sides, and the rules of the game fixed and rigid.

The problem, of course, is,—How can the *Will* of man be free, and yet Divine Will be supreme? How can man be untrammelled in his liberty, to form what plans he chooses, and yet the Divine plan, through, over, and often in opposition to, all these human plans, be wrought out quietly, and with complete success? And more, How can all this be, in a universe where *Law* has universal sweep, if not absolutely unreserved control?

Our answer is a question,—May it not be somewhat as in either chess or whist? While there is no necessity, save that of obedience to the rules of the game, which are binding on all players alike, yet inevitably the victory must be with the more skilful player. Now in the high game of 'life'—which is yet so solemn a *drama* to all who are engaged in it—clearly, the skill of the Divine player, who, in virtue of His perfect prescience, His absolutely complete foreknowledge, knows from the beginning all the possible moves and all their possible issues; foresees the whole from eternity, as clearly as though it were at the moment being played out before His eye; and whose *wisdom* knows as little limit as His knowledge,—His skill, I say, must infinitely transcend that of the most astute diplomatist, the most accomplished tactician, the shrewdest politician, the world has ever seen: and even the united wisdom of the wisest of the children of men, though we should think of them as united in their crusade against good,—as perfectly as in fact they are *disunited*, by their very antagonism to goodness,—as weighed in the balance with the wisdom of God,—would be the folly of simplest childhood, or the maunderings of insanity itself.

If it is this possibility that we are contemplating,—the an-

tagonism of the Divine and human,—we can still see, that (in this stupendous chess tournament) with perfect freedom still preserved to man, to choose his moves, and with strictest observances of the Laws, which He Himself has instituted, on the part of God, as well as man,—the final issue cannot be doubtful. Even when, in his short-sighted cleverness, man thinks himself on the point of winning, he may be only putting himself more securely than ever in the toils of his great Adversary, and working his own speedy and final discomfiture.

And, if we think of it in the more complex instance of the game of cards, cannot we see that, where we are playing the game of Good against Evil, though our 'hand' may be a very poor one, and our own skill may be very slight, with such an One *on our side*, the best resources of those combined against us—the godless and the ungodly—cannot ultimately gain the day. The victory must perforce rest with Him. No device formed against Him can prosper. "He must reign." "To Him the sceptre is given." "The government is upon His shoulder."

§ 308. Perhaps it may excite surprise, that I have not *mentioned* what, to many, seems the most helpful consideration of all in this connection.

The consideration I allude to is this. Though sin does involve this logical contradiction to the rule of God and to the supremacy of the Divine Will, it has been permitted, because it was *necessary*; on the side of God, as affording the only occasion for the manifestation of the Divine *love* in its fullest extent, for the revelation of the Divine Character in its completeness: and on the side of man, for the ultimate realisation of a full-orbed moral character,—because man must sin to be *redeemed*, and only the redeemed know the fulness of the grace of God, or become changed into the likeness of Christ.

This reasoning, however specious, I cannot accept, on the general ground, that it *sets a premium on sin*, and consequently *alters* its *essential character*. Once admit that sin was necessary, and it loses its moral heinousness. Indeed in one way it ceases to be sin at all. Once get to look upon it as the one

condition of our knowing the fulness of God's love, and of His full self-revelation to mankind, and I cannot look upon it with abhorrence; nay, I must view it with a certain fondness, as that which brought me this priceless boon, and which alone could bring it. I learn to look upon it, as the dirty path, or miry road, that must be traversed, for me to reach my final Palace-Home; as a friend in unpleasant disguise, rather than as a real foe. But, if so, then *sin* is not an "abominable thing," which either God or man can "hate with perfect hatred." It may be an unpleasant, a somewhat repulsive thing; but one, the unpleasantness and repulsiveness of which we are willing to tolerate, in view of its glorious issues. It becomes a "light affliction," which we well can pass through with tolerable patience, when we compare it with "the exceeding weight of glory," to which it ultimately leads.

But further; if not so *bad* after all, how can it be so bad as it is represented in the Scriptures to be; so bad as that it needed the *sacrifice* of *the Son of God* Himself to atone for it? No; we make less than the absolutely worst of sin *at our* PERIL; at the peril of what is most vital and central to Christianity. If *thus* we attempt to justify the way of God in allowing sin, we convict Him of speaking about it, and dealing with His Son on account of it, in one strain, and then dealing with it afterwards in man in quite another.

This is "healing the hurt" of the ruined race of man "lightly." We cannot believe that, had not man fallen, God would not have had ample means of showing His highest glory, more directly and more gloriously than He has even in Christ. We cannot believe that to those orders of intelligence of higher range of faculty than our own, who have never sinned, the fact of their sinlessness places them in a position of disadvantage, either as to moral perfections of their own, or as to the fulness and depth and range of their knowledge of *God*. That would be to depreciate that "holiness without which no man can see the Lord;" and the constant, unbroken possession of which must surely have secured for them such a full view and unin-

terrupted sight of His beauty and His glory, as fallen man even when redeemed, can never attain, except after long ages of humble learning in a school where *they* have long ago become proficient.

§ 309. We cannot however go into further detail on this point.

The validity of this argument, in its bearing on the quality of the *human character*, I cannot but consider as lacking in cogency, in its bearing on man's knowledge, and God's own revelation, of the *Divine*.

The argument is this; that, as sin has involved the Incarnation of *God's Son*, the human nature thus assumed by Christ has been ennobled and elevated, as it could never have been had not Christ assumed it; and that those, who repent and are redeemed, by the wondrous act of regeneration, have this new and glorious nature imparted to them; and, growing up into Christ in all things, ultimately realise a higher spiritual development, and more mature spiritual character, than they could possibly have reached had they never *sinned*. This,—and that in the very act of sin, the practical knowledge of good and evil, and not of good alone, is gained with its consequences,—is the substance of the argument of Baldwin Brown, in his sermon, "The Fall considered as a Development"—the first of his series entitled, "The Divine Treatment of Sin."

But to this argument there is this fatal and final objection. According to this, the *humanity* of the *redeemed* is *higher* in quality than *that* of *the* REDEEMER. The moral development of the *saved* is *fuller-orbed* than that of the *Saviour*. The man, whom Christ died to raise from sin and death, is placed ultimately on a pinnacle of moral perfection higher than the "Man Christ Jesus." Now this is too *absurd* an anomaly to admit for one moment. So that I find no help at all, in pointing to the actual issues, as any solution of the initial mystery of the permission of sin—that "abominable thing which God hateth."

We may admit that by the Incarnation human nature has

been ennobled and elevated in a way which could have been effected in no other way. But how can we tell whether the Incarnation would not have been effected for this higher end, if man had never sinned? It is indeed one of these pure *speculations* which it is foolish and fruitless to follow out.

§ 310. In *conclusion*, we may say this one word as to the relation of the Divine Foreknowledge and Divine Will.

It was in the exercise of His foreknowledge, fore-seeing all the issues—near, remote, and ultimate—of the creation of a being with moral freedom, that He freely chose to bring him into being, *doubtless*—may we venture such a *bold word*, in connection with a theme so absolutely mysterious, and in its issue so far transcending the limits of our poor powers?—*because He saw, that on the whole, this would bring more glory to Himself and good to the universe He had made, in the freely elected service of His own children*, than could be secured in any other way.

To this optimism we must come back at last; though, to accept it, in face of all the moral difficulties with which the question is surrounded, and the logical contradictions which are involved, needs the simple unquestioning confidence of Faith.

NOTES

Note A. On § 102, *pp.* 107 *and* 108.

A LITTLE explanation seems called for in connection with a sentence which otherwise may seem self-condemnatory or contradictory. I have written, "We are not therefore ashamed" &c.: and the "therefore" may be very naturally interpreted 'retrospectively' as equivalent to "in view of the facts just adduced." But thus read, while on the one hand it might mean that, as nearly every philosophical writer quotes authorities, and reckons their utterances as of real weight in determining disputed questions, and is not on that account reckoned any less philosophical—only a little more 'scholarly' and 'learned'—I shall only be in the fashion if I do the same, and quote the deliverance of the greatest moral teacher the world has known, and cannot for this be called to account as acting unphilosophically; on the other hand, I may seem to pronounce my own condemnation when I say that it is "manifestly in contravention of the fundamental principles of all philosophising," that "the balance of a catalogue of great names in reference to any point in question is allowed great weight in arriving at the final conclusion." I would point out, however, that, in appealing to Christ, I am not doing what I have denounced as contravening "the fundamental principles of all philosophising," for I am not giving a catalogue of great names, espousing some the one side of the question and some the other, and striking the balance of the lists, and allowing my decision to be determined by 'the greater number.' My "therefore" is *prospective*, referring to

the special character I attribute to the utterances of Christ. Not only may I quote like others; but, when quoting Christ, I quote with special satisfaction, because what I quote I may take as indisputable, and so giving me a new starting-point, a fresh foundation. I am simply quoting the deliverance of Jesus of Nazareth upon this subject, as authoritative; because it is the utterance of One whose authority on such a theme I accept as absolutely final. Now to accept some deliverances as final, to accept some authority or other as absolute and unquestionable is not only not unphilosophical, but is absolutely necessary to all philosophising. Such an authority is needed as a ποῦ στῶ; the foundation on which the structure of philosophical teaching is reared; such deliverances are needed as the premises that are not to be questioned of all subsequent arguments, and which must be accepted if we are to arrive at any further conclusions.

The only question is *what authority* may be accepted as unimpeachable, what deliverances are to be received without question.

With some the only 'authority' to which this deference is paid is consciousness; with others it is the senses; with some the only deliverances accepted without reserve are those of isolated phenomena of our conscious experience, while with others, again, only the established conclusions of science.

Satisfied myself, therefore, as to the reasonableness of my implicit confidence in Jesus Christ as an absolute and final authority on all matters moral and spiritual, I am doing nothing which is "fundamentally unphilosophical" in referring to one of His deliverances as settling to my mind the point in question; and as affording a fresh starting-point in my investigation.

I am free to confess that to many the appeal I make will not be in itself so conclusive as it is to myself, though that fact I can only sincerely deplore. In the issue, however, I do not think it need invalidate the conclusion reached, since it is shown in the subsequent investigation (§§ 105–109), that over

desires there is the power of control, real though indirect and in its operation partial and tardy; a fact which involves the position implied in the utterance of Christ, that for desire we are responsible to the extent of our power of control.

It is true I might have started with this problem, and having established the reality of our volitional control of desire, in part and indirectly, I might in this conclusion have found an answer to the question of accountability; and have referred to the dictum of Christ as confirming this conclusion. What I have written in the text, however, I have written as giving the natural history of my own thoughts upon the matter, and as actually indicating the line along which, in the midst of initial perplexity and difficulty, I was led to what I am persuaded is the true solution of the problem. Since writing what appears in the text, my attention has been drawn to the fact that the instance on which Christ thus pronounces so unhesitatingly is a specially crucial one. If the "look with a view to lustful desire" is sinful, if the lingering glance, which proves that the desire is long indulged and cherished—not at once checked and dismissed—is accounted as really sinful as the outward act which is its consummation; certainly the cherishing or allowance of any other desire *must* be so; because of no kind of desire can the plea be so readily or so plausibly urged that it is so wholly a question of physique that it is hard to lay the responsibility of the guilty longing on him who indulges it, rather than on the physical constitution which makes it so difficult of restraint in some, and which rarely gives occasion for its rise at all in others.

Note B. On § 104, pp. 108–110.

I think it well to add just a word to direct attention to the significance of a slight alteration which I have made in the wording of the text, as it was passing through the press.

I had first written (top of p. 109) "every vicious desire, allowed and not restrained, is as much sinful as the action,"

and I closed the paragraph with these words, "Desire is as sinful as the deed." In substituting "really" for "much" in the first sentence, and inserting "truly" before "sinful" in the second, I am not changing my position, I am only guarding against a construction, I find, might easily be put upon the phraseology, which I did not intend. All I believed then is what I have more exactly expressed in the altered phraseology now, that the "desire allowed" is *sinful*—as truly sinful—as much therefore a thing for which "we must give account," as the act in which the desire would be embodied.

What I do not believe—and never intended to hint—is that such desire when restrained, when, by strong volitional control, the man holds himself back from the corresponding deed, is as guilty as the act. It would be an affront the most palpable to the claims of ordinary justice, to acknowledge no moral worth in that amount of self-restraint—as in sort, a set-off against the guilt of indulgence of the sinful desire. Not that the moral merit of the one cancels the moral demerit of the other; but surely the culpability of the man who without hesitation so far surrenders himself to his carnal impulses as to proceed from desire to act—from indulgence in idea to indulgence in actual fact—must be greater than that of the man who shows at least such deference to the rights of woman, and such genuine realisation of the sad and degrading consequences of the act, as to confine the yielding to temptation to the region of his own imagination. The consequences on his own moral character are serious and injurious; they involve him in greater difficulty to resist if the temptation be presented again; and indeed make it more likely that the self-restraint effected at first will not be achieved a second time; but the consequences are confined to the limits of his own nature. A second name and reputation and character are not tarnished, polluted, ruined, as in the case when the outward act crowns the guilty longing.

Note C. On §§ 107–109, pp. 111–114.

The whole truth in connection with the Volitional control of Desire requires the indication of other methods besides that described in the text.

For the creation of a desire, when there has previously existed a positive and deep-rooted aversion, or a settled and confirmed indifference, that method alone would be sufficient; but for the simple evocation or kindling of a desire for which there is no inherent indisposition, and for the starving and silencing of a desire which has not yet struck its roots very deeply into the nature, other less cumbrous methods are adequate.

1. When the desire has never before been experienced, it may yet be created by considering the pleasure which others have found in its object. If we see that those whom we respect or admire find great delight in any special pursuit, or in some particular game, and clearly always eager for opportunities for following the one or indulging in the other; by the contagion of such example, and through the sympathy which is born of confidence and esteem, we launch out in imagination into the pursuit or the game, to realise the pleasures which we believe would follow in our own case as fully as in that of our friend. And so a desire springs up, not the fruit of our own experience, but based upon the pleasurable experience of another. It is in this way that the first kindling of desire for holiness and godliness arises. The evident gladness, tranquillity, and freedom of a godly life, prompt often the longing which is consummated in the decision, "We will go with you; for we perceive that God is with you."

2. Further, when a desire is only faint and half-hearted, with little impulsive power in it, it may often be augmented and intensified by pondering the benefits involved in its satisfaction, dwelling on them in patient attention till they glow before the mind with something of the vividness and brightness of reality; or even, in a negative way, by realising the pain of

disappointment. By either of those methods, and emphatically by both combined, a desire which has been flagging, even to the point of being in peril of dying out altogether, may be re-kindled into something like fervour.

3. On the other hand, as hinted in our treatment of desire in § 24. 2. *b.* (2), when we are haunted by a desire which we are persuaded, in our soberest moments, can never be realised, and which is therefore only the constant source of restless discontent, we may gradually starve it, reduce its strength, and so diminish the frequency of its recurrence, by withdrawing attention from its object, and by pursuing methods which will prevent its constant intrusion upon our thoughts.

Are we tempted by some *objet d'art* in a shop-window which we pass in our daily walk? The most effectual way to enfeeble the troublesome and vexing hankering after it would be "to walk some other way," and banish the object from our thoughts. A hundred other instances will readily suggest themselves to the mind.

4. And if we would get rid of such a longing altogether, the end may be gained by persisting steadfastly in this line of conduct, by keeping constant guard over our thoughts, so that the hopeless aim may be excluded as soon as it is suggested, and not only no action taken which would naturally bring it before the mind, but such a course of conduct deliberately planned, and sedulously carried into execution, as would absorb us in thoughts and plans of a distinctly different nature. Thus, by resolute persistence, we may extinguish and uproot, or at least for all practical purposes stifle and silence, any desire, even those most deeply rooted in our nature. Now all these means, the direction of thoughts and the determination of courses of action, are under volitional control; and hence the position taken up in the text is strengthened and broadened. In all these ways, therefore, in addition to the one which is there dwelt on, "*we can control our desires indirectly* by the exercise of volition."

Note D. On § 111, *p.* 117.

It will be seen that in passing from the first paragraph of this section to the second, we pass from the abstract 'Law' to the concrete 'a law.' As in what follows I have been at great pains to point out the errors involved in much of the phraseology used even by scientific men in connection with this subject, I may, perhaps justly, be accused of inconsistency, and of inaccuracy, as serious as any on which I have passed such severe stricture, in the way in which I have frequently employed the former phrase.

Undoubtedly I have used this abstract term in a half-personal fashion, and printed it with a capital letter. I have spoken, (p. 188), of "the sole action of Law," and (p. 192) of "the mechanical regularity of Law," I have said (ibid.), "the will is alien to the domain of Law," and (ibid.) that "man in willing transcends the sphere of inalternative Law." In similar fashion I have asked the question (p. 201), "Does Law in any way regulate the amount of Volitional decision in each man's nature?" and in many other passages have used language of like kind. Let me then distinctly say that when I have done so, it has been in a consciously rhetorical sense. But be it noticed that I have never used such language of 'laws' in the concrete—of any individual law, which is the exact form of the error against which I have protested most strongly.

In this form there lurks, to my mind, a very *real* danger. One has not to listen long to the disquisitions of many scientific men before one hears this 'law' and that 'law' adduced as the final explanation and the real cause of certain things happening as they do. If you ask why a solid body falls to the ground? or why the tidal wave follows so regularly the motion of the moon? the answer in all probability would be the same: 'It is by the law of gravitation each is effected.' And whether the instructor has such a misleading and a-theistic notion in his own mind or not, the pupil is very apt to gather gradually a mystic and awful reverence for this "law of gravi-

tation," as a majestic being, which, by his power (or hers—we are left in doubt as to whether it be 'god' or 'goddess') rules, or at least largely influences, the movements of all material bodies. Indeed, so deeply rooted does this idea become, that my experience with an actual interlocutor on this subject, I am convinced, might be paralleled by that of any teacher of this or kindred topics. I was met by the wondering and almost indignant protest, "But you don't mean to say, Sir, that there is no such thing as the law of gravitation?" "Is it not true," another asked, "that whether the law were formulated or not, it would still exist?" Yet to calm thought on the matter it must surely be clear that the only true answer to the one question must be an affirmative, and to the other a negative.

In each and all of the instances to which the law of gravitation applies, that which produces the effect concerned is a *force*, not a *law*. Every material body is the locus of a mysterious *force*, by which it draws to itself or 'attracts' every other in proportion (varying in a definite and ascertainable way) to its bulk and distance: and this is called gravity. So that the true answer to the question, "Why does a solid body fall to the ground?" or (as often put), "What makes a solid body fall to the ground?" would, in the first instance, be "Because it is attracted, drawn to it by the force of gravity," or, in the second, "The attractive power of gravity."

It is clearly the '*force*' that does the work; not the '*law*.' All that the law does is to tell you how, along what lines, within what limits, and under what conditions the force does its work. Put thus, the reference to a 'law of gravitation,' will probably be found an unsatisfactory, an unsatisfying answer to the question. And that is just what ought to be. The mischief of the other answer is that it seems to close the inquiry; and gives the vague impression that a final and complete explanation has been given.

Answered, however, in this simple way, in all likelihood the further question will be put, "How is it that this particular force acts in this particular way?" and to this question a

Positivist can give no answer at all. The Theist, however, can and does; and he gives an answer with which, at the end of the longest series of analyses he is forced—nay, he finds it only the truest reason—to be content; and it is simply this: it was the will of the All-wise and All-mighty Creator that it should act along these lines and preserve these limits and methods of operation.

In that infinitely wise Omnipotence there is the one and the only reason of the order of things being what it is; and it is because in the personification of 'this and that law'—to the extent even of attributing definite effects to their agency, as an explanation of phenomena involved—there is real danger of this supreme and highest truth being forgotten or ignored, that I have protested in the text, and drawn such specific notice to the significance of the propositional form to which every 'law' may be reduced.

But in the very *abstractness* of the term 'Law,'—though printed with a capital—I hoped, there would be a safeguard. I could scarcely suppose that any one would be inclined to think of this *abstraction* 'Law' in the definite and misleading way in which I see it is only too easy to think of any specific law; and so the great convenience of the term in its generality and comprehensiveness persuaded me to use it. It is only when dealing with the question in its most general aspects that I have used it at all; and I think the illusion would at once disappear were the general to be brought down to the test of any specific instance. In that case, my earnest cautions as to the sole significance and range of any individual law, as the formulation of an order of sequence, would at once suggest themselves, and stop any possible mischief.

But when I remember that even those most prosaic of all philosophers, the Positivists, with their general scorn of 'abstractions,' have made so much of a pure abstraction 'Humanity,' as to have made it—the *race* as the whole—(not this man or that man, nor even all the men actually living at any particular moment, but 'mankind in general') the object

of their religious worship, the centre and focus of their religion, the danger may not be so purely imaginary as I was inclined to believe, and it may be wiser in some definite way to guard against it. In most cases, however, it would involve a very cumbrous periphrasis to express my meaning without the use of the word; and it may therefore be well distinctly to state what I mean when I use it; premising that in no case do I wish to hint for a moment that there is any entity possessing power or authority corresponding to it.

(*a*) In many cases it is clearly a compendious way of referring to any, every, or all of the forces, the mode of the action of which is, or can be, formulated in a '*law*;' so that often the same meaning might be expressed by the more complex phrase (itself, perhaps, not absolutely unexceptionable) 'law-regulated force.'

Thus the position that "the formation of character is purely and completely the result of the operation of inalternative Law," referred to in § 205, p. 223, would be more accurately expressed, "the formation of character is purely and completely the result of the operation of law-regulated forces."

(*b*) In some cases, however, this would scarcely do. When the question is put, "Does Law regulate the amount of volitional control?" palpably the plain prose intended by this rhetoric is, "Can the conditions under which the amount of volitional control varies in different persons, or in the same person at different times, be formulated in any law?" or, further, "Does this varying amount of volitional control depend upon the action of forces, all perfectly inalternative in the mode of their operation, the methods of whose action may be accurately formulated in definite laws?"

(*c*) And further, when the abstract term forms part of a complex phrase, such as, "the reign of Law," "the sphere of Law," "the domain of Law," it must be explained again in a slightly different sense. Not that the meaning is at all more 'recondite.' The meaning clearly is, "The region in which all effects are produced by the mutual interaction of forces, the

mode and conditions of whose action may be formulated in laws." So that when we say, "the reign of Law" is not absolute, we mean that there are some effects for the production of which some force or forces must be in operation, the mode of whose action cannot be formulated in any inalternative Law, in addition, it may be, to those the mode of whose action may thus be formulated; and if the "sphere or domain of Law" is said to be transcended, what is meant is, that the operation of some power other than, outside the circle of, law-regulated forces must be supposed and recognised.

These three uses of the term include, I think, all the ways in which, for convenience' sake, I have employed it; and this explanation may, perhaps, prevent any possible misconstruction.

Note E to §§ 111, 112, *pp.* 117, 118. *Command and Law.*

In the explanations and illustrations given in §§ 111, 112, two terms have been used synonymously, because closely allied, which yet in important particulars are distinct and distinguishable. I have spoken of 'a law' as "always expressed in a *sentence* either *imperative* or *categorical;*" and, by the illustrations adduced, have appeared to imply that any *sentence imperative* is a 'law.' This is, however, scarcely correct. It would be nearer the truth, indeed, to say that a 'sentence imperative' is the usual mode of expressing a 'command'; and that, while between a 'Command' and a 'Law' there is much of a fundamental character that is in common, there is real difference, and a difference which in connection with this discussion should certainly be borne in mind. Both 'Command' and 'Law' are the expression of 'Will' in a Personal Authority; and so they are radically akin. And this appears on the surface of the illustrations used. In both cases the '*sentence categorical*,' into which the 'sentence imperative' may be turned, expresses this fact in its very form. Both begin with the clause, "My will is."

But while none would question that the first illustration—

the sixth commandment of the Mosaic 'Law'—is *a Law* as well as a Command; I confess that I think it would be a fair objection to say that the second, 'a Creative Fiat,' would be more correctly described as a 'Command' than as a 'Law.' Both, then, are 'commands;' only one of them, strictly speaking, is a 'Law.' In other words, 'Command' is the 'genus' of which 'Law' is only a species. All '*laws*' are '*commands*' (and that will be found to be true, in their final analysis, even of those which are so often spoken of as involving no 'personal' element whatever; I mean 'the laws of Nature,' as they are called); but all 'commands' are not 'laws.'

Both are the expression of *volitional decision*. Though, again, it must be noticed it is not every volitional decision which, when expressed in words, becomes a 'command.' When the decision affects only the person who makes it, if immediately carried out, it becomes only an expressed determination; as when, in reply to a request, you express your consent—"Yes, I will do it at once;" and if delayed, a 'resolve,' as in any fixed purpose, *e.g.*, "I have made up my mind to go to Scotland next month." Neither of these is either 'command' or 'law.'

It is a 'command' only when such decision is intended to affect what is external to the nature of him who makes it. But in every such instance, where the aim of the expressed volition is to influence the occurrence of phenomena in the material world, or the action of some other person, there is a 'command.' So that 'a command' might be defined, the expression in words of a volition, the object of which is to affect the course of external phenomena, whether in the actions of some other person, or in the domain of 'Nature' in its more restricted sense.

This exposition, it will be seen, will apply most strictly to both of the illustrations cited. In both we have the expression of God's will, the object of the first being to restrain the actions of every member of mankind, in reference to the taking of human life; and in the second, to bring into being a

phenomenon which as yet had not gladdened the dark unformed universe.

The question still remains, however, What is the difference between the 'Command' merely, and the 'Law' proper? What is characteristic of the second which is not characteristic of the first?

I think the true key to the distinction is that the second has reference to 'an order' of things, the first to an isolated action or phenomenon. In every application of the term 'Law,' in the proper sense of the term, we find involved the idea of 'order' (Jardine, p. 118, bottom. Duke of Argyll's definition, p. 119); 'uniformity' (Jevons's definition, p. 119); 'regular sequence' or 'regularity' (definition of Law of Nature in § 119, p. 125). Indeed, I have used these words with just a touch of the rhetorical impersonation I so frequently observe in their use by others (p. 126): "The aim of Law as such is ever to regulate—to produce regularity, uniformity, harmony, subordination." When the volition which is expressed in words has as its object the production of an isolated phenomenon, or a single action, it is only a 'command;' when, however, it is to determine a 'regular sequence of phenomena," or a permanent line of conduct, it is a 'law.'

This is why the first illustration used is strictly accurate, and the second is not. The object of God in the Sixth Commandment was to establish an *order* of conduct. So that were the command obeyed universally, it might be formulated as a law of human action, 'asserting the fact of this regular sequence,' 'human beings never kill one another.'

But in the fiat of the first day of creation His aim was a single event—the 'bringing into being' of light, and that once for all. To be a case strictly in point, the edict promulgated should have had reference to the *method* of the production and propagation of light, to the manner of its manifestation, the conditions of its appearance and maintenance, the order of the occurrence of its phenomena. Had the sacred

historian been permitted thus to enter into the council-chamber of the universe, and record the words of the Divine mandate which settled all this as the order of the occurrence of the phenomena of light for ever; if the undulatory theory of the present day be an accurate guess of what that order is, he would have written somewhat thus: "And God said, Let light henceforth appear on the vibration of the ether within fixed limits of rapidity; and let it be propagated in right lines by the undulations thus produced at the rate of one hundred and ninety-two thousand miles a second;" and this would not have been a command simply, but a *law* proper, because the expression of a volition determining an *order* of things.

I have retained the use of the word 'command' here, though conscious that it involves a slight extension of its meaning from that which is most natural and accurate. Doubtless its most proper application is to intelligent and morally responsible agents, though it is surely legitimate to speak, as does the Sacred Record in the first chapter of Genesis, of *commands* addressed to the inanimate universe. Such a representation has at least this prime advantage—which was doubtless the reason of its being adopted—that it directs attention to the Personal Being to whose volitional determination the existence and the order of all creation alike are due.

Note F. On § 162, *p.* 181.

One important fact, evidently involved in the position already expounded in reference to Law (pp. 117–136), should have been mentioned at this point to give this section completeness.

However paradoxical the statement may appear, the paradox is of course strictly true, that while "the *voluntary* varies *inversely* with the *absoluteness* of the *reign* of *law*;" in other words, while Will and Law are essentially opposed; it is equally true that Will and Law are essentially *akin*: so closely united, that without *Will* Law would not exist. Though, on

the one hand, it is true, as shown in the text, that Law absolute and universal involves the elimination and extinction of Will; on the other hand, it is as true that the very existence of Law is bound up in the existence of Will.

Nor is the explanation of the paradox far to seek. While we think we have now established clearly the position that absoluteness in the reign of Law would make volition impossible; in other words, that there would be no room for the 'power of choice' in a universe in which all the forces, without exception, were absolutely inalternative in their action; it is as clearly involved in our exposition of *Law*, that in its very nature it involves a supreme *Will*, since a law presupposes a Lawgiver; and indeed is but the expression of that Lawgiver's will (§ 115, p. 122). So that the relation of Volition to Law, fully considered, is twofold—as it concerns, on the one hand, the will of God, and on the other, the will of man.

In the first case *Law*—and by that, of course, I mean any and every law which may be formulated as to the regular sequence of the phenomena of Nature—is only the expression in words of the way in which it is God's will that its forces shall operate; and in the second, it cannot be appealed to as formulating or determining the mode of the operation of the will of man; and for this momentous reason, that in virtue of his moral nature man has been so constituted by God, that it is in his power to work along the lines of God's will, or along lines of his own, as he may choose. The will of God does not force the will of man.

ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

SUBJECTS.

ACQUISITIVE FACULTY, relation to Desire, 29; to Volition, 64—74.
Adaptation, Power of, 112, 113.
Æsthetic Desires, 28.
Alternativity of Volitional action, 189, 190.
American Division of Mental Phenomena, 2, 235.
Animal Kingdom, Individuality in, 144, 145.
Association, Laws of, 78, 79.
Attention, 68; relation to Volition, 69—72.
Automatic Action, 12, 13; no sense of exhaustion with, 198, 199; no sense of responsibility, 172; muscular apparatus of, 62.
Aversions, 20—22.

BIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS, 89—91.

CAUSE AND CAUSATION, J. S. Mill on, 131, 132, 191, 247, 281; Volitional, 190—92, 279—85; and Miracle. 305.
Character, determined by Desire, 17—19; relation to Volition, 214—32; formation of, 222—32.
Christ, responsibility in Desire, 107—9; sinlessness of, 334.
Circumstances, Influence upon Character, 222—32.
Cognition, Relation to Desire, 9; to Volition, 57—87; an active power, 59.
Consciousness, 274, 275; ontological significance of, 4.
Conservative Faculty, relation to Volition, 75—77.
Control, power of, 39, 308, 309.

DESIRE AND DESIRES, neglected or wrongly classed, 1; nature of, 3, 98—99; compared with Feeling and Volition, 6—9; relation to Cognition, 9; to Feeling, 10—12, 34; to Feeling and Volition, 12—17; root of, 17; influence of character, 17—19; classification, 19—31; subjective, 20—22; objective, 22—31; mutual relation, 31—34; fate of, 32—34; relation to Volition, 34—37, 97—14; responsibility for, 105—10.
Determinists, view of motive, 216, 217.
Dreams, 42; responsibility in, 174.
Drunkards, nervous system of, 199—201.

EGO, in Volition, 39, 179—81, 186, 187, 239, 240, 253, 262, 263, 275, 278, 279; relation to motive, 211—14; unity of, 236, 237.
Elaborative Faculty, relation to Volition, 82—85.
Emotion, relation to Volition, 91—93, 95—97.
Ethical Desires, 30.
Ethical Law, 126.
Evolution and Will, 212.

FEELING, how differing from Desire and Volition, 6—9; relation to Desire, 11, 34; Imagination, a source of, 17; a passive power, 59, 87; relation to Volition, 87—97; in loneliness, 150—54.
Force, spiritual, 38; amount limited, 43, 44, 69; tends to latency, 51.
Foreknowledge, Divine, and Freedom, 311—35.
Freedom, in Motive, 209; and Necessity of Will, 240—46.
Freedomists, regard the Noumenal, 243.

GOD, as Law-Giver, 122; often ignored as Ruler, 129—31; in Miracle, 292, 302, 304, 306—8; Foreknowledge of, 311—16, 335.

HEARING, 28.
History, God in, 318—319.

Human Action, Science of, 134, 135; calculability of, 187, 188, 315.
Hunger and Thirst, 24—26.

IDEALISM, 269.
Imagination, a source of Feeling, 17, 20. [See Representative Faculty.]
Impulse, 18.
Individuality, nature of, 136—58; objective, 139—47; subjective, 147—58; relation to Law, 158—68; to Volition, 168—81.
Inertia, 50.
Instinct, 186.
Intellectual Desires, 29.

KNOWLEDGE, Desire for, 29.

LASCAR SAILOR, case of, 170, 178.
Law, Its nature and province 117—35; relation to Individuality, 158—68; to Volition, 181—202, 256, 257; to Miracle, 291, 293—95, 303—5; to Freedom, illustrated by chess and whist, 329—32.
Life, Laws of, definition, 129; phenomenal effects of, 142, 143.
Loneliness, 148, 150.

MACHINE, nature of, 185.
Madness, responsibility in, 176—77.
Man, individuality of, 145—47.
Marvels, not synonymous with Miracles, 296—400.
Materialism, 268—69.
Memory. [See Conservative and Reproductive faculties.]
Mental Phenomena, natural order of, 10; Laws of, 184.
Menti-Physical Desires, 28.
Mind, Essence of, 44; a potentiality, 45.
Mineral Kingdom, Individuality in, 140—42; 160, 161.
Miracle, opponents of, 287, 288; scriptural terms for 288—91; relation to Law, 291—95, 305—7; to Volition, 295, 308—10; Positivistic objections, 293—94; Theistic, 300—7.
Moral Development, 127—29.
Moral Nature and Freedom, 321—25.
Motive, relation to Volition, 202—14; definition of, 203—6; not causal, 205—12, 215—17.
Muscular Movement, relation to Volition, 60—63.

NATURE, Laws of, 118—20, 125, 131, 284.
Necessitarian, regards the phenomenal, 245—51.
Nerve Force, and Volition, 197—1.
Neuralgia, 26.
Neurosis and Psychosis, 283, 284.

ONTOGNOSTICS, as to Volition, 243, 244, 267, 268.
Ontological significance of phenomena of Volition, 266—86.
Ontology, 243, 267; of Man, 268—74.
Order, and Miracle, 303, 304.

PERCEPTION, relation to Volition, 65—72.
Permission and Pre-ordination, difference between, 325—27.
Personal Pronouns, 275—77.
Physical Desires, 23—27.
Physical Energy, relation to Volition, 193—202.
Physical Life, 40; control over spiritual, 41, 42.
Physical Theory of Desires, refuted, 107, 109.
Physico-Mental Processes, Dreams, etc., 173—77; semi-automatic actions, 177; compulsory actions, 177—179.
Pleasure and Pain, relation to Desire, 12.
Positivism, 269, 270; and Miracles, 293—94.
Power, 58; Causal 280—82.
Providence and Freewill, 316, 318—20.

REGULATIVE FACULTY, 85—87.
Religious Desires, 31.
Reminiscence, 79—81.

Representative Faculty, relation to Volition, 81, 82.
Reproductive Faculty, relation to Volition, 77.
Responsibility, Sense of, relation to Individuality, 154—58; to Volition, 169—73, 188, 189.
Rest, 46.
Resurrection, rejected by Positivists, 294.

SCRIPTURE TERMS for miracles, 289—91.
Self-consciousness, 72—73; relation to Volition, 74.
Self-determination of Will, 261—66.
Semi-Materialism, 270—74.
Sensations, relation to Volition, 88—91, 94.
Sensory Organs, relation to Volition, 65—68.
Sensual Desire, 27.
Sermon on the Mount, 108.
Sight, 28.
Sin, sense of, 157, 158; not a necessity, 332—35.
Somnambulism, responsibility in, 174—76.
Sovereignty, Divine, and Freewill, 317, 319, 320, 331, 332; Human, 328, 329.

TASTES, accounting for them, 100—5; accountable for, 105—10; education of, 113—14.
Theism, and Miracles, 300—17.
Truth, Desire for, 29.

UNIVERSE, relation to Law, 123—25.

VEGETABLE KINGDOM, Individuality in, 143, 144.
Volition, relation to Desire, 6—9, 12—17, 34—37, 97—14; essential functions of, 38—57; evocative, 40—45; Directive, 45—49; Sustentative, 49—55; Intensifying, 55—57; relation to Cognition, 57—87; an active power, 58, 59; relation to Perception, 65—72; to Self-consciousness, 74; to Conservative Faculty, 75—77; to Reproductive Faculty, 77—81; to Representative Faculty, 81, 82; to Elaborative Faculty, 82—85; Regulative Faculty, 85—87; to Feeling, 87—97; to Desire, 97—14; to Law, 115—17, 181—202, 256, 257; to Individuality, 166—81; to Physical energy, 193—202; to Motive, 202—14; to Character, 214—32; ontological significance of phenomena, 266—86; relation to Miracle, 287—311.
Volitional Energy is continuous, 51—55.

WILL, THE, Definition of, 233—40; Freedom and Necessity of, 240—60; Self-Determination of 261—66.
Wish, distinct from Will, 35.

AUTHORS.

Argyll, Duke of, definition of Law, 119.
Bain, Dr. A., on Feeling and Desire, 2, 14, 34; Volition and Feeling, 13—16; definition of Desire, 14; fate of Desires, 33; Muscular Movement and Will, 60, 61; Laws of Association, 78; control of Feeling, 95, 96, 97; Sense of Responsibility, 154; ignores Subjective Individuality, 163—66; on Liberty of Will, 241, 254; Ontology of Man, 272, 273.
Beckett, Sir E., on Origin of Law, 129.
Bledsoe, on Laws of Thought, 184; use of term, 'part of soul,' 234.
Brown, Baldwin, on Sin, 334.

Brown, Dr. J., mind attends to one object, 51, 52.
Carpenter, Dr. W. B., on Hunger, 25; Volitional Force, 38; retention of Impressions, 76; Biological experiments, 91; distinguishes between Mental and Physical, 183; Physical Energy and Volition, 199.
Clifford, Paul, ontology of Man, 271—273.
Cousin, on Personality, 179.
Cox, S., Illustration of Chess-player, 329, 330.
Descartes, on Essence of Mental Existence, 44.
Edwards, Jonathan, on Volition and Desire, 2; Man not a Machine, 184, 185; "Indifference Argument," 207, note; meaning of phrase, 'The Will,' 234; definition of Will, 239; Self-Determination of Will, 261.
Fichte, J. H., on Natural Laws, 125, note.
Fowle, Rev. J., Evolution, Will, and Self, 212, 213.
Goethe, Illustration of Whist-player, 330.
Grote, Phenomenalism, 138; Life a phenomenal unifying principle, 142.
Hamilton, Sir W., on Will and Desire, 2, 4, 5; essence of mental existence, 44; mind attending to more objects than one, 51, 52; Power, 58 and note; Classification of Cognitive Faculties followed, 64—86; Conservative Faculty, 75; Laws of Association, 78; Regulative Faculty, 85, 86; mental faculties, 234; Cause, 281.
Hobbes, on Freedom, 240, 241, 258; Foreknowledge and Necessity, 311, note.
Hooker, on Law, 123.
Hume, sceptical position, as to reality of Ego, 275, note.
Jardine, on Laws of Nature, 118, 119.
Jevons, definition of Law, 119.
Jouffroi, on essence of mental existence, 44.
Kant, on essence of mental existence, 44; Freedom, 260.
Kinnear, Boyd, on Volitional control, 308.
Leibnitz, on essence of mental existence, 44.
Locke, on Will and Desire, 5; mind not always thinking, 44, 45; Liberty of Will, 241.
M'Cosh, Dr. J., on Causation and Volition, 249.
Mill, J. S., on Law of Wages, 120; Laws of Nature and Causation, 131, 132; actual "state of things," 161; ignores Subjective Individuality, 164, 165; Cause, 131, 132, 191, 247, 281; formation of character, 225.
Mivart, St. George, on Personality, 275, 276.
Morell, Dr. J. D., on Personality, 179, 180; The Will, 237.
Moxon, Dr., on Drunkards, 200.
Picton, J. A., on Power, 58 note.
Reid, attack on Hume's sceptical position, 275, note.
Shakspeare, Somnambulism of Lady Macbeth, 174—76.
Solly, Thos., Objectivity and Law, 161, 162, 183; Foreknowledge, 315.
Spencer, Herbert, Laws of Human Action, 134 note, 165.
Stewart, Dugald, on mind attending to more objects than one, 51, 52, note.
Stewart and Tait, on Miracles, 288, 296, 302.
Webster, definition of motive, 205, 206.
Whedon, Dr., classification of mental operations, 2; Desire and Volition, 5, 8; distinction between Volitional and Voluntary, 170, note; Causes, 189, 190; definition of Will, 238.

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
263-4
52-3
56
68-9
112
156
184-7